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Executive Summary 
Chapter 1 introduces the reasoning underpinning the study. What are the main drivers and the 
overall objective for undertaking this intellectual endeavour? It also sets the main questions 
to be answered and a hypothesis to be verified. 
Chapter 2 sets the scene where the study evolves. What is the role of research and what is the 
mission of different types of research organisations in today’s environment? The chapter 
discusses also the definitions of related terms such as Research and Development as these are 
entrenched in texts with universal applicability. 
Chapter 3 illuminates the role of knowledge from a proliferation point of view.  What are the 
obligations stemming from legally binding treaties for industry and academia? The chapter 
also offers a comparative analysis of the multilateral export control regimes including main 
principles, control lists and terminology used.  The concluding section attempts to explain the 
dual-use problem by providing a definition of dual-use research.  
Chapter 4 explains the main policies applying for EU funded research by focusing on the 
dissemination and use of research results for practical and commercial purposes. The chapter 
offers an analysis of the EU legal framework governing technology transfers of dual-use 
items. Following that, the main scenarios where trade controls come into play in a research 
context are discussed. Finally, the chapter offers an analysis of a case study exemplifying the 
interpretation and implementation of provisions and terms discussed all over the study. The 
H5N1 case study brings to the fore the differences between the EU and US in the oversight of 
dual-use research. 
Chapter 5 presents an assessment of the US trade controls towards academia. How do the US 
authorities interpret the fundamental research exemption? What is a ‘deemed export’ and how 
does it affect academic research? How the term ‘publicly available information’ should be 
understood? 
Chapter 6 sheds light on the role of internal controls in complying with the law and their 
nature as discretionary measures. The chapter provides a summary of the main principles and 
key elements of an Internal Compliance Programme (ICP). Then, it highlights the main steps 
required for designing and implementing ICPs. 
Chapter 7 examines the export compliance practices followed by firms, universities and 
public research organisations. In doing so, it identifies challenges encountered and 
compliance mechanisms used in different research environments. 
Chapter 8 sets forward a method for identifying export controls risks in the initial phase of 
development of an internal compliance structure. The risk identification method builds on 
international standards and previous experience for tackling export control concerns in a 
research setting. To that effect, an international public research organisation, the European 
Commission Joint Research Centre is used as a test case.  
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Finally, chapter 9 compiles the main findings of the study responding also to the main 
questions set forth in the introductory chapter.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Preliminary remarks 
At a time when the diffusion of knowledge into society and the utilisation of science by 
industry is as high as ever some types of research may undergo restrictions on the basis of 
ethical principles and security imperatives. The role of this doctoral study is to clarify the 
legal obligations affecting research activities and explore the level of awareness of 
proliferation risks within the scientific community. National law provisions and especially 
international law would normally reflect and codify long-lasting ethical principles and 
patterns that guarantee the smooth functioning of societies. The study by no means intends to 
stigmatise specific areas of research and direct a purely ethical discussion on what should be 
considered as moral or not when conducting research. Instead, its main purpose is to identify 
the implications of export controls of dual-use items and technologies for legitimate research 
and equip researchers and research organisations with a strategy to cope with the challenges 
posed by the combat against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).   
A second clarification concerns the motives of this study. While the role of technology and 
subsequently, of knowledge is generally acknowledged in the literature dealing with the 
‘proliferation-problematic’ it seems that there is a lack of impetus to study and tackle some 
intricate issues stemming from the application of export controls in the transfers of dual-use 
technologies and know-how
1
.   
From a scientific point of view and focusing on nuclear proliferation, there are scholars and 
theories explaining why States aspire to acquire nuclear weapons and how recognised and 
latent nuclear powers have managed to develop nuclear weapon capabilities
2
. Furthermore, 
there are scholarships examining how nuclear assistance shared for peaceful purposes can be 
diverted to military purposes
3
 while other studies and reports shed light on how proliferation 
takes place by identifying the main patterns of illicit trade in nuclear materials and 
equipment
4
. Lastly, there are studies and handbooks presenting the export controls 
fundamentals and providing to potential exporters guidance and ‘best practices’ for 
complying with arms and dual-use export controls rules
5
. However, there are no extensive 
studies examining the implications of export controls for the academia and the whole 
research community. This might be true for diverse reasons such as the highly technical 
nature of the export controls field, the controversial character of issues touching upon 
restrictions in the diffusion of information and the containment of sensitive research as well 
as the partly right perception that research is or should be excluded from the scope of export 
controls.  
Despite the lack of interest in the relationship between export controls and research in the 
literature, the question whether research activities can contribute to nuclear, biological and 
                                                          
1
 Meier, 2014; Fuhrmann, 2012; Kroenig, 2009; Reed, 2009. 
2
 Sagan & Waltz, 2012; Singh & Way, 2004; Davis & Frankel, 1993; Rhodes, 1988. 
3
 Stulberg & Fuhrmann, 2013; Fuhrmann, 2012. 
4
 Albright, Stricker, & Wood, 2013; Albright, 2010. 
5
 Rosanelli, 2014; Michel et al., 2013; Joyner, 2006. 
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chemical proliferation and how deliberate misuse of research for criminal and terrorist 
purposes can be averted is a hotly-debated issue lately.  Especially as regards the possible 
misuse of emerging technologies relating to biology and chemistry there is a rather vast body 
of literature on the so-called ‘dual-use dilemma’6. Most of these studies see the topic from an 
ethics perspective or, highlight physical security and safety parameters whereas examine the 
role of export controls to only a limited extent. Apart from the ethical dimension, ‘trading’ in 
sensitive materials may bring economic and criminal sanctions to those disregarding export 
control rules either purposefully or by ignorance regardless of whether they are States, 
entrepreneurs or scientists. The debate taking place in the US and most interestingly, the legal 
dispute over the claim of the Dutch licensing authority to ask an export authorisation for the 
publication in a well-known journal of a research study -exploring the transmissibility of 
H5N1 virus between mammals- has recently caught public attention and brought to the fore 
the problematic lying in the interferences between export controls and research in the most 
unequivocal manner.  
From a political point of view, it is increasingly acknowledged that an effective non-
proliferation strategy should target not only State-sponsored proliferation but also illicit 
networks, terrorist groups and individuals willing to carry the cost of proliferating or 
acquiring WMD capabilities. This broader scope of today’s non-proliferation concept is 
captured adequately by the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 
which obliges all UN member States to refrain from providing any form of support -including 
financial assistance- to non-State actors that attempt to develop, and acquire WMD and their 
means of delivery
7
.  The resolution commits UN members to adopt and enforce effective and 
appropriate laws, national export and trans-shipment controls and physical protection 
measures securing thereby the production, use, storage, transport, export and transit of such 
items.  
At the EU level, the proliferation of WMD and delivery systems was identified as ‘potentially 
the greatest threat to European security in the landmark document inaugurating the ‘European 
Security Strategy’ and titled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’8. The EU’s commitment to 
strong national and internationally coordinated export controls and the need to enahance them 
in view of rising threats such as the ‘new terrorism’ and challenges such as a diversified 
economic and technological environment is omnipresent in all relevant policy documents. 
Moreover, export controls are considered as a suitable tool for curbing the diffusion of 
                                                          
6
 See indicatively: Rath, Ischi, & Perkins, 2014; Tucker, 2012; Miller & Selgelid, 2007. 
7
 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological 
Weapons, S/RES/1540, 2004. 
8
 The document was adopted by the European Council on 13 December 2003 and drafted under the 
responsibility of the EU High Representative Javier Solana. It provides the conceptual framework for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including what would later become the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and, singles out five key threats:  
 terrorism 
 proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
 regional conflicts 
 State failure 
 organised crime 
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sensitive technology and know-how by both tangible and intangible means. In fact, the 
inclusion of intangible transfers of technology (ITT) within the scope of the European export 
controls dates back to 2000 and the discussion on their effectiveness is a recurrent topic on 
the agenda for more than a decade.  
Furthermore, it is increasingly realised that the non-proliferation efforts should address and 
actively engage two sets of ‘key stakeholders’ as called by Husbands in the ‘Technology 
Transfers and Non-proliferation’, the industry and the international scientific community9. 
The role of these stakeholders and their ever increasing responsibilities vis-à-vis export 
controls in the context of modern globalisation is implied in the literature and European 
policy texts alike. For instance, the introduction of awareness raising models for 
undertakings, scientific and academic circles as well as financial institutions was mentioned 
already in 2008 among the priorities set by the ‘New Lines for Action in Combating the 
Proliferation of WMD and their Delivery Systems’ (NLA), the EU’s action plan for 
implementing the ‘EU’s Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD’10. Likewise, the 
strengthening of cooperation in terms of consular and scientific vigilance and the 
development of professional codes of conduct for scientists are further initiatives foreseen in 
the NLA of 2008 and the more recent ‘Council’s Conclusions on Ensuring the Continued 
Pursuit of an Effective EU Policy on the New Challenges Presented by the Proliferation of 
WMD and their Delivery Systems’11. Despite the forceful language, the EU institutions and 
the EU Member States have not yet succeeded in implementing all the prescribed measures, 
let alone the ongoing debate on the effective implementation of technology transfers controls. 
Apart from a list of ‘sensitive disciplines’ agreed upon by the competent Council committees 
back in 2009 and a report including ideas and best practices for strengthening consular 
vigilance, the progress is limited to the implementation of awareness raising seminars and the 
adoption of codes of professional conduct by only some MS enforcing such measures in their 
respective national jurisdictions.    
  
                                                          
9
 Oliver Meier, Technology Transfers and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Between Control and Cooperation, Oxon: Routledge, 2014. 
10
 The EU Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD adopted by the Council in 2003 declares the 
resolve of the Union to use all instruments and policies at its disposal, to prevent, deter, halt and, 
where possible, eliminate programmes for the proliferation of WMD and missiles and, sets out an 
action plan towards this target. The document can be consulted in: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015708%202003%20INIT 
11
 The Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 21 October 2013 identified the main areas where action 
should be taken or stepped up by the EU institutions and the Member States with the view to 
responding to the new dimensions of the proliferation threat. The main points included the following:  
 effectively protecting the access to proliferation-sensitive knowledge and know-how in the 
EU, and ensuring their peaceful use   
 reacting to rapid developments in science, technology and communication which provide 
proliferators with easier access to the knowledge and know-how required for the design of 
weapons of mass destruction by proactively adapting EU instruments for combating 
proliferation  
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With regards to the implementation of export controls, the European Commission has 
launched the process for the review of the regulation 428/2009 -henceforth the Regulation or 
the dual-use regulation- establishing the EU trade control system and regulating inter alia 
ITT
12
. The Commission with its Communication to the Council and the European Parliament 
has identified a number of possible policy options and steps forward for the modernization 
and of the EU export controls system.  The application of export controls to the ITT and the 
‘research of dual-use concern’ are among the areas that could potentially require reforming or 
further actions to be taken: “The Commission could examine options to promote a specific 
strategy to ensure ‘immaterial control’ and address the challenges posed by ITT, including 
the need to clarify the control of ‘dual-use research’, while avoiding undue obstacles to the 
free flow of knowledge and the global competitiveness of EU science and technology”13. In 
fact, this could be a first class opportunity to address identified malfunctions and establish a 
modern export control system compatible with the constantly changing external environment. 
Having said this, this doctoral study seeks also to contribute to this policy-oriented discussion 
on how EU initiatives could better address challenges inherent to the control of dual-use 
research and ITT. 
To conclude, both my supervisors Pr. Dr. Q. Michel and Dr. F. Sevini, as well as I are 
convinced about the drivers thrusting this doctorate. The limited literature examining the 
potential implications of technology controls for research activities and, the urgency to tackle 
legal and policy questions along with pragmatic problems stemming from the application of 
export controls to the transfers of ‘proliferation sensitive knowledge’ provide the main 
impetus for this intellectual endeavour.  
  
                                                          
12
 EU, Council Regulation No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, 
transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items, Official Journal of the EU (L134), Brussels, 2009. 
The consolidated version as amended of 12/06/2014 can be found in:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02009R0428-
20140702&qid=1461583498859&from=pl. 
13
 EU Commission, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament: The Review of 
Export Control Policy: Ensuring Security and Competitiveness in a Changing World (COM(2014) 
244 final), 2014, 7.  
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1.2 Main questions and methodology 
‘Export controls’ or, as increasingly referred to ‘strategic trade controls’ are considered to be 
as one of the lynchpins of the international non-proliferation enforcement strategy along with 
the international safeguards and physical protection frameworks
14
. In the arms control, 
disarmament and non-proliferation context, strategic trade controls could be defined as “a 
State’s regulation and activities to control international trade that represent direct or indirect 
threats to its national strategic security”15. Export controls function as a trade measure serving 
security imperatives (economic vs. security interests) and ‘dual-use goods’ are defined as 
primarily civil items which may also have military applications (military vs. civil 
application).  From the preamble, it is clear that export controls of dual-use items are in the 
centre of ostensibly or actually contrasting principles and notions that necessitate the 
attainment of fine balances. If one attempts to draw simple ‘competing pairs’ relating to 
export controls, he or she will most probably come up with the following table: 
Table I: ‘Competing pairs’ in strategic trade controls  
Strategic Trade Controls: Competing Pairs 
‘high politics’   
 
 
versus 
‘low politics’ 
security interests  economic interests 
trade restrictions   trade liberalisation 
Common Foreign & Security Policy Common Commercial Policy 
military nature  civil nature 
technology controls  diffusion of knowledge 
restricted research  academic freedom, openness and 
communality 
 
                                                          
14
 Some scholars prefer to use the term ‘trade’ rather than ‘export’ as the former appears to capture 
better the broad scope of activities, items and actors concerned by trade controls. Indeed, if one looks 
at the dictionary definitions export seems to have a more restrictive understanding  –to carry or send a 
commodity abroad- whereas trade is defined as ‘the activity or process of buying, selling, or 
exchanging goods or services’. It is characteristic that the sole peer-reviewed Journal dedicated 
specifically to export controls is named ‘Strategic Trade Review’.  However, formal texts and 
guidance usually prefer to use the long-standing term of export controls. Therefore, the study uses 
both terms interchangeably without implying any difference. Definitions drawn from Merriam-
Webster online dictionary, available in: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/export and, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trade. 
15
 Renaud Chatelus, “The Role of Customs in Strategic Trade Controls: Challenges and Potential, 
Taking a States’ Enforcement Perspective,” Center for International Trade and Security (University of 
Georgia), 2012, 6, retrieved from: http://cits.uga.edu/uploads/documents/chatelus_customs.pdf. 
15 
 
Some of the foregoing dipoles are not necessarily contrasting or ideally should act in 
complementarity. Generally speaking, foreign policy decisions are not taken in isolation from 
economic and trade interests and vice-versa. The discussion on the broader role of foreign 
policy and the impact of economic interests in shaping foreign policy decisions, is not new 
and relates to a more fundamental debate concerning the  prevalence or not of what is 
traditionally considered as ‘high politics’ (e.g. foreign policy-security aspect) on ‘low 
politics’(e.g. economic policy-trade aspect)16. From a non-proliferation standpoint, 
“economic and security interests among and within parties to non-proliferation agreements 
often clash. Reviews of the non-proliferation treaties and reforms on export control 
arrangements can damage international security should they be driven mainly by profit 
interests.”17  
Export controls of dual-use items represent an intriguing case where trade imperatives and 
economic interests should be balanced against security and foreign policy considerations. 
However, export controls are not the only measure reflecting both economic and security 
objectives; trade agreements and sanctions are relevant examples not least due to the fact that 
the latter are largely enforced through export controls. What makes dual-use export controls 
particularly interesting is the nature of the controlled items as primarily civil products, 
without necessarily direct military applications, originating from any industry sector. Dealing 
with this special case in the EU context poses further challenges due to the complex 
institutional setting and the different decision-making modes applying to the policy areas 
involved.  International security and non-proliferation concerns traditionally fall in the realm 
of Common Foreign and Security Policy whereas dual-use trade controls are governed by the 
Common Commercial Policy
18
.  
This study draws on another less anticipated ‘competing pair’ namely, the imperative to curb 
the diffusion of proliferation sensitive knowledge and technology without disturbing unduly 
the conduct of research. Striking a balance between academic principles underpinning the 
free diffusion of information and non-proliferation imperatives calling for the safeguard of 
sensitive knowledge and technology from misuse seems to be an extremely difficult task.  In 
today’s world, knowledge and technology that is to say the application of knowledge to the 
practical needs of societies, is at the heart of both academic and entrepreneurial activities. 
Apart from the control of raw materials and substances which are available in nature, non-
proliferation efforts may concern technology in all its aspects (technological equipment, and 
technical assistance) including what is deemed as ‘proliferation sensitive knowledge’. The 
control of knowledge and technology on the basis of proliferation concerns is arduous also 
                                                          
16
 For the multifaceted role of the EU foreign policy please see: Stephan Keukeleire and Tom 
Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.  
17
 Meier, Technology Transfers and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 252.  
18
 The author has explored the interconnection between CCP and CFSP in the case of dual-use export-
controls for his master thesis concluding inter alia that: “it is impossible to say if trade or security 
imperatives prevail in the policy formulation and implementation of the dual-use export control 
system. What is clear is that the interdependence between trade and foreign policy demands the 
concerted collaboration of policy actors and instruments from different policy areas across the EU 
edifice, i.e. regardless the remaining confines of the abolished pillar structure”. 
16 
 
from a practical point of view given that knowledge and technology flows are increasingly 
enabled through intangible means of transfer. 
This problematic provides the impetus to set a fundamental question pervading the whole 
reasoning of the study: 
How would it be possible for a system of norms, rules and decision making procedures to 
avert the diffusion of proliferation-sensitive knowledge and safeguard it from misuse? This 
question can be reformulated and answered also as a normative one: Is it acceptable to 
impose controls in the dissemination of proliferation sensitive information?  
 
The practice shows that risks relating to the proliferation of WMD are perceived by 
politicians and citizens–at least in the West- as quite high and, the international and European 
law deal with this issue by setting certain constraints in the diffusion of sensitive knowledge 
and technologies. Therefore, a pragmatic approach should be adopted in order to come up 
with a realistic and workable answer.  
To that end, it is expedient to set two more specific research questions: 
First, what are the obligations of scientists and research organisations stemming from the 
international non-proliferation framework and how are these reflected in the trade controls 
system of dual-use items of the EU?  
Second, how could researchers and research organisations comply with the existing 
regulations and respond to non-proliferation and export control imperatives? 
 
Taking into account the intrinsic challenges in the implementation of technology transfer 
controls, fostering the accountability of research organisations through the adoption of 
internal compliance mechanisms, in synergy with further governmental initiatives, could 
reflect an appropriate and workable option for addressing requirements set in the non-
proliferation law. In that regard, the study seeks to verify the validity of the following   
hypothesis: 
 
Given the peculiarities of research and the challenging application of export controls in 
technology transfers, the implementation of internal compliance programmes by research 
organisations may represent both a fitting and a compelling response to heightened 
proliferation concerns. 
 
Internal Compliance Programmes (ICPs) are useful tools towards both the attainment of a 
climate of awareness and responsibility within exporting organisations and the fulfilment of 
export control requirements by the exporters. Effective ICPs may function in synergy with 
codes of conduct or other agreed guidelines and comprise a clear policy and standardised 
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procedures ensuring that all employees are aware and compliant with any export control 
obligations relating to their work. Furthermore, the adoption of ICPs constitutes a common 
practice for industry already for a number of years already. On the contrary, most academic 
and research institutes -at least in Europe- do not have in place compliance mechanisms and 
awareness-raising tools vis-à-vis the export control legislation albeit they are not always 
untouched by legal consequences deriving from such laws. Enhancing the accountability of 
the research community and achieving compliance with non-proliferation and other security 
imperatives may presuppose a mix of self-governance measures tailored to the needs of 
researchers, In that regard, the ultimate goal of this doctoral study is not to validate or refute a 
hypothesis in view of a theory or a conceptual framework. Instead, the main purpose is to test 
if an ICP could be adapted accordingly so as to function efficiently in a research setting. 
With a view to answering the aforementioned research questions, the study is structured 
along three main axes:   
A. The first part seeks to achieve three main objectives. The first is the conceptualisation of 
‘scientific research’, including the description of the different organisations (e.g. industrial, 
academic, and research institutes) where research takes place. The second is to identify 
restraints posed by the non-proliferation treaties and international export control regimes and 
their potential impact on research activities. In addition to this, the analysis will evidence the 
intricate nature of dual-use trade controls by examining the various understandings of the 
dual-use term as well as the scope and the content of the trade control legislation and 
pertinent control lists. The main driver behind this is to provide a definition of the ‘dual-use 
research’ from an export control point of view. Finally, the third objective concerns the very 
heart of the problems in question that is to say the implications of export controls for the 
academia and research institutions. In that respect, the EU trade control system will be set 
under close examination for clarifying the nexus between trade controls and research 
activities. With a view to understanding better the challenges and opportunities connecting 
with the implementation of export controls in a research setting, the American approach will 
be set under probation, as well. The analysis in Part A will rely mostly on the review of the 
related literature and an extensive analysis of legal documents for providing argumentation 
and broader conclusions. In addition, a case study will be used for elucidating the practical 
implementation of export controls vis-à-vis academia in the European and the American 
context.  
B. The second part intends to elucidate the concept of export compliance and suggest a way 
forward for complying with legal requirements identified in the first section. Why ICPs are 
considered as a necessary tool for ensuring compliance with export control requirements and 
especially ITT controls? What are the drivers and main motives behind the adoption of ICPs 
and what one can learn from the experience of industry implementing such programmes 
already for years? Part B will offer an analysis of the main principles and key elements for 
building ICPs by illustrating different compliance practices followed by industry, universities 
and other research organisations. This part will explore also whether American and European 
universities are aware of export controls and the predominant attitudes of the research 
community in that regard. The ultimate objective here is to define a basic method for 
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identifying export control risks and designing internal compliance measures tailored to 
academic and research organisations. In order to succeed in this, the Part B will utilise a mix 
of online surveys, inquiries and in-depth interviews with export compliance practitioners, 
researchers and academics. This way information gained through online surveys will be 
cross-checked and upgraded with insights provided by experienced professionals.  
C. The third Part aims to elaborate and test in practice the method conceived in part B for 
identifying export control risks and designing compliance systems fitted to research 
organisations. The Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s in-house 
science service will be used as a test case. The JRC constitutes a plausible option since it 
represents a European organisation undertaking research in a wide array of disciplines -
including proliferation sensitive ones- and employing thousands of researchers in different 
sites. What are the components that an export control compliance management system for the 
JRC should definitely have in place? Should such a system be integrated in the existing 
compliance structure of the organisation or not? What are the main challenges in 
implementing such a system and how these could be overcome? How an effective strategy 
increasing the awareness and responsibility of the JRC researchers vis-à-vis export controls 
could be designed? With a view to responding to these questions, an online survey will be 
addressed to the JRC employees including scientific and administrative staff. In addition, for 
aspects requiring technical expertise and a solid background in various JRC research areas 
and institutional processes, I will resort to interviews with JRC experts and competent staff.  
Visibly, the last two parts of the thesis are closely interrelated since the ultimate goal is to 
suggest a methodology for enforcing export control compliance in a research environment, in 
this case at the Joint Research Centre.  
Last, it must be underscored that the present thesis is particularly concerned with exploring 
how certain legal terms and provisions are interpreted and how proliferation-related concepts 
are understood in different contexts. This means that framing concepts and commenting on 
the interpretation of definitions and other legal provisions will be a recurrent issue all along 
the study. Apart from providing answers to the foregoing questions and verifying the study 
hypothesis, the concluding section will also attempt to come up with policy initiatives and 
measures that could be taken by government authorities in concert with the efforts of research 
institutions for furthering export control objectives.  
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1.3. Data collection and data analysis 
The present study is a practice oriented and policy driven study. It is above all a scientific 
enterprise utilising a variety of data sources and data collection methods with a view to 
yielding evidence-based findings. To that end, the study relies on both primary and secondary 
data. The political, legal and highly technical and practical character of the issues in question 
require the use of primary data such as:  
 personal and phone interviews with policy-makers, technical experts and scientists  
 online surveys targeting scientists and export control practitioners  
 participation in international conferences and symposia in the area of non-
proliferation and export controls. 
Also, secondary data sources are used as follows: 
 available literature and peer reviewed journal articles  
 legal and archival documents available from the EU institutions, international 
organisations and national governments  
 information available on websites  
It goes without saying that for issues relating to practices and problems of the scientific 
community as well as some technical questions the study draws also from the experience and 
expertise accumulated within the JRC. Likewise, the author relies on his personal insight 
acquired through earlier professional experience and participation in various Council and 
Commission Committees on dual-use export controls as well as seminars organised regularly 
by the Joint Research Centre for analysing the various issues addressed in the study.  
Last, the research strategy comprises both inductive and deductive reasoning. Deductive in 
the sense that basic concepts and main elements are first defined against the broader context 
prior to being analysed from an export control point of view. Inductive in the sense that 
different case studies and actual experiences are used as a basis for drawing general 
conclusions on the interpretation of the legal framework or, the compliance practices and 
attitudes adopted by different organisations.  
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Part A: Research Activities and Dual-Use Trade Controls 
2. Conceptualising Scientific Research and Research Organisation 
This chapter intends to define what is denoted by the term ‘scientific research’, what are the 
different contexts where research activities take place as well as what is the  role of research 
in today’s environment. This introductory chapter sets the scene for some of the main issues 
discussed in this doctoral study and sheds some light on the reasons why certain terms are 
understood in a given way also in the context of export controls.  
2.1 Defining research: what are its determinant elements? 
No matter how general concept it is, research relates above all with the term ‘science’, most 
probably because research is the vehicle to science and science is the end of research. Science 
comes from the Latin word ‘scientia’ and has as a synonym the word ‘episteme’ originated 
from Greek (επιστήμη). Both terms, the Latin and the Greek one as well, are translated in 
English as ‘knowledge’ and indeed, this is in the very heart of this study, the transfer and 
dissemination of knowledge. 
If one looks at dictionary definitions, ‘re-search’ is almost invariably defined as “systematic 
investigation to establish facts or principles or to collect information on a subject”19. 
Research is a general concept that is not normally defined in policy and legal texts. Although 
everybody has a common understanding of this term, research may refer to varying scientific 
fields and cover different types of activity specified each time by the given context; doing 
research might mean collecting and processing data, studying reports, developing theoretical 
models or observing phenomena and experimenting in a laboratory. The Merriam-Webster 
dictionary provides an all-encompassing definition of research as “investigation or 
experimentation aimed at the discovery and interpretation of facts, revision of accepted 
theories or laws in the light of new facts, or practical application of such new or revised 
theories or laws”20. Thus, one may argue that research is connected with an element of 
novelty since its aim is to establish new knowledge, or to revise acquired knowledge based on 
new facts or to apply such new or revised knowledge.  
As it will be shown below, research is usually paired with terms such as ‘experimental 
development’, ‘technological development’ (RTD) or simply development (R&D). Whereas 
R&D activities concern both academic and industrial research, the term is closely linked to 
and primarily used in the fields of economics and business. In that regard, R&D can be 
defined as follows: “a process intended to create new or improved technology that can 
provide a competitive advantage at the business, industry or national level”21. However, 
research is not necessarily oriented towards the development of a marketable product or 
                                                          
19
 See for instance the Oxford Dictionary of Current English or the online Collins Dictionary (2014) 
in:  http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/research?showCookiePolicy=true. 
20
 See the online Merriam-Webster Dictionary in: 
 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/research. 
21
 The definition of R&D is provided in the online dictionary US Legal, retrieved from: 
http://definitions.uslegal.com/r/research-and-development/. 
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service. Academic research in particular may intend to explain physical phenomena, respond 
to unsolved questions relating to the human existence or just satisfy human curiosity. This 
reasoning implies that who conducts a given research is a determinant factor. For example, 
academia and industry may reflect different environments and differing primary goals and 
needs. It is therefore useful to distinguish between academic and industrial research, albeit 
academic research may serve industry’s objectives and industrial research may contribute to 
the stock of knowledge. 
The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) has 
attempted to provide definitions with universal application for research activities and related 
terms. In fact, the recommendation concerning the International Standardization of Statistics 
on Science (1978) classifies ‘scientific research activities’ under a wider category named as 
‘scientific and technological activities’ (STA). The STA consist of all these “systematic 
activities concerning with the generation, advancement, dissemination, and application of 
scientific and technical knowledge in all fields of science and technology”22. The STA bring 
under the same category ‘research and experimental development’, ‘scientific and 
technological education and training’ (STET) and ‘scientific and technological services’ 
(STS). The terms are defined in great detail in the Manual for Statistics on Scientific and 
Technological Activities. Understanding in depth the specific activities covered under each 
term is out of scope for this study especially since the objective of the ‘manual for statistics 
on STA’ and other related manuals is the establishment of sound and internationally accepted 
standards and methods for the measurement and collection of statistical data on scientific and 
technological activities. However, relying on such UNESCO recommendations and related 
manuals for understanding the basic characteristics and important parameters of research 
could be a useful approach. 
To begin with, scientific research activities are almost invariably defined in the UNESCO 
recommendations and related manuals in the light of ‘research and experimental 
development’ term. In fact, the definitions provided for R&D and ‘scientific research 
activities’ could be considered as conceptually identical. The ‘Frascati Manual’23 provides an 
                                                          
22
 The scientific and technological activities (STA) concern in general the production, distribution and 
utilisation of scientific and technical knowledge. However, as it clarified in the manual, several 
activities such as general school education at the primary and secondary levels, non-formal industrial 
training, routine activities of publishing houses, radio and television broadcasting corporations, 
general and specialized medical and health services, industrial production and distribution of goods 
and services should be excluded from the scope of measurement of STA. Most of these exemptions 
(excluding maybe industry related activities) are also meaningful from an export control point of 
view.  See: UNESCO, Manual for Statistics on Scientific and Technological Activities (Paris: 
UNESCO, Division of Statistics on Science and Technology, Office of Statistics, 1984), 17, retrieved 
from: http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/STSManual84_en.pdf. 
23
 The ‘Frascati Manual’ was first issued 50 years ago by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and in spite of its technical nature, it is considered as the cornerstone of 
OECD efforts to increase the understanding of the role played by science and technology.  It deals 
exclusively with the measurement of human and financial resources devoted to research and 
experimental development and it has become a standard for the conduct of R&D surveys and related 
data collection worldwide. The document was written by experts from the OECD member countries 
and its latest sixth edition (2002) is available in the OECD website:  
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internationally accepted definition of R&D which is used in various policy and legal 
documents including the European Charter of Researchers and has as follows:
 
 
“Research and experimental development’ (R&D) comprise creative work undertaken on a 
systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, 
culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications
 24
.” 
The UNESCO recommendation on the International Standardisation of Statistics on Science 
and Technology
25
 and the manual for Statistics on Scientific and Technological Activities 
define ‘scientific research activities’ as “any systematic and creative work aimed at 
increasing the stock of scientific knowledge and at applying it in practice”26.  
It is clear that both definitions confer to research the same principal elements: creativity, 
systematic effort, generation of new knowledge and last but not least the practical utilization 
of research results. Therefore, one could claim that what renders policy-makers and scholars 
eager to use the R&D term is most probably this reference on the quality of research to attain 
practical objectives as well as to lead to new applications/inventions.  
According to the aforementioned recommendations and explanatory manuals, the R&D 
concept reflects three types of research activities: fundamental research, applied research and 
experimental development. The distinction between fundamental and applied research is 
particularly important and it will be discussed extensively thereafter in the study. It is prudent 
therefore to provide the definitions for the whole spectrum of research activities as they 
appear in the Frascati Manual and the UNESCO Recommendation on the Status of Higher-
Education Teaching Personnel
27
. 
Fundamental or basic research is defined the experimental or theoretical work undertaken 
primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and 
observable facts, without any particular application or use in view.  
Applied research is also original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge. 
It is, however, directed primarily towards a specific practical aim or objective.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
OECD, Frascati Manual: Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys on Research and Experimental 
Development (Paris: OECD, 2002), retrieved from: 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/frascatimanualproposedstandardpracticeforsurveysonresearchandexperi
mentaldevelopment6thedition.htm.  
24
 OECD, Frascati Manual, 2002, 30. 
25
 UNESCO, Recommendation concerning the International Standardization of Statistics on Science 
and Technology, 1978, retrieved from: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13135&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 
26
 The wording “applying it in practice” should not be interpreted strictly as fundamental research is 
not supposed to be oriented towards any particular application. 
27
 UNESCO, Recommendation on the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel, 1997, 
retrieved from:  
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13144&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 
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Experimental development is systematic work, drawing on existing knowledge gained from 
research and/or practical experience, which is directed to producing new materials, products 
or devices, to installing new processes, systems and services, or to improving substantially 
those already produced or installed.  
                                                                                      OECD, Frascati Manual, 2002, 77-79 
As it is implied by this categorization, research activities can be also distinguished on the 
basis of the objective served and the intention of researcher to undertake research of more 
general character or not. Whereas research activities are generally oriented towards the 
acquirement of new knowledge and the attainment of a practical aim, development activities 
intend to produce new materials, devices and processes based on existing knowledge. 
It seems that there is an element of complementarity unifying these three types of research: 
first, basic research establishes new facts, general principles, theories and laws normally 
‘affecting a broad field of science and usually claiming universal validity’. In its turn, applied 
research develops further the results of fundamental research ‘in a way to respond to specific 
cases and problems and with a view to achieving a predetermined practical aim’. Finally, the 
experimental development goes some steps further ‘by setting the principles and/or devising 
the applications required for the actual application of research results’28.  
In practice, drawing a line and setting where fundamental research ends and applied research 
starts might be too difficult. How the wording ‘directed primarily towards a specific practical 
aim or objective’ should be interpreted? Distinguishing between experimental development 
and the pre-production phase can be equally challenging. Normally, all substantial improving 
and installing of new processes, systems and services takes place during the experimental 
development whereas the primary objective of the pre-production phase ‘is the development 
of markets, the pre-production planning and/or the smooth operation of production lines and 
relating control systems’. However, how easy can it be to distinguish between experimental 
development and industrial production ‘when the latter involves substantial modifications and 
granules of novelty’29?  
Also, semantically, the dipole basic and applied research represents a ‘definite hierarchy of 
academic prestige’ that is becoming less apparent. The old-fashioned logic dictates that the 
                                                          
28
 I practically summarise the objectives of basic and applied research as well as of experimental 
development as described in UNESCO, Manual for Statistics on STA, 1984, 20-29.  
29
 The ‘Frascati Manual’ provides a practical rule -devised by the US National Science Foundation 
(NSF)- for clarifying experimental development: “If the primary objective is to make further technical 
improvements on the product or process, then the work comes within the definition of R&D. If, on the 
other hand, the product, process or approach is substantially set and the primary objective is to 
develop markets, to do pre-production planning or to get a production or control system working 
smoothly, the work is no longer R&D”. However, practically, for individual industries it is difficult to 
verify when there is an appreciable element of novelty or when a product/ process is substantially set. 
See OECD, Frascati Manual, 42. 
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“more abstract and detached a discipline is from the ‘real world’, the higher its prestige”30. 
However, as the analysis in section 2.2.1 will show, “research universities are involving into 
structures in which academic departments conducting elite education and basic research are 
surrounded by a constellation of quasi-university organisations that draw intellectual strength 
from the core university and provide important financial, human and physical resources in 
return
31
.” In that regard, the blurring of basic and applied research is manifested also in terms 
of the institutional structures where research takes place.     
Last, a more straightforward categorisation of scientific research concerns the field where it 
takes place.  One can distinguish between research activities undertaken in the area of natural 
sciences including engineering and technology, medical and agricultural sciences (NS) and 
research relating to social sciences and humanities (SSH)
32
. Scientific research activities 
falling in the realm of natural sciences are of greater interest to this study since they are most 
likely to lead to the attainment of sensitive dual-use results and applications. What ‘dual-use’ 
might mean is explained thereunder in the study. The Frascati Manual provides a more 
detailed division into the various functional fields of science. The classification of Fields of 
Science and technology (FOS) determines six main categories of science (1.natural sciences, 
2.engineering and technology, 3.medical and health sciences, 4.agricultural sciences, 5.social 
sciences and 6.humanities) and sets out sub-categories for each distinct field. The revised 
version of the FOS classification can be found in Table II. 
  
                                                          
30
 James J. Duderstadt, “The Changing Nature of Research and the Future of the University,” in 
Reinventing the Research University, ed. Luc E. Weber and  James J. Duderstadt (France: Economica, 
2004), 83. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Scientific research activities in the natural sciences, engineering and technology, medical and 
agricultural sciences can be defined as any systematic and creative activities designed to ascertain the 
links between, and the nature of, natural phenomena, to generate knowledge of the laws of nature and 
to contribute to the practical application of this knowledge of laws, forces and substances. Scientific 
research activities in the social sciences and humanities can be defined as any systematic and creative 
activity aimed at increasing or improving knowledge of man, culture and society, including use of 
such knowledge for the solution of social and human problems. See UNESCO, Manual for Statistics 
on STA, 19. 
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Table II: Revised Fields of Science and Technology (FOS) classification
33
 
Revised FOS Classification 
1. Natural Sciences 1.1 Mathematics  
1.2 Computer and information sciences  
1.3 Physical sciences  
1.4 Chemical sciences  
1.5 Earth and related environmental 
sciences  
1.6 Biological sciences  
1.7 Other natural sciences 
 
 
2. Engineering and Technology 2.1 Civil engineering  
2.2 Electrical engineering, electronic  
engineering, information engineering  
2.3 Mechanical engineering  
2.4 Chemical engineering  
2.5 Materials engineering  
2.6 Medical engineering  
2.7 Environmental engineering  
2.8 Environmental biotechnology  
2.9 Industrial Biotechnology  
2.10 Nano-technology  
2.11 Other engineering and technologies 
 
 
3. Medical and Health Sciences 3.1 Basic medicine  
3.2 Clinical medicine  
3.3 Health sciences  
3.4 Health biotechnology  
3.5 Other medical sciences 
 
4. Agricultural Sciences 4.1 Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 
4.2 Animal and dairy science 
4.3 Veterinary science 
4.4 Agricultural biotechnology 
4.5 Other agricultural sciences 
 
 
                                                          
33
 The revised FOS classification amending the one contained in the Frascati Manual (Chapter 4.4, p. 
67) can be found on the website of the OECD: http://www.oecd.org/science/inno/38235147.pdf. 
OECD Working Party of National Experts on Science andTechnology Indicators, Revised Field of 
Science and Technology (FOS) Classification in the Frascati Manual, Document 
DSTI/EAS/STP/NESTI(2006)19/FINAL, (Paris: OECD, 2007). 
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5. Social Sciences 5.1 Psychology 
5.2 Economics and business 
5.3 Educational sciences 
5.4 Sociology 
5.5 Law 
5.6 Political Science 
5.7 Social and economic geography 
5.8 Media and communications 
5.9 Other social sciences 
 
 
6. Humanities 6.1 History and archaeology 
6.2 Languages and literature 
6.3 Philosophy, ethics and religion 
6.4 Art (arts, history of arts, performing 
arts, 
music) 
6.5 Other humanities 
 
 
2.2 The typology of research organisations 
As mentioned above, the nature of research can be defined to some extent on the basis of the 
specific context in which takes place. For instance, researchers working for the R&D 
department of a company may have to adhere to different principles and deal with a different 
organisational structure compared to their colleagues conducting research in a university. 
This does not necessarily imply that the very essence of research conducted for instance, by a 
pharmaceutical company differs from the research undertaken by biologists in a university. 
However, the general orientation, the specific objectives as well as the privileges and 
obligations of researchers might be varying. Initiating a discussion on the limits between 
academic and industrial research and the compatibility of science with commercialisation 
activities is beyond the intentions of this study. Instead, discussing the different types of 
research organisations by highlighting their main characteristics is necessary for 
comprehending better the nature of research and framing the conceptual basis of the study. 
University based research: The University is considered as the predominant house of higher 
education. What makes a university standing out is its role as centre of diffusion and 
advancement of knowledge and culture. The interrelation between research and teaching 
activities is of central importance to the mission of a university. Simply put, “the results of 
research feed into teaching, and information and experience gained in teaching can often 
result in an input to research”34.  As the ‘Magna Charta Universitatum’ proclaims teaching 
and research must be inseparable if universities wish to effectively address the changing 
                                                          
34
 OECD, Frascati Manual, 35. 
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needs and demands of the society
35
. To that end, universities should emphasize on and 
develop both components of their educative role teaching and researching. 
Industry based research: Contrary to universities, industrial organisations do not have 
amongst their primary objectives the advancement of knowledge per se and they are not 
considered as traditional carriers of education. Firms are sources of economic growth and 
development and they are traditionally setup with the goal of yielding economic profit to their 
stakeholders. Industrial organisations may contribute to the education indirectly through the 
professional formation that they provide to their employees and other lifelong learning 
activities offered to their staff. Regardless of their area of activity, firms may also conduct 
research activities and further the public wellness. Large firms operate normally a R&D 
department and in some cases they may establish research institutes within their structures. 
Microsoft Research is a telling example of a company maintaining several research institutes 
worldwide and working in close collaboration with governments and academia
36
. This is not 
strange, given that R&D activities and subsequent innovations generated can be of vital 
importance to the economic soundness and overall existence of a firm. 
Research performed by non-university organisations: The diversity of research 
organisations is not limited to universities and firms. Therefore, it is practical to delineate 
also a third category bringing together all these research-performing organisations not falling 
in the other two categories. National Academies of Sciences and Humanities and public 
research institutes are good examples of organisations pertaining to this category. National 
Academies provide quite often science-based advice to policy-makers. The Academy of 
Athens for instance, undertakes research activities in a variety of scientific areas and provides 
expertise and insightful studies mostly on issues of major importance, such as education and 
fiscal policy. Public research institutes concern national laboratories and other public 
organisations conducting research usually in furtherance of set national policies and 
objectives. National atomic agencies dealing with nuclear development and safety and, public 
health organisations in charge of public health and disease control are typical examples of 
such public organisations. Admittedly, public research organisations may differ in terms of 
both legal status and mission. In Germany, for instance, the research landscape includes 
research institutes run by federal and State (Länder) authorities as well as other non-profit 
institutes conducting research for both public and private stakeholders
37
. Unifying different 
research institutes under the roof of one association is also a quite common practice.  
                                                          
35
 The ‘Magna Charta Universitatum’, was signed in Bologna 1988 o celebrate the 900th Anniversary 
of the Alma Mater, available in: http://www.magna-charta.org/resources/files/the-magna-
charta/english. 
36
 For more information on the Microsoft network of research labs consult the relevant website: 
http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/labs/default.aspx. 
37
 It must be noted that the role of each institution may reflect different responsibilities ranging from 
undertaking research to tuning the funding of different projects. For more information see: Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research, The German Research Landscape: Who does research in 
Germany? Bonn: Deutscher Akademischer Austauschidienst (DAAD), 2015. 
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2.2.1 The differences ‘unifying’ research organisations 
Regardless of their type, research organisations can vary in terms of main fields of activity, 
organisational structure and legal personality. Among the three categories, one could presume 
that universities and industries will reflect two distinct environments whereas the mosaic of 
research organisations forming the third category it is likely to be similar to universities.  
Table III summarises the main features of research performing organisations in Europe.  
Table III: Types of organisations performing research in Europe 
                               
Elements 
Types of organisations performing research in Europe 
Industry University Other research 
Organisations 
Diversity of activities 
(NS or SSH): 
focused focused and 
multidisciplinary 
focused and 
multidisciplinary 
Type of research (basic 
or applied): 
mainly applied basic and applied basic and applied 
Organisational 
structure: 
unique 
Legal personality: normally private public or private public or private 
Funding: mainly private  mainly public mainly public 
 
Main fields of activity: Universities can be distinguished on the basis of the distinction 
between SSH and NS. Visibly, for industry organisations, such a categorisation is not 
particularly interesting. In France, the renowned ‘Université Paris-Sorbonne’ (Paris 4) and 
the ‘Université Pierre et Marie Curie’ (Paris 6) are good examples of research universities 
dedicated to SSH and NS respectively
38
. However, universities may undertake 
interdisciplinary research crossing both categories. Drawing always from the French higher 
education system, the ‘Université Paris Diderot’ (Paris 7) is a good example of a 
multidisciplinary university bringing sciences from both broad fields (SSH and NS) under 
one institutional structure
39
.  
In addition, universities and other research institutes may pool their strengths in order to 
develop clusters or poles of research furthering synergies with other universities or non-
university institutions and enhancing their research capabilities. An example of such a cluster 
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is the so-called ‘Sorbonne Universités’40. This cluster comprises the University Paris-
Sorbonne and the University Pierre and Marie Curie mentioned above plus one engineering 
university, one business school and various public research organisations. The same logic is 
valid also for non-university research organisations. Generally speaking, research centres 
tend to conduct more practice-oriented or specialised research compared to academic 
universities. The Pasteur Institute specialised in biology and matters of public health and the 
European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) working on nuclear physics are well-
known examples of research institutes with more targeted research agendas
41
. However, as it 
is the case with the large multidisciplinary universities, one can identify public research 
organisations with activities spanning the whole spectrum of sciences. The National Centre 
for Scientific Research in France (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) is a telling 
example of a public organisation conducting research in different scientific areas (life 
sciences, mathematics, astronomy, nuclear physics and social sciences and humanities)
42
. 
In sum, the classification into SSH and NS and their functional sub-fields has a true interest 
for multidisciplinary research organisations only if one segregates into the constituents of a 
given organisation in order to identify compact departments and faculties focusing on specific 
scientific fields. Besides, it should be noted that the complexity of contemporary research 
requires very frequently multidisciplinary teams and collaborations involving different 
research departments and scientists with diverse backgrounds. 
Type of research: Another issue to examine is whether the categorisation to different types 
of research is meaningful for distinguishing between research organisations of either 
fundamental or applied research. Such an idea presents some interest given that research of 
fundamental nature is excluded from the scope of controls.  
The discussion on the different types of research relates in the first place to the key 
orientation of a given research organisation. Separating between practice-oriented and 
academic research institutes is a very common practice. In Germany, for example they 
distinguish between academic universities and universities of applied sciences 
(Fachhochschulen). In Finland, the institutions of higher education are classified under two 
main groupings: academic universities promoting scientific and artistic education and 
polytechnics, known as Universities of Applied Sciences (UAS) maintaining close contacts 
with the industry
43
. Accordingly, one can identify research institutes of applied research such 
as the Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) in the Netherlands and research 
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institutes with focus on basic research like the non-profit organisation ‘Max Planck Society’ 
in Germany
44
. 
From an epistemological perspective, ‘applied sciences’ would mainly refer to the 
engineering strand of sciences leading to the development of technology and thereby, to 
technological applications. However, it must be emphasized that the progression of basic 
knowledge from the library or the laboratory to societal application is far from linear
45
. 
Organisations of applied research and even industrial R&D departments may or respond to 
fundamental research questions whereas organisations of fundamental research can be 
engaged with more practical questions, for instance, in the framework of partnerships with 
firms.  To conclude, it is possible to distinguish between research organisations undertaking 
in principle either basic or applied research bearing though in mind that their overall activities 
may involve different types of research (basic, applied and experimental development).   
Organisational structure: Research organisations may also differ on the basis of the 
organisational structure they represent. The term organisational structure refers to those 
arrangements determining the hierarchical relations, the rights and the duties of each line of 
authority and the information flows between the different levels of management
46
. One could 
assume that all research-performing organisations will have invariably some elements in 
common. In practical terms, universities, non-university institutes and firms will normally 
have in place a configuration of hierarchical levels and specialized units including a board of 
governors and an administrative/secretariat department. Most interestingly, the organisational 
structure denotes also the model of governance and the organisational culture of a research 
establishment albeit the latter is a unique element for every type of organisation. In that 
sense, universities and industries represent two different worlds, as it referred in the relevant 
literature
47
.  
To begin with, universities are usually organised along a backbone of faculties and 
departments each of them representing a specific scientific area. For the research focused 
universities, the strong connection between research and teaching is often reflected in their 
structures. Specific research institutes, research advisory bodies and ethics committees are 
examples of research focused departments embedded in the structure of such universities. 
Defining a European model of governance for universities can be too venturesome. Yet, some 
general characteristics can be identified. Universities are autonomous entities relying 
traditionally in a collegiate style of governance albeit operating according to principles and 
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rules set by public authorities frequently at local, national and European levels. Traditionally, 
educational policy in Europe used to be a salient matter of national importance and it largely 
remains so. However, today European universities have to rethink their role, redesign their 
governance structure and meet standards established at European level. The Bologna process 
and the subsequent founding of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) is a good 
example of a voluntary process committing universities originated from 47 States to attain 
common standards and objectives
48
. Simply put, universities are called to assume governance 
responsibilities previously held by the governments safeguarding at the same time the 
independence of their research. In addition, universities are required to be accountable in new 
ways, move towards the establishment of a more executive style of institutional management 
and seek for funding sources on their own. The ‘Universitatum World’ stands out for some 
other distinct elements, too. The principle of academic freedom, the tenure system of 
promotion and the reward structure of the scientific personnel -based on the publications 
records- render universities a sui generis locus.  
At the other end, firms are organised on the basis of business principles with a view to 
creating markets and generating economic profits. The organisational structure of firms 
includes departments reflecting their distinct role such as sales, customer services and 
marketing departments. Nonetheless, identifying a predominant model of governance is 
rather a difficult case due to the variety of the models used and the diversity of firms’ needs 
and functioning.  
The technological factor, namely the application of science to industry and commerce needs 
is an asset of strategic importance for every firm. The business world emphasizes the close 
link between a company’s ability to manage technology and its capacity to innovate. The 
main source for generation of new product ideas is either the customers or the R&D 
department of the firm
49
. From the conception of the idea and the subsequent generation of 
applied knowledge till the introduction and diffusion of an innovation in the market place, the 
whole process will demand the existence of R&D departments within the structure of the 
firms. Quite interestingly, firms may also opt to outsource certain R&D activities to 
universities or other research institutes given that new products and processes can be 
substantially benefited by pertinent academic research
50
. Therefore, research activities or 
differently, ‘technology development’ is considered to be of central importance for the 
functioning of economically sound and entrepreneurially successful business.  
In broad terms, industrial research responds to different challenges compared to the academic 
ones. The existence of diverging research agendas between research universities and firms is 
only one manifestation of this reality. Firms may differ from universities in terms of 
principles, culture and managerial model embodied in their structure in various ways. For 
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example industrial R&D departments are permeated by a norm of secrecy (e.g. research 
classified as ‘trade secret’) which is not compatible with the ‘culture of openness’ prevailing 
in academic environments. As Oosterlinck remarks, industry-based research may be equal to 
university research as far as quality is concerned, but it lacks the obligation to publish which 
is so characteristic of university research
51
. However, like universities, firms have to operate 
in conformity with the regulatory framework governing their activities and they should be 
accountable and responsible towards the society in new ways, as well.  Whereas business 
organisations have a distinct role compared to research universities, they are still compelled 
to confront an increasingly changing environment and adapt their structure and governance 
accordingly. 
Legal personality and funding sources: The last criterion determining the nature of 
research-performing organisations is the legal personality they hold: are they public or private 
entities? What does the legal personality implies for the governance model and the 
organisational structure of research organisations? 
 
It must be noted that the legal nature of any organisation relates in general with two main 
issues: the overall control of a research organisation and the emanation of the financial 
resources. Generally speaking, in Europe, public universities and public research 
organisations are accountable either to national or regional authorities and depend largely on 
public funding
52
. This is also why in most countries the discussion about granting more 
autonomy to universities is usually connected with reforms increasing the financial 
accountability of these institutions (e.g. performance based budgets, introduction of strategic 
planning). However, the private status of a university does not necessarily imply real 
differences to public institutions. In fact, in certain European countries the legal framework 
regulating the operation of private universities is the same with the one applicable to public 
ones and the financing comes invariably from public sources. In the US, private universities 
account for the majority of higher education institutions and they are able to generate 
considerable income from private resources and donations alongside their public income
53
. 
Indeed, US universities in general have been more proactive in distributing and applying 
knowledge by capitalising for instance the economic value of the intellectual property created 
by research
54
.  
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The issue of funding is a crucial one since it may bear consequences for the overall 
orientation and independence of research organisations. It must be born in mind that research-
performing organisations may utilise a mix of public and private funds independently of their 
legal personality. This is actually a common practice that can be attributed to two main 
reasons: First, the unequivocal need of research organisations to mobilise funds for their 
research and second, the great interest of public and private stakeholders to further both 
scientific research and industrial R&D. With regards to the first factor, Duderstadt has 
observed already 10 years ago that there is a growing pressure on faculty to achieve 
excellence in teaching and research, but also to generate the resources necessary to support 
their activities
55
. This is still applicable today all the more due to the repercussions of the 
global financial crisis of 2008. Concerning the second factor, the section 2.2.2 outlines the 
role of knowledge in driving economic and social development.  
 
2.2.2 Toward the ‘entrepreneurial university’ and the ‘academic firm’? 
What are the variables revolutionising the role of research organisations? What imperatives 
lead research organisations originating frequently from distinct environments to develop 
close relations between each other? Vught provides a plausible answer: “today we live in a 
knowledge society and our economy is strongly dependant on the creation and distribution of 
knowledge. Our markets, production processes and institutions are knowledge-based”56. 
The collaborations between universities and industrial corporations, the utilisation of research 
results with a view to yielding profits for both universities and enterprises (through patenting 
and licensing activities for instance) and the traditional consultation between academic, 
governmental and industrial organisations are practices that have been intensified during the 
course of last three decades. Admittedly, the connection between academic universities and 
governmental or public authorities is as old as the founding of the first universities. However, 
the intensification of university-industry relations is a rather new blossom. In fact, it is a 
product of the consciousness of scientists that research must be responsive to the challenges 
of present times and the recognition of economic operators that knowledge and technology 
can play a drastic role in the acceleration and sustainability of economic growth. In that 
regard, the role of governments in directing and supporting interfaces between research and 
business organisations has been important.  
Knowledge-based economies depend on highly-skilled workers and a science system capable 
of producing and transferring knowledge to economic operators and the society as a whole
57
. 
The struggle to further ‘knowledge-based economies’ through for instance, the development 
of synergies between industry and academia can be traced in the organisational structure of 
both firms and universities. For the former it may be translated into the establishment of 
R&D departments and units providing life-long training and for the latter it might mean the 
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introduction of functions connecting academia with the business world. The particular type of 
such functions might range from simple liaison or career offices supporting students’ 
professional development and their smooth absorption by firms to special units and R&D 
departments furthering closer university-industry relations by assisting researchers on issues 
such as patenting of inventions, student business start-ups and contracting with corporations. 
An example of a dedicated unit coordinating knowledge and technology transfers is the 
Leuven Research and Development (LRD) at the Catholic University of Leuven, in Belgium. 
The main idea underpinning the role of the LRD is described in the website of the university: 
“A university is a source of innovative research, but valuable research results and knowledge 
often go untapped. Research valorisation -creating economic and social value through 
research - is becoming increasingly important and should be encouraged, always with due 
respect to the freedom of the researcher. Various funding channels are available for research 
valorisation” 58. 
Similar statements can be found in the websites of several universities in the EU and certainly 
all European universities have a kind of liaison office albeit at varying development levels. In 
the other side of Atlantic, American universities are considered as pioneers in 
accommodating research and industrial objectives. It is indicative that the US universities are 
allowed to patent and license their inventions from federally funded research from 1980 (with 
the US Bayh-Dole Act). In addition, the establishment of Technology Transfer Offices (TTO) 
within American universities has been a common practice for many years already
59
. 
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3. Identifying Constraints in the sight of International Law 
Having clarified the concept of research including connected terms (e.g. ‘scientific and 
technological activities’, ‘research and experimental development’) as well as the role of 
knowledge and technology in different organisation environments, it is useful to examine 
how these concepts and related activities are seen from a non-proliferation and export 
controls point of view. The main intent is to explore first, whether there are any provisions in 
the international non-proliferation law constraining research activities and second, to clarify 
the role of multilateral export control regimes in the combat against the proliferation of 
WMD. The chapter offers some observations on the role of knowledge in the proliferation 
context and makes also references to the milestones of the non-proliferation history. 
3.1 Proliferation of WMD: ‘a problem of knowledge’? 
As Smith neatly mentions, the nature of the nuclear and of proliferation problem confronting 
mankind is, in its fundamental sense, a ‘problem’ of knowledge60. The advancement of 
science frequently involves or even requires the extensive interaction and collaboration 
between scientists coming from all over the world and probably this is one of the 
characteristics rendering science a common endeavour. The development of nuclear energy 
for instance, has been from the very beginning truly international as the ideas and work of 
scientists in one country stimulated and fertilized the minds of their colleagues in others
61
. 
From the conception of the atomic bomb by Leo Szilard and the discovery of fission by Otto 
Hahn, Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch till the first man-made self-sustaining fission reaction by 
Enrico Fermi, the whole process did involve scientists of different nationalities working for 
research institutions in various European countries and the US. Today the unprecedented 
technological progress and particularly the numerous breakthroughs in Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) have rendered information sharing and exchanges of 
knowledge easier than ever. This practically means that both knowledge and technology have 
no boundaries.  
The origins of the nuclear problem lie not in any unique social or political circumstance of 
our time, but rather in the attainment by mankind after centuries of scientific thought and 
endeavour, of a certain level of knowledge of the physical universe. 
                                                                   Smith, Explaining the Non-Proliferation regime, 266 
In general, constructing a nuclear weapon presupposes the existence of three main elements: 
the fissile material, the essential technological equipment and the expertise to effectively use 
the other two elements. In other words, even if a proliferator has at his disposal the raw 
material, he will also need the technological capabilities taking the form of both explicit 
knowledge (e.g. computational capacity) and implicit knowledge (technical expertise) in 
order to build a nuclear device. The destructive efficiency of such a bomb will depend largely 
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on the technological factor or to put it differently, “any intelligent college student, with 
enough enriched uranium, high explosives, and truck capacity, can build and deliver an 
inefficient but deadly A-bomb, but those without access to large-scale computers will not be 
admitted to the H-bomb fraternity”62. However, if the control of trade flow in proliferation-
sensitive materials sounds feasible, the constraint of information and knowledge flow could 
be largely unattainable. How is that actually possible for a system of norms, rules and 
decision making procedures to avert the diffusion of sensitive knowledge and safeguard it 
from misuse? This is a major question confronted throughout this doctoral study. Smith 
provides us again with a meaningful answer: “the ‘solution’ to the associated dangers of 
nuclear energy use in both peaceful and bellicose forms is only partially amenable to 
technical remedy; fundamentally, the ‘solution’ lies in the patterns of social and political 
interaction that man fashions”63.  
The fight against the proliferation of WMD is not only about nuclear weapons, it also 
concerns biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. In fact, chemical 
weapons such as war gases had been first used, long before the Trinity event (Man’s first 
nuclear detonation in 1945), on the battlefields of the World War I, also referred by some 
historians as ‘the chemist’s war’. The exploitation of chemistry for military purposes has 
been intense and the pursuit of chemical arsenals a common practice for many countries, 
including the USA and the Soviet Union. Likewise, the foundation of microbiology by Louis 
Pasteur and Robert Koch was exploited from the very beginning also for military purposes. 
The use of anthrax and glanders bacteria with a view to poisoning the horses of Allied powers 
during World War I and, the attacks of imperial Japan using disease-causing agents against 
Chinese cities between 1932 and 1945, are notorious incidents of biological warfare. Today, 
successive advancements in life sciences and especially the pace of progress in emerging 
technologies such as genetic engineering and synthetic genomics demand flexible governance 
strategies engaging State and non-State actors in the oversight of proliferation-sensitive 
scientific and technological activities. 
Furthermore, the construction of biological and chemical weapons differs in relation to 
nuclear weapons in that the resources required and the processes employed for their 
development. As Tucker stresses pathogens and viruses can be isolated from nature or 
synthesized in a lab, have a great variety of civil applications and are impossible to detect at a 
distance with available technologies. In contrast, highly enriched uranium and plutonium 
cannot be found in nature in a concentrated form suitable for weapons use and thus, their 
enrichment or reprocessing takes considerable time and funding. In addition, atmospheric and 
underground nuclear tests can be detected and nuclear technology advances slowly compared 
to the short time lag from scientific discovery to technological application in life sciences. 
Differences do exist also between chemical and biological weapons development since 
chemical warfare agents are manufactured compounds not existing in nature, have few 
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peaceful applications and they are derived from a limited set of precursor chemicals whose 
export and import can be controlled
64
.  
Regardless of the foregoing differences, the weaponisation of nuclear, biological and 
chemical materials and equipment is a technically challenging process involving both explicit 
and tacit knowledge. In particular, knowledge as it is expressed in its tacit form, i.e. skills, 
know-how and sensory cues that transferred mainly through personal contacts is a key 
capability not always diffused or readily available. Yet, nowadays the tacit knowledge is 
getting increasingly available due to the global distribution of skilled staff and the extensive 
collaboration between industry and academia in the R&D phase. As Meier highlights, 
globalisation leads to technology diffusion and it is inexorably linked to the sharing of 
technologies including dual-use technologies
65
.   
Explicit knowledge is the information that can be codified, written down in the form of a 
recipe or laboratory protocol, and transferred from one individual to another by impersonal 
means, such as publication in a scientific journal.  
Tacit knowledge, in contrast involves skills, know-how, and sensory cues that are vital to the 
successful use of a technology yet cannot be reduced to writing and must be acquired through 
hands-on practice and experience”  
                                                                         Tucker, Innovation, Dual Use, and Security, 23 
Therefore, one could presume that each technology associates with a distinct R&D process 
and varying technical characteristics which in turn imply specific challenges and 
opportunities from a non-proliferation perspective. Some technologies consist primarily of 
hardware, others are based largely on intangible information, and still others are a hybrid of 
the two
66
. In that regard, Tucker et al. have developed a methodology for assessing and 
managing risks in the area of emerging biological and chemical technologies
67
. In practice, 
the said methodology builds a so-called ‘Decision Framework’ that can be used for assessing 
both the risk of misuse and the governability of certain dual-use technologies. The overall 
objective is, based on this assessment and a cost-benefit analysis, to select the appropriate 
mix of governance measures (hard-law, soft-law and informal measures) to be taken for the 
oversight of each technology. It is suggested also that governance approaches based on 
denial, such as export controls and interdiction, are most effective in the early stages of 
technology development when few suppliers and users exist
68
. It is worth wondering if such 
an analytical tool could be used in respect of the export controls policy-making.  
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3.2 The non-proliferation system yesterday and today 
In its very essence, ‘non-proliferation’ comprises international efforts to prevent the spread 
and use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as well as to inhibit the diffusion of 
‘sensitive’ raw material, technical equipment and knowledge that can be used for the 
development, use and delivery of such weapons. ‘Non-proliferation’ as a term is primarily 
used in connection to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technologies. This is rather 
anticipated if one thinks of the destructive power of atomic and hydrogen bombs and the 
impact of ‘nuclear deterrence’ during the cold-war period. Nevertheless, the first serious 
efforts to prohibit chemical and bacteriological warfare preceded the foundation of the 
‘nuclear non-proliferation regime’, notably with the signature of the so-called ‘Geneva 
Protocol’ dating back in 192569. Regardless of ethical concerns relating to the use of WMD 
and the actual contingency of mutual destruction in the event of a nuclear war, the pursuit of 
WMD and, especially nuclear armaments, used to be and it is still considered as a chief 
matter of International Strategy. It is in principle interwoven with the real or perceived 
changes in the power balance among dissimilar State actors
70
. At the same time, it entails 
strong economic interests for the main players involved. 
Historically, in the nuclear field, the proliferation of nukes and sensitive technology was 
encouraged by the two nuclear superpowers dominating the post-World War II period. As 
Reed and Stillman highlight, within the decade followed the Trinity event, the US and the 
Soviet Union were transferring nuclear technology to their client States on a massive scale. 
“They tolerated and actually encouraged, cross-fertilization until it was too late to turn 
back”71 Thereafter, it was a matter of time and political will for other ‘second-range’ players 
to gain a share in the exploitation of the atomic energy. Nuclear proliferation took place 
through effective espionage, deliberate transfer of technology to allied countries and 
expatriate scientists. Indeed, “the acquisition of Western technology by China did not rely 
primarily on the espionage but it was accomplished one graduate student at a time”72. 
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Even the first years following the foundation of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), the cooperation and assistance for the peaceful development of nuclear energy 
mirrored another area of competition between the two superpowers
73
. 
Technology is fungible: US, Soviet and British nuclear technology all flowed from the same 
wellspring: pre-war Europe. Junior states ‘borrowed’ from their seniors, but in time all three 
thermonuclear superpowers came to learn from each other as they recruited each other’s 
scientists and examined each other’s nuclear debris.  
                                                                                   Reed and Stillman, The Nuclear Express, 52 
Today, the non-proliferation system could be described as a sophisticated construction 
founded on international, regional and bilateral agreements and arrangements backed up by 
national legislation and enforcement mechanisms as well. Non-proliferation efforts reflect a 
mix of different factors and objectives. In fact, the non-proliferation system relates directly or 
indirectly to a diversity of ‘adjacent’ initiatives and problems. For instance, disarmament and 
physical security and safety mechanisms for the transfer and storage of chemical, biological 
and nuclear materials and equipment are not disjoint from non-proliferation and trade 
controls for both practical and substantial reasons. First, such objectives emanate from the 
same legal foundations underpinning the non-proliferation system as it is the case with the 
nuclear, biological and chemical disarmament. Second, the non-proliferation system should 
be working complementary to other related elements since failure to achieve for instance, 
physical security and safety objectives or even worst, negligence to consider them could 
negate the effectiveness of the non-proliferation system as a whole. It should be also noted 
that the ‘non-proliferation’ is a politically charged concept shaped inter alia by political 
purposefulness as many other terms used in political science and relating to the international 
security environment. For instance, Bentley when explaining the ‘WMD’ term notes that 
there is no essentialist definition of WMD but a concept constructed to fit specific political 
and institutional aims
74
. 
3.3 The foundations of the non-proliferation system: a ‘dual role’ for 
researchers? 
What are the main principles and elements underpinning the functioning of the non-
proliferation system?  Answering this question demands first of all to study the legal 
foundations of the non-proliferation construction that are the main international treaties and 
conventions. Treaties can be vague and raise multiple interpretations and treaty-parties may 
try to shape or manipulate the legal provisions for their own benefit.  Despite this, the cost of 
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 With the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act by the US Congress in 1954, “the USA, its hands 
now free, and the Soviet Union began to compete in offering nuclear research reactors to strengthen 
ties with friends and allies and to gain favour with the developing countries”. See Fischer, History of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, 29. 
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 Michelle Bentley, “WMD Terrorism: Defining ‘Mass Destruction’ in US Law,” Politics 31 (2011): 
50. Bentley focuses on the legal understandings of the ‘WMD’ term in the US. This doctorate 
provides further examples on the criteria used for designing export control lists. In addition, Section 
3.3 observes that different national interests may influence the non-proliferation policies pursued by 
States.  
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non-compliance or disregard for treaties with almost universal applicability is generally 
deemed as high by State actors. For example, in today’s geopolitical scene countries that 
stand as ‘pariah States’ run the risk of undergoing economic or other sanctions and being 
isolated from a large part of the international community. Therefore, it could be useful to 
shed some light on the main principles and features underlying the functioning of the main 
treaties clarifying also the role of research community vis-à-vis the non-proliferation system.  
A preliminary remark concerns the origins and the initial focus of the non-proliferation 
treaties. Regardless of their date of signature and entry into force, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
75
, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
76
 and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC)
77
 were primarily negotiated and shaped during the post-World 
War II period marked inter alia by the ‘cold-war’ tensions.  Taking into account the 
international security and economic environment of that time it is not surprising that non-
proliferation was targeting mainly State-sponsored proliferation and certain bloc of countries 
instead of terrorist groups and individual States. Notwithstanding that State actors and State-
sponsored arsenals are still of high interest today, the external environment has dramatically 
changed as briefly discussed above. Economic operators are getting increasingly autonomous 
in acting and shaping the international environment changing thereby how the proliferation-
related trade might take place. At the same time terrorist organisations have threatened to use 
nuclear weapons and they have managed to execute attacks involving lethal bacteria and 
toxic gases
78
. Hence, a question raised quite often by scholars and policy-makers on the 
occasion of the various treaty review conferences concerns the extent to which old-aged 
treaties provide a solid and modern legal basis for responding to new challenges and 
addressing new players.  
Second, non-proliferation treaties are centred on three main axes: (1) non-proliferation, (2) 
disarmament and (3) peaceful development of nuclear, biological and chemical technologies. 
Table IV provides a compendious presentation of the main treaty areas clarifying as well the 
most relevant treaty provisions for each of these three axes. With regards to disarmament, the 
BWC -the first multilateral treaty banning an entire category of weapons- and the CWC bind 
the signatory States to eliminate entirely their offensive bio-chemical arsenals and related 
facilities while the NPT is restrained to express the desire of its parties to pursue “a treaty on 
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 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons opened for signature in July 1968 and 
entered into force in March 1970. 
76
 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction opened for signature in 
April 1972 and entered into force in March 1975. 
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 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction opened for signature in January 1993 and entered into 
force in April 1997. 
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 In fact, as a report of Harvard Kennedy School notes WMD terrorism is a real and imminent threat. 
The report reveals that Al Qaeda has not only threatened to use WMD but it has also actively pursued 
to buy, steal or construct WMD. See Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Threat: Hype or Reality? (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard 
Kennedy School, 2010), 2-9, retrieved from: 
 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf. 
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general and complete nuclear disarmament” as well as “to undertake effective measures for 
the cessation of the nuclear arms race”. As concerns the attainment of non-proliferation 
objectives, the situation is rather delicate since the containment of WMD-related technologies 
could hamper the exchange of scientific information and ultimately, the further development 
of nuclear physics, biology and chemistry. From a cooperation perspective, all State-parties 
pledge themselves to share any benefits reaped for the development of peaceful applications 
in nuclear, biological and chemical fields as well as to resolve any source of strife within the 
frameworks provided by the treaties and the UN Charter. Collaborative actions could involve 
the provision of assistance and the deployment of preventive measures especially for those 
States not being in position to achieve enhanced technical capabilities and a high level of 
readiness in safety and security areas.  
Table IV: The non-proliferation treaty system 
What NPT BWC CWC 
Disarmament Article VI Article II  Article I (2)(3)(4)(5) 
Non-proliferation: Articles I,II, III Articles I, III, IV Articles I, IV, V  
Peaceful development: Article IV Article X Article XI 
    
How    
Verification activities: Article III & IAEA 
safeguards 
- Article IV, V &  
Verification Annex 
Export controls: Article  III  Article III Article VI (2) 
Cooperation/capacity 
building: 
Article V/ IAEA 
technical 
cooperation 
Article VII/ 
capacity building 
by ISU 
Article IX, X/ 
capacity building by 
OPCW 
    
Implementing body: IAEA  ISU  OPCW 
 
In practice, all treaty systems commit their parties not to develop, stockpile, use and transfer 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as well as not to transfer sensitive material, 
equipment or assistance pertinent to the development and use of such weapons. To that end, a 
host of implementation measures are required such as: 
 controls in arms and WMD related items and technologies; 
 on-site inspections and monitoring in order to verify -where applicable- the progress 
of destruction of prohibited weapons and, 
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 further verification activities to ensure that nuclear and chemical materials and 
technologies are not used for non-peaceful applications.  
The implementation of the treaties and the observance of their main principles require 
national legislation and enforcement measures. The treaties’ provisions may entail also the 
conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements between national authorities and the 
treaties’ implementing organisations, namely the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Convention (OPCW) and 
the Implementation Support Unit (ISU)
79
.  
Third, international law binds in the first place sovereign States to take the necessary 
measures in order to achieve compliance with its stipulations. Logically, all individuals 
should abide by the implementing laws enacted in their respective jurisdictions and 
consequently, researchers are not excluded from this obligation. It is noteworthy that Article 
VII of the CWC calls each State-party to adopt national measures inter alia “to prohibit 
natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction 
[…] from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State party under this convention”. 
Nonetheless, each treaty represents a unique structure with its own stipulations and means to 
implement them. A non-proliferation treaty can be less controversial or comprehensive 
compared to another due to the distinct problematic and historical course followed in each 
area
80
. The most notable difference concerns the fact that the NPT sets to some extent 
unequal obligations in its parties on the basis of a distinction between recognised Nuclear 
Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) that are not entitled to 
acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons
81
. In addition to this, NNWS are not allowed to 
acquire sensitive nuclear material and equipment even for peaceful purposes unless they have 
concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA
82
.  
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 In 2006, with the 6th review conference, the BWC -the only treaty then without an implementing 
organisation- acquired its Implementation Support Unit (ISU) operating under the UN Office for 
Disarmament Affairs. 
80
 The CWC with its ‘Annex on Implementation and Verification’ represents probably the most 
comprehensive treaty system. 
81
 Article IX of the NPT qualifies as Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) those states which have 
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 
1967. 
82
 In fact, Article III of the NPT provides for the implementation of safeguards by emphasizing three 
issues:  
a.) all NNWS are required to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and 
concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the IAEA’s Statute;  
b.) all NWS undertake not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material 
especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, 
to any NNWS for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject 
to the safeguards;  
c.) finally, it is reiterated the inalienable right, proclaimed in Article IV of the treaty, of all parties to 
the treaty to undertake nuclear research for peaceful purposes in consistence with the obligations set 
forth in the safeguards agreements. To that end, the implementation of safeguards agreements should 
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Another interesting difference concerns the use of the so called ‘general purpose criterion’ for 
defining controlled toxic chemicals and their precursors and, controlled biological agents and 
toxins in the CWC and BWC respectively
83
. Such substances exempt from controls on the 
condition that are intended for peaceful purposes and their types and quantities are consistent 
with such purposes. This provision is considered as an element of a central importance for the 
functioning of the treaties since it allows the unhindered use for peaceful purposes (e.g. 
industry, agricultural, medical, pharmaceutical, research) of otherwise controlled 
substances
84
.  
A further difference concerns the lack of formal declaration and inspection measures for 
implementing the BWC system. On the contrary, the CWC disposes a comprehensive 
verification regime let alone the IAEA’s full-fledged safeguards framework in the nuclear 
area. In relation to this, whereas all treaty systems are equipped with an organisation to 
oversee their implementation the statute, structure and powers of each implementing 
organisation may differ significantly. In broad terms, their competences range from setting 
standards for safety and security to implementing emergency and technical assistance 
projects and from supporting the national implementation of treaty provisions to undertaking 
verifications activities. Also, given that the treaties do take time to evolve, implementing 
organisations usually facilitate negotiations taking place in the review conferences (normally 
every five years) though scientific and preparatory work. Again, the technology monitoring 
capabilities of each treaty vary significantly. For instance, the Scientific Advisory Board of 
the OPCW does not have adequate resources to carry out its mandated functions whereas the 
BWC lacks a forum or mechanism to assess the implications of scientific and technological 
developments
85
. 
With respect to the role of research, the signatories of all three treaty systems are committed 
to promoting the development of peaceful applications of bio-chemical and nuclear 
technologies be it in economic or scientific field. In fact, quite often the treaties use the same 
language for referring to the overarching principle of ensuring the unhindered conduct of 
R&D activities. For example, the signatory parties of both the CWC and the BWC accept that 
the conventions shall be implemented “in a manner designed to avoid hampering the 
economic or technological development of State-parties […] or international co-operation in 
the field of peaceful chemical and biological activities”86. Also, the BWC and the CWC lay 
down that “State-parties have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of 
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
be designed in a way to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the 
signatories or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.  
83
 See Article II and Article I of the CWC and the BWC respectively.  
84
 The CWC specifies in its Schedules 1, 2 and 3 certain chemicals that have been used or can used in 
connection to chemical weapons and that shall be prohibited and/or subject to verification activities.  
85
 Tucker, 2012, 334. 
86
 See Articles VI (11) and X (2) in the CWC and BWC respectively. 
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bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as well as toxic chemicals and precursors for 
peaceful purposes”87.  
This (the atomic) greatest of the destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the 
benefit of all mankind. 
                 ‘Atoms for Peace Speech’, USA President Dwight D. Eisenhower, December 1953 
Likewise, Article IV of the NPT proclaims “the inalienable right of all parties to the treaty to 
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without 
discrimination” observing however, the commitments assumed under the treaty. As it is the 
case with the CWC and BWC, all parties to the NPT “undertake to facilitate international 
cooperation, ‘through the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and 
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”. Furthermore, Article III 
clarifies that the safeguards required under the treaty “shall be implemented in a manner 
designed to comply with Article IV […] and to avoid hampering the economic or 
technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful 
nuclear activities”. To that end, NWS undertake to make available to NNWS, on a non-
discriminatory basis and under appropriate safeguard agreements, “potential benefits from 
any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions”. What’s more, “the charge to NNWS Party 
to the Treaty for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge 
for research and development”88.  
This imperative to reap the benefits of atomic energy preventing however its diversion from 
peaceful uses to military applications had become apparent from the very beginning. Already 
in 1945, the three holders of nuclear know-how (USA, UK, and Canada) had declared their 
intention to share fundamental scientific information to be used for the peaceful development 
of atomic energy with any nation that would fully reciprocate. However, they were opposed 
to the disclosure of detailed information concerning the practical industrial application of 
atomic energy until the devise of effective measures acceptable to all nations and, ensuring 
the peaceful application of the atomic energy
89
. This last argument was based on the still 
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 Article X (1) in the BWC: “The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have 
the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and 
technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful 
purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing 
individually or together with other States or international organisations to the further development and 
application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology for the prevention of disease, or for 
other peaceful purposes”.  
 Article VI (11) of the CWC: “The foregoing provisions shall be implemented in a manner which 
avoids hampering the economic or technological development of SP, and international cooperation in 
the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention including the 
international exchange of scientific and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the 
production, processing or use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under this Convention”. 
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 See Article V of the NPT. 
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 See the “Three Nation Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy", by The President of the US, Harry 
Truman, the Prime Minister of the UK Clement Attlee and the Prime Minister of Canada Mackenzie 
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valid premise that the military exploitation of atomic energy depends, in large part, upon the 
same methods and processes as those required for industrial uses. The need to stem the 
destructive power of nuclear energy and the realisation that technology transfers are rather 
inevitable have shaped over time both the negotiations in the framework of NPT and the role 
of IAEA since its foundation in 1957 and onwards.   
The extent to which State-parties to the treaties have managed to promote the seamless 
development of nuclear, biological and chemical technologies for all compliant countries and 
safeguard peaceful research from misuse is debatable. Especially in the nuclear area, there are 
developing countries questioning the commitment of supplier countries to share technological 
advancements. In this regard, some analysts point out that technologically superior States see 
nuclear technologies ‘as commercial assets which cannot be forced to share with those whom 
they disapprove of or who cannot pay the price’90. Concerning the prevention of misuse of 
peaceful facilities and processes, North Korea -the first and only up to now State to withdraw 
from the NPT- openly accepted in 2005 that safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle capabilities 
developed ostensibly for peaceful purposes had been exploited for the development of 
nuclear weapons. Almost three decades earlier, in 1974, India -presently a non-signatory of 
the NPT- became nuclear by exploding a ‘peaceful’ device after having diverted plutonium 
produced in a reactor provided by Canada for peaceful nuclear research
91
. 
Any criticism to the functioning of the non-proliferation system and identification of 
weaknesses should not be used as an excuse for not complying with it. Ideally, criticism 
could suggest alternatives and ways to increase transparency, accountability and effectiveness 
of the non-proliferation system as a whole. Scientists in particular seem to have a dual role in 
this pursuit of reinforced accountability vis-à-vis non-proliferation objectives. On the one 
hand, researchers themselves have an obligation to comply with the evolving treaties, export 
control regulations, and other security and safety imperatives. On the other hand, they could 
engage in the review of the non-proliferation treaties and subsequent implementing laws with 
a view to enhancing the scientific and technical back-up made available to the non-
proliferation community. The first aspect implies that researchers today face increased 
possibilities to get involved in proliferation-sensitive activities for instance, in the framework 
of international collaborations with other research institutes or partnerships with industrial 
operators. Therefore, they need to become aware of proliferation concerns so as to act 
responsibly in the conduct of their research. The second aspect suggests that researchers and 
academics are well-placed to identify important technological breakthroughs that could 
change the state of play and suggest solutions already from the phase when policies are being 
shaped and formulated. In the last analysis, researchers shall reasonably have a say on issues 
affecting their work and take up initiatives responding to the ‘proliferation problematic’. 
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3.4 Implementing non-proliferation imperatives through export controls  
Implementing the complex system of international non-proliferation treaties and other related 
agreements demands taking up a number of measures for the lawful supply, safe 
transportation and stockpiling of sensitive materials and equipment as well as the rightful 
operation of sensitive nuclear and bio-chemical facilities. Especially for nuclear non-
proliferation, the monitoring of nuclear flows and the verification of the peaceful character of 
nuclear activities pursuant to IAEA safeguards agreements, the control of supply of nuclear 
related material and technology through export controls as well as the physical protection of 
nuclear facilities are all equally important and concern all the processes and activities 
consisting of ‘the nuclear fuel cycle’92. For this doctorate, the focus is on the second element: 
the role of trade controls and the main principles underpinning their functioning. 
Figure I: “The nuclear fuel cycle”93 
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 The various activities associated with the production of electricity from nuclear reactors are 
collectively referred to as the nuclear fuel cycle.  
93
 Pictorial presentation of the nuclear fuel cycle including the relevance of trade control activities. 
See: Filippo Sevini, Nuclear Export Controls and Nuclear Safeguards, Proceedings of the 7
th
 Joint 
ESARDA-INMM Workshop, Aix en Provence, 2011, retrieved from: 
https://esarda.jrc.ec.europa.eu/images/files/2011-workshop-aix/Working-
groups/WG3/Filippo_SEVINI_pa.pdf. 
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Enforcing controls in the export and import of certain commodities is a common practice for 
diverse necessities such as customs duties, fight against the crime (e.g. trafficking in drugs 
and luxury goods) as well as protection of flora and the fauna, public health and cultural 
heritage of a State (e.g. illegal transfers in specimens of wild animals and plants or cultural 
items of national heritage). On top of that, trading small and light arms and other 
conventional arms and munitions as well as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons is 
forbidden or strictly regulated. Such restrictions are frequently referred as Strategic Trade 
Controls (STC). Whereas there is no specific definition clarifying the STC term and 
determining what items should be covered under this concept, it is generally accepted that 
such controls target areas bearing consequences for the national and international security. 
Trade in drugs, diamonds and items that can be used for internal repression and human rights 
infringements could broadly fall under the scope of sensitive trade with security implications, 
too. However, this study grapples with one of the par excellence ‘strategic trade’ areas, 
namely the export of dual-use items and technologies.  
3.4.1 The origins and evolution of trade controls in dual-use items 
Strategic assets are not to be shared or, to be more accurate, are not to be shared with non-
allies. It was largely around this perception that unilateral national export control systems and 
the first multilateral export control regime, to say the ‘Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls’ (CoCom), were built. From the first US Export Control Act in 
1940 intending to save critical items in a pre-war environment and limit the exportation of 
certain materials and equipment (e.g. aeronautic parts, chemicals and minerals) to Imperial 
Japan and, the operation of CoCom (from 1949 till 1994) to restrict the flow of weapons and 
technology to the Soviet Bloc and China, it became clear that items and technology with civil 
applications can be under scrutiny for national and international security concerns
94
. 
Controlling ‘sensitive’ civilian items sounds as a plausible practice if one considers the dual 
character of the nuclear power or the great variety of items and materials -such as common 
industrial chemicals- which can be deadly when used as weapons. Besides, an item or 
technology can be ‘strategic’ in terms of both practical capabilities and economic power 
conferred to its holder. Taking this into account, one could argue that export controls of dual-
use items were intended not only to deprive certain countries from critical technological 
capabilities but also to restrict the availability of economic means required to develop such 
capabilities. Targeted sanctions and embargoes imposed by national, regional and most 
notably international actors (e.g. UN, EU and OSCE sanctions and embargoes) are other 
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 In fact, the CoCom regime was organised on the basis of three control lists:  
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 an atomic energy list including sources of fissionable materials, nuclear reactors, and their 
components and,  
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See Congress of the US, Technology and East-West Trade (Washigton: Office of Technology 
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measures adopted in the name of various national and international interests -including 
proliferation concerns- and having a  great deal of economic consequences. 
The evolution of trade controls is inexorably linked to the development of the non-
proliferation system per se. As explained in section 3.3, the non-proliferation treaties provide 
the legal basis and main impetus for devising mechanisms to control the transfers of WMD 
and their means of delivery as well as materials and technologies which are integral to such 
weapons. The obligation to clarify and implement sometimes ambiguous treaty provisions 
has led to the establishment of relatively agile and informal structures, the ‘international 
export control regimes’ also known as the ‘Multilateral Export Control Regimes’ (MECR).  
For instance, in the nuclear field, the need to clarify certain NPT provisions and implement 
internationally coordinated export controls was firstly illustrated with the creation of an 
informal group, the ‘Nuclear Exporters Committee’ also known as the ‘Zangger 
Committee’95. The Zangger Committee started its deliberations in 1971 with a view to 
clarifying Article III §2 of the NPT
96
. Contrary to the CWC where explicit definitions of 
controlled toxic chemicals and precursors are given, the NPT does not specify what ‘source 
and special fissionable material’ shall mean and how ‘especially designed or prepared (EDP) 
material and equipment for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material’ 
should be understood. The Committee reached in 1972 a first consensus on an illustrative list 
of controlled material and equipment (the so-called ‘trigger list’) as well as conditions of 
supply of such items (safeguards agreements with the IAEA and re-export clause). In fact, the 
fruit of these discussions were two separate memoranda –one on the export of source and 
special fissionable material and one on the exports of other materials and equipment for the 
production of such fissionable material- published for the first time in 1974 by the IAEA as 
Information Circular 209 (INFCIRC/209). The committee has maintained ever since its focus 
on the interpretation of article III of the NPT taking into account technological advancements 
and new needs
97
. 
Export controls have been evolved also as a result of most or least predictable incidents that 
marked the proliferation timeline and changed the international security landscape. As 
Jankowitsch-Prevor notes the export control regimes evolved primarily in response to 
unforeseen events. 
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First, the ‘peaceful’ explosion conducted by India in 1974 demonstrated the need for adoption 
of full-scope safeguards along with enhanced export controls on the basis of common 
guidelines and led to the foundation of the London Suppliers Group, later renamed as the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
98
. The NSG followed and expanded the work done by the 
Zangger Committee. Indeed, “it achieved ab initio a more comprehensive and at the same 
time flexible approach adding further specific procedures and conditions” such as formal 
governmental assurances, physical protection measures and strengthened re-export 
provisions
99
. Second, the discovery of the covert Iraqi nuclear weapons programme in 1992 
brought to the fore the role that dual-use technologies and equipment can play in the 
proliferation of WMD and led to the establishment of an additional set of NSG guidelines 
“for the transfers of dual-use equipment, material, software and related technology, which 
could make potentially a significant contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or 
nuclear explosive activity”100. Most recently, in 2001, terrorist groups demonstrated their 
ability to bring strikes of critical importance and declared also their intention to use WMD in 
a future attack. In response, the NSG reviewed its Guidelines with a view to preventing and 
countering the misuse of nuclear exports for terrorist purposes
101
.  
Likewise, in the bio-chemical field, various incidents have shaped the non-proliferation 
course
102
. For instance, in 1984, it was revealed that chemical weapons used against Iranians 
and Kurds in the context of the Iran- Iraq conflicts had been sourced through legitimate trade 
in chemicals and related civil materials. As a result, two years later the Australia Group (AG), 
the multilateral arrangement for the control of export of certain bio-chemical agents and 
related equipment and manufacturing facilities came into life
103
. Also, the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) controls technologies enabling the delivery of WMD
104
 
whilst the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), the successor of CoCom sets export control norms 
for the transfer of conventional weapons and dual-use items and technologies
105
. These two 
were founded in 1987 and 1996 respectively and complete the ‘quartet’ of informal 
arrangements regulating in a non-legally binding mode the trade of ‘strategic’ technologies 
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that can contribute to the development of WMD, conventional weapons and their means of 
delivery.  
In today’s landscape, the importance given to export controls has been raised as a result of 
the realization that legitimate trade can be used for proliferation purposes and the existence of 
an international security environment susceptible to old and new proliferation risks. The 
revelations about A.Q. Khan’s proliferation network in 2003 and the threats posed by new 
actors such as terrorist organisations have dispelled doubts on the need for implementing 
export controls. The stake actually today is how to modernize and harmonise national trade 
control systems towards the development of a global level playing field ensuring at the same 
time peaceful development of dual-use technologies. The UNSCR 1540 adopted in 2004 goes 
towards this direction by addressing smuggling and terrorist threats and binding all the UN 
Member States to:  
i. develop effective measures to account for and secure sensitive items within their 
borders by establishing also physical protection measures and,  
 
ii. enact national legislation and enforce effective border controls in the transfers of 
sensitive items including through international cooperation when necessary. 
The term ‘sensitive items’ (author’s wording) covers as much WMD as materials and 
delivery systems relating to such weapons that are to say the dual-use items. As a 
consequence, the Resolution obliges all States to implement a large number of measures 
within their States that can affect domestic politics, a step not exemplified in international 
legal tradition
106
. Also, as an instrument adopted under Chapter VII of the UN charter, the 
Resolution is legally binding on all UN Member States. These two elements have led scholars 
to point out that ‘resolution 1540 is one of the broadest legal instruments in the non-
proliferation field’107. Further, the Resolution provides the basis for implementation 
assistance: ‘States in a position to do so’ are invited to ‘offer assistance as appropriate in 
response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, 
implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions’108.  
 
The Security Council decides […] that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to 
establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological 
weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over 
related materials. 
                                                                                                        §3 of the UNSCR 1540 
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Pursuant to the resolution, the so-called ‘1540 Committee’ has been established with the aim 
of overseeing and facilitating the implementation of the resolution’s provisions by the UN 
Member States
109
. UN Member States are required to report legislative and enforcement 
measures undertaken domestically to the Committee which in turn shall be responsible for 
reporting the progress achieved to the Security Council. The contribution of the Resolution to 
the development and consolidation of export control systems can be evaluated mainly 
indirectly. In fact, “over the past decade, Resolution 1540 has become the main driver for the 
establishment and enhancement of export controls by non-members of the international 
export control regimes, and for the mobilisation of funding for capacity building 
purposes”110. For instance, as Shaw mentions, today companies trading in Asia and Near East 
have to deal with new or significantly upgraded export control laws and regulations in China, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, India, Pakistan and the United 
Arabic Emirates and the list of countries with related frameworks continues to grow. In terms 
of awareness, whereas as of October 2004, only 59 States had submitted annual reports, today 
more than 100 States have submitted their reports
111
. This could be an indicator of the 
increasing legitimacy of the resolution among the members of the international community 
and of their compliance performance. That said, the extent to which the ‘1540 reporting 
system’ and the resolution per se provide the robust and rigorous framework needed for the 
international coordination of export controls is questionable. Besides this, the nature of UN 
resolutions is such that further clarifications and national measures are always required for 
implementing general proclamations and provisions.  
 
Overall, the UNSCR 1540 is a landmark document.  It does not determine specific rules and 
channels whereby common goals could be achieved but it sets legally binding requirements 
for the application of trade controls and other security measures by essentially all members of 
the international community. Given the dispersion of dual-use technologies and the 
interrelated problem of foreign availability, the danger of economic undercut is higher and 
sensitive civilian technologies may easier fall in the wrong hands. International cooperation 
and harmonisation promoted largely by the resolution 1540 are important aspects to look at 
for overcoming such challenges. In that regard, enhancing collaboration and developing an 
action plan that lays down specific steps to be taken at international and national level for the 
harmonised implementation of export controls could be an added value to the current global 
framework of export controls.  
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3.4.2 Dual-use trade controls and arms controls  
Continuing this plunge into ‘strategic trade controls’, it is worth to reflect on the relationship 
between export controls in dual-use items and arms. Such an analysis could help one to 
understand inter alia what items are actually targeted by dual-use trade controls. 
Although both trade controls and arms controls satisfy international security and peace and 
stability objectives, they represent distinct legal regimes. Generally speaking, arms and dual-
use export controls originate from different legal sources, associate to a great extent with 
distinct controlled items and technologies and follow distinguishable courses. For instance, in 
the EU, the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP
112
 establishes common rules for the 
exports of military technology and equipment whereas the Council’s Regulation (EC) 
428/2009 provides the common framework under which exports of dual-use items are 
controlled
113
. At international level the newly adopted Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
114
 
establishes a distinct framework ruling the trade in conventional arms -from small arms to 
battle tanks and combat aircrafts- while dual-use items and WMD are addressed by the non-
proliferation treaties and most notably the UNSCR 1540
115
. This approach suggests the 
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providence of policy-makers to keep the two areas separated for practical (mainly the 
differing nature of the items and technologies concerned by each regime) and political 
reasons (the national interests entailed in each area). From a practical perspective, trade in 
arms entails varying patterns and challenges compared to dual-use trade. For example, 
economic operators are evidently aware of the risks inherent to the production of weapons 
and, the relationship between military corporations and national governments is traditionally 
much stronger than with manufactures and exporters of dual-use goods. In political terms, 
“export of conventional arms is an area considered to be close to the heart of national 
sovereignty and a political instrument, much more so than dual-use exports”116. This fact has 
been clearly manifested in the EU context where common rules for arms exports are still 
decided through intergovernmental instruments (Council common decision) whrereas ‘dual-
use trade falls within the EU’s competence (EU regulation adopted under the ‘co-decision 
procedure’)117.  
Nonetheless, overlaps between dual-use and arms trade controls do exist for a number of 
reasons. First, as it will be discussed in part 3.5, ‘dual-use’ items relate not only to bio-
chemical and nuclear weapons but also to conventional arms. This is true due to technical 
linkages between the controlled technologies and, the existing segregation of various policy 
initiatives and it may result in situtations where items with same or similar characteristics 
appear in both conventional and WMD-related control lists
118
. This is for instance, the case 
with the EU dual-use list containing in certain instances, entries regulated also under military 
related frameworks such as the Common Position 2008/944 and the Council regulation 
98/2013 controlling military items and explosives precursors respectively
119
. In fine, the 
overarching objective underpinning both dual-use and arms export controls is to regulate the 
transfers of strategic items that can be used for military purposes be they conventional or 
WMD. Therefore, one could argue that the relationship between dual-use and arms export 
controls is complementary. This is clearly manifestated in the European dual-use and military 
lists. For several entries of the dual-use list there is the phrasing ‘see also military goods 
controls’ referring to the EU common military list and related national military lists120. This 
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exhortation urges inter alia the authority and the exporter to compare between ‘pure’ military 
and dual-use entries in order to verify how certain dual-use items may be used or adapted for 
military uses
121
. Conversely, for some entries of the EU common military list there is a text 
like ‘see [corresponding  entry] on the EU Dual-use list’ with a view to distinguishing items 
with similar technical capabilities governed  however by the dual-use legal framework.  
Second, the staff implementing controls in dual-use items and conventional arms quite 
frequently overlaps or at least emanates from the same ministries and agencies. This is 
primarily valid for customs officers who are called to interdict the illicit trade in both arms 
and dual-use goods as well as in various other products (e.g. drugs, diamonds, luxury goods) 
as mentioned in the beginning of the chapter. Third, non-proliferation, disarmament and arms 
controls are all closely related meaning that they satisfy the same security-associated 
imperatives and hence, they should not be addressed in sharp disconnection. Ultimately, what 
appears as an overarching need is some degree of coordination among the different ‘strategic’ 
trade control frameworks and also between them and further policy initiatives and 
mechanisms satisfying broader security and safety concerns such as ‘CBRN-E 
preparedness’122. 
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3.4.3 The main attributes of trade controls today 
So far, it was explained why export controls are necessary instruments for implementing non-
proliferation objectives, how they have been evolved over time and what sort of items may 
target. It is prudent to clarify now how trade controls of dual-use items and technologies are 
implemented.  
What is a trade control system? To begin with, trade controls are built upon the principle 
that any ‘export’ of a controlled item outside the boundaries of a certain country or a union of 
countries requires an export license. ‘Export’ means the physical shipment of controlled 
items, technologies and software (by air, sea or land) or the electronic transmission of such 
‘goods’. Passing on information through interpersonal contacts is also covered under the 
term. In certain cases, a ‘deemed export’ may also take place when items or technology are 
transferred to foreigners situated within the country imposing such a requirement (see US 
controls chapter 5). Export control rules may require from recipients of controlled technology 
not to export such technology outside the boundaries of the importing State unless they have 
first obtain the permission of the initial exporting State (re-export clause)
123
. On top of this, § 
3(d) of the resolution 1540 commits UN Member States to adopt legislation and enforce 
controls in the transit, trans-shipment and re-export of WMD and related materials as well as 
in the provision of funds and services related to such exporting procedures and intermediary 
transactions (e.g. brokering and transporting activities). Consequently, the application of 
export controls may relate to complex legal issues such as the implementation of 
extraterritorial provisions and the applicability of multiple jurisdictions. 
The implementation of export controls presupposes the development of a licensing system 
and the establishment of certain criteria, rules and procedures for controlling sensitive items. 
Despite cooperation and coordination actions undertaken mainly in the framework of the 
major international export control regimes or other harmonisation efforts at regional level, 
each State implements its own system maintaining sometimes different legal definitions and 
trade provisions. This is particularly valid for enforcement aspects of export controls. Each 
State disposes its own customs system, penal and sanctions legislation as well as prosecution 
procedures.  In that respect, organisations such as the World Customs Organisation (WCO) 
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have a useful role to play in stepping up collaboration and promoting common rules and 
principles at international level
124
.   
What are the main elements of a trade control system? The 1540 Committee has 
developed matrices representing the requirements of the resolution alongside with measures -
including export controls- that States may consider to take in respect of these requirements
125
. 
The committee has adopted a rather maximalist approach by compiling a long list of 
measures which however should be seen only as a reference tool
126
. In other words, it is 
hardly possible for a State to implement the matrix in its entirety. Generally speaking, a trade 
control system comprises a multiplicity of elements and processes and most probably the 
following ones
127
: 
 basic legal act 
 licensing procedures including general licensing; 
 control lists; 
 lists of proscribed and/or of low risk destinations; 
 risk assessment procedures; 
 information exchange and consultation mechanisms; 
 a system of enforcement and penalties and, 
 outreach activities to potential exporters.  
It is also worth remarking that all modern trade control systems provide for the 
implementation of a ‘catch-all’ mechanism controlling the export of non-listed dual-use items 
when certain conditions are met. Export of items with close technical parameters to the 
controlled ones may be targeted by export controls in respect of a given end-use and/or end-
user. The imperative for implementing end-user controls including end-user certificates and 
post-shipment proofs is acknowledged also in the resolution 1540
128
. Also, in general, UN 
sanctions and embargoes constitute a common reference for compiling lists of proliferation 
sensitive destinations, entities and individuals. Again, national perceptions and interests may 
guide States to impose export control restrictions on other destinations as well. Conversely, 
for low risk destinations and transactions, export control exemptions and privileged treatment 
are usually applicable. In such cases, trade control systems will normally place further 
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compliance obligations in those exporters taking advantage of available trade facilitations in 
each country.  
What are the main trends today? Having broadly described the essential components of an 
export control system, it is useful to pinpoint the main trends underlying the functioning of 
trade controls today. First of all, export controls are grappling with challenges shaping the 
international environment. They are getting more sophisticated in terms of structures and 
mechanisms (e.g. the catch-all mechanism and risk-based approach); more stringent by 
controlling a wider range of items and activities (e.g. inclusion of intangible transfers, transit 
and brokering) and also, they have been given a legally binding status at international level 
with the adoption of resolution 1540. Individuals, civilian society and especially firms and 
academia seem to have an increasingly important role to play in the export controls context. 
Such key stakeholders need to be vigilant and proactive so that to observe their legal 
obligations and benefit the non-proliferation system. In their turn, State authorities have to 
make stakeholders aware of such legal and social obligations and engage them in the policy 
formulation and implementation. Again, resolution 1540 has captured this demand by 
requiring from UN members “to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their 
obligations under such laws”129.  
Furthermore, it seems that trade controls are shifting from State-centric approaches and 
obsolete divides between Western and Eastern campuses towards more modern approaches 
promoting international homogenisation and cooperation. Resolution 1540 has flagged the 
necessity to change course by calling upon all UN Member States “to take cooperative action 
to prevent illicit trafficking in WMD, their means of delivery, and related materials”130. 
Despite this, there are still sources of dispute and, the smooth evolution of the non-
proliferation system can be undermined in the name of national interests and long-lasting 
sources of disruption. One could mention for instance, the North-South divide between 
developed and developing countries intensified in the nuclear field with the ‘discrimination’ 
between nuclear haves and have-nots
131
. A ‘perceptual divide’ also, as seen by Latham and 
Bow had an impact on the relations between suppliers and recipients Sates of controlled 
technologies in the context of international export control regimes
132
. As it will be shown 
later in the discussion of international export control regimes and the examination of the EU 
trade control system, certain issues and well-known weaknesses are yet to be fully addressed.  
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Nevertheless, there are indications that progressively both developed and developing 
countries agree on this the importance of promoting security through the implementation of 
export controls. From the one part, traditional supplier countries are willing to offer 
assistance and cooperate on equal footing with emerging economies and countries with 
restricted resources.  On the other hand, non-western countries have increasingly realised the 
need to take up non-proliferation and counter-proliferation actions including export controls. 
Cooperation and capacity building activities such as the US Export Control and Related 
Border Security Programme
133
 (EXBS) or the EU Cooperation in Dual-use Export Control 
Programme
134
 are telling examples on how bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the export 
control field develops. Turpen and other scholars have neatly presented the challenges 
shaping the international environment and changing the rules of the play for export controls 
and the non-proliferation system in general
135
. In response to this, moving from a denial 
technology approach to a minimum standard of technology governance at international level 
can be crucial
136
. In order to succeed in this, the private sector must work in tandem with 
governments so as to enable the transitioning from a reliance on technology denial to an 
increased focus on comprehensive technology governance
137
. The UN security resolution sets 
the basis and provides the appropriate mandate for materialising such a shift. However, the 
actual implementation of such an approach requires further initiatives at both national and 
international levels. 
3.5 Identifying constraints posed by the Multilateral Export Control 
Regimes 
‘Suppliers-focused, obscure decision-making, non-universal, west-oriented’: These are some 
of the accusations charged to the Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECR). It is true that 
the operation of these international arrangements -some scholars contend the term 
international- confirms in many ways the existence of the problems mentioned above
138
. 
Decision-making procedures, plenary meetings and technical discussions take place behind 
closed doors and a certain degree of secrecy and confidentiality is required. The decision-
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making is consensus-based and so is the admission of new members. Besides, MECR cannot 
be considered as truly international since the participating States originate from a relatively 
restricted number of States typically supplier countries. In that regard, some Southern states 
still see MECRs as illegitimate, unnecessary and discriminatory clubs whose purpose is to 
deny developing nations the commercial technology they need
139
. Despite these criticisms, it 
is also true that MECR have fostered national export controls by setting principal norms and 
consolidating a common export control culture. Anecdotal evidence and empirical evidence 
gathered imply that national export controls have had a significant effect in slowing the 
WMD proliferation
140
. Therefore, one cannot but admit that MECR have contributed to this 
outcome by cooridnating and harmonising national export control regulations.  
The regimes own their existence to the determination of like-minded States to enhance the 
regional and international security and stability in accordance with the principles of the UN 
Charter and the relevant international treaties and regional agreements. If one tries to identify 
direct obligations posed by multilateral arrangements for exporters and more particularly for 
public research institutes and academia will have a great difficulty to list any. “Within these 
regimes, all existing restrictions upon manufacture, possession and trafficking in weapons 
related technologies are addressed to States”141. The NSG for instance, use quite frequently 
the term ‘suppliers’ in its guidelines referring to supplier countries that have voluntary agreed 
to take on measures and comply with a number of rules set for the ‘transfers’ of nuclear and 
related dual-use items. Also, the MTCR and the AG use exactly the same wording in 
clarifying that it is within national discretion of the exporting State to implement and decide 
on the export of controlled items. The MTCR in §1 of its guidelines clarifies that the 
governments will implement the Guidelines in accordance with national legislation and §2 
sets forth that the decision to transfer remains the sole and sovereign judgment of the 
governments. The same wording is used in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the AG. It comes out that 
all regimes address export restrictions in principle to States. From a pragmatic point of view, 
this is an anticipated approach since international security norms used to be and remain 
largely State-centric.  
“The MECR are based upon non-binding foundational documents, yet have elements of 
institutional structure such as regularized meetings, sophisticated information sharing 
networks and procedures for continuing norm generation”142. Although wholly independent 
each other, all multilateral frameworks regulating the export of sensitive items and 
technologies have certain goals and mechanisms in common. The primary purpose is to 
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coordinate and harmonise national export control policies. To that end, all regimes build upon 
basic guidelines setting rules for the export of items and information included in controlled 
lists established again by the regimes. 
Each regime clarifies in its Guidelines the scope and main purpose of controls and sets 
principles to be observed and criteria to be met for the control of exports of sensitive items by 
State authorities: 
I. The NSG seeks to avert the proliferation of nuclear weapons by establishing two sets of 
guidelines; simply put, the NSG differentiates between guidelines targeting what it considers 
as ‘nuclear transfers’ (trigger list items) and guidelines for the ‘transfers of nuclear related 
dual-use equipment, materials, software and related technology’. According to the first set of 
NSG Guidelines (INFCIRC/254, Part 1) concerning items with a clear fuel cycle utility the 
participating governments agree on certain measures and formal governmental assurances to 
be asked as a prerequisite for transfers to NNWS
143
.  In fact, the supplier States are required 
to consider a number of pre-conditions to be fulfilled from the recipient States. These 
requirements range from the implementation of effective export controls to the application of 
IAEA safeguards agreements and the fulfilment of certain levels of physical protection and 
safety. According to the second set of Guidelines (INFCIRC/254, Part 2), supplier States 
should exercise a policy of restriction –by adopting licensing regulations, enforcement 
measures and penalties for violations- for items and technology that could contribute to a 
‘nuclear explosive activity’, an ‘unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity’ or acts of nuclear 
terrorism
144
. 
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water produced therefrom; or where any such obligation is not met. 
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II. The AG controls the ‘transfer’145 of equipment, materials, technology and software that 
could contribute to chemical and biological weapon (CBW) activities including tangible and 
intangible transfers that could enhance the CBW capabilities of both States and non-State 
actors
146
. 
III. The MTCR controls the transfers of delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) 
including their components that could enable the launch of WMD
147
. 
IV. Last, the WA has a broader role by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in 
the transfers of both conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies that could 
contribute in the development or enhancement of military capabilities thus preventing 
destabilising accumulations and acquisitions of such items by terrorists
148
.   
Common elements and distinct characteristics: First, as it was implied from the onset, 
MECR are structured along similar main lines and logics albeit they are not equally 
comprehensive. The WA for instance, has adopted along with its main guidelines a number of 
further guiding documents and best practices dealing with more specific issues and ranging 
from common rules for exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and re-exports of 
conventional weapons to guidance on exports of non-listed dual-use items and ITT 
controls
149
.  Regardless of any differences, all regimes set in their respective basic guidelines 
a number of criteria against which national authorities should evaluate the exports in question 
most frequently on a case-by-case basis
150
. Not surprisingly, these criteria emphasise, 
amongst other factors, the compliance records with the non-proliferation law of the recipient 
State, the plausibility of end-use and end-user for a stated export  as well as  the risk of 
diversion.  Due attention must be shown also in evaluating the risk of misuse by terrorist 
groups and individuals. 
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Second, another element that is ubiquitous in the guidelines of the different regimes is the 
possibility to apply catch-all controls for non-listed items that are or may be intended, in their 
entirety or in part, for a controlled end-use. This issue relates to the very nature of the dual-
use problem.  The factor of ‘intent’ or otherwise how a certain item will be used points to the 
fact that control lists do not cover all the dual-use items but only the most sensitive ones. A 
relevant example can be drawn from the MTCR.  According to its provisions complete rocket 
systems -including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets- 
capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of minimum 300 km are under 
control. However, in paragraph 2 of its Guidelines it is made clear that “particular restraint 
will be exercised in the consideration of transfers of any items in the Annex, or of any 
missile, whether or not in Annex, if the government judges on the basis of all available, 
persuasive information […] that they are intend to be used for the delivery of WMD and there 
will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers”. 
A third element that appears quite commonly in the framework of regimes is a kind of re-
transfer or re-export provision whereby the recipients of controlled items and technology 
undertake to provide sufficient assurances that in case of a future re-export the same 
conditions will apply as those required by the supplier for the initial transfer. In certain 
instances, the consent of the original supplier may be necessary for any further transfer of the 
items to another country. Last, consultation mechanisms and information exchange 
procedures are laid out in an effort to resolve possible implementation problems, verify 
alleged violations of the guidelines and especially to avoid situations where a participating 
State authorise an essentially identical transaction already denied by another supplier country 
(the ‘no-undercut principle’).  
The structure of the control lists: Most regimes make a differentiation between most and 
least sensitive items. The NSG as explained above maintains two different lists corresponding 
to and governed by Part 1 and Part 2 of its Guidelines. Roughly speaking, regardless of the 
differentiation between the ‘trigger list’ for nuclear transfers and the dual-use list for nuclear 
related dual-use transfers, all controlled items are inherently dual-use in nature. The EU dual-
use list groups ‘trigger list items’ as category 0 items while the rest are classified under other 
categories according to their function
151
. The WA establishes a consolidated list separated in 
two sections containing dual-use and munitions items respectively
152
. In addition to this, it 
determines subsets of sensitive and most sensitive dual-use items to which special attention 
should be drawn. The EU regulation relies on the WA dual-use section for establishing and 
keeping abreast its dual-use list. In practice, the EU list includes entries adopted by other 
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regimes only when these are not precisely included in the WA list. The AG list is separated in 
5 sections controlling chemical precursors, pathogens and toxins as well as related equipment 
and software
153
. In practice, the AG lists include materials, items and technologies controlled 
under the BWC and the CWC with some additions of further civil items considered as having 
some potential for misuse
154
. Finally, the MTCR Equipment, Software and Technology 
Annex sets a main distinction between ‘category I items’ of greatest sensitivity and ‘category 
II items’ of lesser sensitivity155. For the transfers of category I items, the MTCR Guidelines 
make clear that there should be a strong presumption to deny authorisations regardless of the 
purpose of their export. 
The content of the control lists: What are the criteria used for including an item on the lists? 
First, the understanding of ‘dual-use’ provided in the frameworks of WA and the NSG hint at 
an element of a critical contribution (see ‘major or key element’ and ‘major contribution’) for 
the development of WMD or other military uses. Most importantly, the WA sets also some 
general criteria for evaluating the eligibility of a dual-use item to be controlled
156
:  
a) the foreign availability outside the participating States  
b) the ability to control effectively the export of goods  
c) the ability to make a clear and objective specification of the item and, 
d) if the item is controlled by another regime.  
In relation to the last factor, the WA clarifies that “items controlled by another regime should 
not normally qualify to be controlled by the WA unless additional coverage proves to be 
necessary according to the purposes of the WA, or when concerns and objectives are not 
identical
157
.  
Second, the level of coordination between the different regimes in terms of composition of 
the lists seems to be low. The EU list of dual-use items incorporating the different regimes’ 
lists provides some representative examples. For instance, hot isostatic presses with close 
characteristics are subject to controls under the WA (2B004), the MTCR (2B104) and the 
NSG (2B204). Also, machine tools with slightly different technical parameters are controlled 
under two distinct entries (2B001b. and 2B201a.) pursuant to controls set by the WA and 
NSG respectively. Such entries originating from different regimes and having similar or even 
identical technical parameters are normally acknowledged in the dual-use list by references to 
other relevant controlled entries. Experts participating in the negotiations under the different 
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regimes, attribute this weakness to achieve a tighter level of coordination to the lack of 
established procedures as well as the absence of fundamental criteria against which dual-use 
items could be evaluated. Moreover, MECR do not always share the same participating 
members thus, the coordination could be an even more challenging process.  
Third, the inclusion of a dual-use item on the control lists depends largely on its technical 
specifications and capabilities. In fact, normally, the regimes set very specific thresholds for 
the controlled items. Also, as suggested in chapter 3.4.2, dual-use items may associate with 
both conventional arms and WMD. The MTCR offers some easily perceived examples in 
support of this twofold argument. In principle, items covered under the MTCR such as 
missiles and rockets are traditionally considered as military items and they are capable of 
delivering both conventional and nuclear and bio-chemical weapons. Nevertheless, MTCR 
items and relating technologies may also have civil applications for instance in the aviation 
industry.  Furthermore, Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs) and sounding rockets are used by the 
European Space Agency for space research and exploration. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs) are a great example of a product originally developed for military purposes and 
subsequently utilised for diverse civil applications (from recreational to human security 
purposes). In that regard, the MTCR controls only certain types of UAVs and most certainly 
those being capable of delivering at least a 500 kg ‘payload’ to a ‘range’ of at least 300 km. 
Despite this, UAVs with specifications under the ones mentioned above can be also 
controlled provided that they bear some specific characteristics such as an autonomous flight 
control, navigation capability and an aerosol dispensing system/mechanism with a capacity 
greater than 20 litres (for the precise specifications see entry 19.A.3. of the MTCR). 
Terminology used in the control lists: Most interestingly, terminology and explanatory 
notes used by MECR in the control lists and related annexes are usually very similar. On top 
of this, terms and notes specified by the MECR are subsequently endorsed and embedded in 
the national and regional control lists. This is definitely the case for the control list and the 
definitions of technical terms used at the EU level. It also implies that the source of 
sometimes controversial provisions resides in decisions taken in the framework of regimes. 
Consequently, studying the terms and notes relating to research activities and defined 
originally by the regimes could be of interest to the study. 
The previous chapters relied on the dictionary definition of technology “as the practical 
application of knowledge in a given area”. Under this understanding, equipment, software 
and know-how are all technological expressions. However, dictionary definitions or, 
‘common understanding’ are not necessarily identical with legal definitions of terms used in 
export controls and any other legislation. The MECR and the EU regulation build their lists 
on the basis of four categories: a) equipment b) materials c) software and d) technology
158
. 
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a) systems, equipment and components 
b) test, inspection and production equipment 
c) materials 
d) software  
e) technology 
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Under this categorisation, all regimes understand invariably technology as “the specific 
information necessary for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of a [controlled] 
product
159
. Technology may take the form of ‘technical data’ or ‘technical assistance and 
software is defined as “a collection of one or more ‘programmes’ or ‘micro-programmes’ 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression”. The fact that technical assistance falls within 
the scope of such regimes and subsequently within the scope of national export controls is 
particularly interesting from a research point of view. Researchers should be vigilant not only 
when transfer or export controlled materials, equipment, data and software but also when they 
provide technical assistance. Activities like training and consulting services are mentioned 
explicitly among the forms that technical assistance may take and are chiefly conducted by 
scientists and researchers.  
‘Development’ shall mean technology related to all stages prior to serial production, such as: 
design, design research, design analyses, design concepts, assembly and testing of prototypes, 
pilot production schemes, design data, process of transforming design data into a product, 
configuration design, integration design, layouts.  
‘Production’ shall mean all production stages, such as: product engineering, manufacture, 
integration, assembly (mounting), inspection, testing, and quality assurance. 
‘Use’ shall mean as operation, installation (including on-site installation), maintenance 
(checking), repair, overhaul and refurbishing.  
‘Technical data’ may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, 
tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded 
on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories. 
‘Technical assistance’ may take forms, such as:  instruction, skills, training, working 
knowledge, consulting services. ‘Technical assistance’ includes oral forms of assistance. 
‘Technical assistance’ may involve transfer of ‘technical data’. 
The question that comes out here is when technology and software are controlled. All 
regimes clarify that the export of technology which is ‘directly associated’ or ‘required’ for 
the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of controlled items should be under scrutiny and 
should be controlled according to the provisions in each category.  
What ‘directly associated’ means -a wording used by the MTCR and NSG- is not defined. 
Instead, the WA clarifies that ‘required’ technology “refers only to that portion of technology 
which is peculiarly responsible for achieving or exceeding the controlled performance levels, 
characteristics or functions and such required technology may be shared by different 
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products”160. One can assume that the phrasing ‘directly associated’ warrants a similar 
interpretation. In any case, determining whether a given technology or software is critical 
enough to bring an export authorisation must require a certain level of technical expertise by 
the implementing national authorities.  
A subsequent question is whether there are any exemptions. First of all, “technology which is 
the minimum necessary for the installation, operation, maintenance (checking) or repair of 
those items which are not controlled or whose export has been authorised”  falls out of the 
scope of controls unless it is specified otherwise. Most interestingly, controls do not apply to 
technology that is ‘in the public domain’, constitutes ‘basic scientific research’ or is the 
‘minimum necessary information for patent applications’. This provision, endorsed by all 
MECR, is the only occasion where scientific research is directly addressed
161
.  
‘In the public domain’ is defined invariably by MECRs as:  “technology which has been 
made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination”162. ‘Basic scientific’ 
research is defined accordingly to the definition given by the Frascati Manual and explained 
in chapter 2 of the study. It is further noted that copyright restrictions do not remove 
technology or software from being ‘in the public domain’. Similarly, software which is 
‘generally available to the public’163, ‘in the public domain’ or, the “minimum necessary 
‘object code’ for the installation, operation, maintenance (checking) or repair of those items 
whose export has been authorised shall be excluded from the controls”164.  
The ‘public domain’ exemption suggests the providence of the legislator to avoid 
unnecessary controls of information and technology that is already widely available relieving 
regulators and exporters from undue administrative burden. Basic scientific research is to be 
published and can be in principle harmless if not applied for specific uses. It seems that such 
provisions were adopted bearing also in mind the preservation of ‘academic freedom’ and 
above all the free circulation of information. However, their practical implementation in 
today’s environment is particularly cumbersome for two reasons. First, there is no strict 
distinction between basic and applied research and second, information can be easily released 
and rapidly spread into the ‘public domain’ prior to being evaluated as harmless or not.  
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As regards technology controls, another provision endorsed by all MECR clarifies that 
technology directly associated to a controlled item will be subject to as great degree of 
scrutiny and control as will the item itself, to the extent permitted by national legislation
165
. 
This second part of the note is quite meaningful. It seems that the wording ‘to the extent 
permitted by national legislation’ acknowledges that technology controls can be curved 
within certain limits. Setting licensing procedures for the exchange of information or, 
intercepting for instance, the electronic transfer of information are controversial measures 
undertaken only in exceptional cases as provided by the national law of each country. It arises 
that the MECR set the general framework for implementing technology controls. Each 
participating State has the discretion to decide upon the severity of such technology controls.  
What is the role of MECR towards research? The Guidelines of the regimes do not pay 
any special attention in clarifying the role of export controls vis-à-vis research activities.  
However, they mention that the laid out provisions are not designed to impede international 
cooperation
166
. Logically, international cooperation includes R&D activities taking place in 
both industrial and academic context. The AG refers directly to Article X of the BWC and 
Article XI of the CWC proclaiming the treaties’ providence to avoid hampering the 
international exchange of scientific and technical information and use of dual-use material 
and equipment for peaceful purposes. Accordingly, the dual-use lists adopted by the regimes 
reflect a precaution to exclude equipment and technologies if they relate to peaceful or 
protective purposes
167
.  
As explained above, multilateral export regimes call State actors to take on national measures 
which subsequently bring legal obligations for private actors such as exporting firms and 
their employees and hence, it is only indirectly that individual actors and organisations are 
subject to such multilaterally agreed provisions. Logically, academia and research institutions 
are not excluded by such export control provisions unless it is mentioned otherwise. In that 
regard, certain international arrangements provide ‘best practice’ documents addressed 
directly to economic operators. The NSG ‘Good Practices for Corporate Standards to Support 
the Efforts of the International Community in the Non-proliferation of WMD’ and the WA 
‘Best Practice Guidelines on Internal Compliance Programmes’ set forth main principles and 
certain standards to be achieved by corporations. Clearly, such guidance documents do not 
have legal binding force but they influence to some extent what undertakings are expected to 
have in place in respect to compliance with export controls. Again academia and research 
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community are not specifically addressed in these documents. At least, one can argue that 
compliance models tailored to industry may constitute a source of inspiration for research 
settings as well. 
Last, technology controls -as defined by related notes and provisions- concern activities and 
processes in which, traditionally, the involvement of researchers can be very likely. On top of 
that, the regimes do not provide any specific guidance with regards to the implementation of 
the ‘basic scientific research’ and ‘in the public domain’ decontrols for research organisations 
and academia. Therefore, one could seek for a methodology or other guidance tool for 
evaluating sensitive research in the respective national implementing laws. 
3.6 The problem of agreeing on a common understanding of ‘dual-use’ 
Prior to focusing on the constraints posed by the European trade control system in the 
conduct of research, it is prudent to examine what ‘dual-use’ might mean. The study grapples 
with what can be called as the ‘dual-use problem’: peaceful uses versus military uses; free 
trade versus restrained trade; free research versus restricted research. In line with this, one of 
the secondary questions set in chapter 1 requires to define what dual-use research means in 
the export controls context. Such s task presupposes to clarify in the first place the ‘dual-use’ 
term.  
Undoubtedly, the ‘dual-use’ concept must have concerned to some extent any scholar 
working in the export controls field. However, this is not solely a matter of academic interest. 
Failure to agree on a clear dual-use definition may result in misunderstandings within the 
export controls community and confusion among professionals working directly or indirectly 
in the non-proliferation area
168
. On top of that, it may be the source of legal ambiguities and 
eventually, it may result in a weakness of those subject to export controls to understand 
properly the dual-use problematic and comply with the obligations set in the related law. 
Quite recently, the discussion on the dual-use concept has been set high on the agenda within 
the EU circles also due to the review process of the EU trade control system that is underway. 
Is there an appropriate definition for dual-use goods in the EU Regulation? How broad such a 
definition should be and what sort of controls may include? Do the MECR or other 
international laws provide for a clear definition to be used universally?  The following section 
seeks to explore how commonly the dual-use term is interpreted in the non-proliferation 
community and how differently is understood in different contexts.  
There are mainly three different contexts where the term ‘dual-use’ can be encountered:   
 the non-proliferation and export controls area; 
 the synergies between military/defence and civil industry and,  
 the research ethics discourse (chiefly in life sciences).  
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Irrespective of this categorisation, the adjective ‘dual’ refers to the dual nature of an item and 
most commonly describes items having apart from civil uses some potential for military uses, 
too.  
In the international non-proliferation law with either legally (‘hard ‘law) or politically 
binding force (‘soft’ law) there is no single definition of dual-use. ‘Dual-use items’ are 
explicitly mentioned or merely denoted by legal texts illuminating quite often different 
aspects of the concept. Neither the international non-proliferation treaties nor the UNSCR 
1540 do explicitly use the term. It is clear though that the resolution 1540 refers to the dual-
use items when states that “the Security Council is gravely concerned by the threat of illicit 
trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and 
related materials which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation […] and poses a 
threat to international peace and security”. The UNSCR 1540 does not omit to define also 
what ‘related materials’ shall mean: “materials, equipment and technology covered by 
relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which 
could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons and their means of delivery”. 
Also, as Q. Michel and A. Viski have noted
169
, the dual-use term from 2002 onwards has 
been repeatedly used by the UN Generally Assembly in its resolutions inviting the UN 
Member States to enact legislation and exercise effective control over the transfers of arms, 
military equipment and dual-use goods and technologies
170
.  
The definitions provided by the export control regimes are rather heterogeneous. Each regime 
looks at the dual-use problematic through its own lens highlighting those aspects that are 
most relevant for the given regime. The NSG for instance, connects dual-use items to “certain 
equipment, materials, software and related technology that could make a major contribution 
to ‘a nuclear explosive activity’, an ‘unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle’ or ‘acts of nuclear 
terrorism’ without defining further the term171. The Wassenaar Arrangement provides that 
“dual-use goods and technologies to be controlled are those which are major or key elements 
for the indigenous development, production, use or enhancement of military capabilities”172. 
Simply put, the WA maintains a holistic approach in its definition without making any direct 
reference to WMD uses. Reasonably, dual-use goods may contribute in the development or 
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enhancement of military capabilities fit for both conventional and ‘mass destruction’ 
weapons. That said, it is noteworthy that the WA definition does not make any explicit 
reference to the possibility of dual-use items to assist in the development of WMD. The AG 
uses the dual-use term in its control lists and Guidelines without clarifying elsewhere how 
‘dual-use’ should be understood173.  
 
At the European level, the dual-use regulation (Article 2) stipulates that dual-use goods shall 
mean: 
“items, including software and technology, which can be used for both civil and military 
purposes, and shall include all goods which can be used for both non-explosive uses and 
assisting in any way in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices”. 
It seems that the European perception of ‘dual-use’ builds upon two distinctions: civil versus 
military purposes and non-explosive versus explosive nuclear uses. While both contrasts 
describe items that can be used for both peaceful and non-peaceful uses, the definition falls 
short of providing a clear understanding. Does the duality refer exclusively or primarily to 
items and technologies that could contribute to the design, development, production or use of 
WMD as the UNSCR 1540 suggests?
174
 Does the adjective ‘military’ refer to dual-use items 
relating to conventional weapons as well? Why ultimately biological and chemical weapons 
or simply WMD in general are not explicitly mentioned in the definition? A thorough 
examination of the provisions of the Regulation confirms that the main driver of the EU dual-
use controls is to impede the proliferation and use of WMD by unlawful actors. As a result, 
one could expect that the main focus is on items and technologies that have primarily civil 
applications albeit can potentially contribute to the development of WMD and in certain 
instances to conventional weapons. Given the absence of a common definition for dual-use 
goods at European or international level, dual-use controls are largely list based.  
Clarifying the dual-use concept requires taking into account what is actually on the lists. 
However, if one tries to decode the dual-use problematic on the basis of the control lists he 
will find himself in front of a challenging situation for mainly two reasons. First, the 
examination of the lists demands high technical expertise. It is characteristic that the 
compilation of lists is considered as an arduous task for those experts involved in the 
technical discussions in the framework of the multilateral regimes. Second, the items 
concerned represent a great variety of technologies transcending very different types of 
technology. Indicatively, the EU dual-use list incorporates a wide spectrum of goods and 
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technologies ranging from metals, alloys and ceramic material to machines tools and 
industrial equipment and from telecommunications equipment to optical sensors and satellite 
navigation systems. Controlled items are certainly not limited to the NSG ‘trigger list items’ 
or chemical and biological agents. Hence, it seems that dual-use trade controls have a broad 
coverage of critical commodities. It should not be overlooked that the EU relies on the WA 
list as a basis for compiling its dual-use list. The WA as the successor of the CoCom has in 
all likelihood maintained a broad scope for its dual-use list not strictly confined to WMD 
proliferation
175
.  
The second occurrence of the ‘dual-use’ resides in the interactions between military/defence 
and civil industry. From this perspective, the term is used to describe technologies and items 
that originate from either military or civilian industry and can have applications in whichever 
area. As Gallart mentions historically there is a shift of focus from R&D outputs derived from 
military industry and applied for civilian purposes (spin-off) to technological developments 
occurring elsewhere in the economy and exploited for the benefit of military production 
(spin-in)”176. As a result, policy-makers at European and national levels who are not directly 
concerned by proliferation objectives perceive the dual-use problematic as a question of how 
to better develop synergies between defence and civil industries exploiting thereby the 
potential of dual-use research for reinforcing innovation. For instance, the European 
Commission Communication ‘Towards a more Competitive and Efficient Defence and 
Security Sector’ suggests ways to better exploit synergies between civil oriented and defence 
associated research for boosting the European defence sector and enhancing the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
177
. Among the actions set is to enhance the coordination 
between the security theme of the 7
th
 Framework Programme for Research and Technological 
Development (FP7) and other defence related research activities in the EU
178
. Promoting and 
funding dual-use research in cyber security, CBRNE detection and space exploration has 
been already the focus of different initiatives and it is expected to grow further also with the 
follow-up of the FP7 under the last framework programme for funding innovative research in 
the EU, the ‘Horizon 2020’179. However, as noted in the Communication, the H2020 has an 
exclusive focus on civil applications and thus, the Commission will need to establish 
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complementary channels to benefit defence and security R&D
180
. As a consequence, when 
EU experts mention that a percentage of about 30% of the FP7 had a dual-use focus, they do 
not refer necessarily to controlled dual-use technologies. A subsequent question to consider 
here is to what extent different professional communities understand the dual-use problematic 
in the same way. 
Logically, there should be a correlation between technologies included in the dual-use lists 
and the dual-use technologies stemming from the interactions between civil and military 
applications. As described in chapter 3.4.3, the control of an item as dual-use is based on 
specific technical parameters and the potential risks posed by a given transaction. In this 
sense, a question such as whether a product has been initially developed by a defence or civil 
industry is a relevant one but not the most important. In practice, technologies and equipment 
developed originally for military uses but having civil applications or the reverse can be 
controlled under arms control, dual-use export controls or other security related instruments 
or, it may not be controlled at all. From an export control perspective, defining dual-use on 
the basis of such a criterion could be rather impossible for three reasons. First, within large 
diversified firms, it is common for R&D to be conducted for both military and civil goals.  
Second, at the moment there is no mapping of the dual-use industry at least at the EU level. 
Third, the inclusion of an item on a dual-use list relates to certain technical standards rather 
than a mere distinction on the basis of who is the economic operator or the organisation 
conducting research and trade activities each time. 
The third occasion where the dual-use term can be found is in the area of research ethics. 
Again, in this context, ‘dual-use’ has been used to qualify research that can be exploited, yet 
not strictly for both civil and military purposes. The term seems to be broader and may refer 
to further risks touching upon cyber security, human right considerations and civil liberties. 
Here are some examples of such research dealing with issues of dual nature and relying 
sometimes on dual-use technologies: vulnerability studies uncovering details on critical 
infrastructure; research projects developing software applications that could be misused as 
cyber weapon; research utilising behavioural profiling, data merging or mining that can be 
misused for stigmatisation, or discrimination purposes if fall to malicious actors. Given the 
lack of a universal understanding of ‘dual-use’ in the international law, one would not expect 
to find one single definition in codes of conduct and literature pertaining to the ethical 
discourse
181
. 
Biotechnology represents a ‘dual use dilemma’ in which the same technologies can be used 
legitimately for human betterment and misused for bioterrorism. 
                                                                                                      The ‘Fink Report’, 2004, 15 
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Nevertheless, there is one field where the term dual-use research is known and most notably, 
has been defined rather precisely: in life sciences and especially in biosafety and biosecurity 
area
182
. Advances in biology lie in the very heart of the dual-use problematic since “almost all 
biotechnology in service of human health can be subverted for misuse by hostile individual or 
nations”183. In fact, much ink has been spilled over the role of ‘dual-use research’ and there is 
already a vast literature examining the so called ‘dual-use dilemma’ in life sciences184. Given 
the special role of emerging bio-technologies, the potential threat of terrorist attacks as 
manifested with the anthrax mailings and the recurrent debate over the conduct or publication 
of sensitive research, it comes as no surprise that biotechnologies have caught so much 
attention recently. 
If one turns the eyes across the pond, he will encounter a definition of ‘dual-use research of 
concern’ (DURC) as follows:  
“Research that based on current understanding can be reasonably anticipated to provide 
knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to pose a 
threat to public health and safety, agriculture, plants, animals, the environment or material”. 
This definition is given in a flagship report entitled ‘Biotechnology Research in an Age of 
Terrorism’, known also as the ‘Fink report’ by the name of Gerald R. Fink the chair of the 
authoring committee. The committee’s main task was to evaluate the potential security risks -
warfare and terrorism- relating to technology and knowledge utilised in the biological field 
and, to identify ways for balancing security and scientific openness while addressing such 
risks. The outcome of this initiative was a set of recommendations for the oversight of 
biological research through existing regulatory frameworks and biosafety practices as well as 
new instruments. For example, the report discusses existing criteria for identifying most 
sensitive agents and toxins (‘select agents’) and determines ‘experiments of concern’ such as 
those aimed at rendering vaccines ineffective. While the relevance of international and 
national non-proliferation law and norms is acknowledged in this report, export controls are 
not seen as the most adequate measure for controlling sensitive biological research. This is an 
observation resulting also from other studies on bio-security and considering export controls 
as only one piece of the puzzle
185
.  
Apart from the USA, the ‘dual-use research’ and DURC are not unknown terms in Europe 
and internationally. The dual-use research term is used frequently in the framework of 
initiatives addressing biosafety and biosecurity issues. For instance, in Europe, the European 
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Biosecurity Awareness Raising Network (EUBARnet) undertakes research and further 
activities aimed at raising awareness of life scientists on biosecurity and dual-use research
186
. 
The DURC term is used also by the World Health Organisation in documents relating to 
security and safety standards in life sciences research. The WHO’ webpage states that: “Dual 
use research of concern (DURC) is life sciences research that is intended for benefit, but 
which might easily be misapplied to do harm”187. In sum, it comes out that different 
professional communities understand the dual-use problem from their own perspective. This 
is not problematic so long as discussions taking place in different areas acknowledge the 
varying understandings and implications of the dual-use problem and try to cope with them in 
a concerted way. Non-proliferation and especially export control policies are formed largely 
in isolation from the biosafety and biosecurity discourse and vice-versa. As mentioned in the 
Fink report there is no culture of working with the national security community among life 
scientists as currently exists in the fields of nuclear physics and cryptography
188
. The 
underdevelopment of the verification and monitoring system of the BWC may connect to this 
problem, as well.  
3.6.1 Defining ‘dual-use’ and ‘dual-use research’: a way forward 
‘Dual-use research of concern’, ‘sensitive research’, ‘contentious research’, ‘proliferation 
sensitive research’. Which adjective describes better ‘dual-use research’ and how finally the 
latter shall be defined?  
Generally speaking, the dual-use term refers to any item and technology which can satisfy 
more than one goal at any given time
189
. In politics, the term is used to connote items and 
technologies that can have both military and civil applications. In fact, in all three contexts 
discussed above, the understanding of ‘dual-use’ lies primarily in the capability of the so-
called dual-use knowledge and technologies to contribute to both peaceful and non-peaceful 
activities. However, the precise understanding provided in different contexts is not identical. 
From an economic and technological development perspective the term denotes the potential 
of certain technologies to further both civil and military or defence applications and, the need 
to develop synergies between defence and civil industry. From an ethical perspective, the 
term will connote the imperative to curb any type of research activities which can be misused.  
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Finally, from a non-proliferation point of view the focus will be on how to exclude unlawful 
actors from taking advantage of mighty technologies and weapons. Logically, each 
professional sees through the lenses of his expertise or experience and certainly all must 
agree on the necessity to further the peaceful development of dual-use technologies.   
In the non-proliferation area, protecting the international community from the adverse 
consequences inherent to the use of WMD is not only an ethical concern. It is also a legal 
issue bearing consequences for those individuals, organisations and States who do not abide 
by the law. Consequently, establishing a universal legal definition of dual-use items and 
technologies could be of help for the orderly functioning of export controls and the non-
proliferation system in general. This is not to say that a well-though definition will solve 
magically all complexities nested in the export control system. Legal systems warrant a 
thorough examination given that they represent complete legal constructions. Yet, appropriate 
definitions are ‘the alpha and omega’ in building effective laws. Defining the dual-use 
concept is one thing to do. Establishing a set of criteria for compiling dual-use lists, in 
accordance with what is suggested by such a definition, is the next thing to consider. As the 
aforementioned discussion showed, export control norms and regulations seem to lack certain 
clear-cut criteria for assessing what needs to be included on the lists. Therefore, a certain 
level of coordination between the export control regimes should be achieved. 
Agreeing on a common approach at the EU and international level can be important for 
another reason, too. Although legal definitions and criteria are not meant to last for ever, 
contracting or stretching the dual-use concept occasionally could be detrimental for the 
credibility of the export controls in general and may lead to a low level of compliance by the 
stakeholders involved. At the same time export control frameworks should be dynamic and 
adaptable to new conditions.  In the EU for instance, the review of the dual-use regulation is 
in process and policy-makers are currently thinking if the ‘human security’ approach is in 
consistency with the concept of dual-use export controls. In relation to this, Article 8 of the 
regulation stipulates that non-listed dual-use items may be prohibited or require an export 
authorisation for reasons of public security and human rights considerations
190
. Some EU 
Member States interpret this article as a legal basis for implementing controls in exports for 
example of surveillance technologies intended for internal repression by public authorities in 
third countries. The WA has recently introduced controls on technologies that can be used for 
mass-surveillance, monitoring, tracking, tracing and censoring and these amendments are to 
be incorporated in the EU list. On top of this, the European Parliament has urged for the 
inclusion of human rights considerations in the framework of the dual-use regulation despite 
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the existence of other legal frameworks addressing human rights concerns such as the ‘anti-
torture’ regulation191.  
As it is the case with dual-use items, the term ‘dual-use research’ needs to be clearly defined. 
In the same way that virtually any item (e.g. a knife or a table) can be used as a murder 
weapon, if somebody has the intention to do so, almost any scientific area may have some 
potential for misuse. Depending on the context, ‘dual-use research’ might mean: (a) research 
originally developed for military purposes and subsequently adapted for civil applications 
and vice-versa (b) research that can be potentially misapplied for a variety of purposes 
including proliferation of WMD (c)  research that can make a major contribution to 
proliferation or other military purposes. Therefore, ‘dual-use research’ could be defined as 
follows:  
 
‘Dual-use research’ could be defined as these ‘scientific and technological activities’ 
involving items, technologies and software restricted under the relevant export control law. It 
concerns primarily civil research that is integral to the design, construction, use and delivery 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction and in some instances of conventional weapons. 
 
The definition refers solely to these research activities falling specifically within the scope of 
export controls law but not to all research of dual-use nature. It is only the export of certain 
items and technologies that requires an export authorisation and may result to legal sanctions 
for the violators. Given that a wide range of activities including training and consulting 
services (see technical assistance controls) can be under scrutiny, the term ‘scientific and 
technological activities’ (STA) as defined in part 2.1 is used. It must be reminded that STA is 
a broad term agreed upon at international level and including R&D activities, as well. 
Second, the definitions adopted in the framework of MECR point to an element of a critical 
contribution for the development of military capabilities. The definition denotes this element 
with the use of the adjective ‘integral’. What ‘integral’ might mean and how one can assess 
potential risks at the stage when a research project is designed or developed is not that 
straightforward.  
Third, dual-use research may associate with technologies and items capable of contributing to 
the development of both WMD and conventional weapons. In line with the content of the 
dual-use control lists, the definition includes also items relating to arms controls and military 
end-uses. 
To conclude, the definition enables to entrench the scope of dual-use research and sows the 
seeds for building a methodology to assess most ‘sensitive’ research activities. 
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4. Restricting the Diffusion of Dual-Use Research in the EU  
This chapter explores the potential implications of the EU legal framework for the smooth 
conduct of research as well as specific problems inherent to the implementation of 
technology controls in either industrial or academic context. The chapter offers also a 
snapshot of the R&D activities in the EU including an overview of the ethics review and 
classification policies applying for ‘Horizon 2020’ funded research.  
4.1 The landscape of research in the EU today: funding sources, ethics 
review and classification of information  
According to Eurostat, the period from 2002 till 2007 the gross domestic expenditure on 
R&D was averaged at around 1.8% of the overall GDP of the EU member States
192
. In 2009 
the R&D intensity increased to 1.94% and has continued to grow marginally since 2011 
reaching 2.02% in 2013. This was mainly a combined effect of the overall GDP falling 
tendency and efforts of the EU governments to offset the impact of economic crisis by 
increasing public R&D investment. As the figure II shows, the EU expenditure in R&D is 
made up of business enterprises with 63.8%, higher education with 23.2%, government 
organisations with 12.2% and private non-profit organisations with just 0.8%. The 
percentages of R&D personnel employed by each sector follow a similar course to R&D 
expenditure with one exception. The higher education sector represents a higher percentage 
compared to the R&D expenditure in this area. This is an expected observation given that the 
higher education sector employs frequently unsalaried students and researchers. 
Figure II: R&D expenditure and personnel by sectors of performance, EU-
28, 2013 (%) by Eurostat
193
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The sources of funding of R&D activities concerned are not clarified in the schemes above. 
Yet, one could assume that the contribution of EU funds into carrying out such R&D 
activities must be considerably high especially for the higher education and government 
sectors. The total amount allocated to research activities under the various EU research 
framework programmes from 1987 till 2013 reached up to almost 120 billion Euros
194
. Under 
the last ‘EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, Horizon 2020 other 80 
billion Euros will be made available over the years from 2014 to 2020
195
. Interestingly 
enough, EU funds are expected to fuel the business sector as well. Around 15% of the EU 
budget for H2020 will be directed towards innovative research undertaken by SMEs
196
.  
Figure III: Horizon 2020 budget breakdown by main areas of priority 
(EUR billion)
197
: 
 
 
One could reasonably wonder whether projects with security implications and in particular 
dual-use aspects are identified from the phase of funding and initial planning. Generally 
speaking, the H2020 and other related Union funding instruments are subject to the financial 
and procedural rules applicable to the general budget of the Union pursuant to the Regulation 
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966/2012
198
. Most importantly, the EU Regulation 1291/2013 establishing the H2020 
determines the main principles underpinning this funding scheme
199
. Open access to scientific 
publications resulting from publicly funded research is one of these important principles 
enshrined under Article 18. Also, Article 19 §1 sets that “all the research and innovation 
activities carried out under H2020 shall comply with ethical principles and relevant national, 
Union and international legislation, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights and its Supplementary 
Protocols”. In §2 of the same Article it is clarified that research and innovation activities 
carried out under Horizon 2020 shall have an exclusive focus on civil applications. This 
element may have repercussions for research proposals associating with military and defence 
related projects. Further, certain fields of research involving for instance human cloning or 
the modification of human genome shall be considered as non-eligible for financing. For 
those proposals involving dual-use material, equipment and information or intending to 
produce outcomes of dual-use nature there is no specific reference in the set of regulations 
administering the H2020 and other related funding schemes. 
The policy imprinted in the H2020 builds on two elements for dealing with sensitive types of 
research: classification of sensitive information and ethics review of proposals. As it will be 
highlighted later in the study, trade control laws set an export authorisation requirement for 
transfers of certain dual-use technology and, therefore, data and information requiring 
classification due to proprietary or security concerns do not always coincide with what is 
covered under trade control requirements. Yet, the probability for research involving 
classified information to intersect with dual-use export requirements could be considered as 
high.  
4.1.1 Exploitation and dissemination of research results 
The Horizon 2020 should support the achievement and functioning of the European Research 
Area in which researchers, scientific knowledge and technology circulate freely
200
. Also, the 
participation of legal entities established in non-EU countries should be promoted
201
. In this 
context, the EU Regulation 1290/2013 lays down the general rules for participation and 
dissemination of research results under the H2020 and related funding programmes including 
provisions for transferring and licensing the results of EU funded research
202
. The spirit of the 
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 Ibid, Article 5 and consideration 1. 
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 Ibid, Article 27.  
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 EU, Regulation No 1290/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 
2013 laying down the rules for participation and dissemination in Horizon 2020 - the Framework 
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regulation is that the dissemination of results achieved under the H2020 shall be free and that 
open access shall be the applicable rule for scientific publications originating from H2020 
research. However, it is acknowledged that the free dissemination of results may be subject to 
restrictions due to protection of intellectual property, security rules or other legitimate 
interests, under the terms and conditions laid down in the grant agreement
203
.  
Furthermore, where results are capable of commercial and industrial applications, the 
researcher(s) owing those results may examine the possibility to protect them
204
. Transferring 
the ownership or licensing the research results is possible provided that the conditions set in 
the grant agreement are respected.  In certain instances such as research with a potential to 
address major societal challenges, exploitation obligations may permit licensing only on non-
exclusive terms. Also, Article 44 provides that “the Commission or the relevant funding body 
may object to transfers of ownership or to grants of an exclusive licence to third parties 
established in a third country not associated with Horizon 2020, if it considers that the grant 
or transfer is not in accordance with the interests of developing the competitiveness of the 
Union economy, or is inconsistent with ethical principles or security considerations”.   
Concerning confidentiality of research results in particular, recital 16 of the regulation 
1290/2013 affirms that the handling of confidential data should be governed by all relevant 
Union law including the EU institutions’ internal rules such as the Commission Decision 
2001/844
205
. Under this Decision, information must be classified if its unauthorised 
disclosure could adversely impact the interests of the EU or of one -or more- of its Member 
States. Pursuant to these internal rules, the European Commission (DG Migration and Home 
Affairs) has published a set of guidelines aimed at backing the evaluation of research 
proposals under H2020 and the classification of research results
206
. The objective of that 
document is to assist the national experts charged with the security scrutiny of H2020 
proposals, to inform applicants on how information should be classified and to help 
Commission staff to decide about the sensitivity of a call for proposal
207
. This guidance relies 
on two parameters for classifying research undertaken under the H2020: the main subject of 
research (e.g. research relating to CBRN risks and explosives) and the type of research 
pursued (e.g. specific guidelines for the design or manufacture and operation of sensitive 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Programme  for  Research  and  Innovation  (2014-2020) and  repealing  Regulation  (EC)  No  
1906/2006, Official Journal of the EU (L 347), Brussels, 2013, retrieved from:  
https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/doc/call/h2020/common/1595113-h2020-rules-
participation_oj_en.pdf. 
203
 Ibid, Article 43.  
204
 Ibid, Article 42. 
205
 EU Commission, Decision (2001/844/EC, ECSC, EURATOM) amending its internal Rules of 
Procedure, Official Journal of the EU (L 317), Brussels, 2001, retrieved from: 
https://www.google.it/search?q=Commission+Decision+2001/844/EC&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-
8&gws_rd=cr&ei=vfQfV5_NBajfgAb80oTgAw. 
206
 DG Migration and Home Affairs, Guidance: Guidelines for the classification of research results, 
Brussels, 2015, retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/other/hi/secur/h2020-hi-guide-classif_en.pdf. 
207
 The guidance concerns solely protective measures to be taken to preserve the confidentiality of 
some research results. Other aspects such as data protection, ethical issues, dual-use are covered in 
other parts of the evaluation procedure of H2020 proposals. 
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technologies, threat assessment and vulnerability studies). Among these sensitive areas a few 
topics such as research on explosives, CBRN preparedness, intelligence surveillance and 
digital security may relate also to dual-use concerns. According to the Commission Decision 
2001/844, there are mainly four levels of classification applying to the dissemination of 
confidential information in the EU: 
 EU TOP SECRET: This classification shall be applied only to information and 
material the unauthorised disclosure of which could cause exceptionally grave 
prejudice to the essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of its 
Member States
208
. 
 EU SECRET: This classification shall be applied only to information and material the 
unauthorised disclosure of which could seriously harm the essential interests of the 
European Union or of one or more of its Member States. 
 EU CONFIDENTIAL: This classification shall be applied to information and material 
the unauthorised disclosure of which could harm the essential interests of the 
European Union or of one or more of its Member States. 
 EU RESTRICTED: This classification shall be applied to information and material 
the unauthorised disclosure of which could be disadvantageous to the interests of the 
European Union or of one or more of its Member States. 
The provisions quoted above stress the fact that finding the right equilibrium between the 
need for free access to scientific information and requirements for restricting the availability 
of sensitive information and data is a recurrent issue when conducting research. The 
following example illustrates the current EU approach towards this problem. The 
‘Commission Recommendation on access to and preservation of scientific information’ 
proclaims that scientific publications and research data should be available free of charge 
with a view to enabling their use and reuse
209
. Especially public funded research should be 
widely disseminated facilitating thereby societal engagement as well as improving the 
capacity of business -SMEs in particular- to innovate. Establishing clear rules and 
institutional policies for dissemination, open access and licensing of publications and further 
developing e-infrastructures for disseminating scientific information are among the main 
actions set in this recommendation. The ultimate goal is to contribute towards the 
development of an economy based on knowledge and innovation. At the same time, the 
recommendation sets that concerns in relation to privacy, trade secrets, national security, 
legitimate commercial interests and intellectual property rights shall be duly taken into 
account
210
. 
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 EU Top-secret is not used for the security scrutiny of research proposals. 
209
 EU Commission, Recommendation on access to and preservation of scientific information, 
(C(2012) 4890 final), Brussels, 2012, retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/research/science-
society/document_library/pdf_06/recommendation-access-and-preservation-scientific-
information_en.pdf. 
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4.1.2 Ethics review and dual-use issues 
Currently, under the H2020, dual-use issues are addressed mostly in the framework of the 
ethics appraisal taking place in different stages in the life of a research project, from the 
submission of the research proposal till the accomplishment of the project
211
. As part of the 
self-assessment conducted at the proposal stage, the applicants are required to fill in an ethics 
table answering inter alia whether their research involves dual-use items in the sense of the 
Regulation 428/2009 or other items for which an authorisation is required. As figure IV 
shows, questions 8, 9 and 10 of the ethics table relate broadly to dual-use concerns. Human 
and animal protection, data protection and privacy, environment protection and safety are 
further issues addressed in the ethics appraisal. With regards to research activities to be 
carried out outside the EU, the applicants must confirm that the proposed research is 
compatible with the Union and international legislation and could have been legally 
conducted in one of the EU Member States. If according to the self-evaluation a dual-use 
issue relates to the proposal, the applicants shall explain the actions already taken or planned 
to be taken for dealing with such issues. The ‘participant portal’ for submission and 
evaluation of H2020 projects provides guidance to applicants for completing the ethics self-
assessment including explanatory notes on ‘dual-use’, ‘exclusive focus on civil applications’ 
and ‘risk for misuse’ of the generated outcomes. 
Figure IV: The ethics issues table
212
 
 
At a second stage, all submitted proposals are evaluated by the independent experts selected 
by the Commission for this purpose. The ethics review consists of the pre-screening and the 
screening phase. The pre-screening concerns all the proposals with no declared ethics issues 
                                                          
211
 The Ethics Appraisal procedure concerns all activities funded in Horizon 2020. Security concerns 
were addressed also in the FP7 in the context of ethics review; however dual-use concerns as 
understood by the Regulation were not clearly defined and included in the appraisal. 
212
 Presentation by the Graham Willmott, Head of Unit Innovation and Industry for Security, DG 
Migration and Home Affairs, 55th meeting of the Dual Use Coordination Group, September 24, 2015, 
Brussels. 
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and that can either get an ethics clearance or be submitted to the screening phase for further 
consideration. The screening process concerns proposals with at least one confirmed ethical 
issue and it is carried out during the scientific evaluation or soon after. Each proposal must be 
screened by at least two independent ethics experts and it shall be given a status as follows:  
 Ethics-clearance: The proposal is clear and the Grant Agreement can be finalised. 
 Conditional ethics clearance: The applicant has to comply with the requirements set 
by the ethics experts. These obligations will be included in the grant agreement as 
contractual obligations. 
 Ethics assessment recommended: For proposals raising complex ethical issues (e.g. 
research involving human embryonic stem cells) the screening panel can recommend 
an ethics assessment to be done by the Commission responsible staff (DG for 
Research and Innovation) prior to the signature of the grant agreement. 
 No ethics clearance: Negative ethics opinion. 
For those research proposals involving dual-use issues special clauses -committing for 
instance the researcher to get any required export authorisation- shall be included in the grant 
agreement. At a later stage and as long as the grant preparation is complete and the agreement 
signed, ethics checks and audits will take place during the lifecycle of the project as well as 
upon its closure.  
Figure V: The ethics appraisal scheme for evaluating research projects 
funded under H2020213 
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 Presentation by Isidoros Karatzas, Head of the Ethics and Research Integrity Sector, DG for 
Research and Innovation, available in the JRC internal website, “Connected”. 
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4.2 Technology controls in the EU: the legal framework 
The Regulation 428/2009 ‘setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, 
brokering and transit of dual-use items’ or simply the dual-use regulation is the cornerstone 
of the EU legal framework governing trade in dual-use items. The Regulation establishes a 
sui-generis, albeit not flawless system which constitutes one of the most comprehensive and 
modern export control system universally. As implied by the analysis in chapter 3, the EU 
draws on the MECR for determining main principles and items controlled under the EU trade 
control system. This is anticipated all the more due to the fact that EU Member States have 
undertaken to observe export control norms and non-proliferation principles set at 
international level. As a corollary, the EU system is faced with weaknesses and problems 
arising in the framework of international regimes. Especially as regards technology controls, 
the Regulation is mainly confined to incorporating provisions adopted by the MECRs.  
The scope of the legislation: To begin with, the Regulation clarifies that ‘dual-use items’ 
shall include items as well as technologies and software
214
. In fact, Article 2 §2 affirms that 
“the transmission of controlled software or technology by electronic media, including by fax, 
telephone, electronic mail or any other electronic means to a destination outside the European 
Community” constitutes an export. “Making available in an electronic form such software 
and technology to legal and natural persons and partnerships outside the Community” shall 
be also controlled. This additional element of the definition intends to affirm that both 
possibilities of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ transmission of information are potentially licensable 
actions. Sending an e-mail to a receiver(s) located outside the EU borders exemplifies an 
active case of transmission. Uploading data or software in a server which is potentially 
accessible by foreign nationals is an example of a passive transmission
215
. It is also clarified 
that ‘oral transmission of technology when described over the telephone’ may constitute an 
export.  
 ‘Export’ shall mean: 
[…] 
(iii) transmission of software or technology by electronic media, including by fax, telephone, 
electronic mail or any other electronic means to a destination outside the European 
Community; it includes making available in an electronic form such software and technology 
to legal and natural persons and partnerships outside the Community. Export also applies to 
oral transmission of technology when the technology is described over the telephone; 
                                                                         Article 2 §2 of the Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 
                                                          
214
 See the recital 8 and the definition of ‘dual-use’ in Article 2 §1. 
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 L. Stefan notes that it is not clear-cut whether ‘passive transmission’ concerns only deliberate acts 
or unwitting acts may also constitute a breach of the export control law. The Hungarian licensing 
authority encourages concerned firms to apply for global licenses so as to be safe from any possible 
breach of the law. See: Lazlo Stefan, “Intangible Technology Controls in Hungary”, in European 
Dual-Use Trade Controls: Beyond Materiality and Borders, ed. Odette J. Prevor and Quentin Michel 
(Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2013), 116.  
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The disclosure of technical data can take place by both tangible and intangible means of 
transfer. Sharing information through electronic mails and uploading software on websites 
are examples of intangible transfers. However, exporting handbooks or CD-ROMs by regular 
post would indicate a tangible transfer of technology and it is generally treated as a physical 
export. The provision of technical service includes working knowledge and any other 
technical service provided by a person on the spot or in oral form enabled by telephone.  
Therefore, one could assume that the main applicable difference implied by this distinction is 
the active involvement of a natural person for the transmission of usually ‘unrecorded’ 
technology. The whole discussion relates to the distinction between explicit knowledge 
codified in a book, manual or hard disk and implicit knowledge contained mainly in 
somebody’s mind and being acquired through hands-on practice and experience216.  
Reasonably, the provision of technical assistance may entail the release of technical data and 
thus, the two forms of technology transfers do not necessarily take place separately. The 
reasons why somebody opts for one or another mode of transmission will depend not only on 
the available options but also on his perception of what is easier or safer in order to achieve a 
given objective (e.g. criminal for malicious actors and economic for industrial operators). 
Different modes of transferring technology are available in today’s world and it seems that all 
of them are potentially controlled if certain conditions are met.  
Provision of technical services outside the EU: The Annex I of the Regulation, the so-
called ‘dual-use list’ specifies that the term technology concerns both technical data and 
technical assistance and, repeats their respective definitions established in the framework of 
MECR
217
. However, Article 7 stipulates that “the Regulation does not apply to the supply of 
services or the transmission of technology, if that supply or transmission involves cross-
border movement of persons”. In practice, Article 7 seeks to clarify that the cross-border 
movement of persons intending to supply technical assistance abroad shall not be regulated 
under the regulation. During discussions in the responsible EU committees, namely the 
Council Working Party on Dual-Use Goods (DUWP) and the Commission Dual-Use 
Coordination Group (DUCG), some Member States have warned that a strict interpretation of 
Article 7 could practically lead to a situation where one can evade export controls simply by 
hand-carrying a controlled technology to a non-EU destination. Moreover, some Member 
States suggest interpreting Article 7 on the basis of a distinction between information 
contained in somebody’s mind and hand-carried technology.   
To remedy this loophole, the Council Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP
218
 covers partly the 
provision of technical assistance when the latter relates to certain military end-uses
219
.  
                                                          
216
 On the distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge see section 3.1. 
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 EU Council, Council Joint Action (2000/0401/CFSP)  concerning the control of technical 
assistance related to certain military end-uses, Official Journal of the EU (Law 159), Brussels, 2000, 
available in: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32000E0401&qid=1462654146181&from=EN. 
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 With the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Joint 
Actions and Common Positions are not any more available policy instruments for the exercise of 
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Article 2 of the Joint Action provides that “technical assistance shall be subject to controls 
where it is provided outside the European Community and it is intended, or the provider is 
aware that it is intended for use in connection with WMD or missiles for the delivery of such 
weapons”. Also, Article 3 of the Joint Action stipulates that the Member States may control 
technical assistance also in cases where the latter relates to military uses other than those 
referred to in Article 2 and is supplied to an embargoed destination. In other words, the Joint 
Action provides the possibility for applying catch-all controls in the very way as Article 4 of 
Regulation does for dual-use goods.  
 
Therefore, in the EU, technology controls connect with two separate legal frameworks with 
differing legal power. Actually, the Regulation imposes in first place a license requirement 
for the transfers of controlled technical data through tangible and intangible means whereas 
the Joint Action sets under control the provision of technical assistance on a case by case 
basis, namely when there is a clear suspicion for use in connection with WMD or other 
certain military applications. In practical terms, the Regulation and the regulation have 
different legal weight. The former is directly applicable throughout the EU while the latter 
may require the enactment of national legislation by the Member States
220
. The source of this 
inconsistency lies in an old-aged dispute over the scope of the Common Commercial Policy 
as defined in the EU treaties. In its Opinion 1/94, the Court of Justice ruled that the supply of 
services involving the cross-border movement of natural persons does not fall within the 
scope of the CCP. No matter what reasons lie underneath, the twofold legal basis for 
implementing technology controls adds complexity to an already complex legal construct and 
represents a peculiar approach.  
Provision of technical services within the EU: What is not explicitly addressed by the 
Regulation is the provision of technical services within the EU. Contrary to the USA where a 
‘deemed export’ takes place when controlled information is accessed by or made available to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
CFSP by the Council of Ministers. However, the Council can now simply adopt a decision of general 
nature -not necessarily addressed to particular persons- and having the same legal weight as the 
abolished Joint Actions.   
220
 Although a Joint Action constitutes a legally binding act and Member States shall be committed to 
taking the measures required for its implementation, it emanates primarily from intergovernmental 
decision-making and not after a Commission’s proposal. In practice, an EU Regulation constitutes 
much more a ‘hard law’ instrument rather than a Joint Action or a Council Decision as superseded 
after the amendment of the Treaties. 
(a) ‘technical assistance’ means any technical support related to repairs, development, 
manufacture, assembly, testing, maintenance or any other technical service, and may take 
forms such as instruction, training, transmission of working knowledge or skills or 
consulting services; 
 
(b) ‘technical assistance’ includes oral forms of assistance; 
 
                                                                           Article 1 of the Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP 
87 
 
foreign nationals within the American territory, the EU has not established such a provision. 
However, Article 22 provides that an authorisation shall be apply for transfers also within the 
EU where it is known –by the ‘exporter’ or the authority- that an item is to be used outside 
the Union in connection with a WMD end-use. The actual implementation of such a 
provision is puzzling, especially when it comes to intangible transfers. The most credible 
scenario would concern the case where a licensing authority has intelligence or a trainer or 
professor suspects that information to be released in a conference may be exploited by a 
member in the audience for an illegitimate purpose.  
However peculiar, the logic underpinning technology controls within the territory of a State is 
understandable. What would be the added value of prohibiting EU nationals from sharing 
knowledge with foreign nationals abroad when these are allowed to come in the EU and 
acquire sensitive knowledge? As Rebolledo observes “the structure of technical-scientific 
knowledge in a given State could be described as a system with inflows (imports of ITT and 
immigration of foreign students, technical experts and researchers seeking scientific 
knowledge) and outflows (exports of ITT and emigration of national technical experts and 
scientific researchers seeking scientific knowledge abroad) where changes in one function 
would probably affect the other one’221. Furthermore, preventing specialised teaching or 
training of certain nationals in disciplines relating to nuclear activities has been pursued 
internationally at the highest level. The UN Security Council Resolutions 1874 (2009) and 
1737 (2006) call upon all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialised training of 
North Korean and Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines 
with nuclear relevance
222
. Consequently, there are instances where students originated from 
certain nationalities may be deprived of their right to follow sensitive courses in universities 
of the EU Member States and of all States adhering to the international law.  
In the EU, the ‘NLA in combating the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems’ 
acknowledge the risks relating to the exploitation of knowledge and technology for malicious 
purposes and recommend stepping up cooperation in terms of consular vigilance in order to 
tackle this problem
223
. In fact, the EU Member States address such concerns mainly through 
visa screening procedures and other student vetting systems.  However, one should not forget 
that visa policies and procedures fall primarily within the national discretion and common 
                                                          
221Vicente Garrido Rebolledo, “Intangible Transfers of Technology and Visa Screening in the 
European Union”, EU Non-Proliferation Papers No. 13, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium (2012): 6, 
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 See §28 of the UN Security Council Resolution 1874, (2009) available in: https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/368/49/PDF/N0936849.pdf?OpenElement and §17of the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1737, (2006), available in: https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/681/42/PDF/N0668142.pdf?OpenElement. 
223
 The relevant discussions take place at the Council Committees, namely the Working Party on Non-
Proliferation (CONOP) and the Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Controls 
(CODUN). It is also at Council’s level where efforts to enhance cooperation and establish synergies 
between the different policy actors concerned are launched (for instance, collaboration between the 
Dual-Use, the Research and the Visa Screening Working Parties). 
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standards at the EU level have not been achieved so far.  It comes out that such initiatives 
could be complementary to export controls. 
Applicable exemptions in the controls of technology transfers: It is prudent to examine 
some further provisions illuminating the applicability of export controls in technology 
transfers. The Annex I of the dual-use regulation includes three main notes offering clarifying 
the general cases where technology and software is either controlled or decontrolled.  
NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY NOTE (NTN) 
-To be read in conjunction with section E of Category 0- 
 
A. The ‘technology’ directly associated with any goods controlled in Category 0 is controlled 
according to the provisions of Category 0. 
 
B. ‘Technology’ for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of goods under control remains 
under control even when applicable to non-controlled goods. 
 
C. The approval of goods for export also authorizes the export to the same end-user of the 
minimum ‘technology’ required for the installation, operation, maintenance and repair of the 
goods. 
 
D. Controls on ‘technology’ transfer do not apply to information ‘in the public domain’ or to 
‘basic scientific research’. 
GENERAL TECHNOLOGY NOTE (GTN) 
                          -To be read in conjunction with section E of Categories 1 to 9- 
 
A. The export of ‘technology’ which is ‘required’ for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or 
‘use’ of goods controlled in Categories 1 to 9, is controlled according to the provisions of 
Categories 1 to 9. 
 
B. ‘Technology’ ‘required’ for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of goods under 
control remains under control even when applicable to non-controlled goods. 
 
C. Controls do not apply to that ‘technology’ which is the minimum necessary for the 
installation, operation, maintenance (checking) or repair of those goods which are not 
controlled or whose export has been authorised.  
 
D. Controls on ‘technology’ transfer do not apply to information ‘in the public domain’, to 
‘basic scientific research’ or to the minimum necessary information for patent applications. 
 
GENERAL SOFTWARE NOTE (GSN) 
 
Categories 0 to 9 of this list do not control ‘software’ which is any of the following: 
A. Generally available to the public by being: 
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Sold from stock at retail selling points, without restriction, by means of: 
Over-the-counter transactions; 
Mail order transactions; 
Electronic transactions; or 
Telephone call transactions; and 
 Designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the supplier; 
 
B. ‘In the public domain’; or 
 
C. The minimum necessary ‘object code’ for the installation, operation, maintenance 
(checking) or repair of those items whose export has been authorised. 
 
                                                                *For the full text please see the Annex I of the Regulation 
 
When technology is controlled? How ‘technology’ and related terms (‘required’, 
‘development’, ‘production’, ‘use’) shall be understood is discussed in part 3.5.  It must be 
reminded that for each category in the Annex I of the Regulation there are different sections 
referring to:  
A. systems, equipment and components 
B. test inspection and production equipment 
C. materials 
D. software and 
E. technology 
This means that technologies that fall under control are specified for each category and the 
abovementioned notes provide essentially some general clarifications. The first interesting 
provision stipulates that technology can be under scrutiny regardless of whether or not it is 
applicable to controlled items. This will essentially mean that controlled technology brings a 
license requirement even when exported to be used in connection with an uncontrolled item. 
This is very relevant for activities undertaken by researchers. The benevolent scientist 
preparing a publication or conducting a research will not have any intention to contribute to 
the construction of a weapon or to the conduct of any outlaw activity. However, according to 
the export control law the very act of transferring or making available controlled methods, 
data or know-how abroad is licensable. Also, such a provision suggests that a controlled 
technology transfer might not take place in conjunction with the consignment of a controlled 
item.  
When is technology exempt? Having clarified these, both the Nuclear Technology Note 
(NTN) and the General Technology Note (GTN) list the main instances where transfers of 
technology exempt from the trade controls: 
 
First, the minimum technology which is necessary for the installation, operation, maintenance 
(checking) or repair of those items that are not controlled or whose export has been 
authorised falls outside the scope of controls
224
. Likewise, the General Software Note (GSN) 
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clarifies that the minimum necessary ‘object code’ for the installation, operation, 
maintenance (checking) or repair of those items whose export has been authorised should not 
be controlled.  One could consider that these decontrol notes refer to basic or already broadly 
available technology and software required for the mere installation and operation of non-
controlled or authorised items. Second, as referred in all three notes, ‘public domain 
information’, ‘basic scientific research’ and software ‘generally available to the public’ are 
excluded from the scope of technology and software controls.   
4.2.1 Further important provisions in the EU Regulation 
The EU catch-all mechanism: The dual-use regulation follows the paradigm of multilateral 
regimes and provides also for end-use controls. Technology controls are not exempt from 
such a possibility. In practical terms the export of items and technologies not included on the 
lists may require an authorisation if they are intended for a WMD or a military end-use
225
. 
Article 4 of the Regulation, the EU ‘catch-all’ mechanism specifies that an authorisation may 
be required where:  
i.) the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for a WMD 
end-use  
ii.) the items in question are to be transferred to an arms embargoed destination and they 
relate to military end-uses as specified by the national military lists (and consequently 
by the EU military list as well)  
iii.) the exporter is aware or has grounds to suspect that the items which he proposes to 
export are or may be intended for any of the end-uses prohibited in points i.) and ii.).  
 
Reasonably, such a provision targets items with close technical parameters to the controlled 
ones. To offset imbalances, Member States implementing a catch–all control and/or issuing 
an export denial are in principle required to report such measures to the European 
Commission which in turn notifies the other Member States. It must be also noted that the EU 
dual-use list consolidating the control lists of all four major export control regimes should be 
understood as the lowest common denominator. This means that Member States have the 
possibility –and some of them have done so- to apply controls on the basis of national control 
lists, based often on stricter criteria. 
Intra-EU controls: The dual-use regulation establishes controls also within the EU for 
certain most sensitive items and technologies as specified in its Annex IV pursuant to Article 
22. The Annex IV is a sub-set of the dual-use list (Annex I). It is separated in Part I listing 
items for which a National General Export Authorisation could be established and Part II 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
also authorizes the export to the same end-user of the minimum ‘technology’ required for the 
installation, operation, maintenance and repair of the goods”. 
225
 A military end-use shall mean one of the following (see Article 4 of the Regulation 428/2009):  
 incorporation into military items listed in the military lists of Member States; 
 use of production, test or analytical equipment and components therefor, for the development, 
production or maintenance of military items listed in the abovementioned lists; 
 use of any unfinished products in a plant for the production of military items listed in the 
abovementioned lists.  
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containing entries for which there is no such possibility
226
. Simply put, Part II of Annex IV 
sets a stricter framework since no trade facilitation is available. 
An authorisation shall be required for intra-Community transfers of dual-use items listed in 
Annex IV. Items listed in Part2 of Annex IV shall not be covered by a general authorisation. 
                                                                     Article 22 §1 of the Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 
The reasoning underpinning this provision appears in the considerations of the Regulation 
where it is stated that “pursuant to and within the limits of Article 30 of the Treaty and 
pending a greater degree of harmonisation Member States retain the right to carry out 
controls on transfers of certain dual-use items within the Community in order to safeguard 
public policy and security” (recital 12). Article 22 has repeatedly received criticism during 
discussions at the EU committees on the impact of intra-EU controls on the functioning of the 
Single market and the smooth conduct of economic activity in Europe.  
Trade facilitations: Nevertheless, the EU regulation provides some trade facilitations with a 
view to reducing or lifting unnecessary burden easing thereby the conduct of lawful trade 
activities. Article 9 lays down three ‘general’ types of export authorisations:  
 Union General Export Authorisations (EU GEAs) 
 National General Export Authorisations (NGEAs)  
 Global Export Authorisations  
The Union GEAs are automatically granted in the name of the EU (formally the issuing 
authority is the EU) albeit no tangible license is issued. Exporters based in any EU Member 
State and fulfilling certain conditions as determined in Annex II of the Regulation can simply 
resort to this facilitation for trading certain dual-use items to prescribed destinations 
representing key trade partners of the EU that implement comprehensive export control 
systems
227
. The beneficiary exporters need to notify the first use of this authorisation to the 
competent authorities of the Member State where they are established and subsequently note 
its use in the export declarations. It must be said that Regulation 1232/2011 amended the 
dual-use regulation by introducing five new possibilities for which a Union GEA could be 
applicable
228
. 
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 Roughly speaking  Part 1 of Annex IV includes a selection of: 
 stealth items, software and technology;  
 explosives and related technology; 
 acoustics equipment software and technology;  
 cryptographic software, technology and equipment and, 
  MTCR items, software and technology.  
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 The first-established UGEA (EU001) concerns export to key trade partners as follows: Australia, 
Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, (including Liechtenstein) and United States of 
America. It concerns all items listed in Annex I with the exclusion of all items specified in Annex IV 
plus some further exemptions as set out in Annex IIg of the Regulation.  
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 Apart from the classic EU001 (see footnote above) five more subtypes are available to lawful 
exporters for certain dual-use items under certain conditions laid out in the corresponding annexes of 
the regulation:   
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The national GEAs are based on the same principle: all exporters established in an EU 
Member State may take advantage of such licenses for a given selection of dual-use items 
destined to certain countries. Contrary to EU GEAs, NGEAs will be established on the 
initiative of a given Member State on the basis of its national law and they will be available 
only to those exporters located in this very Member State. This could create a state of unfair 
competition between companies operating in different EU Member States
229
. It is not strange 
therefore that some Member States question the added value of NGEAs given also the 
possibility for adopting -always at national level- global licenses for eligible exporters. In any 
case, article 9 §4 (b) of the Regulation obliges Member States to notify the Commission 
immediately after any adoption or modification of NGEA. The Commission in its 
Communication on the review of the regulation suggests the idea of introducing a system for 
the regular review of the NGEAs with a view to exploring the possibility to extend their 
application at European level
230
.  
Last, global authorisations are granted to one specific exporter and it may concern multiple 
countries of destination and multiple end-users. Again certain conditions apply for the global 
licenses which are established and governed under national law. Article 12 §2 of the 
Regulation specifies that among the criteria that shall be taken into consideration when 
assessing an application for a global license is the implementation of compliance measures by 
the applicant.  
Reasonably enough, all these types of general authorisations release as much the export of 
equipment and materials as of technology and software from further administrative burden. 
Global and General Licenses –either national or Union- are granted to exporters being aware 
of such facilitations and compliant with the specific conditions. Such facilitations do not 
overcome entirely though, hurdles set by intra-EU controls and constraints posed in the 
smooth communication of firms with subsidiaries and clients established in least precarious 
destinations. The Commission’s Communication to the Council and the European Parliament 
on the review of the EU export control system suggests a further shift towards open licensing 
through for instance the introduction of additional EU GEAs
231
. Among the ideas set out is 
the introduction of new Union authorisations for ‘intra-company technology transfers’ 
relating to R&D purposes as well as for ‘intra-EU transfers’ and ‘large projects’ releasing 
single cross-border projects from unnecessary licensing by different MS authorities.  Despite 
the practical difficulties in implementing new types of EU GEAs, such a perspective could 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
EU002 – export of certain dual-use items to certain destinations (see Annex IIb) 
EU003 – export after repair/replacement (see Annex IIc) 
EU004 – temporary export for exhibition or fair (see Annex IId)  
EU005 – telecommunications (see Annex IIe) 
EU006 – chemicals (see Annex IIf) 
229
 The problem of creating an uneven playing field owing to the establishment of NGEAs has been 
identified by the Commission already with the issuance of the Green Paper “The dual-use export 
control system of the European Union: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing 
world,”the first step taken towards the review of the regulation (see §6.6 of the Green Paper). 
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enhance the efficiency of the EU trade control system surmounting at the same time obstacles 
described above.  
4.3 The nexus between researching and exporting 
According to the foregoing analysis there are mainly three cases where an exporter may be 
required to apply for an export authorisation:  
 transferring equipment and materials; 
 transferring technical data or software and, 
 providing technical assistance.  
 
The three types of exports are not disjoint. For instance, the export of an item may include the 
transfer of technical data and/or require the provision of technical assistance. Also, export 
control requirements concern anyone dealing with dual-use items, software and technology 
coming from either industrial or academic environments. Drawing on this categorisation, 
Table V summarises the main possible scenarios for which an export licence may be required 
in the context of a research organisation. The section below offers some comments on the 
plausibility and implications of the different scenarios presented in the table and of their 
variations.  
Table V: Export control scenarios in a research context 
Scenarios 
I. Transfers of equipment and 
materials 
II. Transfers of technical data 
and software 
III. Provision of technical 
assistance 
 
 
 
Tangible 
means 
Provision of 
equipment, 
materials  
(e.g. under 
international 
collaborations) 
 
 
 
Tangible & 
intangible 
means 
Sharing data/ 
software by 
electronic means  
(e.g. e-mail, 
upload on web-
sites) or by post  
 
 
 
Intangible 
means 
Provision of 
technical services 
in third countries 
(e.g. specialised  
trainings & 
conferences) 
Decommissioning 
of reactors and 
dismantling of labs  
(e.g. selling or 
giving away used 
equipment) 
Publishing 
scientific 
research 
(e.g. in printed or 
e-versions) 
Oral provision of 
assistance from 
the EU  
(e.g. consulting 
services) 
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I. Providing equipment/materials to non-EU countries under an international collaboration 
project might bring a license requirement. Activities such as the decommissioning of nuclear 
reactors or the dismantling of labs may also involve an export authorisation if the items in 
question are to be sent abroad
232
. 
The first scenario incudes cases where a company contracts a university or research centre to 
develop and deliver items such as prototypes and model equipment of dual-use relevance. In 
the EU, such a transaction would be subject to an authorisation depending on the technical 
parameters and the final destination of a given export. If the item is controlled and the partner 
firm is located outside the EU, it is the responsibility of the research organisation to apply for 
an export authorisation. Transfers of items in the framework of collaborations with other 
universities and research institutes established abroad may also involve export authorisations.   
Likewise, donating, withdrawing or selling used equipment to recipients outside the EU may 
be subject to an export authorisation.  On top of that, research organisations need also to meet 
certain safety standards and procedures when transferring most dangerous controlled items 
such as fissile material and radioactive equipment.  
Overall, one could assume that exporting controlled equipment and materials is not the most 
frequent or threatening activity undertaken by universities and research organisations. For 
example, the transfer of fissile material and most sensitive dual-use equipment is strictly 
overseen by the national nuclear regulators and the IAEA. Also, for bio-chemical laboratories 
the quantities of bio-agents and chemical substances required for research purposes will not 
pose generally a direct risk for misuse. In sum, whenever research organisations send 
controlled items outside the EU a license will be required. However, it must be noted that the 
outcome of scientific research may concern innovative items that are not always included in 
the lists.  
II. Posting software numerical codes on websites or sending information via e-mails outside 
the EU are licensable activities. Publishing the results of sensitive research might also entail 
export control implications. 
According to the second scenario, a university or research institution may transfer controlled 
technical information and software as a result of a contractual relation with one or more firms 
established in a destination outside the EU. Such a transaction may require an export 
authorisation unless the information in question falls in the public domain or constitutes basic 
scientific research. The engagement of a firm in scientific activities could imply the practice 
oriented character of a research
233
. As Q. Michel notes, for some EU Member States, 
industries do not conduct ‘basic research’ because the aim thereof is always to develop a 
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 Please note that for the export of most sensitive items specified in the Annex IV of the Regulation, 
a license is required also for transfers within the EU.  
233
 Royalties paid to researchers and their parental institutions for the utilisation of research results 
point to practice oriented research work that is potentially licensable on the grounds of non-
proliferation imperatives. 
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marketable product
234
. A variant of this case could concern the informal exchange of data and 
information between scientists located in the EU and their colleagues established in other 
countries. Nevertheless, in practice setting the transfers of technology by electronic means 
under and the authorisation process is cumbersome and it will definitely demand the 
increased awareness from the part of the researchers. Moreover, verifying whether a 
decontrol applies is not that straightforward, in the absence of specific guidance on the 
interpretation of the ‘public domain’ and ‘basic research’ exemptions at European and 
international level. 
A subsequent question is whether publishing the results of sensitive research either in printed 
or electronic versions is subject to export controls. In that regard, in a recent case -the famous 
research on the transmissibility of avian influenza- the competent licensing authority imposed 
an authorisation requirement for the publication of research of dual-use concern. As it will be 
shown later in the study applying export control principles to the publication of research 
activities can be quite impractical. Most importantly, it might be seen as an inhibitor to the 
progress of science or a violation of the academic freedom.  
III. Providing technical assistance on site or by electronic media and even, presenting 
sensitive information in a seminar/training taking place abroad might bring a licence 
requirement as well. 
The third scenario concerns cases where technical assistance is provided either through the 
physical presence of an EU person in a third country or by distance (oral transmission from 
the EU). Again the supply of technical assistance can take place in the framework of a 
contract or under less formal exchanges when for instance, a researcher provides advice to 
industry for free or discusses controlled information with scientists located outside the EU 
borders. A variation of this scenario includes the case where a professor performs seminars or 
trainings containing sensitive information outside the EU. Today, with the increasing flows of 
scientific and technical staff and the operation of international establishments in various 
countries represents, such a possibility could represent a quite common type of activity. To 
conclude, in a research environment technology transfers are much more likely to take place 
rather than the outflows of physical items.  Besides, scientific institutions produce primarily 
knowledge and they do not possess facilities for large scale production
235
. 
4.3.1 Implementing technology control in an academic environment  
This part provides further examples illustrating whether traditional export control principles 
can be easily applied to swiftly changing environments in general and to research contexts in 
particular. For example, in the event of lectures and seminars conducted by EU nationals 
abroad and releasing sensitive information, the ‘exporters’ that is to say an EU expert or a 
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 Michel Quentin, The European Union Dual-Use Items Control, Comment of the legislation article 
by article, (DUV5Re3) (European Studies Unit, University of Liege, 2014), 16, available in:  
http://local.droit.ulg.ac.be/jcms/service/file/20150107145152_Vademecum-DUV5Rev3-2-2015-.pdf. 
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96 
 
professor, will not normally be aware of a possible requirement to apply for an export 
authorisation. Similarly, in the case of sensitive training within the EU, the educational staff 
will not be in position to check beforehand the security clearance of whoever is present in the 
audience. Presumably, internal mechanisms should be in place rendering lecturers and 
trainers aware of the possible risks and advising them on whether to apply for an export 
authorisation or not. Student vetting schemes applied by some EU Member States can be an 
indispensable tool furthering export control objectives as well.  
Interpreting and enforcing export control provisions when dealing with technology transfers 
can be a true challenge. Intangible Transfers of Technology (ITT) do no ‘respect’ borders and 
thus, border controls are meaningless. Particularly, the verification of end-users and end-
destinations is challenging not least due to the fact that sensitive information can change 
holders without leaving commercial invoices and customs declarations. Verifying whether an 
export does take place and identifying the end-user and end-destination is equally 
problematic even in cases where no controversial publications are in question. The simple 
exchange of electronic correspondence containing dual-use information between scientists 
established in different countries may be subject to controls. In the era of advanced ICT tools 
and extensive reliance on internet connectivity applying controls in intangible transfers is an 
intricate issue. Furthermore, failure to implement accompanying measures concerning for 
instance physical protection and cyber security aspects can undermine the effectiveness of 
ITT controls. The ascent of cloud computing services provides a telling example of how 
export control implications can be accentuated when new technological developments come 
into play. 
Exporting to Clouds: Cloud computing or in short ‘Cloud’ can be defined as the service of 
providing computational capacity over the internet. The Cloud users “rent” capabilities such 
as data storage, computer processing and software applications, from cloud providers 
utilising “clouds” of on-line resources (networks, servers, storage, applications and services). 
There are mainly three distinct service models of cloud computing: 
There are generally three distinct service models of cloud computing
236
: 
I. Software as a Service (SaaS) - the client uses provider’s applications (mainly 
industry –standard software packages) running on cloud infrastructure  
II. Platform as a Service (PaaS) - the client deploys onto the cloud infrastructure, 
applications created using programming languages and tools supported by the 
provider 
III. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) – the client deploys and runs arbitrary software 
including operating systems and applications with the support of fundamental 
computing resources provided by the cloud such as processing, storage and 
networks 
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 Peter Mell and Timothy Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, Recommendations of 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Special Publication 800-145, US Department of 
Commerce, 2011, 2-3,  retrieved from:  
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All the service models referred above relate to the issue of transferring data, software and 
services over the internet. Outsourcing IT services and transferring data and software across 
borders through the internet is not a new idea, especially for multi-national and large 
companies. However, cloud computing is an innovative IT paradigm in that it enables the 
rapid and elastic provision of computational capacity (data storage, computer processing and 
software applications) over the internet, on a ‘pay-as-you-go’ mode237. In practical terms, 
private and public organisations can benefit from the agile usage of advanced IT services 
reducing at the same time the IT infrastructure cost. Naturally, research organisations and 
universities are among those using cloud services and thus, researchers may inadvertently 
violate export control requirements in case they rely on cloud services for exchanging, storing 
or processing controlled data in the framework of their research. Cloud computing services 
rely on distributed networks of servers programmed to search for the fastest and cheapest 
transmission routing or processing time, and located anywhere an internet connection is 
available. This practically implies that a cloud computing environment is characterized by a 
constant shifting of data locations and that data allocations generally occur without the 
knowledge of cloud users.  
From an export control standpoint, deciding whether an export authorisation is required can 
be particularly cumbersome since controlled data may be temporarily stored, routed or 
processed from different locations. Indeed, a wide range of ‘players’ from IT administrators 
to employees of multinational companies located beyond the EU territory may gain access to 
sensitive information. Additionally, as it is the case with almost any issue pertaining to the 
non-proliferation realm, safety and security aspects such as the physical protection of the 
servers and cyber security need to be dealt with, as well. In relation to this, a number of 
security, privacy and trust challenges (e.g. the secure management of virtual resources, 
limitations in providing granular access controls and audit trails for regulatory and forensic 
purposes) are yet to be addressed
238
. 
Cloud users versus cloud providers: To complicate the issue more, defining who acts as 
exporter each time –the cloud user or the cloud provider- is not that straightforward. In fact 
there are different responsibilities connecting with the role of each actor. On the one hand, in 
the EU, some Member States suggest that it is in principle the data owner (user of service) 
who is responsible to comply with export controls legislation and obtain a license, if 
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necessary
239
. However, most of the time data allocations occur without the knowledge of 
cloud users.  Hypothetically, cloud users could choose from a variety of options as follows: 
 identify cloud providers relying solely on servers located in the EU  
  ask for assurances on the part of cloud providers that their data will not be accessed 
outside the EU for instance, by unauthorised IT administrators  
 apply for a license for specific end-users and locations abroad 
 Encrypt sensitive data prior to uploading to the clouds 
 
Yet, there is no official guidance at national or European level on which option shall apply. 
On the other hand, cloud providers based in the EU may also have export control 
responsibilities to the extent that they benefit their cloud users located abroad with 
capabilities resulting from controlled software and applications. Up to this moment, the issue 
of responsibility for cloud services are yet to be clarified in the EU. 
Multiple jurisdictions: Article 9§2 of the Regulation spells out that export authorisations 
shall be granted by the competent authorities of the Member State where the exporter is 
established. The natural or legal person or partnership which takes such a decision -usually 
the cloud user- shall apply, if necessary, for an export authorization in the Member State 
where the respective person or partnership is established or resident. However it is unclear 
what shall apply in the case where several legal jurisdictions are involved. For instance, in a 
hypothetical case where, a European company uses cloud services provided by a US cloud-
provider that relies on servers located in Singapore and India, which country’s export control 
legislation is applicable for possible scenarios? In the EU different MS have acknowledged 
the complexity of this issue. Indeed, at least one case is known where an EU company had to 
apply for a license from the country’s authorities where the servers were located in order to 
download data originally uploaded from this very same company. The problem of multiple 
jurisdictions is also relevant to transfers of and access to data through personal laptops or 
other storage devices carried with by individuals when travelling abroad.  
The pervasive character of these issues entrenching physical borders and national 
jurisdictions might demand international collaboration and reach of a consensus most 
probably at the level of multilateral regimes. A number of options are available for due 
consideration. 
4.3.2 Do export controls clash with the academic freedom? 
Leaving aside the difficulties stemming from the actual implementation of the export control 
provisions, the restriction of research activities and the control of information flow seems to 
be at odds with certain principles as these instilled in the culture of research and the academic 
life in particular. The principle of ‘academic freedom’ proclaims the right of teachers and 
students to freely express their opinion and conduct their research
240
. The ‘Magna Charta 
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 Encyclopedia Britannica and dictionaries define academic freedom as “the freedom of teachers and 
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Universitatum’ enunciates that “freedom in research and training is the fundamental principle 
of university life” and, that “the mutual exchange of information and documentation and 
frequent joint projects [...] are essential for the steady progress of knowledge”. To that effect, 
“each university must -with due allowance for particular circumstances- ensure that its’ 
students freedoms are safeguarded, and that they enjoy concessions in which they can acquire 
the culture and training which is their purpose to possess”241. More broadly, the academic 
freedom is linked to the freedom of speech as defined in the UN Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights
242
. If researchers, students and educational staff are entitled to the same rights 
as all citizens, one might wonder why is there a special need for enshrining academic 
freedom as a fundamental value in the academic environment.  
In practice, the academic freedom relates to the autonomy and self-governance of academic 
institutions but above all concerns the right of teachers and students to pursue any form of 
knowledge without unreasonable interference or restriction from law, institutional 
regulations, or public pressure. Professors and researchers at the highest level of education 
are considered to be modulators of the information flow. As a result, different authorities may 
attempt to exercise control over the education and the carriers of knowledge and they have 
done so in the past. As Karran neatly notes, knowledge is created by challenging orthodox 
ideas and beliefs and, due to the nature of their work, academics are more naturally led into 
conflict with governments and other seats of authority
243
. The conviction that science must be 
free of any constraints set by the State, the church or other institutions had led to the 
consolidation of the academic freedom to teach, learn and (in German Lehrfreiheit) and 
subsequently, the freedom to conduct research (Freiheit der Wissenschaft) already since the 
beginning of 19
th
 century.  In periods of sharp confrontations between opposing ideological 
currents such as the cold-war times social sciences, arts and humanities face a higher risk of 
intervention compared to natural sciences.  
Legally speaking, the term is not enshrined in the international ‘hard’ law. However, it is 
hardly a negligible fact that academic freedom is set and defined in the UNESCO 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
restriction from law, institutional regulations, or public pressure. Its basic elements include the 
freedom of teachers to inquire into any subject that evokes their intellectual concern; to present their 
findings to their students, colleagues, and others; to publish their data and conclusions without control 
or censorship; and to teach in the manner they consider professionally appropriate. For students, the 
basic elements include the freedom to study subjects that concern them and to form conclusions for 
themselves and express their opinions”. See Encyclopedia Britannica website: 
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Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel
244
. The 
UNESCO’s Recommendation in Article 6 §27 spells out that: 
“the principle of academic freedom should be scrupulously observed. Higher-education 
teaching personnel are entitled to maintaining of academic freedom, that is to say, the right, 
without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom 
in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to 
express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from 
institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or representative 
academic bodies.” 
Further, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights –a legally binding document throughout the 
EU- defines that “the arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint and academic 
freedom shall be respected
245”. In the H5N1 case (see section 4.4) the researcher advocated 
that the imposition of an authorisation requirement on his research should be regarded as an 
infringment of the academic freedom. Indeed, the defense line used the example of the 
German constitution for supporting this argument. Article 5 §3 of the German basic law 
forsees that “Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free”246. It is also noted that 
“the freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution”. 
Alike, the Greek Constitution provides that “art and science, research and teaching shall be 
free and their development and promotion shall be an obligation of the State”247. Again, it is 
also clarified that the academic freedom and the freedom of teaching shall not exempt any 
citizen from his or her duty of allegiance to the Constitution (Article 16 §1). The above 
analysis suggests the academic feedom is a protected principle under both the European and 
national law. Also it arises that the application of academic freedom is not unlimited. More 
particularly, national and international security concerns are traditionally seen as areas 
justifying special measures and exceptions and they may take precedence over other less 
compelling objectives at a given moment. As Oosterlinck observes, academic freedom 
automatically includes academic responsibility, both for the university as a whole and for the 
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individual professor or researcher
248
. Yet, security or other concerns should not be used as 
disguise or excuse for encroaching rights and freedoms vested already centuries ago.  
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
                                                               Article 19, UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Last, setting the information flow and the transfers of technology under control brings to fore 
concerns about the protection of personal data and the security of communications.  Insofar 
that the investigation of criminal acts justifies the waiver of data privacy, intercepting 
communications may be exceptionally permitted also on the basis of export control 
objectives. In the EU Member States, normally the prior permission of the public advocator 
will be required for taking such an action. Civil liberties are guaranteed by the constitutional 
law in every democracy governed by the rule of law
249. The ‘public domain’ exemption 
indicates the very intention of the legislator to protect such civil liberties. However, as it is 
the case with the ‘basic research’, the implementing details of this decontrol may differ from 
country to country within and beyond the EU borders.  
As analysed in various instances in the study, ‘common-sense’ terms may need to be 
specifically defined or, require further clarifications when applied in the context of export 
controls. The EU regulation repeats the definition as established in the framework of export 
control regimes: “technology derived from the public domain should be understood as 
information and technical knowledge available without any restrictions upon further 
dissemination”. Further, copyright clauses do not remove technology from ‘in the public 
domain’.  
4.3.3 Implementing technology controls in an industrial context 
Technology controls may apply to both scientific and industrial contexts. A question to be 
explored is whether industry and academia are confronted with the same challenges. Contrary 
to academic research which thank to its ‘fundamental’ character would be most of the time 
excluded from the scope of controls, research activities undertaken by firms are much more 
likely to be subject to export controls. Technology transfers in an industrial environment may 
include supplying or selling goods and services, collaborating with subsidiaries established 
frequently outside the EU borders as well as R&D activities undertaken sometimes in 
partnership with other firms and research organisations. While multinational companies 
(MNCs) represent the lion’s share in terms of volume and value, SMEs may also undertake 
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both exporting and R&D activities. Especially for certain areas of activity such as software 
development, SMEs may play an important role in respect of innovative research. Hence, 
export controls may affect activities of both MNCs and SMEs.   
Reasonably, scenarios and related problems discussed earlier in the study are still relevant in 
an industrial context.  To begin with, cloud computing services were mentioned above as an 
innovative IT model presenting export control implications. Yet, sharing information across 
borders over central IT systems and Shared Data Environments is a usual practice for private 
firms already for years
250
. Very often private companies need to communicate with 
colleagues and clients in real time across geographic boundaries and time zones in the most 
efficient way
251
. From an export control perspective, when IT models and services utilise 
servers and data centres located in third countries export control implications may come into 
play. For example, it is quite possible that IT administrators located outside the EU may have 
access to sensitive data and thus, certain precautions need to be taken in that regard.  
If one sticks to the definition of ‘export’ as given in the Regulation, the mere transfer of 
controlled information or software to a location outside the EU might be considered as a 
licensable act. What is not explicit is what happens in the case where an EU national, an 
employee of a MNC for example, downloads documents, or accesses data saved on his laptop 
or any other data storage device during his stay abroad.  A pragmatic approach would suggest 
that no export takes place if the content of e-mails and other sensitive information is not 
divulged to foreign nationals.  To complex the issue more, in the previous example, the EU 
national who leaves the foreign country after having received controlled information may 
breach the export control law of this very country. It is impressive that certain companies 
advise their employees to delete such information as a precaution. In response to such 
concerns, the UK has established an Open General Export License for ‘individual use’ in 
order to address problematic situations where a UK national accesses to controlled military 
information outside the EU territory
252
. 
Technology transfers can take place also under more straightforward cases. For instance, 
shipping technical data along with equipment to clients established abroad or simply, 
granting access to websites containing controlled information to entities based abroad might 
count as an export. This implies that EU firms have to apply for an authorisation even in the 
case where they send controlled data and information to their subsidiaries or other sub-
contractors abroad. Visibly, such requirements may also affect the collaborations between 
firms and research institutions. One could actually argue that the more the universities seek to 
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 The idea of outsourcing IT services to third-parties is not new. However, as explained in 4.3.1 
cloud computing goes much further than the possibilities of traditional outsourcing of IT services.  
251
 Spencer Chilvers, “Electronic Transfers of Technology”, Background paper presented in the 5th   
ESARDA Export Control Working Group Meeting, November 11-12, 2014. 
252
 For more information on Open General Export License (access overseas to software and 
technology for military goods: individual use only), see: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-general-export-licence-access-overseas-to-
software-and-technology-for-military-goods-individual-use-only. 
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tap the results of their research into practical applications, the higher is the possibility to be 
faced with export control implications.  
The perspective of Member States: The majority of Member States admit that the 
imposition of a licensing requirement on ITT is most of the time the result of a transaction 
involving the transfer of tangible items
253
. This is not surprising taking into account the 
practical challenges relating to the enforcement of technology controls. The lack of export 
declarations –the so-called Single Administrative Document (SAD), the inapplicability of 
border controls as well as a difficulty to prevent or halt an ITT at the time when it does take 
place seem as insurmountable challenges. Thus, the detection of ITT is normally the result of 
post-audit controls, specific intelligence information or, of controls in physically transported 
tangible items. Even in this case of intangible technology transferred via tangible means (e.g. 
stored in a CD or USB driver), a breach to ITT law can remain untraceable. In addition to 
this, EU Member States may interpret the Regulation’s provisions differently or establish 
complementary legislation at national level.  
The legal and practical challenges in implementing technology controls have been 
acknowledged also by the Wassenaar Arrangement. The 2006 ‘WA Best Practices for 
Implementing Intangible Transfer of Technology Controls’ set the main lines around which 
controls on ITT should be enforced
254
.  The participating States to the WA agreed to proceed 
along three main lines: 
i. designing national laws with clear definitions on ITT subject to export controls; 
ii. promoting awareness of ITT controls and self-regulation by industry and academia 
and,  
iii. taking steps that enable post-export monitoring and lead to enhanced compliance by 
stakeholders such as implementation of regular compliance checks and dissuasive 
penalties. 
The WA’s best practices do not only suggest actions to be taken at national level but they 
also hint at the interference between export controls and research since they call for the 
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 The European Commission launched a survey in 2011 aimed at identifying challenges and 
potential discrepancies in the implementation of ITT and catch-all controls during the first years after 
the adoption of regulation 428/2009 (information retrieved from Greek authorities). 21 Member State 
participated to the survey by replying -with a varying degree of detail to a rather comprehensive 
questionnaire.  The results revealed inter alia that only two of the participating MS were used to 
differentiate between licenses for goods and licenses for technologies, just a few had ever received an 
application for intangible transfers and about half of the total had not had till then any experience in 
enforcing ITT controls at all. Despite this, 18 of the respondent states indicated that they had already 
included ITT in the scope of their awareness raising programmes. In this regard, some Member States 
had undertaken some more far-reaching initiatives such as an action plan targeting the research 
community (Germany), a task force to address specifically the issue of ITT (Finland) and the draft of 
codes of conduct along with research institutions (Netherlands and the United Kingdom). Although 
the situation may have been altered in the years followed, the survey still provides a picture of the 
state of implementation of ITT controls in the EU.  
254
 WA, Best Practices for Implementing Intangible Transfer of Technology Controls, WA Plenary 
2006, retrieved from: http://www.wassenaar.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/ITT_Best_Practices_for_public_statement_2006.pdf. 
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implementation of record keeping activities and internal-compliance programs from both 
industrial and academic actors. Even though one could take for granted that everybody -
individuals, firms and researchers- are potentially concerned by export controls, the explicit 
references to academia reveal the increasing realisation of the role that the latter could play in 
the effective implementation of ITT controls. This envisaged role connects with the nature of  
academic research today and may reflect certain responsibilities for academic and research 
community in general. 
4.4 Setting the publication of dual-use research under the authorisation 
process:  the ‘virus H5N1’ case 
At this point, it is useful to examine a recent case that brought to the fore the export control 
implications of publishing dual-use research. The analysis emphasises the different 
approaches followed in the EU and the US as well as the elusive distinction between basic 
and applied research.  
4.4.1 The background:  
The H5N1 case originates in 2011 and relates to two different research projects with similar 
objectives undertaken by Dr. Yoshiro Kawaoka for the University of Wisconsin (USA) in 
collaboration with the University of Tokyo (Japan) and Dr. Ron Fouchier for the Erasmus 
Medical Centre of the Erasmus University (Netherlands). The controversial manuscripts were 
submitted for publication in the well-established journals ‘Nature’ and ‘Science’ respectively 
and both explored the transmissibility of H5N1 avian influenza in mammals
255
. The findings 
were ground-breaking in that the experiments conducted in ferrets proved that the airborne 
transmission of the virus H5N1 among mammals is possible when certain mutations in the 
strain of virus occur. The submission of the manuscripts to the peer-review process was 
followed by an unprecedented debate and publicity on whether in the first place the research 
results should have been published and most fundamentally, if such experimental work 
should have ever taken place
256
. Quite interestingly, the handling of the issue followed two 
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 The avian influenza A (H5N1) or as it is commonly known the ‘bird flu’, is a highly pathogenic 
virus affecting mainly chickens and other farm birds. This A (H5N1) virus subtype first infected 
humans in 1997 during a poultry outbreak in Hong Kong SAR, China. Most recently, a pandemic of 
the bird flu broke out in 2003 and spread from Asia to Europe and thenceforth incidents have been 
reported from Middle East and Africa to North America. The avian influenza can be spread to people, 
but is difficult to transmit from person to person. In fact, almost all people with H5N1 infection have 
had close contact with infected birds or H5N1-contaminated environments. When people do become 
infected, the mortality rate is about 60%. Information retrieved from the WHO’s website available in: 
http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/avian_influenza/h5n1_research/en/  
256
 Indicatively see few of the many articles in scientific news websites and blogs referring to the case: 
Jeneen Interlandi ,“Contagion: Controversy Erupts over Man-Made Pandemic Avian Flu Virus,” 
Scientific American Magazine, as modified of December 9, 2011, retrieved from: 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/contagion-controversy-erupts/; 
Katherine Harmon, “What Really Happened in Malta This September When Contagious Bird Flu Was 
First Announced?,” Scientific American (blog), December 30, 2011, retrieved from: 
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/what-really-happened-in-malta-this-september-
when-contagious-bird-flu-was-first-announced/; 
Martin Enserink, “Dual-Use Research: Dutch H5N1 Ruling Raises New Questions,” Science (news 
and analysis) 342 (2013): 178, retrieved from: http://www.sciencemag.org/content/342/6155/178.full. 
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distinct courses in the USA and the EU. In the first case the US government did not resort to 
the export control quiver in order to deal with the sensitive publications. Instead, the then 
newly established NSABB was called to give its opinion on the potential threat posed by 
these two publications. In contrast, in the EU, the Dutch authorities concluded that an export 
authorisation should be asked for the publication of the Fouchier manuscripts. The worldwide 
alarm and the furor caused by the whole debate led to the voluntary declaration of a 
moratorium on certain types of controversial experiments involving the H5N1 avian 
influenza virus from the side of scientists which lasted till January 2013
257
. In October 2014, 
the US government announced the temporary halt of all federal funding for selected ‘gain-of-
function’ (GOF) research and called for a voluntary moratorium anew till the re-assessment 
of the risks and benefits relating to research altering a pathogen to make it more transmissible 
or deadly
258
. 
4.4.2 The timeline 
The discussion in Europe concerned only the Fouchier manuscripts which are considered to 
be more controversial in that the described methods involved H5N1 virulence factors with 
actual pathogenicity in humans
259
. Dr. Fouchier and his team were informed by the Dutch 
licensing authority that the publication of manuscripts containing information controlled 
under the dual-use regulation required an export authorisation. This was the first time -in 
Europe- that a publication of a scientific work entailed an export authorisation on the basis of 
dual-use export controls. Fouchier applied on 24 April 2012 for a license under protest and 
succeeded in obtaining three days later. Finally, the much-debated manuscript and the 
accompanying one assessing the likelihood of a mutated H5N1 to arise spontaneously in 
nature- were published in Science in June 2012, almost one month after the publication of Dr. 
Kawaoka’s paper in Nature. For the record, all articles are now accessible on line for free260. 
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 “In a letter published online today (23-01-13) by Science and Nature, 40 researchers declare that 
the studies should restart now that scientists, government officials, and the public have had time to 
debate the need for the research and impose new safety measures. ‘The aims of the voluntary 
moratorium have been met in some countries and are close to being met in others,’ they write, and 
researchers ‘have a public-health responsibility to resume this important work’”. Extract from 
‘Science Insider’ news website available in: 
 http://news.sciencemag.org/people-events/2013/01/h5n1-researchers-announce-end-research-
moratorium 
258
 Indicatively see: Jocelyn Kaiser and David Malakoff, “U.S. halts funding for new risky virus 
studies, calls for voluntary moratorium,” Science Insider, as of October 17, 2014, retrieved from: 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/10/us-halts-funding-new-risky-virus-studies-calls-voluntary-
moratorium; US White House, “Doing Diligence to Assess the Risks and Benefits of Life Sciences 
Gain-of-Function Research,” as of October 17, 2014, retrieved from:  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/10/17/doing-diligence-assess-risks-and-benefits-life-sciences-
gain-function-research. 
259
 US National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity (NSABB), Findings and Recommendations 
March 29-30, 2012, 4, retrieved from: 
http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/resources/03302012_NSABB_Recommendations_1.pdf.  
260
 Sander Herfst et al., “Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus Between Ferrets,” 
Science 336 (2012): 1534-1541, retrieved from: 
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/336/6088/1534.abstract;  
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The issue however went on; Dr. Fouchier took legal action against the decision of the Dutch 
authorities to require a license
261
. The case brought to the District Court in Harlem which 
published on 23 September 2013 its decision: the claim of Dutch authorities to set an 
authorisation requirement for the publication of the study was justified by the related law that 
is to say the EU Regulation. Shortly after the ruling of the court, it became known that 
Fouchier filed an appeal against the court decision and the European Society for Virology 
(ESV) sent a letter to the then President of the European Commission, J. M. Barroso 
expressing inter alia its concern to maintain the free exchange of scientific information in the 
interest of animal and public health
262
. 
 
Finally, on 18 July 2015 the Appellate Court in Amsterdam adopted a rather unexpected 
ruling; the appeal was unfounded and what is more, the decision of the District Court should 
be annulled
263
. The reasoning of this decision has as follows: the researcher was granted an 
authorisation to publish his research without any restrictions or conditions. According to the 
Court an appeal is well-founded only if an eventual remedy can bring the applicant in a better 
position with regard to the contested decision. The researcher did not suffer any damage –
apart from legal fees- and hence, no legal ruling can be requested solely on the basis of 
significance for possible future cases. Therefore, the Appellate Court concluded that the 
competent authorities should not have accepted the administrative appeal filed by the 
researcher and the case should not have been heard before the District Court of Haarlem. The 
Appellate Court’s decision does not contribute to the actual issues at stake in the H5N1 case. 
However, it affirms, in a way, the logic embraced by trade controls: the imposition of a 
licensing requirement does not necessarily equate to a prohibition of an export. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Colin A. Russell et al. “The Potential for Respiratory Droplet–Transmissible A/H5N1 Influenza Virus 
to Evolve in a Mammalian Host,” Science 336 (2012), p. 1541-1547, retrieved from: 
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/336/6088/1541.full;  
Masaki Imai et al. “Experimental Adaptation of an Influenza H5 HA Confers Respiratory Droplet 
Transmission to a Reassortant H5HA/H1N1 Virus in Ferrets,” Nature 486 (2012): 420-428, retrieved 
from: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v486/n7403/full/nature10831.html. 
261
As it is the case with many countries, the appeal process for export control cases in Netherlands 
may entail different steps and legal procedures. The first is the administrative appeal where the 
competent authority can re-consider its original decision. Then, there is the judiciary appeal which 
could be examined at the first instance by the Court of Haarlem, at the second instance by the 
Appellate Court in Amsterdam and finally the Supreme Court of Netherlands may adjudicate a case. 
During these different stages the tribunals have the possibility to refer the case to the European Court 
of Justice for a preliminary ruling. The final decision remains with the national court to be taken. 
262
 In the letter, the ESV took a balanced stance by underlying the need to carefully consider the 
potential benefits and risks linked to the conduct of research handling viruses, fungi and bacteria 
listed in the dual-use regulation. They highlighted the implications of setting hundreds of scientific 
manuscripts to a screening process which could avoidably lead to serious delays for scientific 
publications or in some case to the disruption of the free dissemination of data sometimes critical for 
enhancing preparedness against threats in public health. Moreover, the ESV noted their willingness to 
provide scientific advice to law officers at least till the establishment of more permanent mechanisms 
for the assessment of dual-use research.  
263
 The decision of the Appellate Court of Amsterdam was published in the website of the Netherlands 
Judiciary on July 15, 2015 (in Dutch), retrieved from:  
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2015:2913&-
keyword=ECLI%3aNL%3aGHAMS%3a2015%3a2913. 
107 
 
4.4.3 The litigation
264
 
Regardless of this outcome, the arguments presented in the original adjudication of the case 
by the District Court are of interest from an academic and policy point of view. As described 
in the court’s reasoning underpinning the verdict, the overall debate on imposing an 
authorisation requirement for the publication of the manuscripts was centred around the 
‘basic scientific research’ and ‘in the public domain’ exemptions. On the one hand, Dr. 
Fouchier supported that the overarching objective of such a scientific enterprise was to 
acquire new scientific and technical knowledge about the fundamental genetic principles 
governing the airborne transmission of H5N1 in mammals. The project is not primarily 
directed towards a specific practical aim or objective and thus, the basic research exemption 
should be applicable. Moreover, the plaintiff argued that all methods described in the 
manuscripts have been already available in the existing literature since the techniques to 
genetically modify the influenza viruses have been first published in 2000. Likewise, the 
mutations described have been firstly occurred and identified in the course of 20
th
 century 
following the outbreak of global pandemics. Therefore, the researchers only used publicly 
available information in a systematic way in order to verify whether the avian influenza could 
be transferred via the respiratory route in mammals. In addition, they have been the first to 
identify certain mutations that might lead to such a contingency in the future relying again on 
existing knowledge. As a consequence, the research belongs to the public domain.  
 
On the other hand, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported its claim to impose a 
license requirement by specifying the entries in Annex I of the regulation under which 
technology related to H5N1 is controlled and also opposed the arguments about the 
applicability of the exemptions. The two manuscripts pose a threat since they provide 
information that could be used for the production, development and use of the virus as a bio-
weapon, they advocated. The manuscripts do not constitute necessarily basic scientific 
research because even if the overall objective could be reasonably considered as general and 
fundamental, the experiments undertaken during the individual phases had rather practical 
objectives. The first manuscript shows what mutations are required for rendering the virus 
transmissible by air and the second describes where these mutations already occur in nature 
and what strains are already fairly close to the required number of mutations. Moreover, the 
fact that the methods used were already known does not imply that the steps taken and the 
results obtained are not new at all and therefore the study does not necessarily belong to the 
public domain. The fact itself that the manuscripts were approved for publication in these 
journals hints at the special character of the research.  
 
The court settled the dispute by dismissing the allegations of the plaintiff. The court affirmed 
that it is indisputable that H5N1 virus is a controlled pathogen under item 1C352 of the 
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 This section draws from the reasoning underpinning the District Court’s decision as published on 
September 23, 2013 in the website of the Netherlands Judiciary (in Dutch), retrieved from: 
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2013:8527. 
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Annex I of the Regulation and that technology relating to this item is equally controlled under 
entry 1E001
265
. Besides, this was acknowledged by both sides. 
 
Entries of the dual-use regulation under which H5N1 is controlled: 
1C351 (Materials):  
Human and animal pathogens and ‘toxins’, as follows: 
a. Viruses, whether natural, enhanced or modified, either in the form of ‘isolated live 
cultures’ or as material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or 
contaminated with such cultures, as follows: 
[….] 
4. Avian influenza virus, which are: 
a. Uncharacterised; or 
b. Defined in Annex I(2) EC Directive 2005/94/EC (O.J. L 10 14.1.2006, p. 16) as having 
high pathogenicity, as follows: 
1. Type A viruses with an IVPI (intravenous pathogenicity index) in 6 week old chickens of 
greater than 1,2; or  
2. Type A viruses of the subtypes H5 or H7 with genome sequences codified for multiple 
basic amino acids at the cleavage site of the haemagglutinin molecule similar to that observed 
for other HPAI viruses, indicating that the haemagglutinin molecule can be cleaved by a host 
ubiquitous protease; 
E001 (Technology): 
‘Technology’ according to the General Technology Note for the ‘development’ or 
‘production’ of equipment or materials specified in 1A001.b., 1A001.c., 1A002 to 1A005, 
1A006.b., 1A007, 1B or 1C. 
 
On what it concerns the dispute over the basic scientific research and publicly available 
information the court opposed the arguments of the plaintiff. Exemptions should be 
interpreted restrictively and in the light of the main purpose of the Regulation which is above 
all the prevention of proliferation of WMD
266
. In other words, the judge weighed the risks 
against the benefits and decided that an authorisation requirement is justifiable. The 
exemption of the basic research is not applicable because demonstrating how a strain of 
influenza can be adapted to be transmissible in mammals is a practical goal. Moreover, even 
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 Currently, with the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2420, the updated Annex I lists 
the ‘avian influenza’ virus under entry 1C351 and related technology remains controlled under 1E001. 
See EU Commission, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2420 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
428/2009, Official Journal of the EU (L 340), Brussels, 2015, 79-80; 89, retrieved from:  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/january/tradoc_154129.2015-2420.pdf. 
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 According to the Court, the main considerations underpinning the dual-use regulation are non-
proliferation objectives. Recitals three and 15 provide for the establishment of an effective common 
export control system in compliance with the multilateral commitments of the EU Member States and 
the obligations set by UNSCR 1540 whereby the interests of non-proliferation should take precedence 
over other concerns. 
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though the methods used in the study to generate mutant viruses are not novel, Fouchier and 
his team took steps and made choices that led to entirely new outcomes. Nevertheless, the 
court accepted that imposing an authorisation requirement to publications of dual-use concern 
can be, to some extent, detrimental to scientific research mainly due to subsequent delays in 
the publication of the scientific work and/or restrictions in accessing the most sensitive 
findings. The importance of adequate and effective monitoring of proliferation sensitive 
activities must be however a higher priority according to the judges. Last, the objection of the 
claimant that such an approach could lead to the asymmetric implementation of export 
controls since no other EU Member States would have required a license for a similar case 
was dismissed as a hypothetical argument that could not be substantiated. 
4.4.4 The American reaction 
The publication of the opinion of NSABB concerning both Kawaoka’s267 and Fouchier’s 
works preceded the decision of the court in Harlem. In the USA, both cases are considered as 
DURC and thus, the NSABB the advisory board for the oversight of research in life science 
was called to assess the imminent risks stemming from the publication of the studies already 
in the fall of 2011
268
. The board reached two important conclusions: first, the experiments 
conducted indeed “confirmed that H5N1 has the potential to become mammalian 
transmissible and thus poses a threat of future pandemic” and second, the manuscripts should 
be published in a redacted version “with the omission of certain details that could enable the 
direct misuse of the research by those with malevolent intent”269.  
The goal was to deliver the critical information about the H5N1 potential for pandemic 
spread while minimizing the possible risk that the information could be used for nefarious 
purposes.                                                                           
                                                                                 NSABB, Findings and Recommendations, 1 
 
Due to the issues at stake (public health and public security), in February 2012 the WHO 
convened a technical consultation with the participation among other experts of doctors 
Fouchier and Kawaoka in order to clarify the key issues relating to the studies
270
. First, the 
WHO panel of experts recognised the potential for misuse of the results achieved and 
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 Although the Kawaoka’s research relied on different methods from these described in Fouchier 
studies it also reached to similar findings concerning the transmissibility of H5N1 in mammals.   
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 Following the first review, “the NSABB recommended that the general conclusions highlighting 
the novel outcome be published, but that the manuscripts not include the methodological and other 
details that could enable replication of the experiments by those who would seek to do harm”. From 
the US National Institutes of Health website, “Press Statement on the NSABB Review of H5N1 
Research,” as of December 20, 2011, retrieved from:  
http://www.nih.gov/news/health/dec2011/od-20.htm. 
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 NSABB, Findings and Recommendations, 2012, 1, retrieved from: 
http://www.nih.gov/about/director/03302012_NSABB_Recommendations.pdf. 
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 World Health Organisation (WHO), “Report on technical consultation on H5N1 research issues,” 
Geneva, February 16-17, 2012, retrieved from:  
http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/mtg_report_h5n1.pdf?ua=1;  
For more information see also the relevant WHO webpage: 
http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/avian_influenza/h5n1_research/en/. 
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methods used in the studies. However, taking into account that the H5N1 continued to pose a 
great risk for causing a future pandemic -at least back at the time of discussions- they urged 
for the full disclosure of the manuscripts
271
. The redaction option is not a viable option, they 
noted. With a view to dealing with the dual-use problem, the idea of a mechanism ensuring 
the selective access only to those having a legitimate interest to sensitive research was tabled. 
It was accepted though that this was a tricky issue requiring time and further consultations 
with stakeholders from other communities most probably at international level. Therefore, the 
launch of such a mechanism could be considered as an appropriate initiative to take on in the 
future.  
Second, the participating experts examined specific questions relating to physical security 
and safety: What were the laboratory biosecurity standards observed during the conduct of 
the experiments? Were the modified viruses and related samples of H5N1 kept in safe 
locations? Is there a need for re-considering and enhancing the level of biosafety for such 
experimental works? The committee’s participants did not contend any breach of the existing 
biosafety and security conditions applying to such type of research (BSL3+)
272
.  However, 
they called the competent authorities to re-evaluate the biosafety and security standards that 
should apply to related research in the future. In the interim, particular attention must be 
drawn in raising awareness of scientists about potential risks and communicating to the 
society the added value of such research endeavours.  
Finally, the NSABB convened again in March 2012 to review the newly revised manuscripts 
in the light also of the opinion provided by the WHO
273
. The NSABB Findings and 
Recommendations report is accessible in the web and describes the final deliberations on the 
issue taken place on 29-30 March, 2012. The Board reversed its stance and concluded that in 
spite of the fact that the manuscripts still raise dual-use concerns the benefits for publishing 
the work outweigh the risks. The majority of the Board’s members recommended the full 
communication of the revised Kawaoka’s paper. Concerning the Fouchier study in a 6 to 12 
decision the NSABB concluded that the manuscripts could be communicated but some 
further clarifications should be made prior to the publication.  
4.4.5 Lessons learned and further remarks 
Controlling the publication of research on the basis of existing export control provisions is 
not a straightforward issue. It exemplifies both practical difficulties and a weakness of the 
legal framework to clarify some fundamental issues. 
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 According to the committee’s overview the dissemination of the controversial research findings 
could offer significant benefits to global health. The findings could be used to improve sensitivity of 
public health surveillance, facilitate the early detection of potentially pandemic H5N1 strains, and 
might aid the development of vaccines and other countermeasures. 
272
 Biosafety level 3+ corresponds to ‘enhanced containment laboratory’ for safeguarding high risk 
pathogens and toxins. See Peter Clevestig, Handbook of Applied Bio-Security for Life Science 
Laboratories, (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2009), 10. 
273
 The degree of revision done by the authors is rather unclear. From the context, one may assume 
that the revision was not extensive. Instead, it seems that the revisions were limited to eliminating 
certain terminology and highlighting the added value of the research in question. 
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Lesson I: The implementation of export controls vis-à-vis the publication of dual-use 
Research is inextricably linked to practical and legal challenges 
Given the potentiality the publication of research to constitute a form of ‘export’, certain 
issues need clarification. Who must be considered as the exporter and who the end-user of 
any given publication?  For example, during the peer review process the academic might send 
an article containing technical knowledge of dual-use nature to the editor and the editor could 
then make available such information to the evaluators. According to the export controls 
‘philosophy’ the issue of location is very crucial and thus, if both the editor and the reviewers 
are established in non-EU countries more than one export authorisations might be required. 
That said it is unclear if the legal responsibility must be borne by the original expediter of the 
sensitive information i.e. the academic or by the editor or whether both should share it. 
Moreover, the publication of a research work would basically mean the unhindered 
dissemination to anyone having access to the Journal’s website or a certain library regardless 
of the country where he/she is based.  
 
For physical exports, Article 2 of the Regulation considers as ‘exporter’ any natural or legal 
person or partnership holding the contract with the consignee in a non-EU country and having 
the power to determine the sending of the item out of the customs territory of the EU. For 
electronic transfers, the same article considers as ‘exporter’ any natural or legal person or 
partnership that decides to transfer or make available controlled software or technology to a 
non-EU destination. However, normally, neither the academic nor the editor and the 
evaluators hold a transfer contract and even if the academic signs a publishing contract it will 
be difficult to exclude consignees established in certain countries. From the point of view of 
intangible transfers, both the academic and the editorial board may transfer controlled 
information and the problem of the end-user stands also here as an inextricable question. 
 
‘Exporter’ shall mean any natural or legal person or partnership:  
 
(i) on whose behalf an export declaration is made, that is to say the person who, at the time 
when the declaration is accepted, holds the contract with the consignee in the third country 
and has the power for determining the sending of the item out of the customs territory of 
the Community. If no export contract has been concluded or if the holder of the contract 
does not act on its own behalf, the exporter shall mean the person who has the power for 
determining the sending of the item out of the customs territory of the Community;  
 
(ii) which decides to transmit or make available software or technology by electronic media 
including by fax, telephone, electronic mail or by any other electronic means to a 
destination outside the Community. 
 
Where the benefit of a right to dispose of the dual-use item belongs to a person established 
outside the Community pursuant to the contract on which the export is based, the exporter 
shall be considered to be the contracting party established in the Community. 
 
                                                                       Article 2 §3 of the Regulation (EC) No 428/2009                                                                     
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In the H5N1 case, the Dutch government set an authorisation requirement for the export of 
the manuscript to a US-based peer-reviewed journal. In that sense, a physical export was 
taking place from the EU to the US. The stated end-use was publication in a scientific journal 
and the academic was considered as the exporter given that the author holds the right to 
withdraw the article any time before the publication. One could argue that the aim of the 
authorisation was actually to block the release of the information in general, worldwide until 
the evaluation of the risks and benefits associated with the study was completed. This way the 
competent authorities used the time in order to decide on a crucial issue and also, rendered 
the scientists aware of the dual-use potential of their work. Nevertheless, if the ESV is right 
in its estimations, Dutch scientists alone publish an average of 100 manuscripts per year 
containing information about pathogens listed in the Annex I of the regulation. Setting all 
these manuscripts to the approval of the competent authorities can be cumbersome for both 
licensing officers and scientists. 
 
Lesson II: The applicability of the ‘basic scientific research’ exemption is contentious 
The interpretation of exemptions applicable to research activities is a challenging issue due to 
ambiguities in the legal framework at the European and international level. The ‘H5N1 case’ 
demonstrates this problem. On the one hand, the researcher’s argumentation was that the 
purpose of research was solely to explore mammalian transmissibility of an influenza strain 
and thus, the manuscripts justifiably fall within the basic research realm. On the other hand, 
the Dutch authorities supported their stance to impose an export authorisation by highlighting 
that making the H5N1 airborne is a practical goal and thus, the exemption is not applicable. 
From the Court’s reasoning one could deduce that the Dutch authorities resorted to the 
definitions of basic and applied research as provided in the OECD’s ‘Frascati Manual’ to 
make his case in the court
274
. It should be reiterated that both the multilateral regimes and the 
EU regulation draw from the understanding of basic and applied research as originally 
established in the said manual. In fact, both refer solely to the definition of basic research 
without clarifying further the concept. According to ‘Frascati Manual’, the main difference 
between basic and applied research is that the latter is directed primarily towards a specific 
practical aim or objective. Apparently, such a general criterion is open to different 
interpretations and it is not of help to regulators and practitioners dealing with the dual-use 
problematic. 
 
The distinction between basic and applied research merits some further discussion. Generally 
speaking, ‘basic research’ is a poorly defined term that takes different nuances depending on 
the given circumstances under which it is used. The paper of Calvert and Martin provides an 
interesting summary of the different characteristics conferred to basic research as recorded in 
interviews with scientists coming mainly from physics and biology as well as policy 
makers
275
. At an epistemological level, basic research can be unpredictable, novel, and 
theoretical or it may describe things in reductionist terms. It may also be curiosity driven, 
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oriented to benefit social welfare or without any practical usefulness at all. The basic research 
concept can embody contrasting elements and, virtually for almost any of the characteristics 
conferred to it there will be some evidence for their relevance to applied research, too. As 
Calvert and Martin observed already 15 years ago, the concept of basic research is 
characterised by complexity, flexibility and adaptability making it a persistent and long 
lasting term used regularly in the various interactions between scientists and policy-makers
276
 
At the same time, this element of flexibility means that what constitutes basic research may 
depend to a large extent on the perception of whosoever speaks. 
 
From an export control perspective, it seems that the ‘basic research’ concept connotes the 
exceptional character of research and aims at protecting its role in advancing science and 
society. Simply put, it saves scientists from undue hindrance in the conduct of lawful research 
and public authorities from a high volume of unnecessary export control applications. 
However, in practice, using the basic research term may increase the nebulous landscape of 
export controls for both ‘exporters’ and export control authorities for a number of reasons. 
 
First, the boundaries between basic and applied research are indiscernible and are bound to 
become even more so due to the intensification of collaborations between universities and 
corporations. More particularly, basic research is publishable but applied research can be 
published as well. Private firms do not only produce greater numbers of publications but they 
also embark on collaborative publications with universities or other public research 
organisations. The ‘paper-patent’ divide which has been long used to signify the basic-
applied boundary is becoming increasingly less appropriate
277
. Also, whereas basic research 
is generally not intended towards commercialisation, for certain emerging technologies the 
time lapse from very basic research to the production of marketable products is very short. 
 
Furthermore, collaborations between universities and private corporations are increasingly 
favoured by governments and industry. In relation to this, public funding is not directed 
exclusively to public institutions and basic research. As a consequence, researchers can adapt 
the objectives of their projects in order to receive funding and thus, there is usually room for 
manoeuvring from knowledge of a more general and fundamental nature to practical 
applications. This factor implies that the institutional locus and the public or private funding 
of research activities cannot be a sufficient criterion for defining basic research. This is 
vividly illustrated in the responses of some of the participants in the study of Calvert and 
Martin: “if you walk into a laboratory how do you know whether they are doing basic or 
applied research?” “The sequencing of the human genome undertaken by a private initiative 
it would be basic research if it was being done in a university for non-profit purposes
278.”  
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Second, interpreting basic research on the basis of internationally accepted definitions 
established and analysed in the ‘Frascati Manual’ and the ‘Manual for Statistics on Scientific 
and Technological Activities’ is a rather challenging task279. The Frascati Manual highlights 
four characteristics in order to clarify the basic scientific research concept: 
 
 First, the performer of research may not know about actual implications when doing 
the research; 
 Second, the results of basic research are not generally sold but are usually published 
in scientific journals or circulated to interested colleagues; 
 Third and most importantly -from the point of view of non-proliferation- occasionally, 
basic research may be classified for security reasons; 
 Fourth, basic research can be distinguished to ‘pure’ and ‘oriented’. This subdivision 
is suitable due to the admitted fact “that basic research can be oriented or directed 
towards some broad fields of general interest, with the explicit goal of a broad range 
of applications in the future
280.” 
 
Pure basic research is carried out for the advancement of knowledge, without seeking long 
term economic or social benefits or making any effort to apply the results to practical 
problems or to transfer the results to sectors responsible for their application. 
 
Oriented basic research is carried out with the expectation that it will produce a broad base of 
knowledge likely to form the basis of the solution to recognised or expected, current or future 
problems or possibilities. 
                                                                                                         ‘Frascati Manual’, 78 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, applied research involves considering the available 
knowledge and its extension in order to solve particular problems. As clarified in the Frascati 
Manual, the results of applied research are intended primarily to be valid for a single or 
limited number of products, operations, methods or systems. Further, applied research gives 
operational form to ideas and, the knowledge or information derived from it is often patented 
and it may be kept secret
281
. Also, certain research endeavours may require investments in 
both basic and applied research in different phases of a project and the private sector may 
conduct basic research with a view to preparing for the next generation of technology 
objectives
282
. Overall, there are many conceptual and operational problems associated with 
the concept of basic and applied research as defined in international manuals and legal texts 
and their usefulness for trade controls is questionable.  
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That said, a reasonable question would be where the H5N1 research actually falls. Should it 
be considered as (oriented) basic research or as applied research? Following the applicability 
of patenting and specific utility as a part of the definition of applied research, one could argue 
that since neither Kawaoka’s nor Fouchier’s works produced patents or were commercially 
oriented, they are to be considered basic research. 
 
Lesson III: Export Controls: one option among others 
The US authorities did not resort to trade controls in order to deal with the controversial 
manuscripts presumably because they have a distinct approach to interpreting the basic 
scientific research exemption. Otherwise, one could assume that although both research 
works were submitted to leading US based journals, the export control authorities could have 
claimed that the publication by these journals requires an export authorisation since it 
amounts to an export from the US to unauthorised destinations and end-users. To this end, the 
editorial boards of the two Journals would have been required to ask for an export 
authorisation from the Department of Commerce. Regardless of this hypothetical case, the 
US approach provides for a further mechanism to be considered. Research proposals and 
manuscripts of ‘dual-use concern’ can be evaluated by an advisory committee specially 
devised to assess sensitive scientific proposals and production of dual-use nature in life 
sciences. Such a committee should be composed of experts coming from all different 
authorities concerned and it would bring together the research and the security communities 
(e.g. intelligence, national security authorities, and public health and bio-safety experts). In 
the USA this role is entrusted to NSABB, the federal advisory committee addressing issues 
related to biosecurity and dual use research at the request of the United States Government
283
. 
 
As highlighted in the ‘Fink report’, almost all biotechnology in service of human health can 
be subverted for misuse by hostile individual or nations
284
. This premise about the dual-use 
potential of bio-technology led the authoring committee of the Fink report to recommend the 
creation of ‘an advisory board for biodefense’ and eventually to the foundation of the 
NSABB. The same report stresses the importance of overseeing dual-use research already in 
the phase of planning instead of screening completed research works ready for publication. In 
this regard, the recommendation ‘Review of Plans for Experiments’ in the Fink report 
determines seven classes of experiments that could have a high potential for misuse. Among 
them categories four and five ‘experiments that would increase transmissibility of a 
pathogen’ and, ‘experiments that would alter the host range of a pathogen’ seem to match 
with the main objectives pursued in the H5N1 research. 
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The increased domestic and international expenditure in basic and applied public health and 
bioterrorism defence research will inevitably create an increased number of research 
activities that raise concerns about misuse. 
                                                                                                       ‘Fink Report’, 2004, 109 
 
As prophetically mentioned in the conclusions of the ‘Fink report’ the number of dual-use 
research experiments in bio-science is expected to get higher for two main reasons: first, 
scientists need to know what exactly makes certain microbes pathogenic and virulent in order 
to produce appropriate vaccines and second, the funding spent on bio-defence is anticipated 
to continue increasing in the future in the US and globally due to the importance of 
preparedness for the public health security
285
. The importance attached to dual-use research 
in life sciences is also evidenced by the fact that ‘dual-use research of concern’ (DURC) has 
been first defined in this context.  
 
It is worth being reminded that the definition implies correctly that it is not all dual-use 
research that poses an imminent and perceivable threat but only the most sensitive one. What 
most sensitive means exactly is left apparently for the NSABB to decide upon and certainly 
includes research that can be ‘directly misapplied’.  
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5. Monitoring Dual-Use Research in the US: A Genuine Approach? 
The H5N1 case demonstrated not only the legal and practical challenges in controlling the 
publication of dual-use research but also the varying approaches adopted by the US and EU 
authorities in monitoring dual-use research in general. This chapter intends to provide a brief 
overview of the American trade control system placing particular emphasis on certain aspects 
relating to the control of dual-use research. As a pioneer in designing and enforcing trade 
controls the USA operate probably the most comprehensive and sophisticated system for 
controlling strategic goods. Given also the genuine approach adopted for the control of dual-
use research, the US system represents a fitting case to discuss.  
5.1 Brief overview of the legal framework 
The U.S. government operates a complex system of export laws and implementing 
regulations “as a means to promote national security interests and foreign policy 
objectives”286. More particularly, increasing national security by limiting access to the most 
sensitive U.S. technology and weapons, promoting regional stability and the respect of 
human rights, preventing the proliferation of weapons and technologies -including WMD- to 
unlawful end-users and supporters of international terrorism as well as complying with 
international commitments (e.g. international export control regimes, UN Security Council 
sanctions and the UNSC resolution 1540) are the main objectives pursued through trade 
controls
287
. The following implementing regulations are the cornerstones of the US policy in 
dealing with strategic export controls of military and dual-use goods as well as other items 
included in sanctions and embargoes lists: 
 the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) governing the transfer and 
export of inherently military technologies is administered by the Directorate of 
Defence Trade Controls at the Department of State
 288
. 
 the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) setting the rules for the transfer and 
export of commercial dual use - including less critical military- equipment, materials 
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and technologies is administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the 
Department of Commerce
289
. 
 the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in the Treasury Department administers 
regulations prohibiting certain transactions with countries subject to trade sanctions 
and embargoes
 290
. 
Moreover, the provision of nuclear assistance and nuclear equipment for peaceful purposes 
may bring specific requirements -an authorisation or reporting obligation- lying within the 
competence of other departments and agencies of the US government. For instance, the 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the 
Department of Energy, controls the provision of unclassified nuclear technology and 
assistance
291
 while the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is an independent agency 
regulating the export and import of certain nuclear facilities, equipment and material
292
 on the 
basis of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and its amendments. 
This study focuses on dual-use aspects and therefore, the EAR provisions are of high 
relevance to this analysis. Title 15, Part 738.1 of the CFR clarifies the structure and the scope 
of the EAR list that is known as the Commerce Control List (CCL). Simply put, “the CCL 
sets out the combinations of dual-use goods and destinations for which an exporter must 
obtain a license from the BIS. The CCL provides also main reasons for control for each item 
ranging from counter-terrorism to national security and regional stability”. As part 730.6 
clarifies, some control entries intend to restrict access to sensitive items by countries or 
persons that might apply such items to uses inimical to U.S. interests. Furthemore, “a 
relatively small percentage of exports and re-exports subject to the EAR require an 
application to BIS for a license. Many items are not on the CCL, or, if on the CCL, require a 
license to only a limited number of countries. Other transactions may be covered by one or 
more of the License Exceptions in the EAR. In such a case no application need be made to 
BIS”293. As it is the case with the EU list, the CCL draws mainly from the WA list and it uses 
the same division in 10 general categories (nuclear, materials processing, aerospace and 
propulsion etc.) arranged by 5 groups (materials, software, equipment etc.) However, as 
Rosanelli has noted, each State implements the guidelines and lists agreed in the framework 
of the multilateral regimes quite discretionary allowing for national foreign policy 
considerations and national commercial and security interests to be expressed
294
. 
Quite interestingly, the EAR (Part 730.3) adopts a rather distinct and flexible approach in 
clarifying the term ‘dual use’ and its relation with the items covered under the CCL: “In 
essence, the EAR concern any item warranting control that is not exclusively controlled for 
export, re-export, or transfer (in-country) by another agency of the US Government or 
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otherwise excluded from being subject to the EAR [..]. Thus, items subject to the EAR 
include purely civilian items, items with both civil and military applications (including 
terrorism or potential WMD-related), and items that are exclusively used for military 
applications but that do not warrant control under the ITAR”295. Items that are not 
specifically catalogued in the CCL under an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 
yet they are subject to EAR are designated as EAR99 items
296
. Items falling within the 
jurisdiction of ITAR receive stricter treatment and thus, the issue of identifying the right 
commodity jurisdiction is quite important pending also of a greater degree of harmonisation 
between the rules applying to ITAR and those applying to EAR control entries
297
. In this 
regard, the intended use after the export is not relevant in determining the applicable 
jurisdiction. This means that if an item is listed on the US Military List (USML), it will be 
subject to ITAR, even if the exporter claims a de facto civilian-use
298
. Another related 
problem is that items of dual-use nature may be included in the USML, an issue encountered 
also in the EU context (see section 3.4.2). In certain instances a similar or practically identical 
item may be controlled under both jurisdictions. The ongoing Export Control Reform (ECR) 
intends to remedy inter alia this problem shifting also the focus from a ‘design intent’ to a 
‘performance specification’ based USML299. In case of doubt, exporters may apply for a 
commodity jurisdiction determination to the Department of State that has the jurisdictional 
authority to decide whether an article is defence related or not. For EAR specific questions, 
an advisory opinion request may be submitted to BIS. 
The system of the US export controls stands out for the far-reaching scope of the legislation, 
the extraterritorial character of certain provisions and the commitment of the US authorities 
to promote a transparent, accountable and effective licensing system for sensitive products 
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and technologies
300
. The most striking examples of the pervasive character of US provisions 
concern the application of the ‘deemed exports’ and the ‘de minims’ rule.  
More particularly, Part 734 of the EAR defines the different forms of ‘export’ covered under 
the US dual-use trade controls system. An export means the actual shipment or transmission 
of controlled items out of the United States, or release of controlled technology or source 
code to a foreign national in the US. A ‘release’ of controlled technology can take place 
through training, oral exchange, practical demonstration or even visual inspection.  In other 
words, the disclosure or transfer of export controlled software and technical data to a foreign 
individual inside the US is ‘deemed’ to be an export to the home country of the foreign 
individual gaining access to such controlled technology
301
.  In the case of a research institute 
or a university, foreign students, visiting scientists as well as foreign nationals employed in 
certain R&D and manufacturing activities may be confronted with restrictions and export 
authorisation requirements for entering US laboratories, using US technology or, taking 
courses and trainings during their stay in the US. 
Part 734 provides also the definition of ‘re-export’ as the actual shipment or transmission of 
items subject to the EAR from one foreign country to another foreign country. Following the 
deemed export notion, any release of technology or source code subject to EAR to a foreign 
national of another country is a ‘deemed re-export’ to the home country or counties of the 
foreign national. Consequently, recipients of US technologies are required to respect the 
deemed re-export rule and accept re-export clauses as provided in the licensing conditions.  
The impact of the extraterritorial reach of US regulations can be even higher if one considers 
another US-specific rule, the ‘de minimis US content’. First of all, the main rule is that all 
US-origin items remain under control no matter whether they are located in the US territory 
or not. In addition to this, according to Part 734.3 foreign made commodities -including 
software- that incorporate more than a certain percentage (in terms of value) of controlled 
US-origin content shall be also subject to US trade controls
302
. In addition, derivative 
technologies, meaning certain foreign-made goods that are direct product of US origin 
technology or software are subject to EAR, too
303
. The so called ‘contamination principle’ is 
a pervasive concept in the US trade controls in general. For foreign-made items incorporating 
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military components regulated under the ITAR, their re-export will demand the prior 
approval of the US Department of State regardless of the percentage of the embedded 
technology. For former ITAR entries having been removed to EAR a ‘zero de minims rule’ 
would continue to apply if the foreign item into which they are being incorporated is to be 
exported to a country subject to a US embargo.  
5.2 Confronting dual-use research through export controls 
As it was shown in the discussion of the H5N1 case in section 4.4, the US authorities may set 
the publication of sensitive life science research to a risk-benefit assessment by the competent 
national board, namely the NSABB. Therefore, a pre-publication review might be among the 
available options used for monitoring publications of DURC in the US context. Most 
importantly, the US government did not have the legal basis to control the said scientific 
work pursuant to trade controls. In the view of the BIS, Kawaoka’s work did not require any 
export authorisation given that the technologies/methods used were publicly available prior 
the conduct of this research
304
. Also, the results produced were eligible for publication in 
scientific journals -no proprietary or security classification clauses were applicable- and 
therefore, the publication fulfilled the criteria to be treated as ‘fundamental research’ (this is 
the term used in the US regulations for exempting research activities from the scope of 
controls). Shipping, possessing or receiving ‘select agents and toxins’ in the USA -in that 
case high pathogenic strains of avian influenza- as well as handling such controlled 
pathogens in a laboratory environment is subject to biosecurity and biosafety rules as 
required by the US government
305
. This approach departs from the practice followed by the 
Dutch authorities.  Fouchier’s research relied also on published methods and reached similar 
conclusions to Kawaoka’s work. However, according to the Dutch licensing authority, 
Fouchier took entirely new steps and came up with innovative results of applied nature thus 
warranting, an export authorisation in order to get published. At this point, it is prudent to 
further discuss the US approach vis-à-vis the H5N1 research and the dual-use research in 
general. 
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Figure VI: Dealing with the dual-use research in the US context 
306
 
 
The approach of the US authorities is described vividly in the figure above. If one 
distinguishes between inputs to a research and outputs, there are two possibilities for the trade 
controls to come to play. The first one concerns the case where existing controlled items, 
technical data or software are used as inputs in the research. This means that researchers 
dealing with such controlled commodities will need to comply with export and deemed 
export obligations applying each time. Deemed export rules in particular may require export 
authorisations to be in place for foreign nationals working in a laboratory and/or accessing 
controlled information. The second possibility concerns the case where outcomes generated 
by a given research are subject to proprietary or other restrictions. If information relating to 
such research is withheld from publication due to other security controls or proprietary 
reasons an authorisation requirement shall apply in case of ‘export’ of EAR controlled items, 
technologies and software. The distinction between inputs and outcomes of research has 
raised the question whether the outcomes of fundamental research could be subject to export 
controls. The issue has been discussed in various occasions such as during the open 
consultation for the reform of the US system, especially with regards to ITAR controlled 
items
307
.  
The US approach was exemplified in the H5N1 case. According to the US authorities no 
‘export’ took place in the course of the project and also, the results of the study were intended 
for publication in a scientific journal confirming thereby the fundamental character of the 
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research in question. Only when certain information was withheld from publication after the 
first opinion by the NSABB, export authorisations were granted to those scientists and 
experts who participated in the deliberations at the WHO level.  Therefore, the interpretation 
of the fundamental research exemption is central in understanding why Americans apply 
trade controls this way.  
Figure VII: The US approach towards the H5N1 case
308
 
 
The fundamental research exception: The US government maintains an elaborate and 
distinct approach on the issue of fundamental research and public domain exemptions 
compared to their counterparts in Europe. In practice, the underlying logic clarifying what 
qualifies as ‘fundamental research’ and what is ‘published information and software’ is 
spread in different paragraphs of Part 734 including the questions and answers in the 
Supplement No 1 to the Part in question. To begin with, Part 734.8 of the EAR clarifies what 
‘information resulting from fundamental research’ shall mean: 
“basic and applied research in science and engineering, where the resulting information is 
ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific community. Such research can 
be distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, 
production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for 
proprietary reasons or specific national security reasons as defined in § 734.11(b)”. 
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This definition derives from an old national Directive established in the cold war context; 
however its main ruling has some bearing today:  “the products of fundamental research shall 
remain unrestricted to the maximum extent possible and, for federally funded research 
warranting security controls classification should be the main applicable rule”309. Today, the 
nature of threat is different but the foregoing definition is still quite relevant. It seeks to 
protect the free conduct of scientific research acknowledging at the same time that both basic 
and applied research may be exempt from export controls on the condition that the research is 
publishable.  
In the same paragraph of Part 734 it is suggested that the institutional locus is not a sufficient 
criterion for defining fundamental research. Instead, fundamental research can be undertaken 
by organisations as follows: 
 Universities; 
 Federal Agencies or Federally Funded Research and Development Centres (FFRDCs) 
within any appropriate system devised by such an agency to control the release of 
information; 
 ‘Corporations or any other type of organisations to the extent that researchers are free 
to make scientific and technical information resulting from the research publicly 
available without restrictions or delay based on proprietary concerns or specific 
national security controls. 
In all three instances, research stops being considered as fundamental when its results are 
subject to prepublication preview due to proprietary reasons, patent rights or other specific 
national security controls as explained in Part 734.11(b)
310
. In the same logic, the initial 
transfer of information from an industry sponsor to university researchers is not considered as 
fundamental research where the parties have agreed that the sponsor may withhold from 
publication some or all of the information so provided
311
.  
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The rationale of deemed exports: Contrary to technology that arises during or results from 
fundamental research and is intended to be published, the inputs used to conduct such 
research (pre-existing information, equipment and software) may be subject to trade controls 
according to the provisions of EAR. This is particularly burdensome if one thinks of deemed 
exports. American universities and research organisations have to consider who has access to 
what inputs within the US.  Interestingly enough, the US government has opted for a liberal 
interpretation of the deemed export rule although the debate is ongoing
312
.   
More specifically, Part 772 provides the definitions of technology and related terms which 
are generally identical to the known definitions established in the framework of multilateral 
regimes: “technology means the specific information for ‘development’, ‘production’, or 
‘use’ of a product and it takes the form of ‘technical data’ or ‘technical assistance’”313. The 
fact that any technology ‘used’, i.e. any information necessary for the “operation, installation, 
maintenance, repair, overhaul and refurbishing” of a product may be subject to the EAR 
renders the implementation of deemed export rule a quite challenging task. Presently, the 
definition of ‘using’ controlled technology is understood as the combined information 
necessary for the operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul and refurbishing of a 
product. Thus, if any one of these functions is not involved, the overall activity is not subject 
to regulation. In part, thanks to this interpretation based on the use of the conjunction ‘and’ 
instead of ‘or’, “almost all recent research activity conducted in the nation's universities has 
been exempted from export controls
314.”  
In 2005, the efficacy of such interpretation was challenged in a report of the Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) that looked also critically to the definition of ‘foreign national’315. 
The OIG recommended BIS to revise the definition of ‘use’ in Section 772.1 of the EAR and 
base the requirement for a deemed export license on a foreign national's country of birth and 
not on the country of citizenship or permanent residency, as it is currently the case. Following 
this, the BIS launched a public consultation seeking for comments from those potentially 
affected by such a revision of the regulatory framework, i.e. the industry and the academic 
communities
316
. The public comments received were such that led the BIS to withdraw the 
proposed rulemaking (2005) and establish a federal advisory committee with the task to 
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review and provide recommendations on the deemed export policy (2006)
317
. The Deemed 
Export Advisory Committee (DEAC) in a landmark report adopted a critical stance with 
regards to the value of deemed exports as implemented presently and suggested a seven step 
decision processes for  controlling deemed exports.  
Leadership in science and technology today is a globally shared and highly interdependent 
perishable asset. 
                                                                The Deemed Export Rule in the Era of Globalisation, 2 
In the report’s findings and recommendations part, the DEAC underlines that the deemed 
export rule has become increasingly irrelevant to the prevailing global situation. An average 
of 900 deemed export licenses are submitted to BIS per year of which a high percentage is 
often requested by a limited number of US companies and, till 2006 there has been only one 
case brought to trial for violation of the deemed export law
318
. Also, the criteria for assessing 
the potential threat posed by a foreign national are rather superficial since they consider only 
the current citizenship or legal permanent residency and not the place of birth and full 
background of the foreigner. In relation to this, there appear to be escapements to the existing 
regulatory regime (think of researcher with dual citizenship) and the foreign availability of 
targeted technologies is not consistently taken into in the application of the deemed export 
rule. Last, many academic and industrial organisations appear to be unaware of such rules.  
In addition to these observations the report identifies shortcomings concerning the overall 
functioning of the export control policy. The CCL is too all-encompassing and the existing 
regulations are excessively complex and often vague. As an example the committee refers to 
the distinction between technology used for performing fundamental research and the results 
of such research. The report also challenged the rationale of ‘use technology’ and of the 
fundamental research exemption. For the latter, the DEAC highlighted that the existing 
definition leaves open what is in fact meant by the wording ‘ordinarily published’ and who is 
qualified to make such a determination
319
.  
The report ends with two main recommendations: the replacement of the deemed licensing 
process with a simplified new process and the extension of the educational outreach 
programme already conducted by BIS. In support of these recommendations, the report puts 
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forward a seven step decision process and determines actions required for underpinning this 
new construct. Among the specific actions suggested is the creation of a category of ‘Trusted 
Entities’ for which facilitations may apply as well as the annual review of the controlled list 
by independent experts.  
It is worth noting that the committee experts, half of them distinguished academics, examined 
two further tools as an alternative to a new deemed export policy. The first was to rely solely 
on and adapt the existing security classification system. The second was to use the visa 
system as the sole control. The former idea was rejected due to concerns for a possible over-
classification diluting the effectiveness of the system while the latter was also discarded 
partly on grounds that such a task would further burden an already challenged visa processing 
system
320
. The conviction that ‘deemed exports’ should be handled ‘at the border’ through the 
visa application review and partly through existing classification policies has been long 
shared by the American Association of Universities (AUU)
321
.   
Publicly Available Information: Part 734.3(b) also clarifies what does not fall in the scope 
of EAR. The first exemption concerns items or technologies that are exclusively controlled 
for export and re-export by US agencies and departments other than BIS. This refers to 
regulations and controls administered and implemented by the DOS, the DOE, or the NRC as 
explained in section 5.1. In addition, unclassified information in the form of patent 
applications exported abroad is regulated by the Patent and Trademark Office and, EAR 
items sold, leased or loaned by the Department of Defence to a foreign country or 
international organisation are excluded from EAR provisions as well. The second exemption 
concerns mainly printed books, pamphlets and publications that shall not be subject to trade 
controls. Last but not least, the third exemption excludes ‘publicly available technology and 
software’ -except certain encryption software- that: 
A. Are published or will be published 
B. Arise during, or result from, fundamental research 
C. Are educational  
D. Are included in certain patent applications  
A. According to Part 734.7, the main rule for deciding whether the information is ‘published’ 
in the sense of EAR has as follows: Information and software available for general 
distribution to any member of the public or to a community of persons interested in the 
subject matter for free is considered as published. Also, information and software for general 
distribution at a price that does not exceed the cost of reproduction and distribution is still 
considered as public. Information released in periodicals, books, print, electronic or any other 
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media or at an open conference
322
 or, being available at libraries open to public and university 
libraries are all considered as eligible forms of publication. According the Part 734.7 (4.iii) 
submitting papers to domestic or foreign editors or reviewers of journals, or to organizers of 
open conferences or other open gatherings, with the understanding that the papers will be 
made publicly available if favourably received is exempt. Whereas this provision is based on 
the imperative to protect the free dissemination of information and exclude information 
already available, the question touched upon in section 3.5 of the study is also valid here: 
what does apply in the case where one publishes controlled or sensitive information solely 
with the intent to circumvent the controls? 
B. The definition and the importance of the fundamental research exemption is discussed in 
section 5.2 of this study. The supplement No. 1 to the Part 734 provides some further 
guidance with regards to specific contingences that may occur. Most notably, it is clarified 
that informal scientific exchanges are not subject to control as long as they concern 
information arising from fundamental research. Industry-university collaborations are also 
excluded insofar as the sponsor is not allowed to withhold from publication any of the 
information that he provides to the researcher.  However, application abroad of personal 
knowledge or technical experience acquired in the US constitutes an export subject to EAR.  
C. ‘Educational information’ that is released by instruction in catalogue courses and 
associated teaching laboratories of academic institutions is not subject to EAR. In other 
words, educational information that is generally available (neither classified nor proprietary) 
is not controlled. In the event of a lecture releasing recent and as yet unpublished results 
originating from laboratory research, still no license requirement will apply (see question C3 
in the supplement No.1). However, such a provision does not lift any contractual 
commitments undertaken by the lecturer in the framework of research funded by the 
government. Also, as the supplement No.1 to Part 734 clarifies providing controlled 
information in the framework of proprietary courses shall not be considered as educational 
information and thus, it will not qualify for this exemption. It comes out also that training 
provided by industry organisations is excluded from the scope of educational information 
concerned by this exemption.  
D. This exemption concerns mainly information exchanged for the filing of a patent 
application between the American Patent Trade Office and a foreign inventor.  
In sum, the general rule is that information arising during, or resulting from, fundamental 
research or, is generally available is excluded from the scope of controls. If for some reason, 
a research is subject to prepublication review and certain information might be withheld from 
publication then it ceases to qualify as fundamental. Likewise, information and software that 
is free of access restrictions (not classified) or available at a regular price -not exceeding the 
cost of reproduction and distribution should be considered as publicly available. Determining 
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an export control risk or license requirements on the basis of the absence of proprietary and 
publication restrictions seems to be a quite peculiar approach (see following section 5.3).  
With a view to better understanding the providence of the US government to minimise the 
impact of export provisions affecting potentially constitutional freedoms, it is necessary to 
provide some background information on this issue. In the past, the publication of 
information and most particularly of software source code had been a matter of legal dispute. 
In the Bernstein v. United States legal case, Professor Bernstein sued the US Federal 
Government for having imposed a license requirement for the publication of encryption 
software
323
. In 1995, Daniel Bernstein, at that time a doctoral candidate at the University of 
California, Berkley managed to develop a method for encrypting and decrypting data
324
. The 
Department of State claimed that the export of the source code, the paper describing the 
method as well as the instructions for programming a computer to operate the source code 
should be considered as a munition subject to arms controls. Therefore, Bernstein was not 
able to post his ‘Snufle’ algorithm on the internet and share it with his colleagues. The 
District Court judged that source code was speech protected by the First Amendment of the 
Constitution. In 1999, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed the decision of the 
District Court of California and concluded that the EAR provisions in point -the regulation of 
encryption source code was transferred meanwhile under the EAR jurisdiction- constitute “an 
impermissible prior restraint on speech since they vest boundless discretion to government 
officials to decide on the publication of such software”. To conclude, it is useful to remember 
that the overall debate over the protection of freedom of speech as enshrined in the US 
Constitution and the successive legal reviews by the courts in the Bernstein case have played 
some role in subsequent amendments to and interpretation of EAR provisions vis-à-vis 
‘published information’ and fundamental research exemption.  
5.3 An assessment of the US approach vis-à-vis research 
The US system seeks to solve many of the export control issues potentially arising in a 
research setting.  Indeed, it sets a thoroughgoing framework for dealing with research 
involving dual-use items and technologies. At the same time the net of provisions relating to 
research activities stands out for its complexity. Although the intention is to address as many 
contingencies as possible, the applying rules are sometimes spread in different sections or not 
clear enough exacerbating an already complex construct.  
The observations included in the DEAC and the OIG’s reports challenging the interpretation 
and current implementation of the deemed export rule merit due consideration. The peculiar 
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understanding of the term ‘use technology’, the possible escapements to the existing 
implementation practice (e.g. dual nationality) and the low numbers of deemed export 
authorisations indicate a difficulty in implementing an inherently complex concept. Concerns 
over the control of deemed re-exports pertain to this discussion as well. The question is how 
US authorities can be assured that industry and most interestingly, research organisations are 
aware of and comply with such rules. Given the political and economic weight of the US, 
allied governments and economic operators have a vested interest in respecting the US 
approach. It can be assumed that no government would like to be considered as furthering 
unlawful trade of sensitive technologies and no firm would like to be banned from the US 
market. A subsequent issue concerns how foreign users and potential exporters of US origin 
technologies comply with rules originating from a different jurisdiction. In practice, 
recipients of US technologies may be required to sign a sort of end-use statement undertaking 
not to use a controlled item for purposes other than those agreed or provide such an item to 
any third party without prior permission.  
The distinction between inputs (information, technology, software) used in performing 
research and outcomes produced by the same research is rather contentious especially with 
regards to deemed exports.  “In the simple case of a fundamental research study, the “output” 
(or report resulting from research) is not subject to the existing deemed export regulatory 
regime, but knowledge relating to the use of laboratory equipment used in prosecuting that 
same research (the “input”) may be subject to such control”325. The distinction between 
inputs used to conduct research and outcomes of research relates closely to the question of 
what qualifies as fundamental research and also when a research starts to be considered as 
fundamental.  
The interpretation of fundamental research as mirrored in different US provisions is of central 
importance for the control of dual-use research. The US legislation is not restricted in 
repeating the definition of fundamental research as set forth in the framework of multilateral 
regimes. The fundamental research concept may include both basic and applied research 
undertaken by any type of research organisations. Academic research does not fall 
necessarily outside the scope of controls and industrial research does not require always an 
export authorisation in order to be published. This is in line with the role and nature of 
research in today’s world.  
However, the US definition of fundamental research is not perfect either.  The intent to 
publish the results of research among the scientific community is the sole criterion for 
defining fundamental research. Fundamental research is understood in the absence of 
restrictions due to proprietary or national security reasons and thus, the non-public character 
of the research may connote an export control risk. On the one hand, patent rights and 
proprietary restrictions connected with a research may imply an innovative achievement or a 
company’s competitive advantage with regards to formulas, processes, and methods used in 
the R&D phase. Therefore, if this innovative element is linked to a controlled item an export 
authorisation may be required for the transfer of related technical information or the item 
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itself. On the other hand, the fundamental research exemption does not take into account a 
different contingency; what about fundamental research achieving a breakthrough discovery 
of dual-use concern for which no proprietary or security restrictions are applicable or sought? 
This was the case in point with the H5N1 studies. In addition, what shall apply in the case 
where a scientist or a firm’s employee publishes a sensitive research outcome with the intent 
to render it pubic and thus, not controlled? Logically, most of the time a company does not 
have an interest to publish commercially valuable information but the point is that the current 
practice may allow escapements to the rules. Admittedly, a single regulatory framework 
might not be in a position to effectively address all possible issues and, export controls are 
not the only available tool for controlling sensitive research. 
In sum, the logic underpinning US trade controls is not to restrict knowledge transfers 
unduly. First, technology and software that are unclassified or generally available to the 
public are not subject to EAR. One could say that classification schemes and export controls 
are compatible and complementary to each other. Indeed, the EAR clarifies that research that 
respects the specific national controls may still be considered as fundamental. Second, 
proprietary rights are used as a safeguard to monitor and catch export control sensitive 
research. However, not all proprietary information has some relevance to export controls. 
This way different but quite often intertwined purposes are served: furthering national 
security and international peace and stability as well as protecting commercially valuable 
information and technologies are all mirrored in the functioning of US trade controls.  
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Part B: Complying with Trade Controls 
6. Compliance: Designing Strategies - Adapting Policies - Developing 
Models 
Ensuring compliance with the non-proliferation system is a crucial issue towards the 
attainment of non-proliferation objectives concerning essentially the enhancement of security 
and peace worldwide. Apparently, a first issue concerns the allegiance of States to the non-
proliferation system as this is expressed with the signing and ratification of non-proliferation 
treaties and further undertakings assumed in the framework of bilateral agreements and 
politically binding arrangements. A second issue concerns whether States stick to the rules 
and enforce the requisite measures so that to achieve true compliance with the non-
proliferation system in practice. The international system in general lacks an international 
governance and it is composed by States which may try to evade the rules and satisfy their 
own interests at the expense of non-proliferation objectives very much in the same way as 
individuals may violate or abrogate an agreement. For instance, non-compliance may be a 
deliberate effort of a State to pursue a covert nuclear weapons programme or to enable the 
transfers of dual-use items to proliferant States and/or outlaw organisations through funding 
or any other means. Non-compliance can be also a result of the weakness of a State to pursue 
the necessary measures guaranteeing the secure handling, storage and transfer of controlled 
material and equipment.  
It follows that State commitments bring direct or indirect obligations for private actors and 
compliance measures seek to eliminate the possibility for infringements perpetrated by both 
State and non-State actors. This chapter emphasizes what non-State actors could do in order 
to meet their ever increasing responsibilities as laid down in the dual-use export control laws 
and in line with the expectations of society. Given that firms and public research 
organisations operate in an environment entrenched by rules and obligations set by 
governments the role of the latter in stimulating, encouraging and promoting compliance and 
self-regulation efforts is crucial.  
6.1 Complying through the implementation of Internal Compliance Programmes   
The elusive nature of export controls lies partly in the far-reaching impact of the provisions 
and partly in the inherently dual nature of the controlled items.  Export control provisions 
may demand the assumption of a more proactive and responsible role from the side of non-
State stakeholders. Although this is not always explicitly demonstrated or sufficiently 
elaborate in the export control legislation, the engagement of exporters and their 
collaboration with the government is an important prerequisite for the effective 
implementation of trade control laws. Exporters including research and academia should be 
encouraged to embed the concept of compliance not just in their procedural arrangements but 
also in their own mind-sets
326
. In the EU, Article 4 §4 of the Regulation requires from 
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exporters to notify the competent authorities in the case where they are aware that a non-
listed item they intend to export will be used for the development of WMD or other military 
uses as specified in paragraphs 1 to 3 of the same article (catch-all clause). Moreover, Article 
4 §5, known also as ‘the suspicion clause’ provides that a Member State may adopt or 
maintain legislation allowing the imposition of an authorisation requirement if there is a -
logically convincing- suspicion by the exporter that a non-listed item would be used for 
WMD purposes.  
If an exporter is aware that dual-use items which he proposes to export, not listed in Annex I, 
are intended, in their entirety or in part, for any of the uses referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 
and 3, he must notify the authorities referred to in paragraph 1, which will decide whether or 
not it is expedient to make the export concerned subject to authorisation. 
  
A Member State may adopt or maintain national legislation imposing an authorisation 
requirement on the export of dual-use items not listed in Annex I if the exporter has grounds 
for suspecting that those items are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for any of 
the uses referred to in paragraph 1.  
                                                                                          Article 4 §4 and §5 of the regulation 
428/2009  
 
These provisions may seem well-anticipated or even common sense. If one knows that the 
item he produces will be used in connection with an illegal weapons program he will be 
expected to notify the competent authorities about such a contingency and not proceed further 
with the export of the item in question. Codifying such patterns of responsible behaviour into 
law and setting penalties for non-compliance enhances the power of deterrence of export 
control regulations. Besides, the introduction of such provisions is indicative of the intention 
of the legislator to emphasize on the responsibilities and the role that exporters could play in 
the oversight of sensitive trade activities. For example, exporters will be normally well-
positioned in providing information to feed the risk analysis or a possible investigation 
conducted by the competent authorities, As Sevini notes, the highly technical nature of dual-
use controls implies that, sometimes, only manufactures and users can easily assess whether 
their products meet the specifications of the control lists
327
. Besides, under Article 9 §2 of the 
EU regulation exporters are required to supply the competent authorities with complete 
information in particular on the end-user, the country of destination and the end-use in order 
to get an individual or global authorisation.  
Firms and research organisations may be the first embankment before the release of a good or 
technology to an unlawful end-user. The adoption of ICPs is very important in this regard 
since they contribute to both the prevention and detection of export control violations
328
. 
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Their usefulness can be greatly discerned when it comes to the control of ITT posing export 
control risks. The competent authorities may rely heavily on compliance measures and 
reporting done internally and sometimes voluntary by these companies committed to keeping 
track of all potentially sensitive information flows. Indeed, little would be effectively possible 
without informed, collaborative and compliant suppliers and exporters
329‘The WA Best 
Practices for Implementing ITT Controls’ agreed back in 2006 recommend “the imposition of 
a requirement on industry, academia, and individuals to keep records, for an appropriate 
period of time, that clearly identify all controlled technology transferred, the dates between 
which it was transferred, and the identity of the end-user of all intangible transfers of 
technology for which licenses have been issued that may be inspected by, or otherwise 
provided to, export control authorities upon request”. Given the practical and legal 
implications pertaining to the monitoring of ITT, internal measures are considered to be as an 
appropriate tool for responding to such export control challenges. For instance, record 
keeping and more comprehensive technology control plans seek to ensure that no risky ITT 
will take place and inadvertent or intentional attempts to transfer controlled technology will 
not remain undetected by either the company itself or the State authorities conducting 
compliance checks in the company in regular intervals. 
In an ideal world, every company should have a compliance system in place with a view to 
conforming to the obligations set by the export control regulations. Despite the envisaged 
benefits, the implementation of ICPs does not constitute a legally binding obligation in most 
EU Member States. Yet, the practice shows that their implementation is taken into 
consideration during the examination of a license application.  
Generally speaking, licensing authorities of different Member States expect from firms to 
have a sort of internal compliance mechanism albeit they do not necessarily require a full-
fledged ICP. It is also recognised that compliance of SMEs poses a harsh challenge taking 
into account that numerous such firms are not even aware of their export control obligations. 
Licensing officers have a reasonable anticipation from exporters to know the technical 
specifications and the possible uses of the items to be exported as well as the identity of their 
customers including their respective business activities and needs. In turn, the competent 
authorities may take every possible step to render exporters aware of export control 
requirements, notify any amendments or new legislation introduced and, to provide assistance 
for the assessment of a doubtful transaction. For instance, the Business Danish Authority 
clarifies that “it is the responsibility of the exporter to make sure that their product is to be 
used in a civilian and peaceful context and to investigate whether specific exports of a 
product, a technology or technical assistance are subject to the export control rules”. They 
add also that “although the responsibility for the decision rests with the exporter there are 
good opportunities for receiving advice and guidance from relevant authorities”330. The same 
approach is valid also in the USA where various government authorities provide guidelines 
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on what an ICP should cover clarifying, though, that the implementing decision is the sole 
responsibility of the individual companies. For instance, the US DOC has published 
comprehensive guidelines aimed at assisting companies to develop or improve their ‘Export 
Management and Compliance Program’ (EMCP) as ICPs are often called in the other side of 
Atlantic
331
.  
6.1.1 ICPs: a legally binding or a highly recommended instrument?  
For some scholars and export control practitioners, internal compliance mechanisms should 
remain a non-legally binding requirement. Internal compliance is largely seen as a voluntary 
expression of the intention of the exporter to adhere to non-proliferation and other security 
imperatives. In another words, the company’s hierarchy first and then all employees involved 
should see some merit in complying with trade controls if the effective implementation of 
ICPs is the purpose. Apart from that, it is often argued that implementing such programmes 
brings on additional costs and thus, a legally binding provision for introducing ICPs would 
pose an overwhelming economic burden to small and medium sized exporters, the backbone 
of the entrepreneurial activity in Europe. In relation to this, most Member States take into 
account the size of the firm and the degree of sensitivity of its activities when assessing an 
exporter’s compliance system. For instance, the UK expects from large companies and 
regular exporters of controlled technology to have more formalised and comprehensive 
procedures, Hungary emphasizes the need for proportionate compliance measures and 
Denmark is careful not to harm the economic sustainability of small enterprises due to the 
imposition of adverse compliance requirements.  
In addition, certain licensing officers highlight a crawling risk in setting formal ICP 
requirements: “ICPs could become a vague checklist that does not have much bearing on the 
culture of the company itself”332. Indeed, given the absence of EU wide guidelines for 
implementing ICPs and of certification procedures for compliant exporters, the mere 
fulfilment of formal checklists could result to unnecessary administrative burden for 
exporters and increased workload for the export control authorities. One could argue that is 
on the part of regulators to set benchmarks or minimum required standards for adopting ICPs 
usable by different types of exporters enabling thereby the consistent evaluation of such 
measures by the competent national authorities.  
Establishing compliance requirements and a certification process for exporters (‘suppliers’) 
and end-users (‘recipients’) respectively of controlled items, software and technology is not 
completely unknown in the field of EU trade restrictions. The Directive 2009/43/EC is a 
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relevant example
333
. More particularly, the transfer of defence articles may be subject to 
restrictions also within the EU due to a Member State’s essential security interests or on 
grounds of public policy or public security according to Articles 36 and 346 of the TFEU
334
. 
With a view to mitigating the impact of such restrictions on the internal market, the European 
Commission proposed, and the European Parliament and Council adopted the Directive 
2009/43 “setting common rules and simplified procedures for the transfers of military 
equipment and its components to EU destinations”. In practice, the directive sets out a license 
system allowing Member States to publish general licenses granting direct authorisation to 
compliant suppliers for the transfer of certain defence articles to certified recipients within 
the EU. Such licenses will be linked to certain conditions on the part of the suppliers such as 
a registration requirement prior the first use and record keeping obligations
335
. The 
certification of the recipients will be based on certain criteria proving their reliability (e.g. 
relevant industrial activity in defence products, commitment to compliance at senior level and 
implementation of ICPs). 
Member States shall designate competent authorities to carry out the certification of 
recipients established on their territory of defence-related products under transfer licences 
published by other Member States in accordance with Article 5(2) (b). 
                                                                                           Article 9 §1 of the Directive 2009/43/EC 
In this regard, a subsequent Commission Recommendation draws from ‘best practices’ 
followed by certain Member States in this area and details minimum standards and common 
rules for the certification and monitoring of defence undertakings to be considered as 
‘eligible recipients’ of controlled defence-related technologies336. The guidance elaborates the 
criteria referred to in article 9 of the Directive 2009/43 for assesing the reliability of 
recipients, clarifies the powers of competent authorities for monitoring compliance (e.g 
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inspection visits and audits) and spells out the cases where corrective measures and 
suspension or revocation of certificates will be required. What is particularly interesting here 
is the Annex of the Recommendation containing detailed guidance on the key issues to be 
taken into consideration by the competent authorities when evaluating the compliacne 
perfomance of the recipients. The Annex consitutes a useful source of guidance for 
companies willing to deploy internal compliance measures. The core compliance areas 
enumerated in this guide are as follows:   
 Organisational, human and technical resources allocated to the management of 
transfers and exports 
 Chain of responsibility 
 Internal audits 
 General awareness raising 
 Physical and technical security 
 Record-keeping and traceability of exports and transfers 
A plausible question here is whether a certification process or at least some common 
compliance standards could be established in the framework of dual-use export controls, as 
well. The certification of the recipients of dual-use commodities established outside the EU 
cannot be considered as a realistic scenario for practical and political reasons. The reverse 
that is to say the certification of compliant dual-use exporters based in the EU, could be an 
option; yet not the most fitted one. The scope of the Directive differs from the objectives of 
the dual-use regulation. The focus is on intra-EU transfers and defence articles. The number 
of companies concerned is considerably lower and the items in question of a more specific 
nature compared to the high number of exporters and the diverse range of products affected 
by dual-use export controls. Therefore, the certification of defence undertakings is a more 
straightforward and less resource-intensive process in relation to the certification of dual-use 
exporters
337
. That said, the establishment of minimum compliance standards could provide 
further impetus and useful assistance to exporters in meeting their ever increasing export 
control obligations.  
In spite of the fact that the adoption of ICPs is not considered as a legally binding obligation, 
there is much talk in the EU circles about the implementation of Article 12 §2 of the 
Regulation stipulating the following:  
“When assessing an application for a global export authorisation Member States shall take 
into consideration the application by the exporter of proportionate and adequate means and 
procedures to ensure compliance with the provisions and objectives of this Regulation and 
with the terms and conditions of the authorisation”.  
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It seems that the wording ‘proportionate and adequate means and procedures to ensure 
compliance’ leaves some space to different interpretations. On the one hand, there are 
scholars and policy-makers arguing that the article 12 alludes to a need for Member States 
authorities to require the implementation of ICPs by any exporter taking advantage of global 
licences. On the other hand, ICPs are not mentioned explicitly in the Regulation and some 
Member States challenge that ICPs are a necessary condition for the issuance of a global 
licence. Even though most Member States do not require specifically the implementation of 
ICPs for issuing global licenses, different Member States argue that: “ICPs or similar 
measures must be taken into consideration when assessing an application for global licenses, 
but Article 12 does not require ICPs to actually be put in place”338. Presumably the varying 
interpretations of article 12 are indicative of the way that internal compliance and ICPs are 
perceived by different Member States.  
Furthermore, it seems that there is some degree of variation in practices followed by different 
EU Member States vis-à-vis internal compliance. For instance, some Member States attach 
also compliance requirements to general licenses other than global (NGAs, EU GEAs). 
Among them just few attach compliance requirements to individual licenses as well. In 
addition, the EU Member States rely on various means for monitoring the implementation of 
ICPs. In most countries the assessment of ICPs takes place under regular audits and 
sometimes through checks in the phase of the authorisation process or under the registration 
of new exporters.  
In the same fashion, the specific form of requirements varies among different Member States. 
It may range from general criteria to be taken into account during the evaluation of an 
application to specific requirements laid down in the national law that is the most unlikely 
case. It is noteworthy that two of the very few Member States that used to have an ICP 
requirement enshrined in their national law, namely Poland and Hungary, they are going to 
withdraw such an obligation or, they have already done so. In Poland, exporters of dual-use 
items were required to implement ICPs according to ISO 9000 standard. Practically, this 
meant that a certified ICP had to be in place even for a single transfer of dual-use items. This 
was deemed as too restrictive especially for SMEs. Besides, this approach was departing 
from the obligations set in the Regulations and could possibly discourage exporters from 
applying for an export authorisation
339
. As a result, since May 2012, the law does not contain 
any longer such a requirement
340
. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that is the 
advisory body engaged in the licensing process does take into account the implementation of 
ICPs prior to granting global licenses. In Hungary, the adoption of ICPs had been a legally 
binding obligation already for years before the entry into force of the dual-use regulation. 
However, under future legislation being currently in the pipeline, the implementation of ICPs 
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will remain a prerequisite only for the issuance of global licences. The Hungarian authorities 
deem that the conditions requiring the implementation of ICPs with regard to any type of 
authorisations have significantly changed
341
. The international environment has been evolved 
and the degree of awareness of exporters of dual-use items has been increased.  Persistence to 
the fulfilment of rigid formal ICP requirements could mean unnecessary burden for both 
exporters and licensing authorities.  
The lack of a homogenous approach on ICP requirements should not be seen as insufficient 
attention to compliance by the competent authorities.  Germany for instance does not have a 
specific legal binding requirement in place for ICPs and nor does the UK. However, both 
Member States have published comprehensive guidelines and best practices for the 
implementation of ICPs by industry and both assess the ability of exporters to comply with 
export control rules during the application process
342
. In this regard, Members States may 
rely on more flexible and general provisions on restricted trade for the screening of compliant 
exporters during the assessment of an export application.  For example, in Germany again, 
the general criterion on the ‘reliability of the applicant’ included in the Foreign Trade and 
Payment Act provides the legal basis for assessing the compliance status of dual-use 
exporters prior to granting an export authorisation
343
. Especially, for the granting of global 
licenses, the German export control authority investigate by means of written communication 
and on-site audits the adequacy of internal controls implemented by potential beneficiaries of 
such facilitations
344
.  
It turns out that the ICPs are understood -at least in the EU- as comprehensive procedures 
demanding increased investments in resources for both exporters and public administration. 
Member States prefer to maintain a flexible stance meaning that they strongly advise 
exporters to implement internal controls without setting explicitly legally binding 
requirements. In practice though, all governments do take into account the implementation of 
compliance measures by exporters. This way, EU authorities accept implicitly the voluntary 
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character of internal compliance measures and differentiate to some extent between full-
fledged ICPs and other less comprehensive compliance mechanisms such as record keeping 
and export screening procedures. To conclude, maintaining some degree of flexibility in 
tuning ICP obligations and setting minimum standards at the EU level for implementing 
complete ICPs should not be seen as incompatible. Indeed, this could be a way forward for 
boosting export control compliance in the EU. The practice shows that different Member 
States have taken such actions at their respective jurisdictions by providing guidelines with 
key principles and basic elements to be incorporated and function in any ICP regardless of 
the exporters’ size. For example, Denmark has developed standardised ICPs adaptable -with 
certain restrictions- to the situation of the exporter involved
345
. 
6.1.2 What is finally ‘an internal compliance system’?   
Although it would be more accurate to talk about internal compliance systems instead of 
internal compliance programmes the latter is most commonly used in Europe. ICPs reflect 
essentially procedures and mechanisms performing different functions and having as a 
common goal the fostering of a company’s compliance with the export control law. As it will 
be explained later, such systems are usable for research organisations, too.  
An internal compliance system is an arrangement in which a company ensures that it is 
completing legal transactions, obeying the regulations enacted by the government, and 
fulfilling company export policies. Internal compliance systems typically include a set of 
procedures that company officials must satisfy before an item leaves the company. Such 
procedures include a thorough investigation of the buyer and end-user prior to the shipment 
of a purchased item off-site.  
                                                     By the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)346 
What are the motives behind the introduction of ICPs by companies? Tangible benefits, 
compliance with legislation, fear of penalties and other liability costs, self-promotion of the 
organisation and furtherance of non-proliferation and other security objectives are the main 
drivers for adopting an ICP. More particularly, a sound compliance system paves the way for 
establishing a partnership between authorities and exporters. This ‘trusted relationship’ may 
be translated to palpable advantages for exporters in terms of simplified export procedures as 
discussed above. Moreover, it is such the nature of the export control law that exporters are 
required to keep a watchful eye on the legislation and pursue internal compliance measures.  
In relation to this, direct compliance requirements are also foreseen in the EU law. Article 20 
of the dual-use Regulation sets a direct obligation for exporters and brokers of dual-use items 
to keep detailed records for at least 3 years and in accordance with the national law or 
practice in force in the Member State where they are established.  
Failure to comply with the rules would mean administrative or criminal sanctions and other 
arduous consequences such as temporary suspension of exporting activities, lifting of trade 
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facilitations and blockade from markets. Member States may draw on different legal sources 
for enforcing effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties against any export control 
violations. Such provisions may derive from national export control law or other corporate 
and civil law. In any case, article 24 of the Regulation provides the legal basis by stipulating 
that “each Member State shall take appropriate measures to ensure proper enforcement of all 
the provisions of this regulation”.  
Each Member State shall take appropriate measures to ensure proper enforcement of all the 
provisions of this Regulation. In particular, it shall lay down the penalties applicable to 
infringements of the provisions of this regulation or of those adopted for its implementation. 
Those penalties must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
                                                                                      Article 24 of the regulation 428/2009  
Especially, for European firms the threat to lose markets in the US in case of poor 
compliance with obligations stemming from the US export control system is considered as a 
dissuasive factor. Also, falling short of requisite compliance standards or losing face due to 
lax implementation of the rules may harm the a company’s good name and  have implications 
for the whole country’s exporting activities. For example, negative media attention can inflict 
a major blow to a company’s reputation. “Even if a company is merely suspected of carrying 
out illegal export activities, its reputation in foreign trade may be tarnished”347. 
As some export compliance officers note fear and greed are frequently the two main motives 
driving compliance efforts of exporters. However, enhancing a company’s corporate social 
responsibility and contributing to a safer and more secure world should not be 
underestimated. Companies and their employers may commit themselves to non-proliferation 
and national security imperatives once they realise what is at stake. No matter what is the 
motive behind (economic, moral, sense of responsibility) ICPs are arguably considered as an 
essential component of a company’s trading strategy. In practice, exporters have strong 
interests to comply with the rules and export control authorities do take into account and 
encourage the implementation of such programmes. Table VI offers a summary of the 
benefits envisaged from the implementation of ICPs for both authorities and exporters.  
Table VI: Benefits stemming from the implementation of ICPs 
Reasons for requiring and implementing ICPs  
For export control 
authorities: 
For organisations:  Overall objective: 
Increased possibilities for 
identification of export 
control issues 
Increased possibilities for 
informal inquiries 
 
Exchanging of 
information and ‘learning 
from each other’ 
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Release of administrative 
work for non-cases 
Economic benefits (e.g. 
simplified procedures) 
Reducing operational 
costs 
Ensuring compliance with 
challenging  legislation (e.g. 
ITT controls) 
Saving  organisations from 
infringements  and enhancing 
social responsibility 
Furthering non-
proliferation and foreign 
policy and security 
objectives 
Identification of reliable 
exporters and optimisation of   
risk assessment  
Detecting risky areas at an early 
stage and  preventing risky 
transfers from taking place 
 
Operating risk-based  
controls 
What are main principles promoted by implementing ICPs and what are the ‘standard’ 
elements of an ICP? The ‘European Code for Export Compliance’, a private initiative 
undertaken by the ‘European Institute for Export Compliance’ highlights the main principles 
underpinning the operation of any robust export compliance system:
348
 a.) Transparency b) 
Compliance c) Accountability d) Consistency and e) Effectiveness. An appropriate 
compliance system shall guarantee the transparent management of exporting activities, the 
delegation of clear responsibilities among the staff, the consistent pursuance and achievement 
of the set policies and objectives as well as the efficient and responsible use of the available 
resources. In the same code, ‘export compliance’ is defined as a specialised multidisciplinary 
framework providing support to organizations in managing export risks avoiding thereby 
legal and administrative sanctions, financial losses as well as reputation deterioration. It is 
also clarified that “export compliance covers all activities of import and export of goods 
and/or services, tangible and intangible assets (including the transfer of means of payment), 
that somehow are subject to regulations applicable to transactions between two different 
states/jurisdictions”. This is not strange given that most of the time compliance systems in 
either academic or industrial organisations deal with the whole spectrum of export/import 
regulations.  
Monitoring and maintaining Export Compliance is [...] one of the most important methods for 
an organization to maintain its ethical health, support its long-term prosperity, and preserve 
and foster its values and avoid or mitigate any potential legal criminal proceedings. 
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                                                                 European Institute for Export Compliance (EIFEC), 6 
With regards to the specific elements of an ICP, guidance provided by government authorities 
in Europe and USA emphasize on the same key compliance components with slight 
differences each time (see figure below). 
Figure VIII: “the internal compliance cycle” 
 
1. Management Commitment: Commitment to compliance at senior level is important for 
symbolic and practical reasons or otherwise it is where compliance starts and most probably 
ends; if the senior management of an organisation is unaware of export compliance or does 
not see some added value in introducing an ICP, there will not be many chances for verifying 
and enhancing the export compliance status of the organisation. Generally speaking, senior 
management’s commitment to compliance raises awareness within the organisation and it is 
the first step towards the creation of an export control culture
349
. In practical terms, most of 
the time it is a senior manager or the members of the directory board who carry any liabilities 
in the event of a breach of the civil or corporate law. For all these reasons, commitment to 
compliance by senior mangement should be expressed in written with a ‘compliance 
statement’ and shall be communicated to all employees (e.g. published to the orgnisation’s 
intranet or sent by e-mail). The compliance statement should be signed by a person high in 
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the hierarchy (e.g. by the ‘Chief Executive Operator’ in large firms) and it may be referred to 
in the organisation’s mission statement.  
2. Appointment of a person in charge: As it is the case with every management system, the 
responsibility for the operation of an ICP should lie with one individual nominated as the 
‘Export Compliance Manager’ (EMC). The Wassenaar Arrangement ‘best practice guidelines 
on ICPs’ refer to the person supervising the development and functioning of a compliance 
programme as the ‘Chief Export Control Officer’ (CECO) pointing out also that he should be 
a senior representative director or other individual of corresponding status
350
. The EU Code 
of Conduct use the term ‘Export Compliance Officer” (ECO) and further variations can be 
found. What is clear is that the seamless operation of an ICP requires the designation of a 
person as responsible for the development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the 
export control system always in conformity with the legislation and the needs of the 
organisation. Large exporters producing or trading regularly dual-use items or other 
controlled items have often several export control officers established in different business 
units and reporting centrally to the chief compliance officer. Export control responsibility 
will be assumed either as a stand-alone task by a dedicated structure i.e. an ‘Export Control 
Unit’ or as an additional task by an existing unit (e.g. a structure dealing with compliance in 
other areas). For some exporters –especially small and medium sized- the senior manager 
signing the compliance statement may be identical with the principal manager monitoring 
export compliance. Despite this, all available guidance highlights the importance of the 
independence of compliance mangers. “The main aim should be to protect export control 
staff, as far as possible, from any conflict of interests. There is, for example, a higher risk of 
conflicted interests if export control employees are also responsible for sales and marketing. 
For this reason, the export control department should be structured so that it is as independent 
as possible”351. Arguably, the fewer staff is available the more possibilities for conflict of 
interests may arise.  
3. Risk assessment: ‘Risk assessment’ can be seen as an ongoing process taking place in 
different phases of the ‘compliance cycle’. At first, introducing an ICP structure may demand 
a first ‘mapping’ of an organisation’s sensitive activities, products and services against export 
control risks. A more thorough evaluation and rating of the products, parts and components, 
software and technology will take place in the phase of export screening procedures where 
specific risks are identified and mitigating measures are adopted. ICPs operate in a dynamic 
environment where risks should be determined or re-evaluated constantly and thus, export 
compliance depends on the evolving legal framework and the activities of a company or a 
research organisation undertaken each time.  
4. Written policy and manual with procedures: Once a first risk evaluation has been 
conducted a formal compliance programme should be drafted. A written compliance 
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programme will include and elaborate the main principles endorsed in the compliance 
statement. As a rule of thumb the main compliance policy explaining why export compliance 
is important and how it will be achieved in a given organisation should be clear, short and 
must be communicated to and easily perceived by all staff. Apart from employees directly 
concerned with the exporting process, the scope of controls is such that employees involved 
in design, development, engineering, research, purchasing, and maintenance and after sales 
service may also have a role to play in the view of export controls
352
. An ICP will include 
normally a compliance manual clarifying in greater detail the chain of responsibility, the step-
by-step procedures to be taken in response of an export control risk as well as the rules and 
principles governing the functioning of the ICP: Who is responsible for what action? What 
procedures/mechanisms are applicable for given ‘export scenarios’? How often and towards 
whom export control trainings should be performed? What are the standard operational 
procedures for dealing with a violation or a suspicion of violation?  How often should audits 
take place and by who? How often or under what circumstances should the ICP be revised? 
Compliance manuals are expected to provide also information sources made available by 
export control authorities or other private entities and research institutes providing 
commentaries and insights in the area of export control.  
Figure IX: “Drawing up an internal compliance manual”353  
 
 
5. Pre to post export screening: Export screening procedures refer to checks to be performed 
by the designated employees in the pre-export and where applicable post-shipment phase in 
accordance with the export control manual and the related law. Export screening is the core 
of an ICP and it may include all these actions required for the verification and mitigation of 
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export risks in conformity with the obligations set in the legislation. In the pre-licensing 
phase it is determined whether an item to be shipped is subject to any export restrictions. The 
classification of exported items, sofware and technologies must be done on the basis of 
applicable export regulations at European and national level including dual-use lists, 
sanctions/embargoes lists, military lists and where relevant other applicable lists by non-EU 
countries. Exporting firms are required anyway to conduct a rating of their products in oder to 
attribute them the appropriate code according to the Harmonised System Code (HSC), the 
common customs language administered by the WCO. As part of this process exporters could 
also identify items regulated under dual-use export controls
354
. Admittedly, product 
classification can be time consuming and expensive depending on the product portfolio and 
the number of items to be rated whereas small exporters may not even be aware of export 
control implications
355
. Export control authorities may provide support and in some cases on-
line tools for assisitng exporters with the classification of their products.  
What is to be exported is not the only question to ask; the end-use and end-user of an export 
are equally important factors as much as the final destination and the routing of an export
356
. 
Given this,  the plausibility of the stated end-use (e.g. recipient’s activties shall justify a given 
export) and the reliability of the end-user and/or of any middlemen involved in the export 
(lawfulness of recipients) are important factors to consider in assesing an export case. In 
addition, there might be some souces of suspicion usually called as ‘red flags’ to seek for. 
The Wassenaar Arrangement has published a non-exhaustive list of questions to be taken into 
account during the risk assessment of an export
357
: 
1. Do you know your customer? If not, is it difficult to find information about him/her? 
2. Is the customer or the end-user tied to the military or the defence industry? 
3. Is the customer or the end-user tied to any military or governmental research body? 
4. If you have done business with the customer before - is this a usual request for them 
to make? Does the product fit the business profile? 
5. Does the customer seem familiar with the product and its performance characteristics 
or is there an obvious lack of technical knowledge? 
6. Is the customer reluctant to provide an end-use statement or is the information 
insufficient compared to other negotiations? 
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7. Does the customer reject the customary installation, training or maintenance services 
provided? 
8. Is unusual packaging and labelling required? 
9. Is the shipping route unusual? 
10. Does the customer order an excessive amount of spare parts or other items that are 
related to the product, but not to the stated end-use?  
11. Is the customer offering unusually profitable payment terms, such as a much higher 
price? 
12. Is the customer offering to pay in cash? 
 
Non-listed items may undergo export restrictions as provided by the catch-all clause of the 
Regulation. Such restrictions will depend on the final destination, the end-use and end-user of 
the export transaction and this is also why pre-export checks have an extra usefulness. In the 
case of a doubtful transaction or suspicious case national authorities shall be consulted for 
further advice
358
. Whenever an authorisation is applicable certain conditions may apply 
including the provision of end-user assurances. As a consequence, in the post-shipment phase 
further checks and documentation may be required ensuring the delivery of a given item to a 
specific end-user in the quantity specified in the customs declaration and the conditions 
attached in the export license. For research organisations that do not export goods regulalry 
the focus of screening proceudres would logically be on trasfers of technology as well as the 
provision of technical assistance.  
 
6. Information and training: This is another important component of a compliance system 
and a first step towards the establishment of an export control consciousness among the 
employees of an organisation. It is also an ongoing effort demanding sometimes considerable 
resources. As the European Code of Export Compliance mentions organisations need to 
update their ‘export compliance knowledge-base regulalry’ and certainly, when a change in 
legislation or un update in the lists is adopted
359
. Promoting awareness and providing 
trainings on a regular basis are of fundamental importance for the actual implementation of 
an ICP. Providing handy information in the right websites, targeting appropriately selected 
staff for training and communicating effectively export control risks can substantially 
upgrade the use of the tools and procedures being part of an ICP. In the author’s view, no 
compliance system will ever be effective unless it is underpinned by a strong communication 
strategy
360
.   
7. Record keeping: Record keeping procedures is a prerequisite under the EU regulation and 
it is mentioned also in the Wassenaar Arrangement ‘Best Practice Guidelines on ICPs’. 
Export related documents may include export licenses, end-use certificates, invoices and 
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records of electronic transfers. Export compliance officers and private companies offering 
compliance solutions advise their client organisations to document every e-mail, phone-call 
or hard-copy relating to an export control case. This approach is beneficial in many ways to 
the compliance system of an organisation: it may benefit auditing procedures to take place in 
a later stage and the risk assessment of future export transactions. Most importantly, in the 
event of an unintended violation a database containing export records may prove the 
exporter’s bona fide or compliance integrity saving or alleviating the organisation from 
severe legal consequences. Ideally, an electronic system should be in place for the effective 
registration of the cases. What data should be retained, by who and for how long, it should be 
also clarified in the ICP manual as well.  
8. Compliance monitoring and auditing: With a view to identifying and resolving 
inconsistencies  between written procedures and their actual implementation, an ICP should 
provide for a performance review process to take place in regular intervals. Auditing could be 
done internally or outsourced to a third party and in any case should include clear objecives 
and reviewable items to be evaluated. Ideally, auditors must not be involved in the export 
controls chain of responsibility and they should be educated about the peculiarities of export 
controls.  For small exporters, self-auditing will indvertently represent the only option. The 
reuslts of the auditing may reveal areas requiring improvement and lead to the re-assessment 
or modification of certain procedures set in an ICP manual. Perfomance indicators may be 
established in order to measure and evaluate the effectiveness of an ICP.  
9. Handling potential violations: Specific procedures for reporting and dealing with suspected 
export control violations should be established and made known to all staff potentially 
involved. The triptych ‘report-respond-correct’ is of central importnace in identifying and 
handling export control violations. First, clear instructions and escalation processes should be 
provided in the ICP manual. According to the US DOC, a safe environment  should be 
ensured for employees raising questions and concerns about export compliance including an 
anonymous reporting mechanism
361
. Second, investigation procedures on the basis of set 
criteria and timeframes may be also available. Third, corrective actions including a possibility 
for voluntary disclosure to competent authorities, disciplinary measures and positive rewards 
for non-compliant and compliant employees respectively would be predicted as well. 
6.2 Government – Exporters: from a regulation-based relationship to the 
establishment of a partnership 
As explained in section 6.1 the introduction of ICPs is of interest to both authorities and 
exporters. Heretofore, the focus was on actions to be taken on the part of exporters. However, 
enhancing compliance with export control requirements should be part of a wider strategy of 
export control authorities to establish a trusted relationship with the exporters. This effort 
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could comprise facilitating measures for reliable exporters, establishment of formal and 
informal channels of communication between the two parts as well as the provision of 
guidance and support such as trainings, guidelines and on-line tools readily available for 
registered or potential exporters of dual-use items and technologies.  
Effective State control of exports is only possible if all stakeholders, including manufacturers 
of critical goods, exporters, engineers, recognise the need for such controls and support them 
with all resources available to them. A close, trust-based partnership between industry and 
the authorities is vital if we are to achieve our shared objective.  
                    German Federal German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, BAFA 2012, 7 
Although the establishment of a trusted partnership and the attainment of a culture of open 
collaboration is a two-way relationship, regulatory authorities may have to establish the basis 
and the necessary conditions for the engagement of the private sector. Besides, export control 
authorities have anyway an interest to identify and reach out regular and potential exporters 
of dual-use technologies. In that respect, the role of authorities is similar to that of 
compliance officers trying to establish and consolidate an export control consciousness 
within an organisation. Communicating effectively the cause and main drivers behind the 
implementation of export controls such as non-proliferation and other security imperatives is 
an important element of awareness raising activities requiring a continuous effort on the part 
of authorities. 
Second, promoting transparency of the licensing process by publishing for instance licensing 
data and clarifying applicable procedures to the extent permissible due to security limitations 
could further enhance trust to the authorities and export control processes in general. To that 
end, certain EU members States publish licensing data (e.g. the total number of general or 
individual authorisations by destination) through annual reports to the national parliaments or 
in the websites of the competent authorities. The degree of detail and the practices for 
collecting data may differ from State to State and actually, this is one of the reasons why the 
EU Commission could make only approximate estimations when publishing licensing data 
concerning the state of play of export controls in the EU. As part of an open, safe and 
effective communication plan, export control authorities could commit themselves not to 
disclose sensitive information or ‘trade secrets’ to unauthorised persons when processing 
export applications or, requiring information for risk assessment purposes. Establishing 
secure mechanisms for the exchange of such information between exporters and authorities 
could be a further option. A transparent and open decision-making including public 
consultations with stakeholders so as to give the word to the exporters is requisite for 
establishing communication channels and succeeding in non-proliferation objectives. 
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Figure X: Establishing a trusted partnership between regulators and 
exporters 
 
 
Finally, it should not be overlooked that a comprehensive and robust legal framework could 
enhance both the effectiveness and the credibility of a trade control system. Setting clear 
rules and export control procedures as well as making available the requisite guidance and 
support to exporters could reinforce the collaboration between the two edges of the spectrum, 
represented by exporters and authorities. The design above illustrates vividly the 
interrelationship between the three main prerequisites for establishing a partnership between 
regulators and exporters and promoting export compliance.  
6.3. Toward standardisation? 
As discussed in section 6.1.1, the certification of ‘eligible exporters’ may constitute an option 
albeit not always the most desirable one. On the contrary, setting certain common standards 
for compliance with dual-use export controls may be a more fitted solution. In this case it 
should be up to the competent authorities to verify and monitor the compliance status of an 
exporter (e.g. through audits) prior to granting an individual authorisation, a general license 
or allow other simplified export procedures. Unlike other domains such as the regulation of 
nuclear energy or chemical agents, no law-based institution exists that oversees and sets 
international standards for strategic trade controls
362
. Existing guidance by different EU 
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Member States and the Annex of the Recommendation ‘on the certification of defence 
undertakings’ are valuable sources of inspiration for establishing common guidelines at the 
EU level. 
Nevertheless, establishing standards, certification procedures and systems for securing the 
whole ‘supply chain’ may pose another risk. As compliance professionals often stress there is 
a plethora of compliance programmes and systems originating from both governments and 
specific industry sectors concerning different aspects of the supply chain without being, 
however, mutually recognised and coordinated. “Cross governmental or cross industry 
implications are not usually considered when creating a new compliance system or standard, 
thus leading to likely duplication of compliance activities and confusion in areas not directly 
involved in the original concept of the programme or standard”363. Indeed, the potential 
burden is quite high if one considers the existence of adjacent systems set to deal with a 
variety of compliance obligations not strictly related to trade controls. In the EU for instance, 
the discussion to connect the Customs Authorised Economic Operator system (AEO) with 
export compliance requirements under Article 12 of the Regulation has been so far 
fruitless
364
.   
International standards for implementing management systems provide an insight into how 
efficient compliance systems should look like at least in terms of generic management. In that 
respect, the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), the world’s largest 
developer of international standards provides -with ISO 19600- useful guidance for operating 
effective compliance systems in any organisational context
365
. Organisations have to operate 
in an increasingly regulated environment; apart from legally binding regulations, 
organisations may commit themselves to voluntary but internationally accepted standards and 
practices concerning almost every aspect of the functioning of an organisation. Such 
standards may include from technical requirements for the production of safe and quality 
products to best practice guidelines for good governance. ISO 22000 group of standards 
addressing food safety issues
366
, ISO standards for the storage and transfer of certain 
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dangerous goods
367
, ISO 26000 on social responsibility
368
, ISO 9000 for quality 
management
369
 and ISO 31000 for risk management
370
 are but few examples of famous ISO 
standards. ISO standards “provide a presumption of conformance with specific regulatory 
requirements” and in some instances are referenced by national regulations and UN 
recommendations
371
.   
As Makowicz suggests the establishment of ISO 19600 as a benchmark for implementing 
effective compliance systems may have some usefulness from a non-proliferation point of 
view, too
372
. According to ISO 19600 standards, ‘compliance’ means meeting all of an 
organisation’s compliance obligations and hence, non-proliferation and more specifically 
export control requirements are one of these areas that can be dealt within the framework of a 
compliance management system.  Organisations can voluntarily agree to adopt and abide by 
such standards and authorities may embrace standardisation by directly referring to or 
incorporating such standards into law. It follows that if it is judged as useful 19600 standards 
can be directly referenced to export control law at national, European or international level 
and competent authorities could take into consideration such standards when evaluating the 
effectiveness of compliance measures adopted by the exporters of dual-use goods.  
Bearing in mind the key export compliance components referred to in section 6.1.2 and 
drawing from the main principles for effective compliance systems highlighted in ISO 19600 
standards a more elaborate method for establishing and operating ICPs can be set. From the 
preamble it must be said that the compliance function should be as much independent as 
possible, it should have direct access to the top management or governing body and shall be 
given appropriate authority and adequate resources. Above all, continual monitoring and 
improvement is sine qua non for any management system devised to be efficient and 
effective. In that respect, every management project is set and implemented in four steps and 
therefore, it may be useful to determine four main phases for establishing and operating an 
ICP. The ‘PDCA cycle’ of continual improvement, also known as the “Plan-Do-Check-Act” 
principle, is the concept underpinning this four-phased management process and is referenced 
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also in ISO 19600
373
. The terms compliance system, or shorter ICP are interchangeably used 
in the following section. 
Figure XI: A method for adopting and operating ICPs 
 
 
I. Planning: Understanding the external and internal context of an organisation is the first 
step. An organisation should examine the requirements set in the related law as well as the 
broader conditions shaping its role and mission. An ICP will not be applied in a vacuum and 
thus, the identity of the organisation is certainly an important factor to take into account. 
Thereafter, a first identification of the export control risks stemming from the specific 
activities and transactions of the organisation would be necessary. The current organisation’s 
functioning including institutional processes and activities needs to be evaluated against the 
legal obligations and any voluntary commitments undertaken by the organisation. The 
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ultimate goal for this phase will be to clarify the scope of the export compliance system 
setting main objectives and priorities as well as taking into account any limitation underlying 
its functioning. In addition, a central question to ask to be posed here is whether the export 
compliance system should be a stand-alone structure or incorporated in the existing 
compliance system of an organisation. Proliferation risks might be handled within an 
integrated compliance management framework or a separate ‘non-proliferation management 
system’374. In this regard, ISO 19600 clarifies that the recommended standards are compatible 
with any management system and can be combined with other ISO standards such as those 
for risk management (ISO 31000), auditing (ISO 19011) and social responsibility (ISO 
26000). No matter what option is deemed as more beneficial for each organisation, an ICP 
would logically necessitate some degree of central coordination. 
II. Establishing and Implementing: The second phase concerns how the ICP will operate in 
practice.  This is the core process in setting up and operating an ICP. It includes not only the 
establishment of main rules and standard operational procedures to be followed but also 
decisions on the specific mechanisms required for rendering the export compliance policy 
effective and the compliance procedures operational as described in the export compliance 
manual. The management of the organisation may rely on existing tools and channels where 
possible introducing new mechanisms only when there is no other more advantageous 
alternative. The allocation of responsibilities to management and other staff in higher and 
lower levels, the modes of internal and external communication as well as the details for 
training, monitoring, reporting and reviewing the system will be clarified at this stage. 
Furthermore, according to ISO 19600, any outsourcing of the organisation’s activities does 
not absolve the organisation from subsequent compliance obligations. Due diligence vis-à-vis 
the compliance performance of third parties should be part of any compliance system and, 
from an export control standpoint, the verification of the identity of suppliers, clients and 
contractors is anyhow an important aspect of the risk assessment. As soon as all the decisions 
have been taken, the procedures have been established and the programme has been set in 
detail, the ICP will be tested in practice.  
III. Evaluating: Ideally, as explained in section 6.1.2, the export compliance manual should 
envisage a monitoring process for evaluating the compliance status of an organisation and the 
modus operandi of the ICP per se. A problematic situation may be the result of neglect or 
deliberative abuse and it may indicate a defect of the system. To that effect, certain controls 
and procedures shall be established evaluating both the performance of the employees and the 
effectiveness of the compliance system itself. The evaluation process would rely on reporting 
mechanisms, annual reviews, internal and external audits promoting thereby the constant 
evaluation and improvement of the compliance system. The compliance course of the 
organisation should be tracked –through record keeping- and evaluated against certain criteria 
and principles. In that regard, the development of indicators may represent a useful action to 
take up. Such indicators could measure if and how feedback mechanisms are used, what are 
the employees’ perceptions for the compliance system as well as the frequency of contacts 
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with regulators and the percentage of employees receiving training
375
. Also, detaching 
incompatible roles and responsibilities and inserting automated processes where possible is a 
key issue to consider. Evaluation measures should be also subject to periodical assessment for 
ensuring their continuing effectiveness and adherence to the evolving needs and requirements 
of the organisational and external context.  
IV. Adjusting: Once certain needs or weaknesses have been identified follow–up actions shall 
be taken in order to improve the system and response to new or other less urgent risks. Given 
also that risks may be dynamic and the external environment may change rapidly, the system 
may need to be adapted in order to address new risks and needs. In any case, at the beginning 
the programme will fulfil certain priorities as decided in phase I. ISO 19600 clarifies that the 
risk-based approach to compliance management does not mean that for low risk situations, 
non-compliance is acceptable. Instead, organisations can initially direct attention and 
resources to higher risks having as ultimate goal to cover all compliance risks. It is also for 
this reason why a systematic risk assessment and monitoring of the ICP shall be conducted. 
Although corrective actions may be required including the redesign and improvement of 
certain elements of the system, failure to prevent or detect a one off noncompliance does not 
necessarily hint at an ineffective compliance system. Incidents of misconduct or actual 
violation of the law shall be reported to the top management and the competent authorities 
under the escalation processes and in the time frame predicted in the manual.  
6.4 Infusing an export compliance culture 
National guidance in the EU and the US emphasize the idea of incorporating export 
compliance in the culture of exporting organisations. Establishing and maintaining a culture 
of integrity and compliance is also mentioned in the ISO 19600 whereby compliance culture 
is defined as “values, ethics and beliefs that exist throughout an organisation and interact with 
the organisation’s structures and control systems to produce behavioural norms that are 
conducive to compliance outcomes”. Therefore, it seems that the ultimate goal of every 
compliance effort should be the development of a culture of awareness and responsibility 
within a given organisation. As discussed in chapter 2.3 organisational culture constitutes an 
integral part to the identity of every organisation and can be defined as “the shared, tacit 
assumptions that have come to be taken for granted and that determine the members’ daily 
behaviour”376.  It comes out that the concept of culture emphasizes the role of human factor 
and it has some pertinence to all different aspects of compliance. For instance, the 
behavioural patterns of management and employees can be most or least conducive to risks 
relating to security and safety and stemming from activities involving hazardous materials 
                                                          
375
 Examples of indicators mentioned in ISO 19600.  For more information on the development of 
indicators and their categorisation into activity indictors, reactive and predictive indicators please see 
ISO 19600 standards. 
376
 Professor Edgar Schein provided first this definition for introducing a now widely used model of 
organisational culture.  Afterwards, the IAEA relied on this model for developing the concepts of 
nuclear safety and security. Information drawn from presentation done by Andrea Viski in the context  
of the  seminar on export control technical issues: “Enhanced Dialogue and Best Practices for Export 
Compliance,” organised jointly by the European Commission Joint Research Centre and the US DOE 
Argonne National Lab in Ispra, Italy, April, 22-23 2015. 
156 
 
and equipment. However, introducing new nuggets into and, changing the culture of an 
organisation requires time. The question on how to instil and consolidate a culture of 
responsibility should not be addressed only by organisations and individuals. Compliance 
efforts can be further enhanced or influenced by initiatives undertaken by states, international 
organisations and the civil society notably through the establishment of codes of conduct or 
certain standards to be achieved by individuals and organisations concerned
377
.  
The concept of culture is well known and developed in certain areas such as in the nuclear 
safety and security. In fact, the need for a cultural basis for nuclear safety was conceived 
first
378
. The IAEA in its ‘Implementing Guide on Nuclear Security Culture’ published as 
report No 7, refers to the interface between the two disciplines clarifying differences and 
similarities. Safety culture is defined as “that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in 
organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and 
safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance
379
. The nuclear security 
culture is defined as “the assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behaviour of individuals, 
organizations and institutions which serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear 
security”380. While both disciplines have as a common goal to protect human lives, society 
and the environment by considering the risk of inadvertent human error, the nuclear security 
places additional emphasis on deliberate acts. In that regard, the subordinate objectives of 
nuclear safety and security can be in some instances mutually exclusive. “For example, while 
for safety purposes it may be desirable to identify and quantify the amount and types of 
radiological/nuclear materials in a specific area or facility, from a security perspective this 
disclosure could increase the attractiveness of the site as a prospective terrorist target” 381. 
Apart from the nuclear safety and security, the role of culture has some bearing also for those 
aspects covered under the CBRN initiatives, such as mitigation of and preparedness against 
risks related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials and agents. In this 
regard, the discussion in conceptualising and promoting a common and sustainable CBRN 
security culture is a recurrent topic in the relevant fora. As I. Khirpunov mentions building a 
security culture remains largely isolated in the different CBRN silos without sufficient 
horizontal communication. Therefore, ways to identify synergies and promote concerted 
cooperation should be stepped up
382
.   
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In spite of the usefulness of culture for complying and achieving security and safety goals, 
similar attention has not been drawn in the area of trade controls. As pointed in the section 
3.4, non-proliferation objectives and other security imperatives are furthered through a 
number of instruments in nuclear, biological and chemicals areas. These instruments include 
physical protection and safety measures as well as trade controls. Taking this into account, it 
is surprising that the discussion on applying a culture of responsibility has captured –in 
varying degrees- security and safety aspects but not trade controls. A. Viski has highlighted 
this paradox and borrowing from the concept of nuclear security culture suggests a definition 
of ‘Strategic Trade Control Culture’ as follows: “the assembly of characteristics, attitudes, 
and behaviour of individuals and institutions which serves as a means to support and enhance 
non-proliferation through strategic trade controls”383.  
One could further rely on the nuclear security culture for identifying the main features 
underpinning a culture of compliance in any given field. Drawing from the organisational 
culture, the model of the nuclear security culture pinpoints four main requirements for 
creating and boosting a culture of responsibility in an organisation. First of all, security 
culture is founded on a belief that a credible threat exists and that (nuclear) security is 
important. Second, some overarching principles such as motivation, leadership, commitment 
and responsibility should guide decisions and behaviour throughout the organisation. Third, 
effective management systems prioritising security and ensuring good and quality governance 
through well-developed policies, procedures and practices should be in place. Last, the 
behavioural patterns of top management and personnel should promote and enhance security 
through inclusive decision making, effective communication, vigilance and adherence to 
procedures. A questioning and responsible attitude on the part of the employees and a strong 
and exemplary behaviour on the part of leadership and management can be considered as key 
issues in establishing a security culture.  
Although a culture of security can be clarified and further enhanced though national and 
international initiatives, the responsibility for achieving such a goal rests primarily upon the 
organisations and individuals. Personal dedication, accountability and understanding of all 
individuals engaged in any activity that has a bearing on the security of nuclear activities are 
important prerequisites for developing a strong nuclear security culture
384
. The active, visible, 
consistent and sustained commitment of the governing body, top management and middle 
management towards a common standard of behaviour is also highlighted in ISO 19600 as a 
requirement for developing a compliance culture. Essentially, all the elements and procedures 
described in the IAEA guidance for promoting and enhancing a nuclear security culture are 
linked with the key elements required for implementing effective compliance systems. This 
premise is supportive to the conclusion that the ultimate goal of an internal compliance 
system is the establishment and enhancement of a culture of responsibility, a culture of 
compliance. The deriving outcome is that ‘compliance culture’ is not another fuzzy term. 
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Although it has different aspects it relates to certain characteristics enabling the creation and 
furtherance of a culture of integrity and responsibility in a given organisation.  
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7. Looking into Internal Compliance Measures Implemented in Different 
Research Settings  
Chapter 6 theorised the concept of export compliance emphasizing also the objective of 
achieving a culture of compliance in a given organisation. Furthermore, chapter 6 described 
the necessary steps and key elements for building and implementing ICPs on the basis of 
available guidance and standards provided by European and US export control authorities and 
the ISO organisation. The focus has been mainly on firms exporting items and technologies 
through tangible means albeit the measures discussed cover intangible transfers of technology 
and provision of services, too.  
Given the ultimate objective of the study that is the elaboration and test of a basic method for 
identifying risks and designing compliance systems in a research context, this chapter intends 
to show how export compliance is perceived and implemented in different organisational 
settings: Section 7.1 concerns industrial R&D and firms’ exporting activities, section 7.2 
explores compliance practices followed by universities in the US and the EU and finally, 
section 7.3 examines the compliance system implemented by a US and a European  research 
organisation. The main intent is to shed light in some fundamental or particularly challenging 
aspects concerning the design and implementation of export compliance systems.  
7.1 Complying with trade controls in an industrial setting 
This section aims at presenting how different corporations deal with export controlled 
activities in practice. In doing so, current approaches, attitudes and practices vis-à-vis internal 
compliance including challenges and limitations are identified. The analysis examines certain 
aspects of export compliance in industrial settings. First, organisational and operational issues 
are addressed: what are the required resources for implementing an export compliance 
programme? How are duties and resources allocated to specific departments? What are the 
most resource-intensive tasks? Is it advisable to deal with export compliance through a stand-
alone function or not? What are the corporate/institutional policies and departments that 
might be involved in the implementation of ICPs? Second, risk assessment practices followed 
by different organisations are discussed: What are the tools and methods used most 
commonly for identifying sensitive transactions? Third, it is examined how corporations 
comply with requirements to monitor technology transfers and especially intangible ones. 
This aspect is particularly interesting all the more due to the relevance of technology transfers 
to scientific activities. Fourth, the connections between academic research and industrial 
research are discussed not least due to the fact that different types of research may relate to 
distinct export control provisions and exemptions. This is not an exhaustive study of all key 
elements relating to the implementation of ICPs. For instance, the establishment of indicators 
for monitoring the effectiveness of ICPs or of mechanisms for correcting non-compliance are 
not of interest in this analysis. 
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The following analysis draws mainly from the results of an online survey which ran from 
December 9, 2015 to January 8, 2016
385
. In addition, supplementary interviews were 
conducted with industry representatives with a view to clarifying certain aspects of the issues 
in question. The survey was addressed to a total of 60 professionals working as export control 
officers in various exporting firms -operating in the EU- and public affair consultants 
representing such companies in the pertinent European industry associations and unions
386
. 
The target was to reach out to a satisfying number of export control practitioners so as to 
acquire a sample reliable enough for the purposes of this chapter. The goal was to explore 
how exporters of dual-use technologies comply with the EU regulation and ensuing national 
legislation in practice.  
7.1.1 Organisational identity 
The survey gathered a total of 40 replies, a rather good response rate for the purpose of this 
chapter. The sample is made up mainly by large organisations (77%), a rather anticipated 
outcome given that ICPs are implemented primarily by large multinational companies 
undertaking exporting activities from different countries to diverse destinations. However, 
SMEs are also represented as well (22%). Almost all the respondents export items and/or 
technologies to both EU and non-EU destinations while 87% export also to the US.   
 
The gathered data provide an insight into the compliance practices followed by companies 
operating mostly in the electronics, ICT, machine tools and aerospace/aviation sectors (in 
ranking sequence). Among the first things that the respondents were called to reply was their 
motivation for implementing compliance measures. Not surprisingly, administrative sanctions 
(e.g. fines, temporary suspension of exporting activities, lifting of trade facilitations) and 
reputational damage were the two most important motives gathering 32% and 22% 
respectively. Corporate Social Responsibility and criminal sanctions topped the replies as the 
least important drivers for implementing ICPs. This is also meaningful given that the case 
law in the EU has hardly to show any export control violations punished with imprisonment, 
and thus, a relation may exist between the low deterrence of criminal sanctions and their low 
ranking in the survey. It must be noted that criminal sanctions may involve both economic 
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fines and imprisonment but proving criminality and bringing cases to the court seems to be 
quite a challenge
387
. In any case, economic sanctions such as suspending the exporting 
activities or business activities in general of a company or, imposing a fine seem to be 
effective deterrents. Additionally, certain factors are not disconnected; reputational damage 
and Corporate Social Responsibility is such an example. However, the way practitioners 
perceive and classify each motive may be indicative of the most prevailing attitudes 
encountered in an industrial context. Last, differences can be traced between SMEs and large 
companies. For SMEs, criminal sanctions and corporate responsibility stand as a medium 
driver for implementing compliance measures. 
 
 
7.1.2 Compliance structure and resources 
The great majority (87%) of the companies implement a formal ICP aimed at dealing with 
export control requirements whereas the rest implement a sort of individual compliance 
measures such as guidance material for sensitive exports and record keeping procedures
388
. 
The responses to the question whether export compliance is dealt with by a stand-alone 
system or not were divided with the positive exceeding slightly the negatives. 71% of those 
not possessing a stand-alone export control system address export compliance in the 
framework of a broader compliance system dealing with a variety of requirements, mainly 
import regulations, staff codes of conduct and safety rules. The rest delegates export 
compliance tasks to another department such as the Logistics department.  
Depending on their organisational structure and the delegation of roles, the function assuming 
the overall responsibility for export compliance is the CEO or the board of directors in 53% 
of the firms. For the rest 22%, the Head of Export Compliance is the main responsible and 
20% delegates the responsibility to another manager at senior level. Also, 67% of the 
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respondents fully agree with the statement “the employee with main responsibility for export 
control compliance has direct access to top management (e.g. COE and governing board)”.  
 
Generally speaking, the majority (52%) of the responding organisations delegate export 
control roles to more than 10 employees. However, most of the time only a rather low 
percentage of staff assigned such a role is solely responsible for export compliance
389
. For 
SMEs the corresponding percentage is considerably lower (22%). The high number of 
employees contributing to export compliance tasks is a reasonable outcome, if one considers 
the high number of large enterprises participating in the survey. High numbers of employees 
must be translated to considerable resources dedicated to payroll and indeed, this is the 
situation depicted in the survey:  55% of the respondents chose staff expenses as the most 
costly aspect of their compliance mechanisms. Expenses for IT systems (e.g. for risk 
assessment, rating of items and recordkeeping) scored very high as well: 32% selected them 
as the most costly factor. The majority of export compliance officers consider training costs 
as a low to medium cost while half of them listed auditing as the least costly aspect of an 
ICP
390
. The figures are very similar for both large and medium sized enterprises.  
7.1.3 Risk assessment and further operational issues   
This section is particularly useful since it elucidates the different ways that companies of 
different sizes perceive challenges relating to the implementation of compliance systems. The 
section also exemplifies the different tools and practices used for identifying export control 
risks stemming from a given transaction.   
The first question concerned the main challenges encountered in developing and 
implementing compliance mechanisms and fully-fledged ICPs. Although the replies are 
distributed in a quite balanced manner among the different available options, certain trends 
are identifiable. Operationalizing corporate policies and procedures and embedding export 
control objectives into existing processes and tools appear to be the most important 
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challenges. Actually for SMEs, the latter is the most important challenge presumably because 
smaller companies do not necessarily establish formal policies and procedures. The risk 
assessment process ranks in the third position as the most important challenge. This is 
particularly the case for SMEs, 33% of which chose risk assessment as the most challenging 
issue as opposed to 13% of large companies. Collaborating with other departments and 
communicating the risk to top management and all employees potentially concerned appear 
to be the least challenging issues. Reasonably, for firms investing resources to export 
compliance there must not be a great difficulty in communicating the importance of export 
control issues to top managers. The survey also illustrates some more sector specific trends. 
For instance, firms operating in weaponry/defence sector see communication of the risks as 
the least important issue.  
 
The second question concerned the processes and tools used in the risk assessment process. 
Rating exporting items and technologies against controlled lists, screening end-users and 
third parties against ban lists and analysing legal requirements are the methods used most 
commonly in the risk assessment. As far as it concerns the tools utilised, IT systems to 
manage, store, easily retrieve and share information were referred by 67% of respondents. 
Reporting mechanisms for notifying suspect cases, tracking of past violations as well as 
trainings are further sources feeding information to the risk assessment procedure for most of 
the firms. All the tools and processes achieve higher scores among large enterprises. 
 
Most interestingly, some firms were willing to provide further information on the methods 
employed in assessing export control risks.  For instance, one compliance officer singled out 
the specific steps followed in implementing a risk assessment process within an organisation. 
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Building risk profiles (based on sensitive items, end-user/ end-use analysis, economic means 
of payment etc.) and identifying areas of risk are the first steps to be taken. Then, quantifying 
and prioritizing the risks and, identifying ways to address them are the next steps to take. 
Ultimately, implementing the necessary risk mitigation measures is the final step. Quite a few 
officers referred to self-assessment as a means used during the risk analysis. In practice, 
customers are required to fill out self-assessment forms which are then reviewed and 
classified by the export control officers. Also, risk assessment may involve contacting the 
customs authorities, asking for further information including patterns of sensitive 
transactions, routes and destinations.  Enhanced risk mitigation measures may be foreseen for 
shipments going to sanctioned destinations.  
Third, the participating practitioners were asked to list the information sources on which they 
rely so as to keep up to date with changes to legislation and administrative procedures and 
requirements. Despite the different resources and needs, retrieving information is enabled 
through a variety of tools for both SMEs and large enterprises. Subscribing to the authorities’ 
mailing lists, attending export control fora and seminars and drawing information as members 
of trade associations and chambers of commerce are widespread practices especially among 
large firms. Monitoring regulators’ websites, maintaining direct contacts with the licensing 
authority and participating to export control seminars are very common methods also for 
SMEs. It is also worth noting that 74% of the large firms and 22% of the SMEs rely also on 
private consultants and legal firms for dealing with export control requirements.  
 
Fourth, the participants were called to answer what are the departments with which they 
collaborate in executing export compliance tasks. The legal office is the option gathering the 
most replies in the aggregate data. The Procurement and Tendering department rank first 
among the SMEs while the Central Compliance Office is among the first options in both 
large and medium sized enterprises. It seems also that companies -depending on their 
structure and needs- may collaborate with several other departments. Management processes 
relating to production, supply and sales of products such the Supply Chain Management, the 
Customer Relationship Management and the Product Life Cycle Management might have 
some relevance to export control tasks. Especially sales and customers support was quoted by 
quite a few practitioners. Moreover, the departments responsible for quality management, risk 
management and Corporate Social Responsibility and naturally, for R&D activities are 
further examples mentioned by few participants. Another question relevant to the previous 
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one was the following: “Can you identify other corporate policies that re-inforce export 
compliance?” Ethics rules (e.g. staff codes of conduct) and procedures for IT security are the 
two options gathering the majority of responses, 67% and 52% respectively. Quality 
management standards and classification policies for managing confidential information 
follow them with equal percentages each (45%). The procedures and checks established 
pursuant to the Authorised Economic Operators system (AEO) administered by customs 
authorities in the EU were referred to also as a ‘reinforcing policy’ in one case. 
 
7.1.4 Monitoring Intangible Transfers of Technology 
Complying with technology transfer requirements is considered to be as a major challenge 
and an issue of particular interest to this study. Generally speaking, large firms seem to be 
quite active in identifying and mitigating technology transfer risks. Technology transfers 
represent an important part of firms’ business activities. Furthermore, quite often companies 
have anyhow an interest in controlling the sort of information that is released due to trade 
secrets and exclusive proprietary rights. If one thinks of the broad definition of technology as 
established in the framework of the multilateral regimes, corporations may transfer controlled 
technology in a number of occasions
391
. Transferring technical data to customers, sharing 
information with subsidies or collaborators abroad, and even sending data in the phase of 
tendering may be subject to licensing. Moreover, providing technical services outside the EU 
and releasing US origin information inside the EU may be subject to control under the EU 
Joint Action 2000/401 on the provision of technical assistance and the extraterritorial 
application of US deemed export controls, respectively. It must be reminded, however, that 
the EU technical assistance controls apply only in a narrow range of circumstances -military 
end-use- and deemed exports concern only US-origin technologies. Companies maintaining 
activities in particularly sensitive sectors and/or exporting technologies with military and 
defence applications such as aerospace and aviation may implement internal controls of very 
exhaustive nature. 
Therefore, the survey seized the opportunity to explore the practices adopted by industry 
towards this issue. The first question was about the provision of technical assistance and the 
implications of deemed exports. 17% of the firms replied that they are not concerned by these 
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issues. Reasonably enough, the percentage of non-concerned firms is higher among SMEs 
(33%).  Awareness raising activities are by far the most common tool referred to by most of 
the responding companies. Approval procedures for business travels abroad and pre-
employment checks are among the elements used most in monitoring export related activities 
as well.  
 
A few respondents referred to the different tools and management systems utilised in 
addressing tangible and intangible technology transfers. The release of export controlled 
information on-site is addressed mainly through the so-called ‘Technology Control Plans’ 
(TCPs) monitoring who has access to what information and ensuring that sensitive 
information is not exported to unauthorised users either on-site or abroad. Certain officers 
emphasized the role of visitor and travel management systems in operating effective TCPs. 
The application of deemed export/re-export rule may be translated into separate production 
lines or zoning excluding foreign employees from accessing certain US-origin technologies 
and information to use such technologies. 
With regards to technology transfers enabled through electronic means, the responses are 
quite distributed among the different options suggested. However, the majority of firms have 
established a corporate policy and guidance for dealing with sensitive technology transfers. 
Data segregation and access controls as well as communications on the corporate intranet are 
among the practices used often for ensuring that sensitive information is not released to 
unauthorised users. Some export control officers highlighted the importance of monitoring 
planned technology transfers at an early stage so as to obtain required export licenses before 
such transfers take place. Relying on secure file transfer protocol and reliable file sharing 
platforms and, providing training to selected employees dealing with technology transfer 
most often are further tools mentioned.  
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With a view to understanding better the actual implementation of internal controls and 
evaluating the results of the survey, further inquiries were addressed to experienced 
compliance managers working for two leading MNCs. The following remarks concern, in the 
first place, companies exporting primarily controlled items and technologies and investing a 
lot of resources to export compliance. To begin with, such companies operate comprehensive 
corporate policies for dealing with technology transfers. The implementation of internal 
compliance policies requires the delegation of export control tasks to managers and local staff 
appointed in different units or business departments. Responding to the inquiries of 
employees concerned with export issues, approving export related transactions and 
submitting applications whenever an export authorisation is necessary are among their main 
responsibilities.  
Second, in terms of risk assessment, prior to proceeding to any ‘export’ of technology certain 
information should be retrieved and analysed:  
 the full description of the technology; 
 the country of origin and any country that may exercise export control jurisdiction; 
 the different places where technology will be moved to or accessed from; 
 the end-uses and end-users relating to the transaction; 
 the volume and value of export and, 
 the involvement of any third parties in the provision or use of technology.  
The rating of all exporting technologies demand both the attribution of the right Harmonised 
System Code and the verification of the export control classification number according to the 
respective lists applying for each jurisdiction when more than one are involved. The survey 
showed that for tangible goods a ‘controlled item marking’ is implemented by some 
companies. While the rating of items can be easily outsourced to customs brokers the 
classification of a technology requires per force an internal assessment. Internal assessments 
of potentially controlled items and technologies rely on tools and software provided either by 
external companies or developed in-house for this purpose
392
. Screening end-users and third 
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parties against watch-lists and lists of restricted or sanctioned entities and individuals is 
integral to the risk assessment and due diligence process, as the survey confirms as well. 
Furthermore, corporate policies can be quite exhaustive by covering all different occasions 
where a controlled technology transfer may take place and establishing export procedures to 
be followed. The interviewed officers confirmed that their firms’ policies include physical 
exports of technologies, electronic technology transfers as well as transfers of hand-carried 
technology. For instance, travelling with laptops containing controlled data abroad can be 
subject to prior permit given that certain countries require an export authorisation for the 
export from or return of such data to the home-country of the employee
393
. In fact, in one 
case the company’s policy provides for a special permit for taking IT equipment during 
business abroad. Another common practice confirmed also by the survey is that firms may 
require from their staff to use only the approved corporate file sharing platform for e-
transfers. Yet, access restrictions may still apply since an export authorisation may be granted 
only for use by certain individuals located to certain destinations. In addition, different 
corporate policies set that transferring controlled data through e-mails should be as a last 
resort practice. 
Given that governmental polices on technology transfer are still in development and 
therefore, sometimes incomplete, exporting firms may choose to undertake more strict and 
comprehensive rules than those explicitly provided in the law. This way they show in practice 
an attitude of responsibility and prevent inadvertent violations of the export control laws. For 
instance, so far there has been no formal guidance at the EU or at national level with regards 
to technology temporarily stored or accessed in servers abroad (see also chapter 4.2.2)
394
. 
However, and judging from the two inquires, the practice shows that corporate polices may 
address such a possibility. The responsible staff in collaboration with the IT department 
should be aware of the location of servers and data sharing applications used and report any 
export control issue, as appropriate. Last, keeping auditable records for each controlled 
technology transfer represents another main principle included in corporate policies and 
besides, it constitutes a formal requirement in the relevant law.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
transfers an ‘internal working council’ is in charge for providing advice or ruling on the identification, 
classification and safeguarding of controlled information.  
393
 The US is the most known case of a State requiring an authorisation also for controlled data 
contained in a laptop. On the contrary, the EU has not established a common rule on that issue. Article 
7 of the dual-use regulation stipulates that cross-border movement of persons is not subject to export 
controls. For some Member States this provision implies that information contained in somebody’s 
mind shall not be controlled. However, if an individual carries with him controlled information in a 
tangible electronic medium a license may be applicable. In sum, what shall apply in the case where 
controlled information is carried by an individual in tangible form such as laptops, USB flash drivers 
and portable hard disks has yet to be clarified (see also section 4.2). 
394
 The issue has been discussed at the level of DUCG many times and interpretations of the 
applicable rules have been offered by certain Member States. However, common guiding rules have 
not been established so far.   
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7.1.5 Relations with academia and other research organisations 
The concluding section of the survey was dedicated to the relations between industry and 
academic/research institutions. 57% of the respondents confirmed that they undertake 
research in collaboration with academia. Furthermore, 61% of those maintaining such 
relations with academia replied that export controls affect their cooperation with universities 
and other research institutes. For SMEs the picture is different since only 33% collaborates 
with academia and none of them sees export controls impacting this cooperation. The types 
of activities undertaken most commonly in partnership with academic and research 
organisations can be collaborating in joint projects, commissioning directly research to 
universities and, to a lesser extent requiring advice on given scientific issues.  
 
The participants were also asked to explain how export controls affect their collaboration 
with academia. Most of them pointed out that technology transferred in the course of 
collaborative projects may be subject to an export authorisation. To quote just few of the 
officials, “we apply export controls in the same way as for other collaboration projects” and,   
“export licences are sometimes required to enable us to share data with research partners 
located outside the country of establishment.” Moreover, technology developed may be 
controlled and thus, subject to authorisation. Information classified due to proprietary or 
security reasons warrants certain assurances and may require export authorisations as well.  
In that view, it might be also necessary for companies to ensure that their partners can only 
access those parts of their information systems that relate directly to the project in question 
and/or for which an export authorisation has been granted. “We have less flexibility when 
cooperating with research institutes based on certain destinations and, the US export controls 
may influence our decision to collaborate with some institutes due to deemed (re)exports,” as 
another practitioner pointed out. 
Quite interestingly, one official referred to the attitudes encountered in an academic context 
vis-à-vis export compliance. Sometimes research institutes are not aware of export control 
issues and researchers challenge the applicability of export control provisions as pursued 
through non-disclosure agreements. The survey asked export control officers to answer 
whether they have ever informed their academic partners about the applicability of export 
controls when transferring technologies, items and software. Half of the participants replied 
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that indeed they have done this before. It appears that industry may have also an important 
raising awareness role to play in enhancing compliance in a research environment.  
 
Furthermore, a few officials stressed that collaborative projects either with subsidiary 
companies or with key suppliers may be obstructed due to delays in obtaining all the 
necessary licenses
395
. In that regard it is not only the interaction with academia that can be 
affected by export controls but also industrial R&D taking place within the framework of a 
multinational company. One officer referred to the lack of general licenses aimed at 
facilitating collaborative efforts both internally (within company) and with key suppliers. In 
that regard, the UK Export Control Organisation (ECO) pre-publishes a number of general 
licences which any exporting firm can make use of as long as it fulfils the specific conditions 
and is registered in the licensing database (SPIRE) set up for this purpose
396
. The idea to 
introduce new general licenses for intra-company transfers and large projects quite probably 
at the EU level is a long-lasting demand of the economic operators. Actually, the issue has 
been discussed in various occasions and studies in the past
397
.  
This doctoral study discussed the distinction between basic research and applied research in 
several occasions. Therefore, the survey participants were called to reply whether they 
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conduct basic scientific research in the meaning of the EU regulation and, if yes, why. 25% 
of the participants replied that there are instances where they conduct basic research. If one 
extrapolates this figure to those undertaking research in partnership with the academia, the 
percentage rises to 43%. One could assume that companies have an interest in maintaining 
market leadership and their competitive advantages or to develop further their market 
position by investing in basic research and preparing the next generation of innovative 
technologies. In that sense, it is a meaningful fact that certain companies refused to provide 
further information on the instances where they conduct basic research. In one specific case 
the compliance officer said explicitly that this is secret information and, in another case, the 
reason referred to was ‘striving for technology leadership’. Another interesting reply was the 
following: “the company maintains R&D facilities. Such facilities have the freedom to 
conduct basic research. The results of their scientific activities can be exploited by the 
company after further developments or can be provided to universities or research entities to 
nourish academic discourse.” Last, one export control manager said that they conduct basic 
research only to the extent that this is a requirement of a government or an EU funded work 
programme. Last, one officer provided the example of legal studies commissioned to 
universities so as to understand better the obligations of transport sector in relation to export 
controls. Following this, a reasonable question to ask was whether there are cases where 
firms publish the results of their R&D activities in journals or other scientific publications. 
42% of all firms questioned replied that they occasionally publish the results of their 
research
398
.  
In sum, the foregoing figures are useful in different ways.  First, they confirm that firms 
undertake basic research and sometimes also publish the results of such research nourishing 
thereby the state of knowledge and public wellness. Second, they indicate that the 
interactions between academia and industry may be affected by export controls. It comes out 
that having a clear legal framework for determining where export controls apply as well as 
raising awareness within scientific organisations on possible export control issues could be of 
help. A hypothetical example could be helpful here: a pharmaceutical company conducts 
research for the development of a vaccine against a high pathogenic virus. In the course of 
the research the firm relies on inputs provided from and/or achieved through cooperation with 
a university. The exchanges concern technology that is necessary for the development, 
production and use of a listed virus. Are these exchanges bound to be subject to an export 
authorisation? Will the company be free to publish the outcomes of the research if it so 
decides ? This is a hypothetical case concerning a particular field of research but it is also an 
eloquent example of the issues at stake.  
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7.2 University based research and trade controls 
Discussing export compliance in a university setting is a challenging issue. Various experts 
and public authorities both in the US and the EU point out a number of difficulties in 
communicating export control risks and imperatives to the academic and scientific 
community. Officials from the DOC have noted that the initial efforts of US authorities -
about 15 years ago- to reach out to a university audience were unsuccessful
399
. Only when 
they contacted those higher in rank (deans, faculty presidents), were they effective in building 
bridges of understanding and communicating trade control objectives to scientific staff and 
students. Hungarian licensing authorities were confronted with a similar attitude and a 
negative predisposition towards governmental controls of sensitive research during awareness 
raising seminars conducted in the past years in selected universities
400
.  
This is rather anticipated if one thinks of the distinct mind-set and practices pertaining to 
scientific research. Export controls are ostensibly at odds with the principles of academic 
freedom and independence of scientific work. On top of this, scientists may be unaware of 
export control risks and thus, they do not always realise how their work could connect to acts 
of WMD proliferation. Some of them will not be willing to carry further administrative 
burden and compliance checks if they do not see some merit in this. At the same time 
universities embark more and more often on partnerships with corporations and an increasing 
number of research projects are designed with a practical aim in view. As chapter 2 suggests 
tapping academic research into practical applications and furthering knowledge-based 
economies is favoured by governments and industry and, universities see in that an 
opportunity for funding their research programmes. Beside this, connecting the 
‘universitatum world’ with the industrial world is not just about fundraising or commercial 
purposes. It might be also the means of responding to societal needs and translating a better 
understanding of the world to tangible benefits. This evolution takes place in an environment 
wherein the exchange of data and the flows of international students and professors is as high 
as ever. It is characteristic that quite a few universities organise and offer either free of charge 
or upon payment on-line courses and degrees and, operate international campuses in different 
countries or continents. Consequently, export control issues are intensified in such a context. 
This chapter intends to explore whether universities in the US and the EU are aware of export 
controls as well as what are their compliance practices for coping with the export control 
problem.  
7.2.1 An insight into university export compliance in the US  
US Universities are known to be pioneers across all university core missions -teaching, 
research, knowledge transfer and international outlook
401
. The USA is also a country with a 
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long tradition in protecting intellectual property rights and implementing security controls 
especially for federally funded research. At the same time trade control legislation is 
generally considered as having a broader reach compared to the European one. In the US 
context, trade controls are openly seen to serve different objectives and the discussion is not 
limited to non-proliferation concerns. In addition to national security and international 
security objectives, protecting the US economic and technological advantages is a relevant 
aspect as well. Industrial espionage is an issue to consider in that regard. In various 
presentations and reports, US authorities stress that more than 56 foreign nations have been 
identified as collectors of US proprietary information and technologies. Among them 13 
countries appear to be particularly aggressive collectors of U.S. proprietary economic 
information and critical technologies
402
.  
For many reasons, one could argue that US research institutions represent the one edge of the 
spectrum in terms of export compliance as opposed to EU universities that seem to be either 
unaware or less proactive. The analysis of the situation in the US relies on two different 
sources of information. The first is the insight acquired by the author during a conference 
organised by the Association of University Export Control Officers (AUECO), in June 
2015
403
. This was the third annual conference organised by AUECO and gathered 
representatives from colleges and universities, speakers from government as well as private 
organisations specialised in global trade management and e-customs solutions. While this 
was just one of the numerous export control events and trainings offered to export 
compliance practitioners in the US, some remarks may be suitable here. The second source of 
information is the public university websites discussing exports compliance and providing 
documentation and advice to their staff for being compliant.  
Overview of university compliance in the US: To begin with, the conference gathered 
export control compliance managers coming from over than 160 leading US universities such 
as the University of Stanford, the Princeton University, and the Columbia University. All 
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these universities implement internal compliance measures and invest resources in so-called 
‘Export Management and Compliance Programmes’. This commitment of US academic 
institutions to export compliance may be attributed to various factors: increased awareness 
thanks to outreach activities by the US authorities; technological leadership and high intensity 
of knowledge transfers and, the rigorousness of the US export control law. This last element 
works in re-enforcement with a quite robust stance of authorities in enforcing export controls. 
During the three days of the conference, a number of university compliance officers referred 
several times to the verification or suspicion of export control violations as the main reason 
having led their institutions to adopt an export compliance strategy. It comes out that the 
preventive power of the US export controls towards universities is significant.   
Despite that, it is estimated that from around 31.460 licences processed by BIS in 2014 only 
few concerned academic and research institutions
404
. In connection to this, there are not many 
known cases of violations involving academics. The website of the University of Pittsburgh 
refers to the most known export control violations recorded in the recent past
405
. The cited 
cases include both tangible and intangible transfers of controlled equipment and technology 
as well as the implementation of a catch-all control for equipment falling under EAR99 and 
sent to a restricted organisation specified in the Entity List. In 2009, the Georgia Institute of 
Technology made accessible restricted information to users in 36 countries, including China 
and Iran, by uploading such information on its servers.  This is a telling example of an export 
control violation involving ‘intangible transfers’. In 2004, a Professor of Texas Tech 
University received a 2 year prison sentence and a denial of his export privileges for a period 
of ten years for having illegally exported a controlled pathogen (the causative agent of human 
plague) to Tanzania. The most known case is probably the one concerning J. Reece Roth, 
Professor Emeritus at the University of Tennessee. Between January 2004 and May 2006, 
Professor Roth engaged in a conspiracy to transmit export controlled technical data subject to 
the ITAR to graduate students from China and Iran
406
. Although Roth claimed he was 
ignorant of the regulations, in practice he was warned on a number of occasions, including by 
university counsel, that the technology may have been controlled. Professor Roth was 
convicted in a four-year sentence.   
The BIS Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) publication ‘Do not Let This Happen to You’ 
refers to further cases of violations and it notes also the role of Voluntary Self-Disclosures 
(VSD). Most of the VSD cases are closed with the issuance of a warning letter, some require 
no action and only very few lead to administrative sanctions. During 2014, the OEE opened a 
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total of 312 VSD cases and closed a total of 213 VSD cases. Over half of these VSD cases 
were closed with the issuance of a warning letter, while nearly a third were closed with ‘no 
action’ or ‘no violation’ and, around three percent, were closed with the issuance of 
administrative sanctions
407
. The role of VSD in the implementation of compliance systems 
was underlined also during the conference. In case of an export violation, the implementation 
of compliance measures is among the factors taken into account in the prosecution of such 
violations and may attenuate an applicable penalty. US universities see in that a further 
motive for being proactive and complying with export controls.  
Organisational and risk assessment aspects: With regards to organisational and operational 
aspects of export compliance in US academic settings, it could be difficult to build general 
patters and draw conclusions applying to all universities. The organisational structure may 
differ from one university to another and so does the scope of research activities concerned. 
This also implies that different universities employ compliance systems in a way that better 
fits their needs and identity. No matter where the export compliance function is placed, 
integrating export control objectives throughout the organisation is a key to implementing 
effective compliance systems.  Mark Peters, an experienced compliance officer at Oregon 
State University (OSU) has noted that “for a standalone export compliance system, it would 
be very difficult to get the user’s attention; however, if presented as part of shipping or 
dangerous goods compliance it receives much more attention and buy in. Additionally, 
researchers appreciate having the obstacle to research packaged together with a method to 
comply with all applicable regulations and move on their work”408. What’s more, by working 
with other compliance operations, a university compliance officer develops a network that 
can provide insights into what institutional operations or specific projects may need attention 
from an export controls perspective. “These partner compliance departments become ‘gate 
keepers’ looking for problems and referring them to the export compliance staff”. Moreover, 
other compliance officers highlight a difficulty to estimate staff hours and resources 
dedicated in assessing export control risks due to this involvement of staff from different 
departments. 
Generally speaking, the Export Control Office (ECO) of an American University deals with 
the whole spectrum of prohibitions and restrictions from arms controls in defence related 
articles to controls of dual-use commodities and technologies and, from trade sanctions to 
anti-boycott and anti-corruption regulations. According to Mr. Peters, an export compliance 
programme takes about 2 years to get integrated into a US academic institution. The main 
challenge is creating awareness of the program and communicating to the faculty and staff 
the importance to seek assistance when an issue arise. The long time to implement a 
compliance system has as much to do with the traditional culture of openness in academia as 
with the complexity of the material.  
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The AUECO has provided some guidance –a sort of basic model- for assessing a university’s 
institutional structure, core competences and scope of activities against export control 
risks
409
. The main idea is to assess different aspects of each parameter referred above against 
given risk descriptors. For instance, the institutional structure of a university includes 
processes for budget allocation, compliance, purchasing, shipping and international travel. 
The extent to which such processes are centralized or distributed (risk descriptor) may 
indicate a higher or lower risk. The physical location(s) is also a relevant characteristic in this 
evaluation. According to the model, centralised procedures imply a lower risk.  
The second parameter concerns research policies and core competencies of a research 
institution. For instance, a university implementing a policy of non-involvement to military/ 
defence related research or, refusing to undertake research involving non-disclosure 
agreements may be confronted with lower export control risks. Determining whether 
controlled or sensitive items (e.g. EAR and ITAR items and select agents) relate to the 
university core competences is part of the risk assessment, too.  Focusing efforts on primary 
areas of concern such as nuclear, engineering, and biotechnology is a plausible practice to 
follow. Visibly, universities operating nuclear facilities and using special nuclear material 
face a higher possibility to be concerned by export controls. In author’s view, the evaluation 
of the sensitivity research warrants an in depth and thorough examination given that less 
evident research activities (e.g. software simulating certain processes) may be also exploited 
by a proliferator or malevolent user for malign purposes and might be included in the scope 
of trade control lists. As M. Peters neatly notes, providing more and deeper education to 
researchers on export control issues represents a great way to mitigate export risks 
associating with a given discipline.  
The third parameter that determines an export control risk is the scope of international 
activities undertaken by a university. Again here, every type of activity (collaborations, field 
research, operation of international campuses, student exchange programmes, online and 
distance learning) undertaken by a university can be classified as of low, moderate or high 
risk depending on a given risk descriptor. For instance, field research using EAR99 
equipment shipped by a freight forwarder to low risk countries is considered as low risk 
activity. However, field research in a high risk country involving hand carried equipment that 
is not EAR99 may be of high risk. It can be concluded that one needs to correlate the results 
of risk assessment for different parameters (e.g. core competences within the scope of 
international activities involved) in order to identify and address specific export control risks.      
M. Peters suggests a practical way for addressing first the most urgent risks and turn then 
attention to other less evident or urgent areas of concern within an institution. Simply put, 
“using a sliding scale, based upon research subject, amount of foreign participation and 
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international collaboration along with reviewing funding source requirements allows for areas 
of greatest exposure to be reviewed first.”  
Technology Control Plans: Monitoring technology transfers poses probably the harshest 
challenge in implementing an export compliance system. In that regard, and given the extra 
complexity of the US export controls (think of deemed exports), it is interesting to see what 
measures are taken by the US universities in response to such legal requirements. A term 
used quite often when the discussion touches upon intangible transfers of technology is 
‘Technology Control Plans’ (TCPs). Industrial operators have been implementing such 
measures for years as a means to protect classified, proprietary, and export-controlled 
information. In fact, TCPs are explicitly required or recommended by federal guidance and 
regulations dealing with sensitive information released during or produced by defense-related 
R&D
410
. In addition, the application of TCPs is a widely used export compliance practice 
adopted by all major US universities. The University of Washington (UW), for example, 
defines a TCP as an internal compliance document prepared by the responsible lead 
researcher and stating the type of export-controlled information associated with a research 
project as well as measures to be taken to ensure that access to export-controlled information 
is duly managed, and signed
411
. The approval of such TCPs lies normally with the university 
Export Control Office (ECO) that in the case of the UW is the Office of Sponsored Programs. 
Generally speaking, a TCP should deal with all different aspects of security and establish 
level access controls to laboratories, IT services and data
412
: 
 physical security (e.g. security perimeter, safe storage and restricted access); 
 information security (marking of e-documents, secure file transfer method etc.); 
 specific procedures for any export authorisations required; 
 personnel screening and foreign visitors’ checks; 
 training of authorised persons prior to receiving access rights;  
 and record keeping. 
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Furthermore, several presentations made available in the Universities’ websites include 
‘management commitment to export compliance’ as an essential element of an effective TCP. 
The University of Virginia (UOV) stipulates in its export control policy that “Faculty 
members wishing to use (or authorize students or staff to use) controlled technology or work 
on a project intended to generate controlled technology, regardless of funding source, must 
develop a TCP”413. The TCP should be adapted to the specific needs and implications of a 
given project and receive approval by the OEC. The OEC may decide that a TCP is not 
required for instance in the case where a project involves merely tangible transfers of EAR-
controlled items, does not concern controlled source code or proprietary technical 
information and the research is to be conducted exclusively in the US. Similar procedures for 
monitoring sensitive projects involving intangible transfers of information are implemented 
by several US Universities. One could say that TCPs are like targeted ICPs incorporated in 
broader export compliance management systems. 
Further Common Elements: The investigation in the websites of different US universities 
showed certain elements that are in common for most of them. First, the majority of the US 
universities take export compliance quite seriously and to that effect, they have adopted a 
proactive stance. More particularly, several US Universities provide basic information on US 
export control regulations, guidance manuals and policy statements. The UOV that was 
referred above is such an example of a university having established quite comprehensive 
policies and procedures. For example, the UOV policy on sanctions requires that: "all 
University activities that are to be conducted in, involve the participation of parties located in, 
or will benefit a sanctioned country be reviewed and authorized in advance by the ECO.” 
Also, the UOV’s public website provides information on questions such as when the ECO 
should be contacted, what does apply for laptops and other electronic devices hand–carried 
abroad, what classes or courses may be impacted by export controls and also, what is the 
fundamental research exemption and how should be understood in practice
414
. 
Second, quite often the university policy on export control emphasizes both the commitment 
to abide by the applicable laws and the need to respect the academic freedom and the open 
dissemination of the research results. For example, the University of North Carolina at 
Pembroke (UNCP) has included an extract from the Faculty Handbook in its export control 
policy stating: “It is the policy of the University to support and encourage full freedom, 
within the law, of inquiry, discourse, teaching, research, and publication for all members of 
this institution's academic staff. The University will not penalize nor discipline members of 
the faculty because of the exercise of academic freedom in the lawful pursuit of their 
respective areas of scholarly and professional interest and responsibility.” In the same logic, 
the University of Washington seeks to comply with federal laws and regulations governing 
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exports and ensure that such compliance is consistent with the University's open academic 
environment
415
. 
Third, in the US university setting, primary responsibility for export compliance rests with 
the lead researchers for grants or contracts –known usually as Principal Investigators (PIs) - 
who shall be in position to identify risks and inform personnel involved in their research for 
such risks. Also, there must be an Export Control Office raising awareness and assisting the 
PIs in their responsibilities. Reviewing collaboration agreements and contracts, determining 
whether a technology to be used in connection with a research project is controlled, 
performing risk assessment and record keeping procedures are among the responsibilities of 
such an office. It might be the case that this role is entrusted to the Office of Sponsored 
Research or the University legal service depending on the structure of the university in 
examination. In any case, an institutional official will be in charge of the overall coordination 
and implementation of the compliance system and certainly legal expertise is sine qua non for 
the operation of such a system. Also, a mechanism for reporting and verifying possible 
violations is normally in place. For documented or validated violations escalation procedures 
may be foreseen.  Investigations of export control issues demand review at senior level (e.g. 
Provost/Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs) as it is the case for the policy statements 
committing universities to abide by the export control regulations.  
Fourth, the definition and applicability of the Fundamental Research Exemption (FRE) is an 
issue of central importance in related policies and information made available in the 
university websites. The criterion used invariably for deciding whether scientific and 
technical information resulting from a project or activity qualifies for the FRE is the absence 
of restrictions on publication or other restriction on the dissemination of such information on 
the part of sponsors
416
. For instance, the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health clarifies 
in its export control website that the FRE does not apply with regards to transmissions of 
material goods. It also points the cases where the FRE is ‘destroyed’417. If the university 
accepts any contract clause that forbids the participation of foreign persons, that gives the 
sponsor a right to approve publications resulting from the research, or otherwise, operates to 
restrict participation in research and/or access to and disclosure of research results, the FRE 
ceases to apply. In fact, most universities provide extensive guidance including examples and 
practical advice to their researchers for taking advantage of the FRE. As the UNCP export 
control policy sets, it is to the benefit of the university to pursue its mission in a manner that 
is consistent with all applicable regulations while making reasonable efforts to maximize 
opportunities where the FRE can be claimed. Negotiating with research sponsors the removal 
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or modification of contract provisions and publishing research papers prior to attending a 
conference abroad are such ways suggested by many US universities for invoking the FRE. 
To conclude, the investigation in the websites of different US universities confirmed that a 
great number of them have established export control policies and procedures including 
specific guidance and special websites dedicated to compliance with export controls and 
sanctions law. It would not be an exaggeration to say that information published in such 
websites provides a good insight into the US export control legislation as well as the ways 
that the latter is interpreted and implemented in a research context. Of course, different 
universities may publish more or less detailed information, adopt most or least elaborate 
procedures and invest resources according to their core competences and needs. 
7.2.2 An Insight into university practices in the EU 
The study relied on two sources of information for verifying the state of play with regards to 
university export compliance in the EU, namely web-based research and direct inquiries to 
academics working for different European universities. In relation to the latter, an inquiry 
was addressed to a total of 160 professors and senior academics being involved in the 
evaluation of research proposals under the H2020. After a brief introduction to the main 
objectives of dual-use trade controls and the role of the EU regulation, the academics were 
called to answer whether:  
I. they are aware of dual-use issues and the requirements set in the EU regulation 
II. they know what is the state of play (awareness, compliance) with regards to such 
issues in their  respective institutions 
III. there is somebody in their institution taking care of possible export control issues 
The ultimate aim was to verify the level of awareness in different EU universities, contact 
those employees or departments in charge of export compliance and explore further sources 
of information in their university websites. The published ‘lists of experts’ containing the 
names of the external evaluators of research proposals in the framework of H2020 were 
utilised for selecting a suitable sample
418
. The sample is made up of academics representing 
mainly applied sciences and coming from a variety of EU countries. The selected experts 
participate in the evaluation of proposals falling mainly under the specific area of H2020 
‘industrial leadership’ and concerning research disciplines such as nanotechnology, advanced 
materials, biotechnology, advanced manufacturing and processing, and space. A total of 28 
replies were collected representing   universities from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Although the 
response rate does not permit to draw safe inferences for the overall situation in the EU, the 
findings are indicative of practices followed and problems arising in the EU context. The 
evaluation of the results can be found in the following section. 
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The Findings of the Survey: Half of the academics replied that they do not know about the 
issues in question. The rest replied that they are partly aware of the dual-use concept and 
linked problems.  In fact, 25% of the academics are aware of the dual-use regulation in 
particular whereas only 14% of their respective institutions implement a sort of compliance 
mechanism such as ethics committees on dual-use research and provision of related 
information on the universities’ websites.  
First, the level of awareness of dual-use issues among the evaluators of H2020 proposals does 
not appear to be high. This does not imply necessarily a flaw in the evaluation process since 
only some of the evaluators are also in charge of the ethics screening. The rest are concerned 
with other aspects such as the evaluation of scientific and technical parameters of the 
proposals. Quite interestingly, two of the respondents provided more specific information on 
their role as ethical reviewers. Both of them acknowledged that the dual-use regulation is one 
of the instruments used in the evaluation of proposals. “Checking the potential risks of 
research proposals involving transnational cooperation and technologies of dual-use concern 
are among the tasks entrusted to the reviewers,” the first evaluator said. The other evaluator 
stressed that in all evaluations he was involved there was no concrete dual-use concern. 
Several reasons are likely to have contributed to this fact. To quote his words, “maybe, the 
most important is that the call topics I was involved were mostly at a very early stage of the 
innovation chain, not being fundamental research, but always at quite Low Technology 
Readiness Levels (TRL)”. He also pointed out that “although it is clear that in most cases 
future innovation branches may also include non-peaceful applications, the calls and also the 
principles of H2020 agenda make clear that civil purposes are targeted”. As a result “the 
proposals really focus on civil applications when discussing the potential impact and 
innovation of research”. Exploring the potential of a research project to contribute to non-
peaceful applications is a useful action to take from an early stage. However, determining 
whether there is a high probability of an export control risk to materialise is particularly 
challenging given that the evaluators are not export control trained and the applicable 
legislation is not always clear-cut.  
A remark concerning the role of TRLs is pertinent here. Generally speaking, the TRLs are a 
nine-step scale for assessing the readiness of a given technology to be used for practical 
purposes. The TRLs metric was first developed by NASA scientists in 1970s and adopted by 
the Air Force Research Laboratory as a means of evaluating the readiness of technologies to 
be incorporated into a weapon or other type of system
419
. In fact, there are several –slightly 
varying- TRL scales used by governments and managers to select mature technologies for 
                                                          
419
 The amended TRL scale used by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) can 
be found in the following link:  
https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/heo/scan/engineering/technology/txt_accordion1.html; 
See also: Ricardo Valerdi and Ron J. Kohl, “An Approach to Technology Risk Management”, paper 
prepared for the Engineering Systems Division Symposium, MIT, Cambridge, MA, March 29-31, 
2004, 2. 
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inclusion in their programs. The ‘Build in Canada Innovation Program’ is such an example of 
a public funding scheme using the TRLs metric
420
. 
Table VII: TRLs according to the Work Programme 2014-2015 of H2020
421
 
Technology Readiness Levels according to H2020 rules 
TRL-1 Basic Principles Observed 
TRL-2 Technology Concept Formulated 
TRL-3 Experimental Proof of Concept 
TRL-4 Technology Validated in Lab 
TRL-5 Technology Validated in Relevant Environment (industrially relevant 
environment in the case of key enabling technologies) 
TRL-6 Technology Demonstrated in Relevant Environment (industrially relevant 
environment in the case of key enabling technologies) 
TRL-7 System Prototype Demonstration in Operational Environment 
TRL-8 System Complete and Qualified 
TRL-9 Actual System Proven in Operational Environment (competitive 
manufacturing in the case of key enabling technologies; or in space) 
In practice, the TRL scale ranges from the idea (level 1) to the full deployment of the product 
in the marketplace (level 9). More specifically, the first level is the lowest one and concerns 
‘basic research’ relating to a technical field (e.g. fundamental investigations and related 
studies). The second level concerns applied research such as analytical studies and 
experimentation for formulating a technology concept and/or applications.  In the H2020 
context, wherever a call for proposals refers to or requires a specific TRL, the TRL scale 
specified in the General Annexes to the H2020 Work Program must be used. According to 
the evaluator, the TRLs are utilised also as a means for assessing whether dual-use risks 
connect to a specific proposal. 
Second, it is rather worrying that half of the respondents seem to be unaware of the dual-use 
concept in general and export controls in particular. Certainly, it is not each and every 
researcher or university concerned with export controls but justifiably, one cannot be 
responsible if he or she is not aware of the existence of a problem. In some cases, the 
                                                          
420
 More information on the BCIP can be found here: 
https://buyandsell.gc.ca/initiatives-and-programs/build-in-canada-innovation-program-bcip/program-
specifics/technology-readiness-levels. 
421
 See the H2020 Work Programme 2014-2015, General Annexes, 29, retrieved from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2014_2015/annexes/h2020-wp1415-
annex-ga_en.pdf. 
183 
 
responses were quite unexpected. Academics dealing with nanotechnologies or conducting 
research in electric propulsion replied ‘we are not concerned’ or even ‘we do not know about 
the issues in question’ or, ‘we do not do nuclear research’. Moreover, it was revealed that 
scientists working for institutions known to implement export compliance measures, they 
might be still unaware of dual-use issues. Being responsible in the conduct of research is also 
a matter of personal consciousness but such findings may indicate a need to step up 
awareness raising activities undertaken by both academic institutions and regulatory 
authorities.  
Third, the survey shows that quite often universities address dual-use issues in the framework 
of ethics committees and codes of scientific conduct. Generally speaking, universities may 
adopt codes of ethical conduct covering from scientific fraud and ethical conduct of research 
to issues such as conflicts of interest and corruption
422
. Especially for life science research 
involving for instance, clinical trials and animals testing further guidance and universal codes 
of conduct are provided by international organisations, university networks and national 
academies of science
423
. The survey also suggests that the establishment of some kind of 
ethics committee or advisory body overseeing the implementation of such codes of conduct 
or other regulations and guidelines is a quite common practice in a research context. In 
Portugal, the University of Coimbra (UC) has established an ethical commission in charge of 
the screening of proposed projects requiring clinical trials
424
. However, till now dual-use has 
never been an issue for research and studies carried out in the Faculty of Pharmacy of UC.  
In Belgium, the University of Leuven (KUL) has set up separate committees in charge of 
different aspects of research such as medical ethics, social and societal ethics, laboratory 
experimentation, data privacy, scientific integrity and most interestingly dual-use research
425
. 
KUL researchers rely on existing mechanisms for getting approval for certain types of 
research, reporting claims concerning current or past incidents or asking advice. In practice, 
the University offers a flowchart to advise researchers when they need to contact the different 
committees in place (see the Annex at the end of the study). 
The public website of the Ethics Committee on Dual-Use Research (EC DU) draws from 
definitions and information used in the H2020 sources for discussing dual-use research.  
Therefore, one could assume that awareness of export control issues is owed partly to 
                                                          
422
 One example is the Code of Conduct governing research in the University of Roma ‘Tor Vergata’ 
available in: 
http://web.uniroma2.it/modules.php?name=Content&action=showattach&attach_id=13032. 
423
 Indicatively one could consult the following:  
WHO, Responsible Life Sciences Research for Global Health Security, A Guidance Document, 2010, 
Geneva, retrieved from: 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/70507/1/WHO_HSE_GAR_BDP_2010.2_eng.pdf. 
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Improving Biosecurity, Assessment of Dual-use 
Research, 2013, retrieved from: https://www.knaw.nl/shared/resources/actueel/publicaties/pdf/advies-
biosecurity-engels-web. 
424
 The webpage of the ethics commission can be consulted in the following link:  
http://www.uc.pt/fmuc/orgaosconsultivos/comissaoetica. 
425
 The relevant information can be found in the KUL website,  available in: 
https://www.kuleuven.be/english/research/integrity/committees. 
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initiatives undertaken under the Horizon 2020 and explained in chapter 4.1. An application 
form for requesting approval by the dual-use committee is also available in its public 
website
426
. The applicants are called to provide a short description of the project that is 
already submitted or about to be submitted for funding including also the sponsor’s 
description.  For research involving cross border transfers, researchers are required to declare 
how they conform to the imperatives set by the dual-use regulation. Researchers must also 
clarify whether their research is subject to ‘military ethical standards’ or otherwise, has 
potentially military applications. In that regard, pathogen-related research, autonomous 
robotics, drones and specific laser technologies are mentioned as examples of potentially 
sensitive research. In case of research funded by military organisations further information is 
required. Depending on the source of the funding the assessment of the committee may have 
either an advisory or a binding character. For instance, for projects funded under the H2020 
and relating EU funding schemes the final approval rests on the EU funding body. Instead, 
for research funded through internal and federal funds the opinion of committee will be 
binding.  
The University of Uppsala in Sweden constitutes another example of academic institution 
addressing export controls in the context of the broader ethics discussion.  The CODEX 
website run by the Swedish Research Council in collaboration with the university’s centre for 
Research Ethics and Bioethics addresses different types of concern relating to broad areas of 
science
427
. Dual use research is mentioned in connection with natural sciences. The website 
offers an overview of the legislation including links to non-proliferation Treaties and the 
UNSCR 1540, national laws administered by the Swedish Agency for Non-Proliferation and 
Export Controls, the EU regulation and sanction regulations. While the website provides a 
good insight into the logic and main issues relating to export controls, it is highly probable 
that no formal procedure or mechanism addressing export control concerns exists. It comes 
out that it is the sole responsibility of the researcher to identify such an issue and ask for an 
authorisation as required by the law.    
Fourth, there must be a relationship between proactive university compliance stance and 
vigorous implementation of trade controls involving for instance in-reach activities towards 
the academia by the regulatory authorities.  For instance, universities established in Members 
States known to dedicate increased resources to export controls such as Germany and the UK 
appear to be in general better informed compared to universities originating from other 
Member States. The validity of this argument requires further evidence and it does not imply 
an inadequate implementation of export controls by other Member States. For example, the 
survey showed that universities based in Member States such as Belgium, Portugal and 
Sweden can be aware of export controls as well.  
Another interesting remark is that even in cases where the evaluators were aware of the dual-
use problematic and stated with most or least certainty that their respective institutions take 
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 The form can be accessed in the following link: 
http://www.kuleuven.be/ethicsatarenberg/page.php?FILE=subject&ID=676&PAGE=1&LAN=E. 
427
 University of Uppsala website, “CODEX: rules and guidelines for research: Dual-use research” 
retrieved from: http://www.codex.vr.se/en/teknat4.shtml. 
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care of such issues further inquiries to the Universities were most of the time unsuccessful. 
Additionally, certain responses in the survey and further contacts with university officers 
suggest that the EU universities have become aware of export control issues only recently. In 
addition, for certain universities it is clear that specific policies addressing such concerns will 
not be introduced. In the words of a legal officer, “we are unlikely to have a large number of 
projects concerned by dual-use requirements and therefore, we would intend to consider them 
on a case-by-case basis rather than put in place an explicit policy or process”.  
The UK’s Approach by Alpha Project: With a view to completing the analysis of the 
situation in the EU a special reference must be done to the situation in the UK. The Higher 
Education Guide and Toolkit on Export Controls drafted by the Project Alpha of the King’s 
College of London (KCL) and the Association of University Legal Practitioners constitutes a 
good basis for discussing different aspects of the UK system
428
. The document was prepared 
with support from the UK's Export Control Organisation (ECO) and offers an analysis of the 
UK legislation affecting potentially the activities of academic institutions. Also, it provides 
advice and specific tools such as fictitious case studies, flowcharts, models of policy 
statements and examples of ‘red flags’ for addressing export control issues and complying 
with the applicable laws in a university setting. This is probably one of the very few 
initiatives taken with the support of an export control authority in the EU and providing 
detailed guidance to academic institutions
429
. 
Three remarks are relevant here. First, the document provides an insight into the approach of 
the UK authorities concerning all different aspects of export controls. What does the term 
‘export’ comprise according to the UK interpretation? What might be considered as 
technology ‘necessary’ for the development, production and use of a controlled item? The 
Guide discusses also the decontrols for information ‘in the public domain’ and ‘basic 
research’ on the basis of the Export Control Order of 2008. Whereas both the UK legislation 
and the Guide do not go too far in relation to what is already known by the EU regulation, 
certain issues are clarified. For instance, item, information, technology or research is not in 
the public domain if 
430
: 
 needs to be bought from a supplier who controls the supply; 
 requires registration; 
 is restricted for access by certain people only; or 
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 The Higher Education Guide and Toolkit on Export Controls and the ATAS Student Vetting 
Scheme, drafted in partnership by the Association of University Legal Practitioners and Project Alpha 
of King’s College London and with support of Export Control Organisation and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, (April 2015) can be consulted in: http://www.projectalpha.eu/academia. 
429
 In addition to the guide be the Alpha project,  the British licensing authority has published specific 
guidance on the topic:  UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skill (BIS), Export Control 
Organisation,  Guidance on Export Control Legislation for Academics and Researchers in the UK,  
2010, available in: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/68680/Guidance_on_E
xport_Control_Legislation_for_academics_and_researchers_in_the_UK.pdf 
430
 The Higher Education Guide, 17.  
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 is subject to Government and Ministry of Defence security classifications (e.g. 
commercially confidential information, Official Secrets Act, etc.). 
Second, it is clarified that the public domain and basic research exemptions do not apply in 
the case of an end-use or sanctions control
431
. It could be interesting to know if such an 
interpretation is shared by all EU Member States. Different Member States have 
acknowledged that applying catch-all controls in the context of research activities involving 
transfers of items and technologies is a plausible case
432
. However, it is not clear whether the 
implementation of a catch-all control impairs the applicability of decontrols. This could 
potentially mean the unlimited discretion of a licensing authority to decide on the 
dissemination of any scientific information or technology. In response to this, section 8 §1 of 
the UK Export Act (2002) stipulates that any interference of protected freedoms must be no 
more than is strictly necessary
433
. 
It should be also reminded that end-use controls are implemented on the condition that the 
exporter has been informed by the competent authority or he is aware that an item, 
technology, software or service is to be used in connection with a WMD purpose outside the 
EU. In the UK practice, transfers of technology and software also within the UK are included 
in the scope of end-use controls where the transferor knows or has been informed that the 
technology is intended to be used outside the EU for such a purpose
434
. This means that for 
example, teaching in the context of a university course may fall within the purview of an end-
use control.  
Third, another means for addressing proliferation concerns in the UK context is the Academic 
Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) operated by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
The ATAS is a student vetting scheme for nationals who originate from countries other than 
the UK, EEA, or Switzerland and wish to study in a British university
435
. In practice, ATAS 
certificate seeks to ensure that individuals who apply to study certain sensitive subjects do not 
have links to WMD programmes. ATAS certificates are required in addition to the normal 
visa procedures for certain post-graduate courses. It is the responsibility of the University to 
assign the appropriate Joint Academic Coding System (JACS) code and inform the applicant 
students if an ATAS requirement applies for their course program.   
It should be noted that in the EU, non-proliferation concerns are dealt with in the framework 
of student visa procedures. For short stays -up to three months- the common visa procedures 
                                                          
431
 Certain provision of Articles 6, 7, 10, 11, 12 and 19 of the Export Control Order supplement the 
catch-all provision of the Regulation by clarifying the specific cases where a transfer or export of non-
listed items, software, technology or service may require an authorisation. See the Export Control 
Order 2008, retrieved from: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/3231/pdfs/uksi_20083231_en.pdf. 
432
 This was for instance the opinion of the Member States that participated at the 7
th
 ESARDA Export 
Control Working Group.  
433
 UK Export Control Act 2002, 5-6, available in: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/28/pdfs/ukpga_20020028_en.pdf. 
434
 See Article 10 of the Export Control Order 2008. 
435
 For more information on ATAS see the webpage of the UK government: 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/academic-technology-approval-scheme. 
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for the Schengen Area apply
436
. However, for longer stays, applicants are required to follow 
the procedures set at national level (normally a resident permit will also be required in 
addition to a valid visa). In practical terms, the extent to which a non-proliferation screening 
takes place may vary from country to country. For instance, certain Member States appear to 
be quite proactive by proceeding to inter-service consultations between visa issuing 
authorities (such as consulates and embassies) and other security agencies -including export 
control authorities- prior to approving visa applications
437
.    
Examples of University Compliance Practices in the UK: It is useful to take a look at the 
ways whereby UK universities respond in practice to requirements set in the legislation. The 
section draws mainly on information available in the websites of renowned British 
universities undertaking multidisciplinary research and promoting innovation through 
partnerships with industry and other research organisations
438
. First of all, as it was shown 
also in the survey, ethics committees and policies for research integrity are in place. This is 
particularly the case for research involving humans and clinical trials with human tissue or, 
using personal data of individuals
439
. For instance, the Cambridge University has four 
School-level Research Ethics Committees and in addition, some departments, faculties and 
institutes also have their own local committees. In relation to this, funding organisations such 
as the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) may require from universities to have 
some sort of internal mechanism for ethical review of all research funded under their 
frameworks. 
We believe that deciding what to research is a matter for the individual researcher or research 
group. This belief reflects the value we accord to the principle of academic freedom, enabling 
the pursuit of academic enquiry subject to the norms and standards of scholarly undertaking, 
without interference or penalty. This freedom […] will ensure that our strong core disciplines 
flourish. 
                                                                                                   Oxford Research Strategy
440
         
Export Controls are among the issues addressed by the main research policies on approval 
procedures for sponsored research and collaboration agreements with third organisations.  For 
instance, the webpage of the Imperial College London has a specific section with the heading 
‘non-standard factors’ that can affect the normal application process or contract negotiation 
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 For more information on the Schengen Area visa policies see the website of DG Home: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/index_en.htm. 
437
 Information drawn from discussions with Member State representatives in the margins of the 55
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Dual-Use Coordination Group meeting, 24 September, 2015.  
438
 The websites of the University of Cambridge, University of Oxford and the Imperial College of 
London were used as a source of information.  
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 See for instance the webpages of  the Imperial College London Research Ethics Committee: 
http://www.imperial.ac.uk/research-ethics-committee/purpose-of-icrec/; the University of Cambridge 
Research Ethics webpage http://www.research-integrity.admin.cam.ac.uk/research-ethics and the 
Central University Research Ethics Committee (CUREC) of the Oxford University:  
https://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/curec/. 
440
 Information retrieved from the website of the Oxford University, available in: 
https://www.ox.ac.uk/about/organisation/strategic-plan/research?wssl=1. 
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and, which may delay the Institutional Authorisation to submit the application or execute the 
agreement, if not established and considered in the early stages of proposal development. 
Among these factors is ‘research that can be used or modified for military purposes’441. In 
addition, the Research Office provides further guidance on the issue of export controls.  This 
is the case also with other Universities such as Cambridge and Oxford.  
In practice, the Universities under examination offer basic information on the legislation, 
examples of controlled items, and make special references to end-use controls. The Oxford 
for instance, clarifies that the research service has registered on the University’s behalf in 
SPIRE so that licence applications and queries can be submitted and that, individual 
researchers can also directly register on SPIRE
442
. In addition, the university websites provide 
links to the consolidated UK control list of dual-use and military items as well as the 
guidance provided by the UK government and the Higher Education Guide.   
Export control issues are dealt with mainly by officers from the legal or technology transfer 
departments and staff from research offices. Contacts with officers from the legal and 
research services confirmed that presently there are not comprehensive policies and internal 
controls on export compliance. As R. Boyle notes "in Cambridge responsibility lies primarily 
within departments and with researchers, partly because Cambridge is quite decentralised and 
also because the export control regime is very technical -only the actual researchers may 
know if their experiments might be captured by the controls". Some universities such as the 
Imperial College of London operate central research compliance offices dealing with legal, 
ethical and scientific aspects in certain areas of research such as healthcare. It is worth 
wondering whether existing mechanisms such as central research offices could assume a 
more proactive role in ensuring compliance with export controls. In any case, raising 
awareness through websites and information seminars for scientific and administrative staff 
as well as providing points of contact for export control queries are among the initiatives 
increasingly taken by many British universities
443
.   
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 See relevant information in: http://www.imperial.ac.uk/research-and-innovation/research-
office/preparing-a-proposal/non-standard-factors/. 
442Information retrieved from the University of Oxford webpage offering “Guidance on Export 
Control Legislation”, available in:  https://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/researchsupport/contracts/export/. 
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 See indicatively, information provided by the University of Birmingham: 
https://intranet.birmingham.ac.uk/as/registry/policy/programmemodule/programmes/exportcontrols.as
px and, the export controls policy of the University of Surrey in: 
http://www.surrey.ac.uk/policies/export_controls_policy.htm. 
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7.3 Other research organisations  
This section analyses the cases of two non-university research organisations in the US and 
Germany with a view to elucidating what are the export compliance strategies adopted and 
practices implemented pursuant to export control laws.  
7.3.1 The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) 
The Identity of the Organisation: The PNNL was founded in 1965 and is operated since 
then by Battelle the world’s largest non-profit R&D organization444. It is one of the 10 U.S. 
Department of Energy national laboratories managed by DOE's Office of Science
445
. It 
conducts innovative research in a variety of disciplines from environmental molecular 
sciences and biotechnology to security including cyber security and non-proliferation matters. 
PNNL operates research facilities in different locations in the US territory such as in 
Washington and Oregon and its main campus is located in Richland (Washington). It 
undertakes research for and collaborates with government agencies, universities and industry.  
Its R&D expenditure for fiscal year 2015 was $955 million and made up of funding sources 
including the DOE, other federal, State and local agencies, universities and industry sponsors.  
Around 4.300 scientists, engineers and non-technical staff are employed in its premises and 
the number of visiting scientists and other users was 2000 for 2013.   
Figure XII: Sources of R&D expenditure for fiscal year 2015
446
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 Battelle headquartered in Columbus (Ohio) has managed and operated PNNL for DOE and its 
predecessors since the Laboratory's inception in 1965. 
445
 There is a total of 17 National Laboratories managed for the account of DOE. The Office of 
Science is the steward for 10 of them. More information can be found on the website of the US DOE, 
Office of Science, available in: http://science.energy.gov/laboratories/. 
446
 PNNL website: About PNNL Business Facts, Fiscal Year 2014, retrieved from: 
http://www.pnnl.gov/about/facts.asp. 
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Export Compliance Practice at PNNL
447
: The PNNL Export Control Office (ECO) was 
formally set up in 2009 with the task of reviewing all the activities of the organisation 
requiring an export control clearance. The realisation of the importance of operating an 
internal export compliance system originated from contacts and communications with the 
competent regulatory authority. With regards to organisational and operational aspects, the 
ECO employs currently 4 fulltime staff members including the manager and receives support 
from at least 8 other employees from the legal, property, contracts and procurement 
departments. PNNL’s compliance office resides in the Safeguards and Security Services 
Division (SSSD) and it represents a stand-alone function. The overall responsibility for 
export compliance lies with the legal department whereas the day-to-day supervision of 
export related tasks is assumed by the ECO manager. It is estimated that the full development 
and operation of the compliance policies and procedures took about two to three years from 
the moment of the initial inception of the system. This seems to be in accordance with what 
section 7.2.1 suggests for the US universities.  
The PNNL’s capabilities cover different points in the spectrum of scientific activities from 
basic to applied research and export controls do affect its collaboration with industry and 
academia (joint projects, licensing invention/patents and consulting services).  In fact, the 
PNNL has applied for different types of authorisations pursuant to military, dual-use, nuclear 
and sanction controls. Concerning risk management practices, a useful way for assessing the 
risks and identifying priority areas is at the phase of planning of a new research project. 
Many companies operate a ‘Gate Review Process’ that is a conceptual and operational road 
map for moving a new project from idea to launch. Researchers getting engaged in such a 
process need to contact the security, legal and export control services prior to entering into a 
formal collaboration with an industry partner. This way potential export control risks are 
assessed at an early stage. 
A. Rittel, export compliance manager at PNNL considers that making the staff aware of 
export compliance and training them on the occasions requiring contacting the ECO for 
further advice is a key element for the proper functioning of the system. In relation to this, 
particular attention has been paid to training activities. The ECO conducts routinely training 
seminars upon request by the lab personnel and whenever is deemed as necessary. Export 
control modules and objectives have been incorporated into the annual security refresher -an 
electronic awareness raising course- and general awareness brochures dealing with a range of 
compliance matters. In addition, an export control website available internally and a video 
series freely accessible in the ‘YouTube’ can be consulted for drawing further information on 
export controls. On top of that, commitment statements by lab directors and videos having as 
spokespersons officers high in rank increase the consciousness that export compliance does 
matter for the organisation.   
When it comes to technology controls a variety of tools are utilised for monitoring sensitive 
transfers. Security clearances for hiring new staff, approval procedures for foreign visitors 
and travels abroad as well as access controls, and specific procedures for IT security are all 
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 Information retrieved after communication with Alan Rittel, export control manager at PNNL. 
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included in the quiver of the export compliance strategy. The implementation of export 
compliance measures is underpinned by policies and accompanying material such as an 
export control manual for lab personnel and an export guidebook for export control staff. 
Although a lab procedure exclusive to export compliance does not exist, export control 
requirements are embedded in the major activities in which PNNL is involved such as 
international shipping and foreign national visits. Not surprisingly, the implementation of the 
deemed export rule represents a quite challenging issue in a research organisation employing 
several foreign scientists for accomplishing its research portfolio. The application of the 
fundamental research exclusion is done on the basis of the intent to publish the results of a 
scientific research. Also, it requires assessing any security implications of a given publication 
and the close collaboration between the export control officers and the researchers. 
The PNNL is working to set a higher standard in export compliance and non-proliferation by 
considering all available means. It also recognizes that it must increase visibility of PNNL’s 
export control compliance program and step up compliance efforts in certain respects. For 
instance, implementing stringent compliance practices such as preferentially procuring from 
and subcontracting with companies that maintain strong export compliance programs and, 
considering inclusion of export control objectives in key management documents are such 
initiatives under consideration
448
. Although the US authorities have not published best 
practices and specific standards for national laboratories, quite similar approaches are 
implemented across the DOE lab complex. In relation to this, there is also the Office of 
Safety and Security Policy operated by DOE and overseeing the safety and security policies 
and procedures implemented by different national laboratories. Export control policies are not 
explicitly mentioned among the areas dealt with by this office
449
.  
7.3.2 The Helmholtz Zentrum of Berlin (HZB)
450
 
The Identity of the Organisation: The ‘Helmholtz Zentrum Berlin für Materialien und 
Energie GmbH’ (HZB) is a member of the Helmholtz Association. The latter is made up of 
18 centres representing Germany's largest scientific research community with activities 
throughout Europe and worldwide. Each year, thousand scientists and researchers come to the 
Helmholtz Centres from all over the world to work on the large-scale scientific facilities and 
instrumentation that these centres provide. In some cases, this equipment is the only one of its 
kind in the world. Although legally independent, representatives from federal and Länder 
government participate in the external decision making body –the senate- coordinating inter 
alia in which areas public money should be allocated. One could reasonably expect that the 
largest German research association performing cutting-edge reseaech in a variety of areas 
takes precautions against export control risks. For that case study the spotlight is on HZB.  
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 Information from presentation” by Kevin Whattam, “Enhancing Export Control Awareness at 
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Italy.  
449
 Information retrieved from the website of Office of Science, DOE, available in: 
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450
 Information drawn from the official websites: https://www.helmholtz-
berlin.de/zentrum/index_en.html and, 
http://www.helmholtz.de/en/about_us/die_gemeinschaft/facts_and_figures/. 
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Table VIII: The Helmholtz Association at a glance 
The Helmholtz Association  
N
o
 of  research centres:  18 throughout Germany 
 
International offices:  Brussels, Moscow, Beijing 
 
Scope of research activities: 1. Energy, 2.Earth and Environment, 
3.Health, 4.Aeronautics, Space and 
Transport, 5.Key Technologies, 6. Structure 
of Matter 
N
o 
of employees: (2013 figures) 38,036 of which 14,734 are scientists 
N
o
 of foreign scientists: (2014 figures) 7,476 work at the Helmholtz Centres 
Budget:(2015 figures) €4.24 billion (2/3 from public sponsors) 
N
o
 of publications: (2014 figures) 13,549 in ISI or SCOPUS-indexed scientific 
journals 
N
o
 of patents:  An average of 400 patents each year 
Revenue from collaborations with industry: About 2,000 collaborative projects with 
industry with revenues of appr. €158 million 
Revenue from licensing agreements:  €14.2 million from about 1,400 licencing 
agreements 
 
The main areas of activity of HZB relate to the exploration and test of new materials and 
complex material systems that help to face challenges such as energy conversion and efficient 
use of energy and resources in information technology. To that effect, HZB operates two 
large-scale facilities for basic physics research on the structure and function of matter: the 
research reactor BER II for neutron experiments and the third generation synchrotron 
radiation source BESSY II including a number of state-of-the-art laboratories and user 
facilities. This research infrastructure is used by researchers from universities, foreign 
research institutions and industry. Indeed, the two HZB campuses -Wannsee and Adlershof- 
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welcome each year about 3,000 visiting scientists
451
. Although HZB work has exclusively a 
focus on peaceful applications, the dual-use nature of certain facilities and equipment used 
and the high number of collaborations and exchanges with foreign scientists and universities 
may pose some security risks including export related ones. HZB acknowledging this 
contingency implements a number of safety and security measures including export 
compliance procedures.   
Table IX: The identity of the Helmholtz Centre Berlin (HZB) 
The Helmholtz Zentrum Berlin (HZB) 
N
o 
of employees:  1,114 
Visiting scientists:(including trainees and 
PhD students) 
3,000 
Campuses: Berlin-Wannsee and Berlin-Adlershof 
Budget:  €146 million Euros (2015) 
Partners:  About 400 German and international 
universities, research institutes, and 
companies 
 
Export Compliance Organisation at HZB
452
: In HZB, export compliance is considered as a 
stand-alone function and it is coordinated by a legal advisor setting the main policies and 
procedures to be followed by all staff concerned and, supervising the work of the different 
employees in charge of export compliance. The legal advisor reports directly, at senior level, 
to the Administrative Director who bears the overall responsibility for export compliance.  
Nonetheless, the day-to-day execution of export related tasks is dealt with mainly by staff in 
the Purchasing and Materials Logistics department.  Indeed, the legal advisor and the 
responsible staff from the Purchasing and Materials Logistics –a total of three people- they 
are assigned as Export Control Officers (ECOs). As it is the case with other organisations, the 
ECOs are not solely concerned with export compliance and they collaborate with colleagues 
from other departments as appropriate. The Legal Office, the Personnel and Social Matters 
Department and the Compliance Management Office are the most common examples of other 
services contributing to export compliance objectives. In addition, the User Coordination 
Department takes into account export control requirements when implementing approval 
procedures with regards to the access and use of the HZB facilities by external researchers. 
                                                          
451
 For many research questions, it is a huge advantage to be able to study different material samples 
using both neutrons and synchrotron radiation: By combining these two complementary methods, a 
more complete picture of matter is obtained. 
452
 Information retrieved from interviews with Dr. Ulrike Behrns, assistant to the Administrative 
Director and legal advisor on export compliance at HZB.  
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Last but not least, the scientists themselves are called to provide their expertise and clarify 
possible implications of their research. 
How does the management of a research institution become aware of trade control 
requirements and perceive export control risks is always an interesting question to ask. Not 
surprisingly, at HZB the issue of trade controls came to the forefront after an audit conducted 
by the German customs back in 2007. Thence, a rudimentary compliance mechanism was 
introduced relying mainly on an electronic system for the monitoring and, approval where 
appropriate, of all transfers of materials and equipment outside Germany. At the time an e-
system for approving visits of foreigner scientists was also set in place. However, this 
preliminary effort was not backed up with formal export control policies setting main 
principles and procedures to be followed.  
Since 2013 a formal compliance system has been established at HZB and the task to enhance 
internal compliance controls is seen as an ongoing effort. For tangible transfers, the electronic 
system in place deals with requirements set in the different legal frameworks: transport and 
safety rules; import regulations and reporting obligations under the Additional Protocol to 
Safeguards agreements and naturally, export requirements for dual-use equipment and 
technology
453
. According to ECO, HZB conducts mainly fundamental research and the 
number of formal applications for exports to non-EU countries is limited. For 2014, a total of 
300 exports were reviewed at the HZB from which 60% concerned transfers within the EU 
and the rest exports to non-EU destinations. Most of the time, the activities of the HZB 
involve temporary exports (e.g. for repairs), transfers of samples and materials and only 
rarely transfers of listed dual-use equipment.  In fact, for 2014 there has been no license for 
dual exports whereas in 2015 there was just one authorisation. The risk identification and 
mitigation concerns in-house activities, activities undertaken abroad as well as screening of 
cooperation agreements with firms and other research institutions. For dubious cases formal 
inquiries may be submitted to the German licensing authority. In fact, four formal inquiries to 
BAFA have been recorded in 2014 and two in 2015.  
Concerning transfers of technology, HZB implements internal controls for visiting guests and 
official travels to non-EU countries. Export control risks are assessed mainly through existing 
procedures. For example, approval procedures for travels abroad have been established. In 
the near future, an information sheet regarding information sharing and export risks will be 
introduced in an electronic workflow required for getting approval for travels abroad. In 
relation to this, a handbook assisting HZB staff to assess potential risks relating to travels in 
non-EU countries will be introduced as well. As it is the case with many research 
establishments access of visiting scientists and employees to certain laboratories or buildings 
is subject to prior approval and access controls. The screening procedures may differ 
                                                          
453
 In practice, researchers are required first to read information about possible applicable export rules. 
A pop-up window appears in case of transfer to EU countries- and the applicant has to declare 
whether an export control issue relates to their transfer. The reason for this is Annex IV that concerns 
only a limited number of particularly sensitive items and for which a different procedure applies. If 
there is no such issue then they can proceed with the electronic workflow. Otherwise and in case of 
exports to non-EU countries, the application is subject to further review by the responsible ECO.  
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depending on the duration of the guests’ stay in the institution. Internal controls apply also for 
accessing data through the intranet. For example, visitors are able to access only the guest 
network while employees have normally full access to HZB intranet. As discussed above, 
HZB has in place a user system allowing external researchers to access its facilities. This is 
for instance the case for beam-time applications (time allocated to researchers for use of a 
beam of photons from BESSY II source)
454
. The evaluation of applications concerns as much 
scientific and technical aspects as security (e.g. trade control and sanction requirements) and 
safety issues (e.g. radiation protection rules).   
Maintaining high standards of compliance requires increasing the level of awareness and 
cultivating a culture of compliance. With a view to living up to this challenge, HZB relies on 
its intranet webpage, internal notes and training sessions for communicating export control 
objectives. The trainings are half-day seminars taking place once a year and their thematic 
extends to a broad range of matters such as anticorruption, regulations for publicly funded 
research and other compliance requirements. The implementation of the export compliance 
system is monitored and the results are reported once a year to the Administrative Director 
who evaluates the overall progress and decides for further improvements. Depending on the 
identified areas of concern ad hoc trainings conducted by the German licensing authority may 
be scheduled. This possibility is offered by BAFA to every research establishment requesting 
such training. The ECO singled out the need to ensure proper information sharing and raise 
awareness as a constant challenge given the dynamic context of the organisation (flows of 
PhD students, trainees and visiting researchers). Also, striking a balance between the freedom 
of research and export control regulations is a particularly challenging task given the lack of 
common criteria to interpret the basic research exemption. Integrating export control 
objectives to existing procedures and offering regular trainings seem to be a key to 
establishing a sound internal compliance system in a research setting.  
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 The evaluation of applications for beam-time is entrusted to the HZB Scientific Selection Panel 
and it involves the scientific and technical assessment of the submitted work as well as a risk 
assessment. Regular access at HZB is free of charge for national and international academic users.  
Private sector researchers can use the HZB facilities provided that the research is in collaboration with 
an academic partner from a university or research organization. However, industry users and any 
users who do not wish to publish their results of HZB experiments in the public domain they need to 
purchase beam-time. Information retrieved from: https://www.helmholtz-
berlin.de/user/beamtime/types-of-beamtime_en.html. 
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Part C: Implementing Compliance Measures in Practice 
8. Tailoring ICPs to the Needs of Research Organisations: the Case of the 
European Commission Joint Research Centre 
This chapter suggests how the risk identification process can take place in practice so as to 
design compliance measures tailored to research organisations. The intent is to use the Joint 
Research Centre as a test case for elaborating and completing a model risk assessment to be 
applied in the initial phase of development of an ICP. As section 6.3 suggests such a risk 
assessment can be considered as a necessary condition for implementing effective 
compliance mechanisms. The Joint Research Centre is a European Commission Directorate 
General (DG) having a distinct role compared to all others. Its primary objective is to conduct 
research with a view to backing the EU policy making. This way the JRC does not only 
provide independent scientific and technical input to the other DGs but also has an impact on 
innovative research carried out in a variety of fields from nuclear security to safety standards 
and from environmental research to cyber security. From its foundation under Article 8 of the 
EURATOM Treaty as the Joint Nuclear Research Centre in 1958 till today’s 
multidisciplinary research work, many things have changed except this: the JRC’s 
contribution to the nuclear safety and security in Europe and beyond
455
.  
As the Commission's in-house science service, the Joint Research Centre's mission is to 
provide EU policies with independent, evidence-based scientific and technical support 
throughout the whole policy cycle. Working in close cooperation with policy Directorates-
General, the JRC addresses key societal challenges while stimulating innovation through 
developing new methods, tools and standards, and sharing its know-how with the Member 
States, the scientific community and international partners. 
                                                                                                      JRC Mission Statement456 
Today, the organigram of the JRC comprises seven research Directorates, three Directorates 
coordinating the overall operation of the JRC plus the Board of Governors and the assistants 
to the Director General
457
. The three policy support Directorates are the following: A. Policy 
                                                          
455
 “After consulting the Scientific and Technical Committee, the Commission shall establish a Joint 
Nuclear Research Centre. This Centre shall ensure that the research programmes and other tasks 
assigned to it by the Commission are carried out. It shall also ensure that a uniform nuclear 
terminology and a standard system of measurements are established. It shall set up a central bureau 
for nuclear measurements”. See Article 8 §1 of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community (also known as EURATOM or EACC) as of March 2010, retrieved from: 
http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-
making/treaties/pdf/consolidated_version_of_the_treaty_establishing_the_european_atomic_energy_c
ommunity/consolidated_version_of_the_treaty_establishing_the_european_atomic_energy_communit
y_en.pdf. 
456
 ‘JRC in brief’ from the JRC’s Science Hub website, retrieved from: 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/about. 
457
 The JRC has recently undertaken (April 2016) a major reorganization with a view to streamlining 
and modernising its model of governance. For instance, all the nuclear related Units will come under 
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Support Coordination, B. Resources and C. Ispra Site Management. The seven research 
institutes are listed below (the numbering follows the organigram of the JRC):  
D. The Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) develops advanced 
measurement standards and provides state-of-the-art scientific advice concerning 
measurements and standards for EU policies. 
E. The Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) contributes to an effective safety and 
safeguards system for the nuclear fuel cycle. It also undertakes research associated with 
technological and medical applications of radionuclides/actinides.  
F. The Institute for Energy and Transport (IET) seeks to ensure sustainable, safe, secure 
and efficient energy production, distribution and use and, it fosters sustainable and efficient 
transport in Europe. 
G. The Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen (IPSC) contributes to a 
variety of EU policies ranging from global stability and crisis management to maritime 
security and fisheries management and from the protection of critical infrastructures to digital 
security. The IPSC performs also statistics and information analysis for the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of policies and to enhance financial stability. 
H. The Institute for Environment and Sustainability (IES) conducts research concerning 
the protection of the environment promoting thereby the efficient and sustainable 
management of natural resources at global and continental scale. 
I. The Institute for Health and Consumer Protection (IHCP) undertakes research in the 
areas of food, consumer products, chemicals and public health by contributing to the set and 
harmonisation of safety standards.  
J. The Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) provides science-based 
evidence concerning the socio-economic, scientific and technological impact of certain EU 
policies.  
The JRC employs over 3000 people coming from throughout the EU and bringing their skills 
and talents to work on scientific activities meant to underpin the EU policy-making process. 
About two thirds of the staff are scientists or work on scientific projects, 21% carry out 
administrative or support activities and 2% work in nuclear decommissioning and waste 
management.  
The JRC budget is made up by funds from the EU's framework programme for research and 
innovation, Horizon 2020, for its non-nuclear work and by the EURATOM Research and 
Training Programme for its nuclear work. Further income is generated by the JRC through 
additional work for Commission services, and contract work for third parties such as regional 
authorities and industry. In practical terms, one may distinguish between ‘institutional’ 
projects funded directly by the H2020 and the EURATOM budget and ‘competitive’ ones 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the roof of one Institute. Yet, the main areas of work and competence will remain as described in the 
doctoral study. 
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funded under contracts with other Commissions DGs, research organisations, governments 
and firms.  
Table X: The Joint Research Centre in a nutshell 
The Joint Research Centre in a nutshell 
 (2014 figures) 
N
o
 of  JRC sites  5 plus the Headquarters and Directorates in 
Brussels 
Scope of research activities and policy 
support: 
1. Economic and Monetary Policy 2. ICT 
and Cyber Security 3. Energy and Transport 
4. Environment and Climate, 5. Agriculture 
and Global Food Security 6. Disaster Risk 
Reduction 7. Health and Consumer 
Protection, 8. Nuclear Safety and Security 9. 
Nuclear Decommissioning 
N
o 
of employees:  3,055 of which 77% work on scientific 
projects  
Temporary staff (contractual agents, grant-
holders, SNEs, trainees)  
About 40% of the staff 
Budget: €374 million 
JRC revenue (indirect actions for 
Commission services and contracts with 
third parties): 
€72,8 million  
N
o
 of publications:  689 books and articles in peer reviewed 
periodicals 
 
N
o
 of patents granted:  21 
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8.1 The dual role of the JRC vis-à-vis export controls  
As F. Sevini has noted, the JRC has a special role to play in respect of trade controls, a role of 
‘dual nature’458. The organisation is a provider of expertise for the ‘dual-use’ policy making 
as well as a holder and potential exporter of controlled technology. The Strategic Export 
Control team was established in 2009 by the Nuclear Security Unit (NSU) and it is the most 
indicative example of the mutli-disciplinary support provided by the JRC in the area of trade 
controls. STREX competence concern four main areas: policy support; capacity building; 
research and, EU outreach.  
 
For instance, the STREX team provides ad-hoc technical and legal support to DG Trade with 
regards to the implementation of the dual-use regulation (e.g. draft of guidelines for 
harmonised implementation, technical studies). STREX activities include the organisation of 
scientific conferences (ESARDA Export Control Working Group) and trainings for licensing 
and customs officers coming from the EU and partner countries as well as the planning and 
evaluation of EU outreach activities promoting export control objectives in non-EU countries. 
Also, developing statistical methods and tools for estimating the impact of trade controls on 
economic activity as well as identifying and analysing licensing data and patterns of dual-use 
trade are further areas where the JRC contributes to through the project ‘Strategic Trade 
Analysis for Non-Proliferation’. 
Despite this multifaceted role of JRC support, the organisation could be more actively 
engaged in the policy formulation and technical back-up required in the export controls area.  
Trade controls have not only legal aspects to be clarified; they are also a highly technical area 
requiring expertise be it for understanding and drawing up the control lists or clarifying the 
export control implications of innovative technologies. Such expertise is widely available in 
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 Presentation by F. Sevini, C Charatsis, “Strategic Export Control Awareness and Compliance at the 
JRC,” 7th ESARDA Export Control Working Group, December 3-4, 2015, Ispra. 
200 
 
the different JRC Institutes and combined with the JRC’s experience in policy support could 
benefit the operation of the EU trade control system and the international non-proliferation 
system in general. Currently, apart from the regular support provided by the JRC during the 
deliberations of the DUCG and the DUWP, JRC scientists may participate and back the EU 
delegation in the meetings of international export control regimes and most notably at the 
NSG and the AG plenaries
459
. From a compliance point of view, the JRC is a research 
institution and thus, it should act in conformity with the trade control laws as any other 
research or exporting organisation. Indeed, as part of the European Commission, the JRC 
should ‘lead by example’ ensuring that research conducted in its premises meets strict safety 
and security standards including trade control requirements. On top of this, third-party due 
diligence should be shown with regards to tasks funded or carried out by the JRC in 
collaboration with other organisations.   
For this doctoral study, the focus is on the role of the JRC as a research organisation that 
should abide by the export controls law. What are the JRC’s particular characteristics having 
some relevance from an export compliance perspective? First of all, the identity of the JRC as 
an organisation conducting research in nuclear, biological and chemical fields may raise 
export control related questions. Dual-use trade controls concern a variety of technologies 
such as ICT equipment (from ultra-wideband equipment and frequency hopping radios to 
encryption software), electronic equipment (from neutron generators, frequency changers and 
mass spectrometers to optical sensors and inertial gyros), machine tools (from coating 
equipment and vacuum pumps to melting furnaces and isostatic presses) let alone hazardous 
materials such as natural and depleted uranium, pathogenic agents and chemical precursors. 
Many of these materials, related software and technologies are used or most rarely developed 
by the JRC’s institutes for research purposes. Therefore, one could ask whether such items 
are being exported to destinations abroad and also, who is able to access sensitive technical 
data and equipment used or developed during JRC research.  
Second, Article 8 of the EURATOM Treaty sets out that the activities of the Centre may, for 
geographical or functional reasons, be carried out in separate establishments. This is a long 
standing characteristic of the JRC. The bulk of its research activity takes place in Ispra (Italy) 
but research institutes have been established also in Belgium (Geel), Germany (Karlsruhe), 
Netherlands (Petten) and Spain (Seville). At the same time, the headquarters including also 
the central Policy Support Coordination and Resources Directorates are located in Brussels. 
This dispersion of research and supporting activities albeit limited to the EU territory may 
pose further challenges from an export control standpoint. Also, in executing its research 
programme, the JRC works with about 1000 partners worldwide. Even though the majority of 
its partners are EU based, the JRC maintains over 200 international cooperation agreements 
with partners in Africa, North and Latin America -including Caribbean- Asia and Eastern 
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 The EU is a founding member of the Australia Group; the Commission has the status of observer 
in the Nuclear Suppliers Group while there is no official role of the EU in the Wassenaar 
Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
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Europe
460
. Furthermore, the JRC welcomes a large number of visitors in its premises each 
year for conferences, collaboration activities and trainings.  
Third, contrary to much more developed institutional policies and procedures for safety and 
security implemented by the JRC, similar attention has not been fully drawn to export 
compliance. The JRC lacks of a formal comprehensive export compliance system. The main 
internal compliance practice followed is the conduct of awareness raising seminars in 
selected institutes. That said, in a period of two years three such seminars took place one in 
the Nuclear Decommissioning Unit (Ispra), one in ITU (Karlsruhe) and one in IHCP (Ispra) 
on the initiative of the Nuclear Security Unit and the STREX team. Basic export compliance 
rules and procedures exist mainly for those institutes undertaking nuclear related research and 
most notably the ITU. Actually, the ITU took some concrete steps for introducing export 
compliance procedures back in 2014, following communications from the German licensing 
authority on possible ITT issues and preventive measures. In any case, nuclear scientists are 
more accustomed and receptive to security controls compared to their colleagues in other 
fields where the relevance of dual-use trade controls is less evident. That said, as a result of 
awareness raising efforts, scientists also from other fields contact STREX for advice on 
export control issues pertaining potentially to their work. 
8.2 Applying the risk identification method in the JRC setting  
Developing an export compliance strategy requires taking those steps described in the first 
phase of the ‘Plan-Do-Check-Act’ cycle. The objective is to elaborate and test the basic 
method suggested in section 6.3 with the aim to identify export control risks in the context of 
a research organisation. In addition, further intrinsic characteristics impacting potentially the 
institutional identity and thus, the compliance strategy of the organisation should not be 
missed out. The perception of employees towards compliance in general, the commitment of 
the senior management to compliance in the running of the organisation as well as the level 
of awareness of export control issues are such supplementary factors to consider in the phase 
of the ‘inception’ of an export compliance system. The culture permeating the relations 
between the employees of an organisation is another aspect to consider albeit not easily 
quantifiable.  
To begin with, the ISO 19600 standard sets that “the organisation should identify compliance 
risks by relating its compliance obligations to its activities, products, services and relevant 
aspects of its operation”. Following this, compliance risks should be analysed “by 
considering causes and sources of non-compliance, the severity of their consequences, as well 
as the likelihood that non-compliance and associated consequences can occur”. This approach 
is in alignment with what chapter 6.3 suggests. Building on that suggestion, one could single 
out three main steps to be taken at the phase of inception and planning of an export 
compliance system: 
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 Information retrieved from JRC official webpage, “Working with us”, available in: 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/working-with-us. 
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I. explore the export control requirements that the organisation has to or voluntarily commits 
itself to comply with; 
II. identify potentially sensitive research activities undertaken by the organisation; 
III. assess the institutional policies and procedures of the organisation as well as any other 
specific aspects (e.g. culture)  having some bearing for export controls. 
Establishing a comprehensive compliance system from scratch is not an easy task. One 
should start by evaluating the risks stemming from the specific identity, activities and 
external environment of an organisation prior to designing a compliance strategy. The 
ultimate goal would be the establishment and implementation of an efficient and effective 
export compliance management system well-integrated in the structure of a given 
organisation. For this study, the main intent is to explore what is the initial process for 
identifying areas of risk and designing a compliance system fitted to the needs of a research 
organisation. This process could be considered of utmost importance since it allows the 
verification of possible risks and the implementation of mitigating measures. The JRC as a 
public cross-border organisation conducting research in a variety of disciplines constitutes a 
relevant case study for reasons explained above. In other words, this exercise can be seen as a 
feasibility study aimed at providing an insight into possible challenges and options for 
designing an internal control system tailored to the risk profile and the needs of the JRC. 
8.2.1 Introductory remarks 
I. The Regulatory framework: As a research establishment, the JRC is subject to the specific 
rules applying in the respective national jurisdictions where its different institutes operate. 
This is valid for export control and other safety and security obligations. The EU regulatory 
landscape on export controls was presented in chapter 4. Although the dual-regulation sets 
the foundations and the main principles of a common trade control system, the 
implementation and actual enforcement of trade control provisions is conferred to national 
authorities that have also the discretion to take additional national measures and laws. To 
complicate the situation further, the applicability of extraterritorial provisions of legislation 
adopted by other countries may be another issue to consider. As discussed earlier, complexity 
increases in a research setting and thus, clear guidance can be of great help to researchers 
striving to fulfil different compliance requirements. 
 
II. The sensitivity of research: Evaluating the sensitivity of the research undertaken by a 
research organisation requires taking into account first, whether controlled materials, 
equipment, technologies and software are being used or developed in a laboratory and 
second, if such goods are shared with non-EU nationals or transferred abroad. This way one 
could correlate the sensitivity of research per se with the amount of foreign involvement so as 
to identify an export control risk. An unpredictable outcome of a research activity may also 
pose a risk to the extent that it relates to a controlled item or has high potential to be misused 
due to ethical or other concerns. Evaluating each and every project of the JRC can be too 
cumbersome and besides this, the results of research can be frequently unpredictable.  This is 
also why certain measures such as awareness raising seminars and trainings aimed at creating 
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a culture of responsibility are necessary steps to consider in the framework of a compliance 
system. It follows that identifying potentially sensitive projects in the work programme of the 
JRC and, asking from the responsible scientific staff to clarify both the technical parameters 
and the amount of international participation involved is a plausible way to proceed.  
III. The export related processes: Generally speaking, the organisational structure and the 
values shaping the culture of an organisation are unique elements determining the identity of 
an organisation. Figuring out how an organisation is structured as well as identifying 
processes relating to export controls is an important parameter to consider prior to 
implementing an ICP. For instance, a good question to ask is whether the JRC implements a 
centralised model of governance or not. Despite the allocation of the research portfolio to 
different institutes and locations, central coordination is exercised by the policy support 
Directorates and the Director General according to the main policies and rules set by the 
competent EC DGs and services. Most importantly, the way that certain policies and 
procedures function may pose a risk and therefore, assessing such procedures against export 
control objectives is a necessary action to take. Proposals for tackling risks and integrating 
export control objectives to existing processes could be the outcome of such assessment. 
Studying the practices followed by the JRC and interviewing the staff involved in the 
operation of export related processed is the way to proceed for accomplishing this step.   
Following the method suggested above, sections 8.2.2 to 8.2.4 intend to show how risk 
identification can take place in practice by applying the main steps in the JRC context. The 
Nuclear Security and the Chemical Assessment and Testing Units were chosen for testing the 
method described above. Each unit represents distinct areas of research namely nuclear and 
chemical and both Units have been exposed -although with varying success- to export control 
objectives thanks to awareness raising initiatives undertaken during the past years by 
STREX. Also, both Units were quite accommodating in furthering the purposes of this study. 
The first step is to assess the sensitivity of research -determined by both the nature and the 
scope of such activities- bearing always in mind the legal requirements set in the trade control 
law. The second step is to explore what institutional processes are already in place for dealing 
with ‘export’ related issues. Whereas the sensitivity of research may differ for each Unit, the 
institutional procedures being applied must be largely common for both. Presumably at the 
end of the process, one would be able to answer what sort of risk mitigation measures need to 
be established and through what institutional processes and mechanisms.  
8.2.2 Determining the sensitivity of research  
With a view to identifying sensitive research activities, the author relied on the JRC web-
based ‘project browser’ listing the active work packages including their defining 
parameters
461
. For a targeted search, the project browser provides the option to filter by Unit, 
responsible officer, main DG concerned, source of funding involved and period of activity. 
This tool is accessible only to JRC staff and it provides inter alia information concerning the 
following aspects of every JRC work package: 
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 In the JRC jargon, the term ‘project’ is used to describe work packages including both institutional 
direct actions and competitive activities.  
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 the general description  
 the key orientation and main policy area to which a work package relates 
 main funding DG and types of collaboration involved (e.g. competitive or 
institutional) 
 the stakeholders involved (European Commission DGs plus external beneficiaries)  
 the type of activities involved (e.g. instrumentation and hardware, monitoring, 
verification and surveillance, methods and testing, education and training)  
 the main deliverables (including published reports and articles)  
It comes out that the project browser provides a good source of information for evaluating the 
sensitivity of the research portfolio. Such a task demands to draw on expertise of the 
responsible researchers and officers in order to understand in the first place what technology, 
equipment and materials a given project entails and contend whether an export risk is 
relevant. Nonetheless, the project browser does not provide all the details that could be useful 
for performing a complete risk assessment. For instance, information concerning procurement 
or exporting activities and other third parties involved in the execution of a research project is 
not mentioned.  
A. The Nuclear Security Unit (NSU) 
The NSU undertakes research in areas such as non-destructive analysis of nuclear materials, 
development of technologies for monitoring, containment and surveillance of nuclear 
activities, verification and detection technologies, analysis of open-source information and 
satellite imagery in support of the implementation of non-proliferation treaties and safeguards 
agreements and of course, research on trade control issues. Such activities include the 
provision of technology, instruments, technical services and training to inspection agencies, 
States and operators. In addition, the Unit operates the European environmental radioactivity 
emergency notification and information exchange systems
462
. In practice, the research 
portfolio of the NSU could be divided into four thematic areas -closely intertwined each 
other- plus limited activities in nuclear waste management and decommissioning: 
1. Detection for nuclear security  
2. Implementation of safeguards agreements 
3. Other actions supporting non-proliferation objectives 
4. Environmental monitoring and emergency preparedness 
 
For this case study, Dr. Paolo Peerani, a former NSU scientist and presently Head of Unit 
(HoU) in the Nuclear Decommissioning Unit was asked to make a first classification of 
potentially sensitive projects taking into account both factors the nature of research per se and 
the international exchanges involved. The outcome was a compilation of activities presenting 
some interest from an export control perspective and originating from all four areas. Then, 
                                                          
462
 See also information provided in the NSU and JRC public websites, available in: 
http://npns.jrc.ec.europa.eu/structure/01-structure.htm; 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/about/institutes-and-directorates/jrc-itu/organisation. 
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the responsible scientists, the so-called ‘project leaders’ were asked to provide their 
perception and clarify the potential export control risks relating to their work. It turns out that 
projects flagged as sensitive under the first evaluation do not necessarily involve transfers of 
controlled items and technologies subject to an export authorisation. The detailed analysis has 
been made available to the management of the JRC. 
B. The Chemical Assessment and Testing Unit (CAT) 
The work of CAT focuses on human exposure to chemicals by providing databases, detection 
methods and risk analytical tools for a number of areas including consumer products, medical 
devices and food contact materials. Indeed, the Institute hosts the EU Reference Laboratory 
for Food Contact Materials. In practical terms, the laboratory seeks to offer harmonised 
testing methods for food packaging materials and kitchen utensils, cosmetics, and textiles. 
The Deputy HoU, Dr. Diana Rembges provided her insight in identifying most sensitive 
work-packages that could have some dual-use interest. The nature of research including 
equipment, material and processes used or developed in Unit’s laboratories was the main 
criterion used for the selection. Then, the responsible ‘project leaders’ were interviewed with 
a view to clarifying potential risks and perceptions vis-à-vis export controls. From the 
preamble, it became clear that exporting items, travelling with equipment or providing 
trainings abroad do not represent currently a major part of the Unit’s activities. In the past, 
transfers of controlled materials –mostly temporary exports of chemicals- were a quite 
common activity of the Unit. The detailed analysis has been made available to the 
management of the JRC. 
8.2.3 Institutional processes relating to export risks 
The risk identification process requires correlating the applicable legislation, the sensitivity of 
research -including both particularly sensitive areas of research and activities involved- and 
the institutional processes relating to the conduct of such research. Taking into account the 
different activities covered under the trade control law –tangible and intangible exports of 
items and technologies- as well as the possible export scenarios described in chapter 4.3, one 
could draw up a list with all types of activities encountered in a research setting and having 
some relevance to export control requirements: 
 Exporting  
 Contracting with international partners 
 Patenting 
 Publishing 
 Electronic exchanges 
 Hiring staff and receiving visitors 
 Traveling abroad 
 
Naturally, different types of activity are not disjointed from each other. For example, 
contracting with non-EU partners may involve travelling, sharing data through electronic 
means and even patenting innovative outcomes of research. Quite interestingly, for almost 
every type of activity, the JRC has in place institutional processes and specific tools that 
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could be adapted for accommodating and promoting export control objectives. The table 
below summarises the main activities potentially posing an export control risk, the 
institutional processes and tools relating to such activities as well as the Directorates that 
coordinate or set the main policies to be followed for each activity.  
Table XI: Potentially controlled activities versus institutional processes  
 
  
Types of activities JRC Institutional processes  Main Units concerned 
I. Exporting and importing:  - Procedures for 
exports/imports, dangerous 
goods/ donations/ withdraws 
etc. 
- Procedures for fissile and 
radioactive material/ 
equipment 
C.3 Assets and Logistics 
 
A.4 Nuclear Safety and 
Security 
‘Comitato Materiali Fissili e 
Radioattivi’ 
 
II. Contracting: 
- Collaborating with/ 
outsourcing  to international 
partners  
 
 
 
- Procurement 
 
 
 
- Staff employment contracts 
 
 
- Approval  procedures and 
risk assessment of projects, 
and  legal support 
 
 
 
 
- Screening (early warning 
system), approval 
-  Background checks and 
other security processes 
A.5 International, 
Interinstitutional and 
Stakeholder Relations/ B.6 
Legal Advice/  B.4 Budget, 
Accounting and Competitive 
Activities 
B.5 Finance and Procurement 
C.2 Safety and Security/  
B.2 Human Resources 
 
III. Patenting: Approval procedures and 
advice 
Unit for Intellectual Property 
and Technology Transfer 
under deputy DG  
 
IV. Publishing: PUBSY publication system A.2 Planning, Evaluation and 
Knowledge Management  
 
V. Electronic exchanges: ICT security procedures C.2 Safety and Security 
B.7  Information and 
Communication Technologies 
 
VI. Foreign visits: Security procedures for EU 
and non-EU visitors, 
employees etc. 
C.2 Safety and Security 
VII. Travels abroad: Mission approval scheme 
(MIPS) 
B.7  Information and 
Communication Technologies 
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In the JRC context, certain aspects are dealt with at central level by the policy support 
Directorates and the competent EC DGs and therefore, main policies and rules to be followed 
are common for every Institute. That said, the different Institutes and their Units have some 
leeway to implement or introduce certain procedures for meeting a given objective taking 
into account their needs and the specific legal requirements stemming from the national 
jurisdiction to which they belong. The focus for this case study is on Ispra site and more 
specifically on the selected Units and their respective Institutes, the Institute for 
Transuranium Elements (ITU) and the Institute for Health and Consumer Protection (IHCP). 
However, it should be noted that the ITU with all its Units except the NSU is based in 
Karlsruhe and hence, practices followed by the NSU in Ispra might not be indicative of the 
situation in Karlsruhe. The results of this exercise might point to one of the following 
possibilities for the state of play concerning export compliance in the JRC:  
 
a. unaware (no export risk is perceived as credible)  
b. reactive (export risks generally known and addressed when a case arises) 
c. proactive (export risks incorporated in institutional processes and dealt with from an 
early stage)  
 
Exporting and Importing: The risk identification could concern both exporting and 
importing aspects for two reasons: first, import procedures are handled by the same staff and 
departments in an organisation and second, import requirements may indirectly imply a 
potential risk in the case of a future export. Therefore, an internal compliance process should 
address both aspects. The JRC as part of the European institutions enjoys a special status 
including certain privileges and immunities
463
. For the Ispra site, the Italian government has 
promulgated a law setting the main principles governing its relations with the JRC
464
. This 
law incorporates and clarifies the rights and the duties of the JRC as set in the EURATOM 
Treaty and more specifically, the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities (PPI). According 
to PPI, “the Union shall be exempt from all customs duties, prohibitions and restrictions on 
imports and exports in respect of articles intended for its official use”465. For instance, in 
terms of customs duties, the JRC is excluded from paying the Value Added Tax. The same 
applies for imports and exports restrictions in respect of the Union’s publications. Article 4 of 
the PII clarifies also that goods imported under this status cannot be afterwards released, 
whether or not in return of payment, in the territory of the importing country except under 
conditions set by the government of that country.  
 
                                                          
463
 Pursuant to Article 343 of the TFEU and Article 191 of the ‘Euratom’ Treaty, the European Union 
and the EURATOM shall enjoy in the territories of the Member States such privileges and immunities 
as are necessary for the performance of their tasks.  
464
 Law No 906, Official Journal of the Italian Government 212, 1960, available in: 
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/1960/08/31/060U0906/sg;jsessionid=FLh6GOPvPXcqDYoECS9
MJw__.ntc-as1-guri2a 
465
 Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union, Treaty Establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM or EACC)  as of March, 2012, 100.  
208 
 
The Community shall enjoy in the territories of the Member States such privileges and 
immunities as are necessary for the performance of its tasks, under the conditions laid down 
in the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union. 
 
                            Article 191 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy (EURATOM) 
It is probably due to this ‘extraterritorial’ status of the JRC that certain procedures have been 
established. The JRC operates its own customs affairs office that is part of the Assets and 
Logistics Unit (C.3). In fact, the work of this internal service is supported by a local Italian 
Customs Office established in the JRC site
466
. An Italian customs officer is employed 
permanently and he is the one who controls whether the documentation accompanying the 
transport of goods is correct for either domestic or international transfers. If necessary, the 
customs officers may proceed to physical checks and controls before the goods leave the 
‘JRC territory’.  
 
The Assets and Logistics Unit handles various logistics procedures including customs 
documentation essential for import and export of goods and takes care of VAT exemption 
aspects. Simply put, every item -above a certain value- entering or leaving the JRC must be 
inventoried and accompanied with the required customs documentation, ‘documento di 
transito’, clarifying the nature and the quantity of goods467. The JRC customs office operates 
as the link between the JRC staff requiring a given transfer, the external companies taking 
care of the transport outside the JRC and the Italian customs controlling the lawfulness of 
every transaction.  In practical terms, for every transfer a request has to be submitted via an 
online tool, the ‘JRC Assets’. Indeed, each Institute has appointed a technical responsible 
who manages the requests for the transfer of inventoried items according to the Institute’s 
procedures. This is the case for both the ITU and the IHCP. The applicant has to submit the 
inventory code and the description of the item to be transferred, the destination as well as the 
purpose of the transfer
468
. The applicant has to select from a long list of purposes such as 
calibration of an instrument, repair and performance of experiments. The application form 
contains also a specific entry with the heading ‘other risks’ where the exporter has to declare 
whether the requested transfer concerns dangerous goods requiring certain safety assurances 
(ADR procedure applies). Most of the time, requested transfers concern temporary exports 
and, therefore, the applicable customs procedures are followed for either domestic 
(MEMORANDUM) or international shipments (CARNET ATA). Also, as the interviews 
with project leaders showed, in certain occasions, a temporary export may end up with the 
sale of equipment or sample to the recipient university or organisation. All these internal 
procedures do not include a specific review process for exports requiring potentially an 
                                                          
466
 Both the JRC and the Italian customs officers were interviewed on their tasks and responsibilities. 
467
 For transfers within the EU the T2 is the necessary transport document that must be issued by the 
customs whereas for exports outside the Union the T1 is issued by the central customs office.   
468
 All JRC assets exceeding a certain value (>420 Euros), from office furniture and ICT stuff to 
laboratory equipment is inventoried under a certain code. In that regard, the procurement and logistics 
procedure could potentially play a role in identifying and tracking particularly sensitive goods such as 
dual-use equipment from the very beginning.  
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authorisation. In the case of a dual-use export to a non-EU destination, the responsible 
scientist has first to submit an application to the Ministry of Economic Development and 
furnish the subsequent authorisation along with any other necessary documents to the internal 
customs office.  
 
For transfers of nuclear material (e.g. nuclear waste) and radioactive sources (e.g. X-ray 
devices) a different process applies. A request is submitted to a special committee the 
‘Comitato Materiali Fissili e Radioattivi’ (CMFR) ensuring compliance with the national and 
international rules in force (e.g. transport notification to the Italian Nuclear Regulatory 
Authority, ISPRA). To that effect, the CMFR operates special registers of nuclear material, 
radioactive sources and X-ray machines and deals with all notification and accountancy 
obligations set in the national legislation and IAEA safeguard agreements. Whereas the 
CMFR is in charge of authorising the acquisition, disposal, transport and handling of such 
equipment as well as of verifying compliance with the applicable legislation (including 
record keeping and trainings for holders of radioactive sources), dual-use authorisations are 
not included in the mandate of the Committee. During the interviews with the project leaders 
it came out that dismantling of laboratories and donations of equipment is a plausible issue 
for both the NSU and the CAT Units. Old equipment may be sold, end to a scrap yard, 
exchanged with new one (a discount will apply for the purchase of new equipment) or 
donated to a partner organisation. Again, there are certain procedures (prodecura di riforma) 
requiring approval by a special committee after a request signed by the technical responsible, 
the HoU and when necessary by the Director.  
 
Contracting with international partners: As explained in the introductory section of 
chapter 8, JRC activities are categorised into direct actions funded under its institutional 
budget and competitive activities funded by other Commission DGs and external 
stakeholders, plus till recently indirect actions funded by the H2020. This means that, in 
certain cases, the JRC signs collaboration agreements with a variety of partners such as public 
organisations and governments, international organisations, universities and firms. The 
execution of such agreements may include shipment of equipment as well as provision of 
technical assistance, software and data to the requesting parties. From an export control 
perspective, a risk could be addressed during both the initial decision-making phase and all 
along the execution process of a given project.  
 
Concerning the decision-making, institutional and competitive activities are proposed at Unit 
level and require the approval of the Institute’s Director. In that regard, it is interesting that 
for competitive activities a risk assessment process takes place. The purpose of such risk 
assessment is to inform the decision-making process of any possible risks and anticipate the 
impacts of such risks. In practical terms, the responsible project leader has to fill in a 
document in which he or she identifies possible risks, related causes and controls in place. He 
has also to assess the likelihood that such risks will be materialised and their potential impact. 
The Annex to the risks assessment document provides examples of risks, impacts and 
mitigating/ aversion measures. The risks suggested relate inter alia to the JRC’s independent 
status, public safety, third party liability, confidentiality of results and data protection and, 
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external license requirements such as for building a facility. Export issues are not referred to 
explicitly among the possible risks. The potential impacts of such risks include negative 
publicity, loss of trust by the JRC customers and reputational damage. The remedy measures 
include early reporting at the planning phase, introduction of quality/approval system and 
final approvals by the Director. For institutional projects, a similar risk assessment is not 
presently in place.  
 
The execution of an institutional or competitive activity may involve tangible and intangible 
transfers of materials and technologies under subcontracting with third parties. As far as it 
concerns procurement, purchases of low value (>15.000 Euros) are dealt with at Unit level. 
For purchases above a certain threshold, the applicable procedure entails prior planning, 
approval at Unit level and an internal request to Unit B.5 dealing with the finance and 
procurement needs of the JRC. The JRC, as part of the European Commission, has to follow 
certain internal regulations ensuring transparency, financial accountability and certain quality 
management procedures.  
 
Despite the lack of an internal compliance programme, the JRC applies approval procedures 
for different types of agreements concluded pursuant to its working programme. For instance, 
for non-monetary agreements with external organisations the workflow requires pre-approval 
by the Institute’s Director as well as approval at central level by the International, 
Interinstitutional and Stakeholder Relations Unit (A. 5). Also, the Unit B.6 provides legal 
advice with regards to a variety of aspects that may relate to export control requirements: 
 site agreements and the application of privilege and immunities;  
 international collaboration and agreements with third parties in nuclear research;  
 contracting and subcontracting for competitive activities and,  
 procurement and contractual issues such as disclosure of information.  
The Commission operates also an Early Warning System for activating a red flag about third 
parties that are likely to pose a threat to the financial interests of the Commission. Till today 
the role of B.6 has been mainly reactive to the very few export related issues that have been 
raised. For nuclear matters, also Unit A.4 on Nuclear Safety and Security provides 
coordination for nuclear related projects. As suggested in chapter 7, the extent to which 
different departments are aware of export control issues is a re-enforcing factor for export 
compliance. Should the competent staff become aware or follow training on export controls, 
possible issues can be identified and filtered already in the phase of planning by the policy 
support and scientific Directorates.  
 
Patenting and Technology Transfers: The JRC has the right to protect and disseminate the 
results produced during its research activities in a fair and equitable treatment for both the 
Union and other parties involved. For JRC direct actions funded under the specific 
Framework Programme implementing the H2020, the rules described in section 4.1 for the 
dissemination and confidentiality of H2020 research results still apply. 
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The JRC should continue to generate additional resources through competitive activities, 
including participation in the indirect actions of Horizon 2020, third party work and, to a 
lesser extent, the exploitation of intellectual property
469
.  
 
                                                                                        Council Decision 2013/743/EU, 967 
 
In addition to this, for nuclear activities funded under the Research and Training Programme 
of EURATOM, Article 12 of the EURATOM provides that
470
: 
 
“Member States, persons or undertakings shall have the right, on application to the 
Commission, to obtain non-exclusive licences under patents, provisionally protected patent 
rights, utility models or patent applications owned by the Community, where they are able to 
make effective use of the inventions covered thereby.” In relation to this, Article 24 of the 
EURATOM stipulates that:  
 
“Information which the Community acquires as a result of carrying out its research 
programme, and the disclosure of which is liable to harm the defence interests of one or more 
Member States, shall be subject to a security grading system to be enacted with the adoption 
of a security regulation by the Council.” 
 
On the basis of these Articles and, given that Article 26 of the dual-use regulation states that 
the Regulation does not affect the application of the EURATOM, there is a debate over the 
applicability or not of export licence requirements on information owned and  developed by 
the Commission in the execution of its EURATOM research programme. The author’s 
interpretation is that it is indisputable that the Commission and the JRC in particular has the 
right to protect and make available the results of its EURATOM related research under 
license agreements. This is in alignment with the letter of the law and the spirit of the Treaty 
for furthering nuclear research in the Union.  Indeed, the Commission has implemented 
Article 24 of the EURATOM with the adoption of regulation No 3 determining the security 
grading (e.g. top secret, secret, confidential, restricted) and the security measures that shall 
apply for EURATOM Classified Information (ECI)
471
. However, it is not absolutely clear 
whether security considerations dealt with in the framework of the dual-use regulation can be 
addressed through such a security grading system seeking to protect ‘the defence interests of 
the Member States’. In any case, the JRC would be expected to comply even voluntary with a 
                                                          
469
 Council Decision, Establishing the Specific Programme Implementing Horizon 2020 - The 
Framework Programme for Research and Innovation and Repealing Decisions 2006/971/EC, 
2006/972/EC, 2006/973/EC, 2006/974/EC and 2006/975/EC, Official Journal of the EU (L 347),  
2013, 967. 
470
 Article 12 clarifies also that: “The Commission shall grant such licences or sublicenses on terms to 
be agreed with the licensees and shall furnish all the information required for their use. These terms 
shall relate in particular to suitable remuneration and, where appropriate, to the right of the licensee to 
grant sublicenses to third parties and to the obligation to treat the information as a trade secret.” 
471
 Council Regulation No 3 Implementing Article 24 of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community, Official Journal of the EU 017, 1958, 0406 – 0416. 
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regulation intending to ensure that the transfer of export controlled technology is duly 
monitored.  
 
Regardless of the applicability of the dual-use regulation and ensuing national legislation to 
EURATOM activities, for non-nuclear related activities an export control clearance would be 
still relevant. In that regard, the JRC Intellectual Property and Technology Transfer Office 
with the assistance of the Legal Advice Unit (B.6) could play an important role in applying 
systematic export control checks before entering into a license agreement. The JRC creates 
most of the IP rights of the Commission and thus, it has developed expertise in the 
identification, protection, and management of IP assets. Indeed, the JRC IP and Technology 
Transfer Office has the role of the Central Intellectual Property Service of the Commission
472
. 
 
Publishing (approval procedure under PUBSY)
473
: JRC publications be it power point 
presentations, technical and policy related reports or, articles contributions, monographies, 
articles in peer-reviewed journals, literally everything has to pass through an electronic work-
flow, the so-called PUBSY authorisation process
474
. The PUBSY management system allows 
the screening and registration of all publications with JRC authorship. This way, the system 
facilitates the archive of JRC publications as well as the monitoring, evaluation and reporting 
of all JRC outputs.  
 
Under the authorisation process, JRC employees have to apply through the PUBSY online 
tool in order to take prior approval and register any scientific work drafted during their 
service in the JRC
475
. In fact, JRC staff has to make a draft registration request prior to 
                                                          
472
 The European Commission creates, procures, acquires, and disseminates intangible assets on a 
regular basis, in particular copyright works such as text, sounds, videos, images, software and data. 
More information on the role of the JRC Intellectual Property & Technology Transfer Office can be 
found on the JRC public website in the following link: 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research/crosscutting-activities/intellectual-property. 
473
 Information dawn mainly from the PUBSY Guidelines (version February, 2016), available in 
Connected, the EC intranet. 
474
 There categories of publications are based on the categorisation of the JRC work programme 
deliverables as follows: 
 Scientific reports for policy-making (scientific reports feeding a policy-making process) 
 Scientific outputs (e.g. books and monographs, article contributions, peer-reviewed articles in 
indexed and non-indexed Journals, PhD theses) 
 Technical outputs (technical reports on:  technical systems and prototypes engineered or 
patented by the JRC; validated methods; reference materials, databases/software and datasets) 
 Material for training and JRC conferences (e.g. oral and poster presentations and proceedings) 
 Public information documents (brochures and leaflets, newspaper articles etc.) 
 External study reports (outputs of contracts produced by JRC and external entities) 
 JRC working document s (e.g. assessment and management documents, operational review) 
475
 The PUBSY management process is composed of seven main steps supported by the workflow 
application as below: 
1. Submission by the Applicant of a request for authorisation to release an output. The request can be 
submitted by any JRC staff member. 
2. Approval by the Applicant's Head of Unit (HoU) to release the output. 
3. Validation for authorisation by the Applicant's Institute Publications Officer (IPO). 
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releasing any JRC output such as presentation, talk, or scientific poster in a non-EC 
conference. The authorisation process requires the approval of the HoU and of the Institute’s 
Director. The Institute’s Programme Officer (IPO) assists the Director with the evaluation of 
the applications taking also care of issues from such as applicable templates, metadata 
resources and registration details. The final registration is handled by the PUBSY team. 
 
With a view to safeguarding sensitive or confidential information on the basis of Commission 
Decision 2001/844/EC, scientists are called to declare whether a given document should be 
marked as ‘limited distribution’ or classified as ‘EU restricted’ or otherwise, made accessible 
to everybody. JRC staff is advised not to use excessively the limited distribution marking 
allowing access only to the authors and those involved in the approval process for a certain 
period of time.  Requests to access such documents are reviewed by the PUBSY team on the 
basis of the ‘need to know principle’. In any case, documents marked as ‘EU restricted’ 
cannot be even attached to the PUBSY request
476
. The Open Access Policy (OAP), namely 
the free of charge online access to scientific information for any user is being currently 
applied by the JRC as provided also in the framework of H2020. The OAP applies from the 
moment that a JRC scientist decides to make available for publication the results of his or her 
research and therefore, it should not be seen as contradictory to EU’s classification policy. 
The details for the dissemination and exploitation of research results are arranged normally in 
the contract or the grant of the given research.  
 
Most importantly, certain outputs may be marked as ‘sensitive’ already at the planning phase. 
The ultimate responsibility for assessing the sensitivity of an output to be published lies with 
the Institute’s Director. It is in this phase where security and export control concerns may be 
taken into account. In the NSU for example, such an assessment against export control 
implications has taken place before. Presently, in the PUBSY workflow, there is no 
communication to the applicants of possible export control issues relating to their work. In 
that regard, the Head of the Planning, Evaluation and Knowledge Management Unit (A.2) has 
been informed by the STREX on the possible need to address export control issues in the 
PUBSY workflow. 
 
Electronic Exchanges and IT security: ICT Security in the JRC Ispra site is dealt with by 
Unit on Safety and Security (C.2). The Unit B.7 Information and Communication 
Technologies along with DG Informatics (DIGIT) set the main rules and provide the overall 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4. Authorisation by the Applicant's Director to release the output. 
5. Flagging the request as ready for registration by the Applicant (the request must be flagged as ready 
for registration when the output has been released). 
6. Validation for registration by the Applicant's IPO. 
7. Registration of the output by the PUBSY Team. 
The first four steps must be completed before the output can be released to a publisher or to a 
customer. 
The last three steps must be completed as soon as the output has been published in its final version in 
any format and after the output has been delivered. 
476
 Documents with higher level of classification (EU Confidential, EU Secret and EU Top Secret) 
cannot be registered to PUBSY and require certain handling under other security systems. 
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coordination of the local security offices in each JRC site. In this regard, the experience of 
ICT experts could be utilised for setting clear guidance on sharing information online that 
could require an export authorisation. Although the JRC as part of the EC implements 
enhanced security measures (e.g. secured e-mails and secured transferred protocols for 
particularly sensitive information), technical issues such as the identity of cloud providers 
and the locations of servers utilised may need to be re-examined in view also of export 
control requirements.  The Ispra Local Information Security Officer has become aware of the 
export control problem thanks to the efforts of the STREX team. Besides, in the past he was 
asked to provide his insight into technical issues relating to the provision of cloud services 
and having some importance from an export control angle.  
 
Security System for Visitors and Employees: The DG Human Resources and Security 
(HR) sets the main policies and internal procedures for the safety and security of the 
Commission’s infrastructures and the staff using and operating such facilities and premises. 
In Ispra site, the Unit on Safety and Security (C.2) implements a comprehensive net of 
measures taking into account as much international rules as national legislation. For instance, 
the JRC applies access controls relying on about 200 badge readers and a zoning policy 
ranging from least sensitive premises (white) to most sensitive (red). In fact, the local security 
office is in charge of all different aspects of security from the handling of confidential 
information to cyber security and from the transport of hazardous material within the JRC site 
to security clearances for JRC employees. According to the JRC intranet, the main tasks of 
the JRC Security Office are as follows:  
 physical protection of sites 
 physical protection of nuclear installations 
 stand-by-duty service at the JRC sites (24 hours/7 days) 
 provision of a security clearance service 
 management and storage of EU Classified Information 
 briefing staff before going on mission to dangerous countries 
 provision of a VIP protection service 
 training of JRC staff on the applicable security provisions 
From an export control perspective, the most important issue is who has access to what 
premises, IT systems and information. In that regard, the Security Office implements its own 
‘technology control plan’ for employed staff and visitors through an online tool, the 
SECPAC. A different degree of scrutiny applies on the basis of nationality, the duration of 
stay in the JRC and types of access required. For instance, for Third Country Nationals 
(TCN) -term used in the EC jargon- the host Unit is required to ask the security office 
opinion. The process may involve a minimum documentation, the CV of the individual as 
well as his or her criminal record
477
. The outcome of the risk assessment may have an impact 
on the access rights granted to an employee including default IT accounts, access to 
internet/intranet and use of PCs. For longer stays of TCN, the Unit for Security Intelligence 
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 For data privacy reasons, all information required is exchanged through secure electronic mails.   
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& External Liaison in Brussels may need to be consulted as well.  In practice, the opinion of 
the security office is required for every visitor, group of visitors or new employee. The whole 
process is facilitated by local supporting officers being in charge of compliance with security 
and safety rules applying in JRC different facilities.  
 
Approval Scheme for Travels: JRC staff travelling anywhere in the EU or beyond with the 
aim of performing trainings, lectures, presentations etc. has to submit a request in a workflow 
known as the ‘Mission Processing Scheme’ (MIPS). Any professional travel or, ‘mission’ as 
named in the European Commission jargon, should be screened by the Paymaster Office 
according to procedural and financial rules and approved by the HoU and the Institute’s 
Director. The MIPS workflow does not include specific approval procedures or guidance 
with regards to export controlled information possibly released during such travels.  
 
Other Related Policies: In the JRC context, there is a variety of policies and established 
procedures that could benefit the functioning of an export compliance system. It has been 
made already reference to policies for the confidentiality and dissemination of the JRC 
research results. JRC polices for quality management as well as ethics and integrity standards 
are further examples of reinforcing policies. The JRC as integral part of the European 
Commission is bound to meet the Internal Commission Standards and follow the rules 
applying for the EU officials. To that effect, the Organisational Development Unit (B.1) has 
put in place an Integrated Management System (IMS) for consolidating all management 
systems in the JRC into one coherent framework. Risk management tools, internal and 
external audits, ISO certified procedures are measures implemented by the different JRC 
Directorates  in accordance with Commission’s prerequisites for enhancing the effectiveness, 
accountability and transparency of the organisation.  
Furthermore, all JRC staff shall abide by the staff regulations including commitments on 
ethics and integrity
478
. Each EC DG has an ‘ethical correspondent’ to whom possible 
complaints or incidents of noncompliance can be reported. Available guidance includes rules 
and procedures on whistleblowing, a JRC code of conduct and other documents on scientific 
integrity for research fellows and grant-holders.  Respecting existing policies on security and 
conducting research responsibly is a constant refrain in all these documents. Presumably, 
referring to the role of export controls in such documents and introducing an export 
compliance system underpinned by further management processes could be a useful initiative 
to take on in the future.  
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 See in particular Title II, Articles 11-26a of: EU, EURATOM, Regulation No 1023/2013 for 
amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the Conditions of Employment 
of Other Servants of the European Union, Official Journal of the EU (Law 287), 2013. 
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8.2.4 Preliminary conclusions of the risk assessment  
The targeted risk assessment for the NSU and the CAT brought out some interesting issues 
that need to be highlighted.  
First, correlating research activities and potential export control risks for a Unit’s work 
programme composed of more than 40 active work-packages which in turn contain individual 
projects –as it is the case for the NSU- is not an easy task. Also, it should be noted that some 
projects are close to end or have already completed certain deliverables and new ones are 
about to be introduced. This is a reminder that a research programme is a dynamic structure. 
New projects are being initiated quite often and therefore, the risk assessment is an ongoing 
process. This task could be better accomplished through a systematic risk assessment in the 
framework of an export compliance system. In relation to this, the scientist or manager 
involved in the selection of ‘sensitive’ projects needs to have not only the full picture of the 
activities undertaken by the Unit but also a good understanding of export control issues. In 
fact, the better informed he or she is the more meaningful the selection of projects will be. 
Therefore, providing export control training to whoever undertakes the risk assessment 
process and to scientific staff can be a useful action to be taken. 
Second, the initial screening and the subsequent risk assessment of work-packages was based 
on both criteria sensitivity of research per se and international involvement. For instance, 
project 666 includes provision of trainings and access to nuclear facilities (PERLA, PUNITA, 
AS3ML etc.) to external users such as students and researchers.  The said project was not 
considered as ‘sensitive’ since it does not enable intangible transfers of controlled technology 
or direct access and use of nuclear plants and facilities by foreigners. The use of both factors 
can be of great benefit.  The risk assessment suggested that projects involving a great amount 
of international collaborations such as capacity building for enhancing nuclear safety and 
security do not necessarily entail transfers of controlled equipment and knowledge. The 
reverse is also possible: particularly sensitive research for instance, on new techniques for 
non-destructive analysis do not necessarily involve exporting regularly such methods or items 
outside the EU.   
Third, the beneficiaries of the research of both Units are mainly international organisations, 
national public authorities as well as EC DGs and EU organisations. Research commissioned 
by governments to research organisations is not excluded from the scope of export controls; 
instead it may entail certain sensitivities and non-disclosure clauses. That said, transfers 
requested by certain partners such as the IAEA or national customs authorities could hardly 
ever pose a credible export control risk. A more interesting issue to assess is whether research 
conducted in the framework of agreements with such public organisations includes 
subcontracting and collaborations with other parties especially research organisations and 
firms established outside the EU. However, according to the case studies, it seems that most 
of the time NSU and CAT research involve transfers within the EU. Exploiting the research 
results for commercial purposes under patents and license agreements is another activity that 
may allude to an export control risk and it is included in the scope of activities of the NSU.   
218 
 
Fourth, activities undertaken by both Units showcase that research can be ‘of dual-use nature’ 
in different ways. The research undertaken by CAT on the effects of new drugs and 
psychotropic substances is a telling example. The study on the effects of nuclear incidents in 
the framework of emergency and preparedness initiatives provides an example of a NSU 
research that could be misused.  More broadly, data repositories, classified studies and other 
potentially sensitive information tools can be the outcome of research undertaken by the two 
Units. Also, during the interviews D. Rembges noted that whereas focusing on controlled 
dual-use equipment and materials commonly used in laboratories is one important parameter, 
exploring the dual-use potential of new methods and technologies can be equally useful. A 
relevant example is the use of additive manufacturing technologies for ‘replicating’ human 
tissue, a technology that has been already tested (not in the JRC). 
Fifth, with regard to institutional processes, each Institute has assigned to a technical officer 
the task to take care of transfer requests for every item leaving the JRC in accordance with 
the applicable rules and procedures. For most sensitive items such as chemical agents and 
nuclear equipment the responsible employees are well-informed. This is owed partly to the 
awareness of scientists and partly to the fact that certain procedures are in place for transfers 
of particularly sensitive items and dangerous goods such as fissile material, radioactive 
sources and gas tanks pursuant to safety and security regulations at national and international 
level. For other dual-use items that do not fall in the aforementioned categories and may 
require an export authorisation, it seems that the responsibility to inform ‘exporters’ lies with 
the internal customs office and the Italian authorities. Also, certain administrative 
departments such as the Legal Advice Unit (B.6) and the Human Resources Units of nuclear-
related Institutes have developed an attitude conducive to export control objectives owing to 
their previous entanglement with export control issues. 
Sixth and in relation to the previous, it can be deduced that the institutional processes 
operated by the JRC are most of the time ‘reactive’ to export control risks, not ‘proactive’. In 
the past, staff dealing with customs and legal aspects has been confronted with export control 
issues and thus, they have become aware of such concerns. Most of the time, staff employed 
in administrative posts have only a vague knowledge or understanding of the dual-use 
requirements and the related issues at stake. This is an expected outcome to the extent that 
there is no formal policy on export compliance.  At the end of the day, the main responsibility 
of being aware of export controls and applying if necessary for an export authorisation rests 
with the lead scientist undertaking a given research.  
Last, the NSU and CAT scientists interviewed for these case studies are aware of the 
existence of dual-use trade controls and the security implications of their research thanks to 
previous interfaces with STREX activities and their own capacity as researchers working for 
the EC. This is particularly true for NSU scientists because of the sensitivity of nuclear 
research. However, this general awareness does not imply that the Units’ researchers are 
always in a good position to realise how export control issues might entangle in their research 
given also the lack of dedicated export control training.  
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8.3 Complementing the risk identification method 
From December 9, 2015 till January 22, 2016 a JRC-wide online survey was launched with a 
triple aim. The first objective was to provide a broader picture of the JRC activities and the 
potential export control risks stemming from such activities. The second was to assess the 
preliminary results of the case studies discussed above against the situation illustrated in the 
survey and the third was to explore attitudes and the level of awareness towards security and 
export control matters. Statistical analysis can be seen as a supplementary tool to the more 
elaborate risk assessment method described above. It might further inform the risk 
assessment process and especially, in the case where online tools such as the JRC web-
project browser are not in place it represents a useful action to take first so as to identify 
potential areas of risk.  
The population concerned by the survey is all JRC staff (3.050 employees) working in all 
different sites and the responding sample represents about 10% of the total population (312 
employees), statistically speaking a very good sample for making inferences about the whole 
population. The majority (61%) of the respondents belong to permanent staff categories 
(administrators and assistants) whereas temporary staff (mainly ‘contractual agents’ and 
‘grant- holders’) is represented with about 37%479.  
 
Also, a good percentage of the respondents (18%) concerns project leaders meaning 
employees that are in position to have deep knowledge of the nature of research and the types 
of activity involved in their work. The JRC work (scientific and administrative) is supervised 
by more than 70 HoUs having the full view of activities undertaken in their respective Units. 
The survey gathered the views of 15 HoUs with regards to export control concerns.  
The risk identification method described in section 8.2 relied on the JRC project browser for 
identifying potentially sensitive research activities in NSU and CAT. This tool can be used 
for mapping all JRC activities undertaken by different institutes and their constituent Units 
and having some interest from a dual-use angle
480
. Already the core competence of each Unit 
                                                          
479
 About 2% of the participants did not provide an answer in that question.  
480
 In fact, back in 2008, SIPRI was commissioned to assess the JRC work programme against its 
dual-use potential by conducting a preliminary mapping of JRC activities. This effort relied on an 
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(main areas of research) may hint at potentially sensitive activities. In that regard, the 
preliminary evaluation done for this study came up with a number of candidate Units for 
testing the risk identification method. For instance, one could easily suspect that a Unit 
developing standards for nuclear safety and security or modelling the behaviour of chemical 
substances under certain circumstances may have some dual-use relevance. Then, on the 
basis of the description of each project, most sensitive projects need to be singled out as it 
was done in the CAT and NSU case studies. For this study the purpose was to carry out an 
academic exercise and not to apply the risk identification method to all potentially sensitive 
Units. The whole process and particularly the selection phase of sensitive projects drew on 
JRC available technical expertise and officers having a global picture of the activities 
undertaken by the chosen Units. Reasonably, the risk assessment can be benefited by 
identifying scientists or managers closely involved to the activities of a selected Unit. In 
addition, a research organisation may need to seek assistance from the regulatory authority in 
order to acquire a better understanding of technologies concerned by export controls or, to 
use external expertise on export controls, dual-use technologies and weaponisation processes. 
The scope of dual-use export controls is such that it might be necessary to engage experts 
having a nuclear, bio-chemical and probably an electronics related background in the risk 
assessment process. For example, the author opted for a nuclear and chemical research Units 
and hence, relied on a nuclear engineer and a chemist for the case studies. Units that were 
considered as relevant in the first selection, appear also in the survey among the most 
sensitives.  However, as it was underlined oftentimes in the study, export control risks may 
stem from a broad area of research activities. This was also exemplified in the survey. For 
instance, for a non-specialist, the IES could be seen among the least sensitive Institutes. 
However, as the survey showed and as discussions with scientists confirmed, some IES Units 
may use instrumentation or technologies that are of dual-use nature and in addition, their 
research may demand a lot of travelling abroad for experiments and testing purposes. It turns 
out that the role of technical expertise is of chief importance for the risk assessment process 
in all phases of implementing export compliance measures. Chapter 8.3 provides an overview 
of the potential sensitivity of JRC activities as illustrated in the survey. The accuracy and 
broader applicability of the results could be checked against available JRC expertise and 
experience so as to draw safe conclusions for the overall sensitivity of the research portfolio. 
The most complete way to carry out such a task would be by implementing the risk 
identification method as described in chapter 8.2.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
online tool that was in place at time. However, the focus was to identify areas where JRC expertise 
could be drawn upon to back the implementation of EU export controls. This approach is in support of 
the dual role of the JRC towards export controls. However, the existence of technical expertise of 
dual-use relevance does not necessarily imply an export control risk and today, a large number of the 
identified projects have been completed or suspended.  
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8.3.1 Identifying areas of sensitivity and expertise: a mapping exercise 
 
The survey provides a good representation of most JRC Directorates and scientific Institutes. 
The role of Institutes is interesting in that they may be confronted with export control issues 
when conducting their research.  The policy support Directorates could have a different role 
to play. They could act as ‘gate keepers’ providing administrative/legal support and catching 
potentially problematic transactions and activities relating to a sensitive research project.  
The first section of the survey contained nine questions providing a number of examples of 
dual-use goods. In broad terms, these examples covered all ten categories of the Annex I of 
the Regulation. The participants were asked to clarify whether they use or develop any of the 
suggested materials and technologies for their research activities. The respondents were 
allowed to refer to other examples of dual-use goods falling in the suggested categories and 
relating to their research. The categorisation is shown in the table below
481
. Quite 
interestingly, with very few exemptions such as rockets, rocket propulsion systems and water 
tunnels all suggested options were marked by the respondents in varying percentages. Table 
XII collects the most ‘popular’ options from each category. The fact that all these different 
types of materials, equipment, and related software exists in the JRC laboratories, does not 
mean that such items fall always within the controls thresholds or that are being exported. In 
any case, for this fist mapping, it was deemed as necessary to have an all-encompassing 
picture. Already the existence of dual-use equipment is a good risk indicator for identifying 
Units undertaking particularly sensitive research and, having expertise that is not to be shared 
broadly. The specific outcomes of the survey including figures and conclusions for each 
Institute have been made available to the management of the JRC for further consideration.  
  
                                                          
481
 Dr. F. Sevini helped the author to identify examples of materials, equipment and related 
technology that could be of relevance to JRC research activities.  
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Table XII: Categories of dual-use equipment involved in JRC research  
Broad Categories Most Selected Options 
I. Nuclear fuel cycle related material and 
facilities 
19% replied yes 
II. Special material  other than nuclear  Metals and alloys; Toxic chemicals; 
Graphite and ceramic materials; Composite 
materials; Fibrous and filamentary materials 
 
III. Industrial materials processing 
equipment  
Vacuum pumps; Ovens, crucibles and 
melting furnaces; Pressure transducers; X-
ray and ultrasonic test equipment; 
Environmental test chambers; Machine tools 
 
IV. Electronic equipment  Mass spectrometers; Signal analysers, signal 
generators and synthesizers; X-ray 
generators; Solid state switches 
 
V. Certain types of  computer (e.g. 
ruggedized)  
7% replied yes 
VI. Telecommunication equipment Cryptographic systems, equipment and 
components; Cryptographic and intrusion 
software; Mobile phone interception or 
jamming equipment 
 
VII. Lasers/ sensors and navigation/ 
avionics equipment 
Lasers; Pressure sensors; Thermal imaging 
and night vision cameras; Global Positioning 
Systems 
 
VIII. Marine and naval equipment  Pressure housings and pressure halls; 
 
IX. Aerospace and propulsion equipment Unmanned Air Vehicles (e.g. drones flying 
longer than 30 minutes) 
8.3.2 Transferring and exporting dual-use goods, technical data and 
software 
The second section of the survey explored whether potentially sensitive dual-use goods are 
exported to non-EU countries or otherwise what ‘type of exporting activities’ are involved in 
the conduct of JRC research. Learning whether JRC scientists have been already required to 
apply for an export authorisation is a plausible question to ask. About 8% of the participants 
replied that they have applied for an export authorisation at least one time in the past. Not 
surprisingly, the Directorates primarily concerned are the ITU, the IRMM and the Ispra Site 
Management. The IPSC, the institute with dual relevance to export controls has also two 
entries in the survey. Finally, the IHCP and IET have from one case to refer each.   
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In the ITU context, past export authorisations concerned mainly transfers and exports of 
nuclear material and of other sensitive material such as UO2 epitaxial films to both EU and 
international destinations. The Institute is also an importer of dual-use materials, equipment 
and software. As a result end-use/end-user statements have been signed by ITU staff in 
several occasions.  With a view to identifying further areas of concern, the participants were 
required to answer whether they ship potentially controlled equipment, provide technical 
assistance or share software and data mentioned to either EU or non-EU destinations. The 
first question included also dismantled or old equipment that might be sent as a donation 
abroad. 10% of the respondents stated that they ship such items abroad. These transfers and 
exports are destined mainly to the EU 28 and other countries of the European Economic Area 
and the US. Japan scored also quite high whereas China and Russia received very low 
percentages. Other destinations mentioned include Sub-Saharan countries and Mexico.  
Furthermore, 9% replied that they provide technical services to both EU and non-EU 
destinations. Such activities concern mainly the US and Japan and to a lesser extent Russia 
and China. Also, partner countries from the Eastern and Southern Europe, Asia, Middle East, 
Africa and Latin America are recipients of technical assistance under the Instrument for 
Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) and the CoE Initiative. Last, just 5% of the participants 
replied that they share technical data and software with partners abroad. Again the most part 
of such transfers concern exchanges with US partners, and to a lesser extent Japan and 
Russia. The respondents referred to Turkey, Israel, Mexico and Cuba as further recipients of 
technical information. The majority of the employees sharing technical data and software use 
e-mails and phone calls for such transfers.  Also, a relatively high percentage makes software 
available for download in JRC web-sites.  
8.3.3 Awareness and attitudes towards export compliance 
The third section of the survey looked into the level of awareness and attitudes vis-à-vis 
export controls and export compliance in the JRC. The participants were called to answer 
whether they are aware of dual-use export controls pursuant to the EU regulation. A quite 
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impressive percentage of the JRC staff (49.7%) replied that they are indeed aware of the 
regulation and the requirement to apply for an export authorisation when transferring dual-
use materials and technologies abroad. Among temporary staff, the percentage of those 
knowing about dual-use export controls falls to 38%. 
 
The questionnaire contained another related question exploring the level of awareness of 
dual-use research and dual-use goods in general. The majority of the participants (56%) 
responded that they were aware of the dual-use issues already before taking the survey. There 
are different sources whereby the JRC staff may learn about export controls. These concern 
mainly contacts with colleagues, reading the news as well as information sessions organised 
by the JRC. Also, an important percentage learned about dual-use export controls after 
communication by the competent government authorities
482
. Other recorded responses are 
‘studies on that issue’, ‘self-education for work purposes’, ‘external trainings’, ‘information 
from NGOs’, and ‘common sense’. 
Quite interestingly, JRC employees have become aware of the dual-use problematic in many 
different ways including previous employment either in private or public sector (nuclear 
regulatory authorities or previous position in the EC). There were also responses as follows: 
“on my own duty, as project leader working with nuclear materials”, “learning by experience 
(having occasionally dealt with or worked on dual-use items over 20 years)” and, “we have to 
specify that our services can be exported”. In addition, the Legal Advice Unit (B.6) appears 
to take well into account export requirements, as the responses of its employees illustrate: 
“this is part of my duties” and “yes, I work on legal aspects of collaboration agreements”. 
This outcome confirms the conclusion drawn in section 8.2.4, that compliance with export 
controls is part of the running of the organisation.  
All the participants were willing to share their understanding of terms ‘basic scientific 
research’ and ‘applied research’ on the basis of a number of options provided. Research that 
has no immediate applications is the option that scored first (44%), followed by the option 
‘theoretical work on how fundamental principles work in nature’. Research conducted by 
public organisations and universities was the third most popular response followed by the 
                                                          
482
 The respondents had a chance to select more than one options for that question. Therefore, despite 
the imbalance of the specific percentages, the ranking is still indicative of the main sources of 
information.  
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criterion used by  the US authorities for defining ‘fundamental research’ namely, ‘research 
that is published regularly in journals, scientific conferences etc.  
 
Reversely, applied research is understood primarily as research that has immediate practical 
applications (77%) and it can be often client-driven research (11%). The funding source was 
hardly referred as a defining characteristic for either basic or applied research.  
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Some of the free text responses provided by the JRC researchers present particular interest 
and point to issues already discussed in this study, most or least extensively. Some 
respondents stressed the difficulty to provide a widely applicable definition of the basic 
research. Others pointed out that there might be connections between basic and applied 
research. Most interestingly, one respondent differentiated between basic and applied 
research on the basis of  the TRL scale. Accoridng to him, research beloning to low TRLs (I-
II) is basic whereas research being at TRL III and above must be considered as applied. 
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Basic research comprises both theoretical and practical research to understand and explain 
fundamental principles in nature, but also in culture and human interaction. 
Applied research has immediate practical applications and it uses or adapts to a large degree 
pre-existing knowledge for developing a fit-for-purpose solution. 
                                                                    Indicative defintions as provided by the respondents 
When it comes to the JRC research activities, 39% of the respondents categorise their 
research as applied, 27% as mixed and only 5% as basic, a rather anticpated outcome given 
the nature of JRC activities. 
With regards to the prevailing attitudes, the participants were asked to rate two statements. 
The majority (58%) of JRC employees agree or strongly agree that "the diffusion of research 
results and processes may be exceptionally restricted on the grounds of international and 
national security concerns". A higher percentage (63%) agrees or strongly agrees that 
‘showing due diligence with regards to security implications of their work is an important 
parameter to be taken into account when conducting research.” Although, the first statement 
touches upon a delicate issue that may be perceived quite negatively in a research 
environment, JRC staff adopts a rather receptive stance. 
Last, the participants asked whether they would see as useful the possibility to follow training 
on the dual-use export controls. A significant number (46%) replied that they would like to 
receive training on that topic.  
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8.4 Building the ‘risk profile’ of the JRC: an overview 
The risk identification method requires correlating legal obligations, the sensitivity of 
research and the institutional processes in place for identifying the level of risk relating to the 
operation of an organisation. The foregoing sections exemplified how this can be done in the 
practice and what the possible challenges are. The section below offers some main 
conclusions with regards to the risk profile of the JRC.  
The legal obligations: First of all, the Italian government by force of the legislative decree 
96/2003 specifies certain aspects of the EU Regulation such as the conditions for using 
general authorisations and the applicable sanctions for different types of violation of the 
export control law
483
. The law does not set any specific requirement for exporters to apply 
internal measures. However, it stresses that transfers of controlled technology and software 
over the internet shall be subject to authorisation (Article 15). It is also interesting that the 
law provides for specific sanctions depending on the type of infringement. For instance, 
omission of record keeping procedures is punished with a fine from €15.000 to €90.000. The 
unauthorised transmission via internet or other electronic means of listed items is punishable 
by imprisonment up to 2 years plus economic fines. Indeed, the law provides for the ‘seizure’ 
of the website containing controlled information.  The provision of technical assistance in 
connection to a military end-use may bring imprisonment up to 2 years, while where a WMD 
end-use is in view the penalty may increase to 4 years. These provisions bear some 
importance given that a research organisation such as the JRC ‘exports’ in principle 
technologies and technical services.  
Sensitivity of research and types of activity involved:  
 Almost all JRC Institutes may use or, in some cases develop potentially controlled 
equipment, methods and software; 
 Certain Institutes and Units appear to be facing a higher degree of sensitivity from an 
export control angle (ITU, Ispra Site Management, IRMM and IHCP); 
 JRC collaborates mostly with government authorities. JRC has a rather limited 
number of competitive projects and therefore, export control risks may be attenuated. 
However, the formal collaborations with international organisations and governments 
do not necessarily imply that export control requirements are not applicable; 
 8% of the participants replied that they have applied for an export authorisation in the 
past (includes previous working experience too); 
 Technology transfers and license agreements for software represent a source of 
concern; 
 Dismantling laboratories and sale/ donation of equipment represent a possible area of 
concern; 
                                                          
483
 Legislative Decree  No 96 "Implementation of certain provisions of Regulation (EC) no. 
1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use technologies, as well 
as' technical assistance intended for military purposes, in accordance with Article 50 of the law 1 
March 2002, no 39, Official Gazette 102, 2003, retrieved from: 
http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/deleghe/03096dl.htm 
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 The overall sensitivity of the research undertaken by the organisation could be 
evaluated as medium. There are clearly sensitive types of research but ‘exporting’ 
activities are most of the time limited to intra-EU transfers.   
 
Existing processes for addressing export control risks:  
 Export compliance is indirectly part of the day-to-day running of business. The survey 
showed that a non-negligible percentage of staff has applied for an export 
authorisation in the past. However, export compliance is not dealt with in a systematic 
way fostering a culture of compliance and preventing risky transactions from 
happening.  
 There are different institutional processes in place (customs office, personnel 
screening, contract review, patents and technology transfers office) ensuring 
conformity with security rules and other applicable regulations. However, the risk 
assessment does not take into account by default export control issues.  
 The JRC’s overall stance could be characterized as reactive. As past experience 
showed, the JRC complies with export controls without implementing a 
comprehensive export compliance strategy but relying mainly on the awareness of its 
employees. 
Attitudes and level of awareness:  
 Permanent staff is better positioned in terms of awareness compared to temporary 
staff. About half of the participants replied that they are aware of the dual-use 
regulation.  
 63% agree that showing increased responsibility with regards to security implications 
of their work is an important parameter. 
 46% would like to receive training on export controls. Generally speaking, the more 
an institute is concerned with the topic, the more merit is see in following training.  
 JRC staff seems to be generally aware of dual use export controls. However, this does 
not mean that they realise how their work relates to export control risks.  
Concluding remarks: The EC Joint Research Centre is a sui generis organisation. It is 
part of an international institution of specific legal nature and its functioning is 
underpinned by legally binding intergovernmental agreements, the European Treaties. 
This fact implies certain opportunities and challenges from an export control point of 
view. Most notably, thanks to the proximity of JRC to the EU policy-making and its 
active engagement in issues relating to security and non-proliferation, JRC is well 
positioned in term of awareness of export compliance issues. In fact, JRC scientists may 
know about export controls for a number of reasons such as: 
 awareness raising seminars conducted in the past by the STREX team 
 in their capacity as responsible scientists working for the EC 
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 the proximity of JRC to EU policy-making and JRC’s active involvement in issues 
relating generally to security and particularly to export controls 
 the sensitivity of their research or past incidents of non-compliance 
At the same time, the JRC staff may feel immune to risks relating to export controls. This is 
to some extent justified. NSU scientists for instance, work for the accomplishment of non-
proliferation objectives and the recipients of their research are mainly government authorities 
and international organisations working again in the fields of nuclear security and safety. 
However, to the extent that JRC collaborations and subcontracting include provision of 
equipment and technology to research institutes and universities in non-EU countries or, have 
commercial aspects certain precautions need to be taken. One should not forget that end-use 
undertakings, sanction restrictions and especially controls of intangible transfers of 
technology require showing due diligence and taking up concrete actions so as to minimise 
the possibility for the organisation to contribute inadvertently to a sensitive transaction. 
Moreover, it should be reiterated that certain equipment and technologies require an 
authorisation also for transfers within the EU. 
Second, the fact that JRC employees are generally aware of dual-use trade controls does not 
imply that they also realise how their work may connect to export control risks. The shift of 
export controls towards an all-encompassing and modern approach means practically that the 
term ‘export’ covers different possibilities and also, the export compliance concept includes a 
number of concerns stemming from interrelated but different legal frameworks. Reasonably, 
one needs to go through an ‘initiation process’ and follow related training for becoming 
familiar with and understand better the logic and the implications of export controls. This 
need for training concerns both scientific and administrative staff and should be underpinned 
by a broader strategy for coordinating different policies, procedures and setting tangible 
compliance targets. In that regard, particular attention needs to be paid to temporary staff. It 
is a very common and useful practice for the JRC to employ scientists under contracts of 
determined duration. In addition, temporary staff needs to acquire a general understanding of 
export controls and comply with the applicable rules and procedures. 
Third, the JRC as part of the European Commission could take advantage of established 
procedures and mechanisms as well as quality management practices for addressing and 
integrating export compliance into existing structures. Section 8.2.3 discussed the 
institutional processes being currently in place and relating to export control issues. In 
relation to this, the analysis suggested simple measures that could be taken in order to 
establish a compliance system and foster a culture of responsibility and export compliance. 
Whereas, as said above, such initiatives need to be part of a broader strategy, at the same time 
it must be ensured that researchers are not overburdened with bureaucratic procedures and 
overly strict internal rules.  
An export compliance system equipped with certain policies and procedures could initially 
target those Institutes undertaking research in areas of high dual-use potential such as the ITU 
(nuclear safeguards and security), the IRMM (nuclear safety and standards) and the IHCP 
(bio-chemical) and then expand to cover other sensitive areas. In fact, a compliance system 
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could be launched as a pilot programme in one of the Institutes, tested for a certain period of 
time, improved and then expanded at JRC-wide level. Once the system is fully operative, an 
ECO, an export control responsible could be appointed in each institute for questions and 
assistance in the preparation of an export application if necessary. The overall coordination 
and monitoring of the system should be entrusted to a central export compliance function. As 
long as certain quality management principles are respected, the specific location of the 
export compliance function in the organigram of the organisation has little importance. 
Table XIII: A SWOT analysis for the JRC 
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats 
Established security 
policies  & approval 
procedures 
Lack of an export 
compliance system 
Back up the policy 
formulation in the 
area of trade controls 
Different legal 
frameworks 
applicable 
Modern model of 
governance 
Lack of an export 
compliance culture 
Proximity to the EU 
policy making 
Nature of activities 
(sensitive fields, 
applied research) 
Lawful partners Different locations 
(fragmentation of 
activities) 
 International 
collaborations 
Part of the European 
Commission (good 
governance practice) 
  Flow of researchers 
 
8.5 ‘Refining’ the risk identification method (SPO) 
This part intends to evaluate and further elaborate the risk identification method as tested in 
the JRC context. In doing so, the analysis shows what worked well and most importantly 
what was missed out. The ultimate goal is to draw conclusions with regards to whether such a 
method represents a useful practice to follow in different organisational environments, and 
mainly in research organisations and universities.  
First of all, the core idea of the risk identification method is (1) to assess the sensitivity of 
research undertaken by an organisation and (2) to evaluate the operation of institutional 
policies concerned by export-related activities keeping in mind (3) the obligations set in the 
law. At the end of the process one should be in place to evaluate the imminence of export 
control risks to occur given the sensitivity of research and the capabilities of the organisation 
to deal with such risks. This way the organisation will be able to set up a fit for purpose 
export control system by adapting existing procedures and introducing new ones only where 
deemed as necessary. The abbreviation SPO can be used for naming this basic method: S 
stands for Sensitivity, P for Processes and O for obligations.  
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The test case of the JRC showed that in fact there is also a step (0) to be taken prior to 
applying the core steps of the SPO: the analysis of risks at ‘macro-level’. This step involves a 
first analysis of the risk profile of the organisation in general and it addresses the following 
aspects:  
 Organisational structure: How central is the model of governance of an organisation? 
Generally speaking, the more decentralised an organisation is, the more difficult will 
be to identify risks and implement common mitigation procedures. For instance, the 
constituent units may follow different policies and procedures warranting different 
actions. In addition, the different locations where an organisation operates is a 
relevant issue to consider.  
 Type of research: What are the key competences of an organisation? Does the 
organisation undertake mainly basic or applied research? Is it active in proliferation 
related disciplines or defence related research? These are all plausible questions to ask 
here. 
 Main Partners: What are the sectors of origin for the collaborators (public authorities, 
industry, academia, defence related etc.) of an organisation and what percentage of 
the funding sources they represent? 
 Scope of activities: How international is a research organisation and, what types of 
activities are involved in the conduct of its research (travelling, provision of services 
on site, operation of int. campuses, patenting etc.) 
 Level of awareness: Are there indications about the level of awareness and the 
patterns of behaviour pervading the interactions between the employees of an 
organisation? 
Reasonably, this introductory risk assessment does not need to be in depth –this rests upon 
the next steps of the SPO- but it is necessary for providing the background information 
required for understanding the organisational context. This approach was followed also for 
the JRC in the introductory section of chapter 8. The outcome of such preliminary evaluation 
could be that the organisation is not concerned at all by export control issues (think of a 
university providing mainly undergraduate courses and maintaining limited research 
activities in disciplines relating to humanities for instance). If this is not the case the 
following step is the evaluation of risks at ‘micro-level’. 
This step (1) includes the evaluation of sensitivity of research and could conclude that the 
research activities of a given organisation are of low, high or medium risk. The assessment of 
the sensitivity of research requires taking into account what technologies are used or 
developed and what activities are involved in such research. The legal obligations and the 
control lists are the factors against which the risk assessment takes place. The question raised 
here is which units, departments or faculties should be chosen for this assessment. Ideally and 
depending on the resources available each unit could conduct the risk assessment for each 
own portfolio and activities. Alternatively, one could start by selecting departments or units 
potentially most vulnerable to export control risks. It is at this stage where the launch of an 
233 
 
online survey could provide further evidence for identifying areas of concern and selecting 
most sensitive units. 
The initial selection and the assessment of the sensitivity of research should be based on the 
collaboration between a legal expert knowing the regulatory framework of export controls 
and a technical expert or manager having deep knowledge of the research portfolio. A 
potential problem could be the case where a university or organisation is such a decentralised 
structure that the manager does not have a complete picture of the undertaking activities. The 
JRC case study represents an academic exercise. In that regard, the author lacked the required 
resources and expertise for conducting the risk assessment for all sensitive units. Also, for 
reasons of consistency with the method as described in this part the online survey should 
have already been conducted in the phase selection of most sensitive units and not as a 
supplementary action taken at the end of the SPO. The general objective of this phase is to 
determine whether the research undertaken by the selected units and accordingly by the 
organisation as a whole could be regarded as of low, medium or high risk. It goes without 
saying that the process allows also to draw conclusions concerning the specific challenges 
and sources of risk stemming from the activities of the organisation.  
The next step (2) requires considering the existing institutional policies and procedures 
relating directly or indirectly with export control issues. Exploring whether export control 
risks are taken into account or addressed by internal policies and processes within the 
selected Units is of central importance for suggesting improvements and integrating export 
control objectives where necessary. What the potential aspects connecting to export controls 
are was illustrated vividly in the JRC test case as well as the case studies discussed in chapter 
7. Definitely, the logistics and the legal departments could have a more active role to play 
with regards to export compliance.  Also, the case study illustrates the accompanying 
measures that could benefit export compliance and foster a culture of responsibility such as 
staff regulations, codes of conduct and ethics committees and certainly, security related 
policies and measures. The result of such an institutional assessment would help one to 
answerer whether the organisation can be considered as (a) unaware (b) reactive or (c) 
proactive. It is noted that an organisation may generally comply with export control 
requirements even in the case where it does not implement a formal compliance system.  
At the final phase (3), one could rely on the results of the assessment for both the sensitivity 
of research portfolio and the responsiveness of an organisation to export control concerns so 
as to design effective and efficient compliance procedures improving an organisation’s 
management system, reducing the compliance costs and eliminating any undue burdens. It is 
reminded that the integration of such polices and measures to the broader compliance and 
management system of the organisation would lead to significant benefits as well as other 
positive side effects. Such benefits include the thoroughgoing sustainability of the export 
compliance structure, the incorporation of proliferation risks into an aggregated risk portfolio, 
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the reduction of costs and complexity through convergence of structures, higher efficiency 
and avoidance of disputes over competencies
484
.  
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9. Main Findings and Conclusions: the Interfaces between Research and 
Export Controls  
9.1 A policy perspective 
The role of knowledge: The knowledge is the driving force for both scientific and economic 
development. In other words, it is the vehicle to personal and societal advancement. At the 
same time the knowledge can be also exploited for malign purposes. In relation to this, the 
proliferation of WMD can be considered in its very essence as a ‘problem of knowledge’. 
The dual nature of knowledge and the security environment in which knowledge diffuses 
pose certain challenges and require the attainment of fine balances.  
Building a WMD requires three main elements: (1) special material (2) technological 
equipment (explicit knowledge) and (3) technical expertise (implicit knowledge)
485
. One can 
argue that among the three, the element posing the greatest difficulty to get acquired is tacit 
knowledge
486
. Consequently, it is not strange that trade controls cover both tangible and 
intangible technologies in the scope of controls. In today’s environment, the globalisation of 
the labour power and the rapid pace of technological advancement may accentuate the risk of 
diffusion and use of sensitive knowledge –including tacit- by proliferant states and outlaw 
organisations or individuals. Considering the level of expertise and tacit knowledge required 
to master a technology as well as the extent to which such a technology is becoming deskilled 
is an important factor for evaluating what items and technologies need to be included on the 
control lists
487
.    
Tucker goes further by arguing that different types of technologies warrant specific 
governance measures. Such governance measures may range from legally binding regulations 
(e.g. statute-based export controls) to soft-law (e.g. government guidelines and self-
regulatory mechanisms by industry and academia) and, other informal measures such as (e.g. 
codes of conduct and ethic committees)
488
. This doctoral study provides further support to 
this argument. In broad terms, each area of proliferation concern (nuclear, biological and 
chemical) may associate with a distinct weaponisation process implying specific limitations 
and opportunities in terms of measures to be taken. Chapter 3.1 offers further examples of the 
distinct technological parameters connecting to each proliferation area.  
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 The means of delivery is an important but not a necessary condition for ‘building’ an effective 
WMD. Generally speaking, their types may vary from simple and commonly available items such as a 
lorry or, spray planes to advanced technologies such as missiles and drones. It comes out that the 
impact of an attack involving a WMD will depend on the destructive power of the weapon itself as 
well as the capacity of the means of delivery. 
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 J. Tucker offers a further interesting distinction between personal tacit knowledge and communal 
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In that regard, emerging bio-technologies seem to pose different risks compared for instance, 
to nuclear technology for technical and legal reasons. In the case of biological weapons, the 
basic science relevant for civilian uses is essentially the same as that relevant to military and 
especially, terrorist applications
489
. At the same time the lack of a verification system at the 
level of the BWC may have played some role in the perception of the bio-related proliferation 
as a stand-alone case. There are several factors suggesting that bio-technologies warrant a 
specific set of control measures. The study discusses some of them: the definition of dual-use 
research designed to address sensitive research in life sciences; the cost-benefit analysis 
between public health preparedness and security as demonstrated in the analysis of the H5N1 
case study; the founding of a special board in the US for dealing with bio-security issues and 
dual-use research; the temporary halt of funding by the US government for gain-of-function 
research; the several initiatives for biosafety and security by European public authorities and 
universities (e.g. codes of conduct, ethics committees, the European Biosecurity Awareness 
Raising Network)  and, the extensive literature on the dual-use dilemma. It seems therefore, 
that export controls represent only one ‘ingredient’ from the blend of measures targeting 
sensitive dual-use research. This approach could be valid also for the other areas of 
proliferation concern or specific technologies.  
What are the obligations of scientists and research organisations stemming from the 
international non-proliferation framework and how are these reflected in the trade controls 
system of dual-use items of the EU?  
 
The Non-proliferation Treaties: The responsibility to devise suitable mechanisms for coping 
with proliferation concerns lies primarily with State authorities. The non-proliferation treaties 
commit States to enacting and implementing legislation at their respective jurisdictions. It 
follows that all individuals should abide by such national implementing laws and 
consequently, researchers are not excluded from this obligation.  For instance, the signatory 
States of all treaty systems declare their commitment to facilitate international cooperation 
and promote the development of peaceful applications of bio-chemical and nuclear 
technologies in economic and scientific field. In that regard, one could say that scientists have 
an indirect obligation to promote the peaceful development of nuclear, biological and 
chemical technologies within the limits set by the treaties. 
The Multilateral Export Control Regimes: The MECRs are international voluntary 
arrangements committing participating states to pursue commonly agreed goals. Again, if one 
tries to identify direct obligations posed by the MECRs for exporters and more particularly 
for public research institutes and academia, he will have a great difficulty to list any. The 
export control regimes set the main norms and control lists that should be embodied in the 
national legislation. Understanding what is controlled and why is an issue of chief importance 
for two reasons. First, it helps one understand (1) what sort of items are targeted by the 
regimes or otherwise, how the ‘dual-use’ term is understood from an export control point of 
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view. Second, the content of the control lists is important also because it hints at (2) types of 
research potentially concerned.  
With regards to the first point, the WA has a broader scope compared to the other regimes. Its 
dual-use list unfolds on the basis of nine categories covering a wide range of technologies
490
. 
Given that, the WA sets forth some specific criteria for selecting dual-use items that can be 
controlled:  
 Foreign availability outside the participating States. 
 The ability to control effectively the export of the goods. 
 The ability to make a clear and objective specification of the item. 
 Whether an item is controlled by another regime. 
If each area of proliferation concern (nuclear, biological and chemical) associates with a 
distinct weaponisation process implying specific limitations and opportunities in terms of 
measures to be taken, the same can be applicable for specific technologies controlled under 
the regimes. This would be particularly applicable to the WA dual-use list, given its broad 
character and variety of controlled technologies. The validity of this argument would require 
further analysis by technical experts. Whereas only items falling within certain thresholds are 
controlled, identifying related controlled technology could pose a greater difficulty.  
Concerning the second point, section 3.6 discussed and compared the varying definitions of 
‘dual-use’ at international and European level. Based on that discussion, the section suggests 
an all-encompassing definition of ‘dual-use research’ or otherwise, of ‘export controlled 
research’: 
‘Dual-use research’ could be defined as these ‘scientific and technological activities’ 
involving items, technologies and processes restricted under the relevant export control law. 
It concerns primarily civil research that could be integral to the design, construction and use 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction and in some instances of conventional weapons. 
Although this definition was built for the purposes of the thesis, it could function as a basis 
for understanding when export controls interfere with research activities. This is all the more 
important due to the fact that different professional communities understand the dual-use 
problem from their own perspective. For example, the non-proliferation community may look 
at the dual-use problem from an export control standpoint. The scientific community may see 
only the ethical implications connecting to dual-use research. Therefore, it can be argued that 
the governance of dual-use research and the control measures governing trade in dual-use 
items represent two distinct areas that cross each other at certain points. The first point of 
contact is exporting dual-use materials and equipment in the framework of research activities. 
The second point of contact is much more intriguing and it lies in the heart of scientific 
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activities. Whereas the inclusion of technology transfers within the scope of controls can be 
considered as justified, it can also be proven highly problematic. In relation to this, the 
MECRs set the general framework for implementing technology controls. Each participating 
State has the discretion to decide upon the strictness of such technology controls.  
To begin with, all regimes understand invariably the term ‘technology’ as the specific 
information necessary for the development, production or use of a product. Technology may 
take the form of technical data and technical assistance. It is also established that controlled 
technology means technology ‘directly associated’ or ‘required’ for the development, 
production or use of the items specified in the lists. The WA clarifies that ‘required’ 
technology “refers only to that portion of technology which is peculiarly responsible for 
achieving or exceeding the controlled performance levels, characteristics or functions of a 
controlled item. Reasonably, as regards know-how and knowledge in general, it is mostly the 
individual possessing such knowledge who could be able to determine each time whether 
information is controlled or not. To complex the issue more, technology remains under 
control even when exported to be used in connection with a non-controlled item or end-use. 
This may have far-reaching consequences for research activities. To use a real life example, 
Fouchier in the H5N1 case was exploring the transmissibility of a lethal various -known to 
affect up to that moment poultry- with a view to exploring the risk of a pandemic among 
humans. 
Nonetheless, all MECRs clarify that technology directly associated to a controlled item will 
be subject to as great degree of scrutiny and control as the item itself to the extent permitted 
by national legislation. Hence, it can be assumed, that the discretion of authorities to control 
the transfers of technology is not unlimited. Actually, the regimes set some decontrols in 
relation to technology transfers: ‘basic research’ and ‘public domain information’ must be 
excluded from the scope of controls. Visibly, it is meaningless to control information that is 
already broadly available. Also, for quite understandable reasons basic scientific research and 
public domain information should be free of constraints.  
The European Trade Control System: The European system is founded on the same main 
principles and control lists as the regimes. This is not to say that the EU Regulation 428/2009 
does not establish a distinct framework taking into account the peculiarities of the EU 
construction and the increased needs for consultation and coordination procedures. However, 
in broad terms and as far as it concerns technology controls the EU system is limited to 
repeating the definitions set in the framework of the regimes.  
First of all, ‘exporting’ technology through tangible or intangible means from the EU to a 
destination outside the Union is within the scope of the Regulation.  However, the provision 
of technical assistance outside the EU is regulated by the Council Joint Action 2000/401 and 
only in respect of WMD end-uses and other military uses to embargoed destinations. As 
regards the provision of technical assistance within the EU, the Regulation does not provide 
for a sort of deemed export as it applies in the US. This is not necessarily a weakness given 
also the problems linked to the implementation of the deemed export rule in the US context. 
The regulation provides the legal basis to control transfers of items including technology also 
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within the EU on the condition that the final destination is outside the Union and the end-use 
connects to the production, use or development of WMD.  
Second, except the definitions provided in the framework of regimes, the ‘basic scientific 
research’ and ‘in the public domain’ exemptions are not further clarified in the Regulation. 
The study demonstrated that the use of the current universal definition of basic research is 
problematic in the trade controls context. Whilst the demarcation line between applied and 
basic research is not clear-cut the ‘institutional locus’ and the funding source of a given 
research can only be indicative. Moreover, what constitutes public domain information is not 
evident either. What is sorely lacking is some guidance on how these ‘fundamental’ 
exemptions shall be applied in practice.  
The adoption of a practical rule or a methodology for assessing the nature of controlled 
information could be of help. Such a methodology should definitely take into account the 
sensitivity of a given research, its main purpose and its readiness to reap practical benefits. 
Already from chapter 2, it was suggested that R&D is an evolving process with different 
phases ranging from the establishment of general principles, theories and laws to the 
application of such knowledge to a specific problem and ultimately the actual application of 
such results at industrial level. In that regard, the TRLs scale could help authorities and 
researchers to evaluate ‘the level of maturity’ of a given research project to deliver practical 
applications. However, the usefulness of such a tool for evaluating the sensitivity of a dual-
use technology requires further examination and studies of a technical nature. It is noted that 
the ethics review taking place in the framework of Horizon 2020 use the TRLs metric as an 
informal means for assessing the potential dual risks posed by research proposals.   
The US interpretation of the decontrols: The analysis of the H5N1 case study illustrates 
inter alia the divergent approaches between the US and the EU. It seems that the same type 
of research may be considered in the American context as ‘fundamental’ while in the 
European as ‘export controlled’. The US system offers a rather crystal-clear approach. It 
clarifies that information arising during or resulting from fundamental research exempts from 
the controls. This implies a distinction between inputs used for and outputs generated from a 
research. The inputs -including both items and technology- can be subject to control as long 
as they do not constitute publicly available information. In addition, the fundamental research 
exemption concerns information that is intended to be published and shared broadly within 
the scientific community. It comes out that there is an underlying relationship between public 
domain information and fundamental research.  
In practice there are two basic safeguards enabling the US authorities to identify research that 
could also be controlled from an export control perspective: 
 Classified information due to security reasons (in the framework of federally funded 
research) 
 Information that is withheld from publication due to proprietary reasons (e.g. pre-
publication reviews by a private partner) 
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The question that remains to be answered is what applies for fundamental research achieving 
an innovative outcome of dual-use concern for which no proprietary or security restrictions 
are applicable or sought. In that case, it can be argued that other governance measures may 
represent a more fitted option rather than trade controls.   
The US system sheds light also on the issue of the public domain information. Through an 
extensive list of examples the EAR specify the cases when information shall be considered as 
publicly available. For instance, information published in periodicals, books, hand-outs, 
electronic, or any   other   media   available   for   general distribution either for free or at a 
price not exceeding the cost of reproduction and distribution still qualify as public domain 
information. Likewise, information released in the context of a conference or other gathering 
is considered as basic as long as all technically qualified members are permitted to participate 
and take notes of the proceedings and presentations notwithstanding a registration fee 
reasonably related to the cost or, other limitations due to eligibility criteria and availability of 
places. Again, the EAR does not clarify what shall apply in the case where a scientist or a 
firm’s employee publishes a sensitive research outcome with the intent to render it pubic and 
thus, not controlled. Logically, most of the time a company does not have an interest to 
publish commercially valuable information. In addition, the threat posed by individuals 
having the lawful right to access controlled data is not an issue dealt with primarily by export 
controls. Furthermore, one should not overlook that a regulation cannot foresee every 
possible contingency and hence, certain issues may require consideration on a case by case 
basis.   
Assessing the role of trade controls vis-à-vis research: Contemplating the role of dual-use 
trade controls in respect of research activities, it can be argued that trade controls are not 
coined to oversee dual-use research. The inclusion however of technology transfers in the 
scope of controls brings de facto the issue to the fore of export controls policy making. 
Moreover, technology controls as a security measure set on the agenda of discussion the 
attainment of fine balances between the freedom to conduct research and the limits that may 
be set due to security reasons. The basic scientific research and public domain exemptions 
seek reasonably to unleash non or less sensitive information from unnecessary restraints as 
well as to protect the unhindered dissemination of information and conduct of research.  
Researchers are required to apply for an authorisation to the extent that they send tangible 
controlled items abroad as any other ‘exporter’. What is less clear is what applies for 
technology transfers that are in the core of research activities and difficult to be controlled. In 
that regard, the distinction between inputs to research that can be controlled as long as they 
are not in the public domain and outputs of research to be published freely seems to be 
meaningful. Then a second issue is the interpretation of basic research exemption. In practice, 
as regards the publication of sensitive research, a policy-maker may have to choose among 
three options: 
I. The American paradigm: The definition of fundamental research in the US albeit not 
perfect provides a plausible path for identifying potentially export controlled 
technology. On the negatives, the fact that what constitutes proprietary information is 
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not necessarily export controlled. Conversely, what is sensitive or controlled is not 
always classified or proprietary. In any case, a researcher or research organisation will 
have some latitude to negotiate contract terms and maintain the right to publish the 
full content of a research. Also, at the time of the conclusion of a contract, one cannot 
be certain for the sensitivities relating to a given research project. On the positives, the 
US definition provides a practical rule for determining what qualifies as fundamental 
research and what shall be under further examination. This criterion emphasizes the 
role of pre-publication reviews undertaken by federal agencies and industry for 
security and proprietary reasons. 
 
II. A methodology for defining basic research: The second option suggests setting some 
criteria or developing a sort of methodology capable of evaluating effectively the 
sensitivity of a given technology. The readiness of a technology to be used for 
practical objectives may not be the sole criterion for practical and substantial reasons. 
The risk assessment shall take into account the sensitivity per se and the overall 
objective of a given publication. It comes out that the engagement of the academic 
and scientific community in general is a necessary condition for the implementation 
of such a rule. In fact the finding of a methodology or the establishment of certain 
criteria for determining basic research should be the product of a consultation between 
the trade controls community and the academia. The study shows that in either US or 
EU context the input of researchers in clarifying the nature and the impact of their 
research is crucial. For example, the analysis of the case studies for the HZB and the 
PNNL illustrate vividly that presently the risk assessment of a research project relies 
on the collaboration between the export control officers knowing in depth the 
obligations set in the regulations and the responsible scientists knowing in depth the 
technical implications of their work.  
 
III. Maintaining the status quo: This option suggests that one continues using the 
definition of basic scientific research as Europeans do. The Dutch authorities for 
instance, have made clear that their approach vis-à-vis the publication of dual-use 
research has not been changed after the legal dismissal of the H5N1 case. Given the 
absence of a clear distinction between basic and applied research, it seems that the 
monitoring of sensitive publications pursuant to export controls represents an ad hoc 
measure or more precisely a tool of last resort.  In that regard, certain Member-States 
interpret that the process of making a research available for publication abroad can be 
subject to an authorisation. This is a peculiar logic and means practically that 
submitting a publication containing controlled data or methodologies in a Journal or a 
publishing house outside the EU requires an export authorisation.  Furthermore, trade 
controls allow for implementing catch-all controls when a WMD or other military use 
is in view. In relation to this, certain Member States argue that the publication of 
research is not exempt from the scope of end-use controls. However, it is doubtful that 
the publication of dual-use research could point to a WMD end-use unless there is 
specific information from an intelligence service. In addition, measures granting in 
principle wide discretion to authorities to control the free dissemination or flow of 
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information are not perceived positively. Therefore, the third option appears to be the 
least advisable.  
Other governance measures: The importance of other tools that could function in synergy 
with export controls was highlighted in different occasions in the study. Section 4.2 stresses 
for instance, that the structure of technical-scientific knowledge in a given State is a system 
with inflows and outflows and therefore, monitoring the release of information also within a 
State can be justified. However, traditional export control concepts and their variations (e.g. 
‘deemed exports’) have certain limitations. In that regard, visa screening policies and student 
vetting schemes could offer certain assurances with regards to who has access to what 
courses and technologies within a given State.  
Another security measure that could function complementarily to export controls is systems 
for the classification of sensitive information. The Section 4.1 discusses the classification 
policies applying for EU funded research. Stepping up efforts for consistent and rigorous 
application of classification policies could indirectly benefit export controls. In that regard, 
the American paradigm relies on classification policies for identifying potentially export 
controlled research. It comes out that a rigorous classification policy for sensitive publicly 
funded research could be of benefit to the export control system of a country.  
Addressing dual-use research at its earliest stages is quite important for both practical and 
security reasons. The study provided an insight into the ways whereby dual-use research is 
addressed presently at the phase of evaluation of research proposals under the Horizon 2020. 
Research proposals of broader dual-use nature may hint at export controlled research. Hence, 
informing researchers for the implications of ‘exporting’ items and technical knowledge to 
certain end-users and end-destinations already at the phase of planning offers an extra layer 
of assurance. It can be deduced that the role of funding organisations in identifying dual-use 
research is important at least in two ways: it benefits the detection of export related research 
from an early stage and it seeks to ensure that certain classification rules will apply for 
particularly sensitive research. 
Pre-publication reviews by editorial boards of scientific journals are among the possible 
measures that could offer a better oversight of dual-use research. In the US, certain Journals 
in life sciences have taken initiatives for screening potentially sensitive research. This could 
represent a further option for safeguarding dual-use research. However, as it was explained 
above, addressing a ‘problematic’ research at an earlier stage through ethics reviews and 
funding schemes, for instance, represents a more desirable route.   
Patenting Organisations such as the European Patent Office and the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation could have a role to play in the screening of potentially sensitive 
applications for patents. In the US for instance, the BIS has delegated authority under the 
Export Administration Act to the American Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for 
approving exports and re-exports of controlled technology contained in patent applications.   
Ethics committees on dual-use research and codes of conduct are indicative examples of self-
regulatory measures that could definitely include export control concerns in the array of the 
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issues addressed in a research setting furthering thereby the attainment of non-proliferation 
and export control objectives.  
9.2 Complying with export controls  
In chapter 1, the methodology part of this study puts forward a basic hypothesis to be 
explored:  
Given the peculiarities of academic research and the challenging application of export 
controls in technology transfers, the implementation of internal compliance programmes by 
research organisations could be a compelling and feasible response to heightened 
proliferation concerns. 
The first half of the study (chapters 2, 3, 4, 5) sheds light on the characteristics of the 
academic and research environments, the legal obligations stemming from the application of 
export controls law as well as the interfaces between export controls and research activities. 
In doing so, the study responds to the question why internal controls represent an essential, a 
compelling initiative to take up so as to deal with export control imperatives. The second half 
of the study provides evidence on how internal compliance can be achieved in practice. The 
analysis in chapters 6, 7 and 8 provides evidence that internal controls are suitable means for 
dealing with export control risks in either academic or industrial context. It can also be 
argued that export compliance systems can be benefited by broader compliance systems 
furthering adherence to different security objectives and requirements set either internally or 
externally.  
With regards to the element of ‘necessity’, chapters 4 and 5 stressed the breadth and width of 
trade control provisions and the implications of the inclusion of technology transfers in the 
scope of the controls. One would say that everything can be controlled when certain 
conditions are met and the inclusion to export control systems of flexible mechanisms such as 
end-use controls is a telling example. Even the possibility to deny access to sensitive courses 
for students originating from certain nationalities is envisaged under sanction provisions of 
the international law. In that regard, traditional export control principles pose certain 
limitations.  
As a matter of fact, the notions of exporter and end-user are generally incompatible with the 
nature of intangible transfers of technology. In addition, border controls enforced by customs 
authorities are pointless in the case of intangible transfers over the internet or other electronic 
means. Public authorities have acknowledged such limitations by stressing the role of record 
keeping procedures and other internal controls for achieving compliance with controls of 
technology. In that regard, internal compliance measures addressing different security aspects 
such as Technology Control Plans represent a useful practice to follow. It comes out that the 
role of enforcement authorities is restricted to ex-ante and ex-post verifications checks and 
audits with regards to the monitoring of technology transfers.   
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Furthermore, chapter 6 provides evidence that export control authorities promote a transition 
from a regulation based relationship with exporters to the establishment of a trusted 
relationship. This shift is the result of the realisation that export control objectives cannot be 
pursued satisfactorily without the engagement of exporters. Whereas this can be true for any 
regulatory framework, the nature of export control risks and the scope of related legislation 
requires from exporters to act to some extent as regulators. Exporting companies need to 
consider the nature of their work and introduce where necessary risk assessment procedures 
including end-use and end-user plausibility and ‘third-party diligence’ checks. Likewise, 
research organisations may need also to assess the nature of their research against export 
control objectives including tests for evaluating research’s readiness to deliver practical 
applications. Although personal liability is important, such goals require further review 
mechanisms to be in place such as internal procedures for advice, training and overall 
monitoring purposes.  
Last, the control of information flow can be seen as contradictory to civil liberties and 
academic principles well entrenched into the patterns of human culture. Again, internal 
compliance mechanisms could respond to such a challenge. Internal processes are to be 
designed from inwards and in consistency with both quality management practices and 
specific needs of an organisation. In other words, internal controls as tailor-made measures 
reflecting the needs of researchers and the peculiarities of a specific organisational 
environment are bound to face less resistance from the recipients of such initiatives. Besides, 
the ultimate goal of an ICP should be the infusion of ‘a culture of compliance’ throughout the 
organisation. The section 6.3 advocates that this should not be seen as an idealistic 
unenforceable approach. There are concrete ways to pursue such a goal: inclusive decision-
making, leadership commitment and effective management systems are the main elements for 
creating an export compliance culture.  
With regards to the element of feasibility, chapters 7 and 8 confirmed that the implementation 
of export compliance measures and formal ICPs is a widespread practice for both industrial 
and research organisations, especially as regards large ‘exporters’. However, the analysis 
highlighted a striking difference between European universities having started only lately to 
discuss export compliance and Americans implementing compliance systems since some 
years. This divergence can be the result of differences in legal obligations, available 
resources, nature of research undertaken and cultural characteristics. However, it suggests a 
need for European export control authorities to render universities aware of their 
responsibilities with regards to export compliance and encourage them to adopt compliance 
measures. In turn, universities need to assume a more active role in promoting values that 
could have some bearing for their function as responsible organisations conforming to 
security imperatives.  
The risk identification method (SPO) seeks to facilitate research organisations in identifying 
potential risks stemming from their activities and designing effective mitigating measures. 
The method was tested in the context of a non-university organisation undertaking research in 
a variety of disciplines. Although, the main idea underpinning its functioning is applicable to 
any exporting organisation, it will be useful to test the SPO in different universities so as to 
245 
 
conclude on its pertinence to academic environments. The different lessons learned from the 
application of SPO are listed below: 
 The SPO requires relying equally on both legal and technical expertise. In fact, a 
meaningful initial selection of units potentially concerned by export controls could 
lead to savings in resources and it is subject to the availability of both technical and 
legal expertise.  
 The whole process can be substantially benefited by utilising expertise already 
available in the organisation. In other words, an ‘insider’ should undertake the 
responsibility of applying the SPO method. 
 The threat perception and the communication of the risk are of chief importance 
already from the phase of identification of possible risks. Highlighting too much the 
consequences of non-compliance or presuming that export risks are the most 
imminent or important for the activities of the organisation is not advisable. 
 Having a clear mandate from the top management of the organisation demonstrating 
the importance of the internal compliance process is a necessary condition for 
mobilising and involving the right people within the organisation. 
 Where to place the export compliance structure is not of utmost importance also 
because each organisation has a quite unique organisational structure.  Integrating the 
compliance function in the broader management model of the organisation and 
embedding export control objectives in existing policies and procedures is instead 
crucial. In that view, synergies with other security procedures and policies need to be 
sought.  
 Good management and good compliance practice are interrelated and benefit each 
other. 
9.3 The governance of dual-use research and the role of trade controls: 
exploring possibilities 
How would it be possible for a system of norms, rules and decision making procedures to 
avert the diffusion of proliferation-sensitive knowledge and safeguard it from misuse? 
 
A system of monitoring: Export controls are striving to respond to challenges posed in a 
constantly changing environment. Technological advancements as well as individuals and 
organisations acting at global level are the main changing factors shaping an increasingly 
interconnected international environment. In relation to the first factor, trade controls seek to 
respond to technological challenges by operating a monitoring system of intangible transfers 
of technology. As regards the second factor, trade controls are moving sluggishly from State-
centric approaches towards a strategy engaging more actively key stakeholders such as 
industry and academia. The study alludes to two crawling risks in implementing 
comprehensive trade control systems. While, modern trade controls seek to address as many 
sensitive transactions as possible, they do not necessarily clarify how this will be achieved in 
practice. Second, whereas the role of non-State players in furthering export control objectives 
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is widely acknowledged, this is not highlighted in the related legislation. In that concurrence, 
what exactly trade controls seek to achieve with regards to the oversight of dual-use is not 
clear.  
‘Insider’ and ‘external’ threats: The Fink report when discussing the role of biotechnology 
notes that “given the nature of research and the development enterprise, it is unrealistic to 
think that biological technologies and the knowledge base upon which they rest can somehow 
be isolated within the borders of few countries”491. One could argue that the governance of 
dual-use research comprises different measures and trade controls represent just a means for 
safeguarding dual-use research among others. This is perfectly right but one important 
element should not be missed out here. Although traditionally trade controls have not been 
crafted for coping with the problem of sensitive research, their functioning is to some degree 
entangled with that issue. Most importantly, trade controls as legally binding measures 
represent a unique opportunity in that they may contribute to an increased awareness of the 
dual-use problem by the scientific community and lead also to a more active compliance 
practice on the part of universities and research organisations.  
Furthermore, trade controls focus primarily on threats stemming from a foreign State or 
individual. In that view, they address primarily external threats to be materialised beyond the 
borders of the ‘supplier State’. Thus, the factor of nationality and national borders is of chief 
importance for a trade control system. The application of the deemed export rule and controls 
for intra-State transfers are probably exceptions confirming the general rule. However, 
monitoring effectively ITT demands departing from the traditional consideration of trade 
controls. In relation to this, trade controls can be greatly promoted by the application of other 
complementary initiatives such as systems for the classification of information, physical 
security measures and ethics reviews. One should not forget that a national of a ‘supplier 
county’ -to speak in old-fashioned terms- can always have access to a research laboratory and 
misuse certain information if decides to assist an unlawful activity (from State proliferation to 
terrorist attacks). In that regard, the role of trade controls is to eliminate such a possibility by 
working in mutual reinforcement with other security measures. In sum, any single system of 
norms, laws or voluntary rules cannot address and tackle all the possibilities. The realistic 
contemplation of the world suggests that different asymmetric factors need to be taken into 
account including human irrationality. 
A strategy for implementing effective controls: If defining to the extent possible a clear cut 
legal framework is of utmost importance, adopting a pragmatic and weighted approach in 
implementing rather ambitious and comprehensive export control provisions is equally 
necessary. The pragmatic element shall reflect the inevitability of diffusion and the pace of 
technological advances. The ‘weighted’ element concerns a cost-benefit calculation that shall 
be taken into account when implementing trade control provisions.  For the industrial world, 
the calculation will definitely include the economic impact of any measures in relation to the 
security issues at stake.  For the academic world, the calculation will also take into account 
any economic costs involved but it will focus primarily on the need to preserve the 
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unhindered conduct of research and its role as carrier of wellness to societies.  To the extent 
that universities are moving closer to industrial R&D and vice-versa the calculation may need 
to be adapted accordingly. Self-governance measures and ICPs are such initiatives enabling 
adherence to export controls and providing room for manoeuvring between the different 
considerations involved. Reasonably, self–governance measures should operate in 
conjunction with other top-down initiatives in order to respond to the various challenges 
described above.  
The self-governance option: The study argues that industry and academia should assume a 
more active role in furthering non-proliferation and security objectives in general. Self-
regulatory measures could act complementary to controls undertaken by the government. 
Scientists are usually better positioned to know the implications of their research work and in 
any case governmental measures should transfer ownership to scientific staff in the same way 
that reforms in public administration depend on the perception of civil servants in order to be 
effective. Recipients of most or least controversial changes should see some merit and 
assume ownership of new initiatives if the latter are to be successful. There are already 
various initiatives such as ethical reviews, codes of conducts and guidelines steering 
scientists on how to deal with the dual-use problem in either nuclear or bio-chemical fields. 
However, generally speaking such efforts do not take into consideration export controls 
issues at least in a comprehensive way. Acknowledging the pertinence of export controls is a 
first step to take; responding to export control challenges in a research environment is the 
next step to consider.  
The study suggests that tackling dual-use research should be based on four main elements: 
 pragmatic and weighted approach in implementing technology controls 
 Synergies between available mechanisms  
 Engagement of key stakeholders and collaboration among very different communities 
 A mixed approach including self-regulatory and legally binding measures  
The section below seeks to clarify the role and the possible initiatives to be taken by different 
stakeholders at different levels emphasizing the role of trade controls in relation to dual-use 
research. 
International level: Whereas all treaty systems, stress the need to protect the development of 
peaceful applications in bio-chemical and nuclear technologies they do not specify ways to 
achieve this in practice. On top of that, the international law takes time to evolve and non-
proliferation treaties have proved to be quite inflexible legal constructs. Therefore, it rests 
upon the signatory states to decide along with the treaties’ implementing organisations about 
the measures to be taken in that regard. Promoting international cooperation and monitoring 
new scientific developments and related challenges is pertinent to the role of such 
organisations. The IAEA, for instance, provides a wide range of technical support to its 
Member States and has been active in developing international standards for nuclear safety 
and security. The role of such implementing bodies towards the development of common 
standards on export compliance may merit some consideration. 
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The UNSC resolution 1540 as a legally binding instrument promoting efforts to enforce and 
coordinate internationally trade controls and physical protection measures may provide a 
framework whereby certain initiatives highlighting the ‘dual’ role of the research and 
academic community could be taken. Such initiatives could range from a statement of the 
1540 committee acknowledging the need to comply with trade controls in whatever context 
either academic or industrial to more concrete actions such as conferences on the nexus 
between research and trade controls. More broadly, discussions in different UN organisations 
could take up the issue of dual-use research making clear also the role of trade controls.  For 
instance, for bio-related research the WHO may offer the right setting for such a discussion 
bringing thereby closer the research and security communities. 
The MECRs are less rigid structures compared to the treaty systems and represent the salient 
framework where international trade control norms are first discussed and devised. It is 
therefore worth wondering whether deliberations at the level of regimes could lead to the 
establishment of common guidelines or standards for technology transfers. Given the nature 
of trade controls today, the MECRs could take initiatives for engaging the academia and 
industry in the trade control policy-making highlighting also the role of such stakeholders in 
achieving a safer and more secure international environment. In fact, certain regimes, and 
most notably the WA have set ‘best practices’ acknowledging also the importance of internal 
compliance measures for both academia and industry.  
Last, as the study highlighted, another example of international organisation that undertakes 
work of relevance to export control objectives is the ISO organisation developing standards 
for compliance systems. Other international frameworks such as the OECD might have an 
important role to play in promoting responsible standards for the conduct of dual-use 
research. 
European level: From the preamble, it must be said that the EU Regulation is the product of 
an intergovernmental process facilitated and coordinated by the Council and Commission 
committees and approved by the European Parliament. Despite its legal binding nature and 
direct applicability throughout the EU, the implementation and enforcement of the Regulation 
is left upon the 28 Member States and it may require enacting further national legislation. As 
Q. Michel has neatly said, the regulation functions to some extent as a directive to be 
enforced in 28 different jurisdictions. Given this, the nature of the provisions of the regulation 
cannot be too specific and the establishment of supplementary measures such as EU-wide 
guidelines could be seen for certain aspects as the most preferred option.  
A clear legal framework especially when it comes to technology transfers, the provision of 
further trade facilitations (e.g. general licences) and the establishment of common compliance 
standards could probably provide more impetus to exporting organisations for pursuing 
export control objectives. Whereas such initiatives can also be taken at national level, the 
craft of common rules and guidelines at European level could largely promote a more 
rigorous and harmonised implementation of trade controls in the EU. Making for instance, 
explicit references in the Regulation to internal compliance measures as an important aspect 
to be taken into account in the evaluation of all types of export control applications could be 
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an interesting option to consider. Developing EU-wide guidelines for implementing effective 
compliance systems and monitoring ITT represent a further possibility.  
Above all, the thesis highlighted the possible ways for interpreting the decontrol notes and 
dealing with the applicability of technology controls to research activities. What may 
represent the most beneficiary and commonly accepted pathway to follow it will be the result 
of consultation between the EU Member States and the Commission. In any case, a more 
proactive stance of the EU in the regimes, coordinated closely with its Member States, could 
potentially contribute to the clarification of long-standing problems at a more universal level. 
National level: As it appears most of the Member States have not adopted additional 
legislation or guidance for clarifying the application of technology controls at national 
level
492
. Pending a possible tightening of technology controls around common guidelines and, 
subject also to limits set by available resources, Member States may have to invest in 
outreach activities towards European industry and academia. In turn, industry and scientific 
organisations and their professional associations could enhance initiatives undertaken by 
public authorities.  
Higher education policies are generally determined at national level and hence, certain 
actions may need to be taken at that level bearing also in mind export control objectives and 
implications. Establishing new mechanisms or legislation for the oversight of dual-use 
research may require synergetic actions to be taken by institutions such as National 
Academies and research councils.  
To conclude, trade controls create obstacles and bottlenecks to anyone aspiring to contribute 
to activities that could undermine the national and international security and most 
importantly, they offer a means of protection against WMD related risks.  Given their legally 
binding nature, the violation of trade controls brings legal consequences and therefore, they 
also have a preventing function. The aim of trade controls is not to hinder the economic 
activity, control the flow of information or impose obstacles in the conduct of research. 
However, there are instances where certain research activities may be subject to monitoring 
by government authorities and to self-regulatory measures by the research community. 
Indeed, an instinct of accountability and self-governance has been developed since long time 
ago with regards to particularly sensitive types of research. Threat perception is a matter of 
utmost importance for implementing compliance measures and adhering to trade controls. At 
the end of the day, the ‘public opinion’, politicians and individuals tend to become concerned 
only when a threat has been materialised. The role of the study is inter alia to remind that 
internal compliance measures and trade controls is about being anticipatory and assuming to 
the extent possible a stance impenetrable to risks. The A. Q. Khan’s illicit network is 
probably the most known case of misuse of industry facilities for proliferation purposes. This 
case is a reminder that export control risks do not pose a vague, distant threat. Simply put, the 
more precautions one takes the better armoured will be against a risk. 
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ANNEX: compliance mechanism implemented at the KUL: decision tree
493
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 Scheme retrieved from the KUL website, available in: 
https://www.kuleuven.be/english/research/integrity/schemes/schemeone. 
Will you conduct a 
research experiment on 
humans? 
Will you conduct a 
research experiment with 
animals? 
Will you conduct research that could be 
used for criminal, terroristic or 
unethical purposes or exclusively for 
military purposes?  
Will the research be funded by military 
authorities? 
Will you work on personal data?  
[Personal data are all data that identify or can 
identify an individual directly, or at least that 
is how the Privacy Act defines them.] 
Does your research project 
require statements with regard to 
'conflict of interest (COI)'? 
YES 
Contact the Medical 
Ethics Committee 
UZ KU Leuven / 
Research for a 
compulsory review by 
the medical review 
board. 
Will you conduct a research 
experiment on human subjects, 
human material, or human data? 
and with the perspective to 
advance science for a WUG- 
profession (see also "Wet 
betreffende de uitoefening van 
een gezondheidszorgberoep”)? 
Contact the Social and Societal Committee 
(SMEC) for an ethical review of research in 
the humanities, and the behavioral or social 
science research traditions. Also protocols in 
engineering, natural or biomedical science may 
be submitted to the SMEC panel, as far as they 
do not relate to health science practices or 
include invasive medical or pharmacological 
procedures. 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
- Vertebrates (including zebrafish 
from the 6th day of life)  
- Fetus of mammalians from the last 
3th part of the gestation (e.g. for 
mouse and rat from day 14th of the 
gestation)  
- Some invertebrates, like 
Cephalopoda (no flies, no 
grasshoppers, ...) 
Contact the Ethical 
Committee for Animal 
Experiments 
YES 
Contact the Ethical Committee Dual Use to obtain an 
ethical advice.  
(“Dual use of research” is: “Research involving or 
generating materials, methods or knowledge that could be 
used for unethical purposes or used exclusively for military 
purposes”) 
Announcement to be made at the Federal Privacy 
Committee: consult the KU Leuven privacy 
website or get in touch with the “safety advisor 
KU Leuven" 
Is the COI related to  
*a spin-off  
*a specific requirement 
from the funding agency 
(e.g. NIH) 
see KU Leuven Financial 
Conflict of Interest Policy related 
to PHS-funded research 
spin-off: see regulations 
concerning conflict of interest 
related to spin-offs (dutch) 
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